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ABSTRACT
The numerous studies that exist on political factionalism in Japan have mostly limited
themselves to factionalism after the establishment of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
in 1955. This thesis attempts to throw light on factionalism within the conservative
Parties in Japan between 1945 and 1964 by comparing factionalism within the two main
conservative parties until 1955, the Jiytito and the Minshuto, with that of the LDP.
The thesis is an attempt to answer three basic questions. First, what was the character of
factionalism within the early conservative parties and how was it different from the LDP
factionalism? Second, how and why did the character of factionalism change in this
period? Third, what maintains the factionalism within the LDP?
I argue that the factionalism of the Jiyuto and Minshuto did not affect the whole party and
did not affect electoral politics in any significant way. The factions were fluid entities,
with no organisational structure and very loosely defined membership. They were not
effective tools to enhance political advancement within the parties. This contrasts with
the politically significant LDP factions, which have clear membership and a clearly
defined organisational structure which cuts through the whole party.
In answer to the second question, I argue that the dominant view that the multimember
electoral system is vitally important in the emergence and maintenance of factionalism is
flawed, and that factionalism in the LDP evolved out of power politics within the party
which were exacerbated by the organisational environment.
Although I accept the dominant view that the electoral system has been important in
maintaining the LDP factions once they were established, I conclude by arguing that the
factions were legitimised and maintained by ascribing to them features seen as
'traditional' but which, I argue, were recent inventions when it comes to factionalism in
Japan.
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PART I
Chapter I: Introduction
CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION
1.1. The aims
This thesis is about factionalism (habatsu) within the conservative parties in Japan from
1945 to 1964. The thesis has three aims. The first is to fill some gaps in the history of
factionalism in Japan by examining the factionalism of the early postwar conservative
parties, the Jiyuto (Liberal Party) and the Minshuto (Democratic Party), particularly as it
compares with that of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP, Jiyuminshuto).' Much has
been written about the history of political factionalism in Japan but most analyses only
deal with factionalism within the LDP since its establishment in 1955. The history of
factionalism in the first ten years of the postwar period has not been investigated in detail
in English publications. The data presented here will, I hope, be a valuable contribution
towards a more comprehensive picture of the development of conservative factionalism
in postwar Japan. The central argument of the thesis is that we should focus on change
rather than continuity in Japanese factionalism, and seek to identify the forces that cause
and shape factional changes. Second, the thesis will seek to clarify how and why
factionalism has changed in this period. The thesis assesses the main approaches to
factionalism in Japan, their strengths and weaknesses. While my approach is essentially
institutional, it differs in focus from existing approaches to factionalism in Japan,
emphasising micro organisational changes rather than macro institutional arrangements.
Third, although institutional changes produce changes in factionalism, I aim to show how
a discursive approach can help to explain how factionalism has been maintained.
This introduction will discuss and evaluate the existing scholarly debate on factionalism
in Japan and will explain my theoretical approach. I will start with an overview of
discussions of the concept of 'faction', and will consider how intra-party divisions have
been variously defined and understood.
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1.2. What is a faction?
Factions have been widely studied within both political science and anthropology,
particularly in the period 1950-1980, but there is still great divergence in approaches and
definitions. What is a 'faction'? What structure do factions have, what causes them, and
what functions do they serve? These are questions that scholars have sought to answer in
comparative studies of factionalism. Most have agreed that a political 'faction' is a group
within a political party with separate existence from the party leadership (see Stockwin
1989:164). More specific definitions have, however, varied in terms of how extensive the
division is considered to be within the party, how the factions are internally organised,
and what their functions are.
A point of divergence is whether all internal groups within a party should be called
factions or only those with extensive organisation and membership. A number of scholars
have argued that two main internal party groups exist and that 'factions' are only those
groups which are organised, cohesive and permanent, and cut the party vertically from
the top to the rank and file. Groups at the top without organised rank and file, with little
structure, vague membership and no official headquarters, have thus been termed
'tendencies' (Rose 1964:37-8; Panebianco 1988:38-9; Beller and Belloni 1978c:422;
Zariski 1978:20; Zuckerman 1975:20; Lande 1977:xxxii). Some scholars, like Sartori
(1979), Hoffman (1981 :232) and Stockwin (1989: 164), choose not to make such
distinctions and treat all internal groups as factions irrespective of these structural
differences (see also Beller and Belloni 1978c).
In spite of the existence of such definitional schemes in the comparative literature, there
have been few attempts to study the meaning of the word 'faction' in Japan (ha in
Japanese). Scholars tend to use LDP factions as the model of a 'Japanese faction' and this
has corresponded most closely to Rose (1964) and Panebianco's (1988) definition of
'factions'. As will be seen in Chapters 2 and 3, however, no matter what definitional
scheme we adopt for the study of factionalism in early postwar Japan, it becomes clear
that the early postwar factions, which were all called 'factions', are not the same
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phenomenon as the LDP factions. In fact, a study of the way the word 'ha' was used and
understood in the early postwar period reveals many different meanings. However,
generally speaking it may be said that to scholars and observers in the early postwar
period, factions were small, impermanent groups that appeared within political parties,
causing great instability. Ward (1965:71-2) defined factions as small, informal groups,
based on personal or limited loyalty. This corresponds to an understanding of factions in
many of the first studies on the subject. Lasswell viewed factions as impermanent groups,
a precursor to political parties, and that therefore 'past a certain point a "solidification" of
factional divisions turns the factions concerned into parties in their own right' (Stockwin
1970:362). Huntington (1968) saw the development of the party system in similar terms,
arguing that factions would develop into polarised units which would then turn into
political parties. This understanding of factions as unstructured, impermanent factions
causing instability and threatening splits, quite accurately describes the Jiyuto and
Minshuto factions between 1945 and 1955.
As mentioned before, permanent factions developed within the LDP after 1955, which
vertically divided the party into clearly defined groups with membership. The
development of factionalism within the LDP and the great increase in studies of factions
during that time changed the general perception of what a 'faction' was in Japan. Using
the example of the LDP, scholars have made a standard definition of what, at least, a
conservative faction is, which challenges Lasswell's definition of factions as
impermanent. Stockwin summarised succinctly the general characteristics commonly
thought to apply to Japanese factions, and defined a Japanese faction as
a) ... a semi-permanent grouping, with a history and even a tradition to which its
members can relate; ... [it is] an integral part of the parent body (i.e. party) but in
competition with other factions within the same party (as well as with other parties, or
even with factions in other parties);
b) '" a focus of loyalty for its members which may be weaker or stronger than party as a
focus of loyalty for the same members;
c) '" a mechanism for more or less institutionalised maximising of political advantage
within the party (and within the broader political arena), in terms particularly of
distribution of posts and accumulation of funds (Stockwin 1989: 163).
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Most scholars have emphasised the relative permanence of Japanese factions, as seen in
their sophisticated organisation, permanent offices, and regular publications; the clear
sense of membership to a faction and strong identification and loyalty to faction over
party; and the role factions play in distributing posts and political funds (Ramseyer and
Rosenbluth 1993:60-63; Bocking 1989: 145; Stockwin 1970:363). As will be seen later,
this definition with its emphasis on the institutionalised existence of factions within a
party is apt for the LOP. The majority of studies of factions in Japan have focused on the
LOP and therefore, perhaps unsurprisingly, 'Japanese factions' have been defined from
the LOP example. 'Factions' in Japan have thus been described as permanent, organised,
highly politically active, non-ideological groups which divide the party. At the same time
it has become widely accepted that factions eventually solidify, and, rather than split
from the mother party as Lasswell and Huntington argued, become permanent features of
parties, as in the LDP (see also Nicholas 1965:58).
How are we then to understand factionalism in Japan? I will argue here that it is
important to understand that the 'faction' has not been a static phenomenon in postwar
Japan, and that the meaning of the word itself has changed greatly in this time. This has
been largely ignored in studies of factions in Japan. The early postwar factions were
significantly different from the LDP factions in terms of organisation, functions and
political importance. All the same, scholars have been tempted to view earlier factions as
if they were the same as LDP factions, ignoring the differences between them. However,
because in historical and analytical work in the postwar era internal party groups in
Japan, small or big, temporary or permanent, structured or unstructured, have been
referred to as 'ha', or factions, I will, in this thesis, refer to all the various internal groups
as 'factions.' At the same time, I hope to show how our understanding of the term has
changed over time. Using the categorisation developed by comparative analysists, I will
seek to point out the structural and organisational variations between different factions
Within and between periods, and the way their different structures affected political
Outcomes in different ways. These differences, I argue, do not just represent different
stages of organisation on some predetermined developmental path within factionalism.
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Factions do not automatically mature into more complex, structured, permanent units. To
do that they need a certain impetus.
Now that we have clarified our understanding of the word faction, let us tum to the main
approaches to factionalism in Japan as presented in political studies and the way scholars
have viewed factional development and change.
1.3. Institutions, culture and rationality
As seen in the previous section, scholars have found it difficult to agree on what a faction
is, but they have also varied in their approach to intra-party groups, particularly in
explaining what causes and sustains them. In both comparative studies and in studies of
Japanese factions, two main approaches have emerged, both of which can be termed
institutional: the historical and cultural institutional approach, and the rational choice
approach. I will discuss these briefly in this section.
Factions were not studied in Japan as independent political units until the late 1950s.
Western studies done on Japanese politics during and following the end of the war, were
simultaneously reductionist, viewing politics in terms of behavior, and contextual,
reducing political organisation in Japan to geography, economic development and culture
(see March and Olsen 1989:3). Scholars were interested in identifying aspects of
Japanese culture that were alien to Western societies and in using these to explain
political behaviour and political structures in Japan (Yanaga 1956; Colton 1948). As will
be discussed in Chapter 6, Western scholars tended to approach the study of Japan with a
rather patronising air, looking for cultural characteristics to the Japanese that made them
different if not inferior to Westerners (see Dower 1986; Said 1987). Japanese scholars
also commented on the backwardness of politics in Japan. Sakano noted that the leading
Party politicians of the Jiyiito operated in a 'feudal or half feudal environment of oyabun-
kobun relations' that stood in the way of more 'modem' politics (Sakano 1948:99). The
preVailing view was that Japanese politics were heavily 'cultural' and coloured by
personalism, whereby the Japanese, be they politicians or the public, sought to cultivate
personal relationships and showed personal allegiance to political leaders rather than to
Political principles. Japanese politics were to be understood in terms of social behaviour
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and psychology, and as a peculiarly Japanese phenomenon (Ike 1957; Yanaga 1956;
Colton 1948; Quigley and Turner 1957).
In Japanese political studies, as in political science in general, there was a resurgence of
institutional or organisational approaches in the 1960s onwards, in reaction to the
behavioral approach that had dominated the 1950s. It was during this period that the
study of factions in Japan as independent political entities started to develop. A
pioneering study was Watanabe Tsuneo's book, published in 1958, on conservative
factions in Japan. This study was the first to provide detailed information about the
factions that had emerged within the LOP, their development, activities and membership.
Watanabe's book was historical in nature, tracing the personal connections of politicians
to the prewar era, but also emphasising the impact of the wider structural and institutional
environment on the development of factions. The work had a great impact on the study of
Japanese factions and informed many subsequent analyses by Japanese and Western
Scholars. Although an emphasis on the prevalence of personalism, a group mentality and
hierarchy in Japanese political culture continued to inform many studies of factions (see
Ike 1958; Nakane 1970; Yanaga 1956; Thayer 1968; Baerwald 1964; Scalapino and
Masumi 1962), there developed simultaneously an interest in the influence of institutions
on the political system (Scalapino 1968; Thayer 1968; Baerwald 1986; Curtis 1988).
The study of factionalism in Japan has since been heavily influenced by institutional
approaches. Studies focusing on institutions as important political phenomena multiplied
in political science in the 1970s, and their approach 'became known as the New
Institutionalism. They emphasised that 'institutional arrangements and social processes
matter' (Grendstad and Selle 1995:5; Ware 1996:11) but they were not able to agree on
much more than this (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Grendstad and Selle 1995). They
differed in their definition of institutions, but generally they showed an interest in 'the
whole range of state and societal institutions that shape how political actors define their
interests and that structure their relations of power to other groups' (see Thelen and
Steinmo 1992:2). The New Institutionalism as an approach to politics included three
dimensions: a historical approach, a cultural approach, and a rational choice (calculus)
approach (see Thelen and Steinmo 1992).2 These three approaches share a basic interest
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in institutional features of the political system and the political parties, and the way they
influence outcomes in the political system. But there are also important differences
between them, as they view political agents, their relationship with institutions and the
role of culture in shaping institutions in different ways. The diversity and incompatibility
of the New Institutionalist approaches can also be seen in the studies of factions in Japan.
However, most of these studies fall into two main categories: a historical and cultural
institutional approach on one hand, and a rational choice approach on the other. I will
discuss these in turn.
1.3.1. Historical and Cultural Institutionalism
Most scholars of Japanese factionalism from the 1960s to the 1980s adopted a historical
view of factions, and can thus be termed historical institutionalists. The historical
institutional approach which developed in response to structural-functionalism in political
science 'reacted against the tendency of many structural functionalists to view the social,
Psychological or cultural traits of individuals as the parameters driving much of the
system's operation' (Hall 1996:937). It gives institutions a great weight in shaping
political history (see Thelen and Steinmo 1992). Historical institutionalists have argued
that political agents are heavily conditioned by their institutional environment and that
thus 'not just the strategies but also the goals actors pursue are shaped by the institutional
Context' (DiMaggio and Powell 1991:11; Thelen and Steinmo 1992:8; Ware 1996:9).
A variety of historical factors have been found in comparative studies of factionalism
(Beller and Belloni 1978c:435; Panebianco 1988; Zariski 1960) to have contributed to or
encOuraged factional divisions. Researchers in Japanese politics have drawn attention to a
variety of historical factors in the early postwar period, such as the Occupation purges
following the end of the war, which led to a political division between depurgees and new
POliticians, the lack of reform of the bureaucracy, which led to struggles between
bureaucratic politicians and party politicians, and the merger in 1955 of the conservative
Parties into one big party with many different internal elements (see Baerwald 1986: 19-
21; Tomita et al. 1986:257). The advent of secret ballot elections for the LDP party
8
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president in December 1956 was also considered by many to be instrumental in
encouraging factionalism.
Other scholars put more emphasis on the broader structural features of the political
system. A dominant party system, it was argued, produces factional divisions (Beller and
Belloni 1978c:435; Zariski 1978:26). In Japan the dominant 'one and a half party system'
of LDP dominance after 1955 was widely considered to contribute to continuing
factionalism (Masumi 1985). Other political factors to do with the political system as a
Whole, such as electoral competition, the electoral system, and political funding rules
were also studied, as they were in other countries where factionalism was found. Of these
institutional factors, the multimember electoral system, continuously in force from 1925
to 1993, with the exception of the 1946 election, came to feature strongly in most
explanations of factionalism in Japan (Baerwald 1986:22; Calder 1988:24; Curtis 1988;
Hrebenar 1986b; Iseri 1988; Richard and Flanagan 1984; Sato and Matsuzaki 1986;
Thayer 1968; Uchida 1983; Watanabe 1958). In such a system, a big political party was
forced to run many candidates in each district, pitting them against each other. The
electoral system thus encouraged politicians to minimise such intraparty competition by
creating factions. By running as candidates of factions politicians could divide resources
and votes (see Baerwald 1986:22; Curtis 1988:85; Hrebenar 1986b:37; Stockwin
1983:221; Stockwin 1989: 165). These issues will be discussed in Chapter 5.
Although most studies of Japanese factionalism emphasised historical and institutional
frameworks, they tended also to argue that Japanese cultu~e played an important role in
creating and maintaining factionalism in Japan. In political science, cultural
institutionalism, sometimes termed sociological institutionalism, differs from the
historical institutionalism in that it assumes political actors are capable of showing
'bounded rationality' (DiMaggio 1991; Hall 1996; Immergut 1998). The goals and
strategies of politicians are shaped by not only the institutions that the actors work within,
but also the cultural environment (Elkins and Simeon 1979: 131). In order to reach their
goals political actors 'turn to established routines or familiar patterns of behaviour' (Hall
1996:939). Institutional continuity is explained by arguing that many conventions of
institutions are not readily open to choice (Hall 1996).
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Most studies of factionalism in Japan until the 1980s adopted some features of the
cultural approach combined with aspects of historical institutionalism (see Baerwald
1986; Thayer 1968; Curtis 1988) but many of the views on Japanese culture derived from
prewar and early postwar views of Japanese society. Scholars argued that in spite of the
important effect of historical and structural frameworks, political factionalism in Japan
could not be understood without an understanding of Japanese culture, such as Japan's
feudal background, the historically hierarchical nature of Japanese society, and the
historical prevalence of leader-follower relationships at all levels of society (Baerwald
1986:17; Scalapino and Masumi 1962; Thayer 1968). This cultural environment created a
tradition and a need to work in clearly defined patron-client based hierarchical groups
(Baerwald 1986; Hoffman 1981; Nakano 1970; Richard and Flanagan 1984; Stockwin
1989:168). Baerwald (1986: 17), for example, argued that factionalism was such an
ingrained cultural component of Japanese society that 'to anticipate or wish that
factionalism could or should be eliminated from the LDP, as its critics so ardently desire,
is to expect this political party to be something other than a Japanese organization'.
Japan's political culture was traced back to the Tokugawa era, while the hierarchical
nature of Japanese politics, personalism and loyalty were traced back to feudal values.
Richardson's famous study of political culture in Japan found that 'personalism,' was a
major theme in political attitudes in Japan, and 'is also associated with traditional
tendencies toward dependence on paternalistic leaders for representation of interests'
(Richardson 1974:235; see also Shiratori 1988:187).
A major criticism on the historical and cultural institutional approach to factions in Japan,
as in political science in general, is its inadequate explanatory power in relation to
institutional formation and change (Thelen and Steinmo 1992). Historical institutionalists
have had 'a strong tendency toward "static" institutional analyses' (Thelen and Steinmo
1992:13), and also tend to neglect institutional change, evolution and the dynamism that
can often be found in institutions (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 14-15). As Thelen and
Steinmo (1992: 14-15) point out, the historical institutional approach has been valuable in
explaining cross-national differences but it tends to obscure change and give too much
weight to certain institutions by assuming that no other outcomes were possible under the
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institutional constraints, thus showing a kind of 'institutional determinism'. This can be
seen in the weight that has been given to the multimember electoral system in Japan as a
force creating and maintaining factionalism. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, no studies
have addressed the question whether there could have been any other possible solutions
to the problems created by the system, and whether the electoral system in fact created
factionalism or only allowed it to exist. If the electoral system is a major factor
explaining the existence and maintenance of factionalism, major changes in the factional
system under this particular electoral system must seem unlikely. As will be shown,
however, conservative factionalism has indeed changed significantly under the
mUltimember electoral system.
The cultural approach has also faced criticism relating to institutional change. It has been
criticised for its use of 'political culture' and its lack of theoretical content (Hoffman
1981:231; Kohno 1997). Culture was a residual category, used to account for features
that the historical institutional approach could not adequately explain. Again, this
approach, owing to its inability to account for changes in political culture, was unable to
explain how political factions emerged and how and why they changed. Adherents of the
political culture approach had not addressed the problem of political and cultural change
in any systematic way and had a tendency to emphasise continuity rather than change.
The political culture was static. With regard to factions specifically, there was also a
tendency to view the development of factionalism as moving forwards in some sort of
continuity. Critics pointed out that the cultural approach to Japanese factions was not able
to aCCOuntfor changes in factionalism in the 1960s and 1970s as the LDP factions
adopted many seemingly 'cultural' features that had not been there before (Kohno
1992:377). The cultural approach was criticised for its inability to explain why
preoccupation with seniority and factional balancing, factors that might be considered
derived from such cultural values as hierarchy and consensus, did not become
pronounced within the LDP factions until the 1960s and 1970s (Kohno 1992:377-8;
1997:97).
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This criticism seemed justified. As seen before, scholars using cultural explanations to
account for the factionalised nature of political parties in Japan tended to use culture as a
variable without fully theorising. it. As discussed in Chapter 6, 'Japanese culture' was
often viewed as a static phenomenon, a heritage from the feudal past brought into the
present. If factionalism was unavoidable in a Japanese organisation, as Baerwald argued
(1986: 17) then what cultural features created it, what maintained it and what could
change it? Some scholars claimed that Japan's culture was changing. For instance,
Richardson (1974:13) argued that '[a]lthough many continuities undoubtedly can be
observed between prewar and postwar political cultures in Japan, it is equally important
to appreciate the degree of change in political life and socialization patterns in these two
periods'. However, very few ventured to explain how political culture was changing in
relation to factional development. Some argued that the massive changes taking place in
the internal organisation of the LDP in the 1950s and 1960s were in part a generational
change which produced a shift in political culture when the old political leaders died. For
example, Curtis (1988:81) held that the LDP factions changed from patron-client groups
into more 'collegial' structures, signaling a change in the political culture towards greater
modernisation. Factions in the early postwar period, he claimed, were 'traditional', built
on Japanese cultural traditions, which revered the old Confucian values of loyalty and
respect for authority, and emphasised group work. After the formation of the LDP, many
of the old-time factional leaders died, giving way to a new political culture, a new way of
running factions. Factions ceased to be based on personal relations and instead become
institutions, built on clear rules, although still bearing the hallmark of traditional values
(Curtis 1988:80-81). But few ventured to explain what changes were taking place and
how political culture was changing. Was personalism decreasing, and if so, why? And
how should it be measured? In the 1990s cultural approaches faced increasing criticism
as a result of these questions, not the least from the rational choice approach to
factionalism which was gaining momentum, and to which we turn now.
1.3.2. Rational choice
The third strand of the New Institutionalism, rational choice, was not used as an approach
to Japanese factionalism until the 1990s. Like the two other strands, the rational choice
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approach emphasised the effect of institutions on political structures, but it viewed the
relationship between institutions and agents in different terms. In the rational choice
model, the agent is rational and seeks to maximise his gains from the political system.
Thelen and Steinmo (1992:7) pointed out that 'political and economic institutions are
important for rational choice scholars interested in real-world politics because the
institutions define (or at least constrain) the strategies that political actors adopt in the
pursuit of their interests'. The institutional environment shapes the strategies adopted, the
argument goes, but the goals themselves are exogenous to the institutional structure (Hall
and Taylor 1996:939). In the studies of Japanese factionalism it was thus argued that
political actors seek to maximise their 'profit' from the political system, and a primary
goal is to get (re)elected. However, this goal is subject to institutional constraints,
primarily the multimember electoral system (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993:7; see also
Kohno 1992:382, 1998). A rational way to enhance your chances of getting elected in a
multimember district system where you fight other members of your party is thus to form
factions. With regard to continuity and change within institutions, the rational choice
approach suggested that institutions (such as factions) persist because they reach some
sort of equilibrium whereby a deviation from them would result in loss (see Hall 1996;
KOhno 1997).
Both the historical institutional approach and the rational choice approach thus
recognised the electoral system as a key influence on factional development. In the
rational choice approach, however, the explanation was almost totally reduced to this
factor, and it was argued that '[T]he electoral system alone is sufficient to explain the
survival of LDP factions' (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993:59). It was essentially an
approach that was willing to 'sacrifice nuance for generalizability, detail for logic' (Levi
1997:21). Because it was argued that the goals of political actors were exogenous to the
institutional or cultural framework, the notion of culture was abandoned. Rational choice
theory thus proposed that factionalism could be explained without any reference to
CUlture or cultural change, and argued that given the rationality of political actors,
Political phenomena like factions could be explained by focusing on the institutional (Le.
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electoral) environment and the way it influences and constrains the strategies of political
actors.
Although the rational choice model has been widely used in analyses of Japanese politics
in the past decade, and in particular in factional studies, it too has come under increasing
criticism for its failure to explain change. First, the rational choice approach was
criticised for being too simplistic in assuming that rationality was bound by nothing but
institutional structures (Curtis 1999:6). Panebianco pointed out that it is not possible to
determine the aims of organisations as easily as the rational choice approach leads us to
believe. To the advocates of rational choice, organisations like factions are instruments
for 'the realization of specific (and specifiable) goals' (Panebianco 1988:6), a goal which
is most often said to be one's re-election (see Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993; Kohno
1992). Panebianco (1988:7) argued that organisations have many aims and the primary
goal may be subordinate to less ambitious aims, and that even when they do have
manifest aims, the real aim may be to ensure survival only, or survival of power
positions. It has also been pointed out that action is often based on 'identifying the
normatively appropriate behaviour' and not the calculated maximising aim (March and
Olsen 1989:23). Organisations need to balance demands and thus aims can change. They
are not independent of the institutional environment.
As will be seen in this thesis, this criticism is well justified. A comparison of the early
postwar factions and the LDP factions reveals a more comp!ex picture of organisational
aims within the parties. As seen in Chapter 4, factionalisation was at times driven forward
by short term aims to bolster one's power position or get the upper hand in a battle within
the party, and not by broad political factors like maximising one's gain from the electoral
system. As will be seen in Chapter 3, there is little to suggest that the Jiyiito and
Minshuto factions served the purpose of ensuring the re-election of their members.
Recent studies have also pointed out that even after the introduction of a new electoral
system consisting of single member districts and proportional representation lists in 1994,
the factions have not disappeared. To argue therefore that the electoral system alone
could explain factionalism is a massive simplification (see Reed 2003: 185). The rational
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choice approach put all its eggs in the same basket by arguing that the electoral system
was the key to factional formation and maintenance. They assumed that the effect of the
electoral system was the same for the whole period in which it was used, while only
studying a small part of that period. Thus, Ramseyer and Rosenbluth argued that political
actors in prewar Japan behaved in the same way as LDP politicians in the postwar period,
without ever studying the earlier period in the same detail (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth
1993:62). As will be seen in Chapter 3, it is critically problematic to assume that
factionalism in Japan has remained essentially the same ever since 1925, when the
multimember electoral system was established. The rational choice approach, while
focusing on institutional change, left out any consideration of the interaction of
institutional and ideational variables. The importance given to institutional and structural
forces and the total disregard of any cultural or ideational factors has given factional
development in Japan a much greater sense of continuity than it is due.
Neither the historical and cultural approaches nor the rational choice approach to
factionalism can adequately explain factional change in postwar Japan. They each have
their own shortcomings although they all share the tendency to assume historical and
organisational continuity. I will now tum to situating my own approach to factionalism in
Japan within the existing approaches, focusing on the interplay between organisational
factors and culture. I will argue that factional change has to be explained through a
historical institutional approach that is more organisational and less concerned with the
wider structural features of the political system, suc~ as the electoral system.
Furthermore, I argue that by looking at discourses on factionalism we can better
understand the way factions are maintained. I develop this explanation in the next
section.
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1.4. Political change and the development of factionalism in Japan
This thesis starts from the often overlooked observation that the nature of factionalism in
postwar Japan has changed significantly and that the existing approaches to factionalism
cannot account for these changes. First, it will be argued that we need to focus more on
institutional change than on continuity in politics. Second, I argue that the narrow
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structural focus of all the existing approaches to factionalism in Japan needs to be
replaced with a more micro level historical and organisational focus. Third, I argue that a
discursive approach is helpful in illuminating the way particular political phenomena
such as factions are maintained through specific discourses which give them legitimacy. I
will discuss each of these arguments in turn.
1.4.1. Historical Continuity or Change
The tendency to present history as coherent has been strong in political science (Najita
1982:6). Political development has been viewed in terms of progress, 'the more or less
inexorable historical movement towards some more "advanced" level' (March and Olsen
1989:7,54). Both Japanese and Western scholars have been preoccupied with theorising
about Japan's modernisation and her development. Most have tended to view this
development as a progressive movement, away from traditional society and its feudal
characteristics, towards a modern society, a society similar to Western societies (see
Kersten 2000; Nakane 1970:viii-ix). In a similar way, the predominant view amongst
commentators has been that political factionalism has been advancing towards a more
institutionalised level (see Fukui 1970; Scalapino 1953, 1968). Scholars have been
interested in the changing aspects of factions, identifying traditional and modern elements
and viewing trends in their development along a continuum away from the traditional
towards the modern (see Curtis 1988). For instance, Fukui (1970:53) argued that at the
time of its establishment, the LDP had 'an enormous amount of tradition and experience
behind it. .. in terms of membership composition, organisationstructure, factionalism, and
relationships with extra-party groups, all of which had evolved over many decades.' The
LDP built on this experience, creating factions that were more institutionalised. However,
there Were some exceptions to this interpretation. For example, Leiserson argued in 1968
that the LDP factions were really new organisations, and Kitaoka argued that they did not
represent Japanese traditions but were a modern phenomenon (Kitaoka 1995:27-8).
These were, however, minority views.
16
The emphasis on continuity and progressive development is detectable in all the major
theoretical approaches to Japanese factionalism. One of the main criticisms of the cultural
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approach made by proponents of the rational choice approach was that it tended to
accentuate the continuity of traditions in Japanese society (Kohno 1997:96). However,
they themselves have tended to emphasise the continuity of specific institutional
arrangements, such as the electoral system, and the influence of such structures on
political phenomena. Their problem has been similar to that of other approaches in that
they have focused on limited periods in the history of factions and failed to acknowledge
that changes can be random and irrational. Some scholars have studied the prewar period
(Scalapino 1953) while most others have focused on factionalism within the LOP since
the late 1950s with very limited comparisons to early postwar and prewar factions (Fukui
1970; Kohno 1997; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993; Scalapino 1968). Although
historical analysts have in recent years started to emphasise the contingencies of history
and the way chance affects institutional development (see Immergut 1998:19), the
tendency is still strong in Japanese studies to view the history of factionalism as a
Continuous history.
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It will be argued here that the focus on continuity presents great difficulties to the study
of factions. First, I will present data on the early postwar factions and compare them to
the LOP factions in order to show that factionalism changed greatly in organisational
terms in the first 20 years of the postwar period. Second, I argue that the LOP factions
showed more assumedly 'cultural' characteristics than the Jiyuto and Minshuto factions.
These findings raise questions about all the major approaches to factionalism-about the
role the multimember district system plays in creating and sustaining factionalism, and
about the way we view culture and its effect on political institutions. I argue that it is
important to look at the development of political factionalism in a more extended
historical time scale in order to counter the tendency to 'present a coherent sequence
along an historical time line' (Najita 1982:6) and to be able to recognise changes when
they Occur.
1.4.2. Institutional changes
If factionalism has changed so much it is important to theorise about how and why such
changes OCcur.I will argue that we need to look at both structural and discursive factors
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to explain factional change adequately. My approach could be termed institutional,
although it is more concerned with organisational development in its historical context
than specific institutions, such as the electoral system, which the current institutional
approaches to Japanese factions emphasise. I agree with institutionalists that politics are
affected by the institutional environment, but argue that in the study of factionalism it is
the organisational features of the party itself in its specific historical environment, rather
than the party-external institutional arrangements, that affect factional patterns.
Institutions are defined here as not only formal organisations but also informal rules and
procedures that affect political behaviour. It is true that the institutional environment in
which factions emerged after the end of the war and the institutional changes that took
place between 1945 and 1955 shaped factionalism and the institutional development of
the conservative parties. However, the current approaches leave unanswered the question
why the JiyUto and Minshuto were so different from the LDP.
Panebianco's (1988) theory of the organisational development of parties has not been
Used on Japanese parties before, but it captures well the differences between the inner
organisation of the early postwar parties and the LDP in terms of their levels of
factionalism and centralisation. His theory was more encompassing than most previous
historical theories, explaining factionalism from the genesis of parties. He (1988:55)
measured party institutionalisation on two scales: systemness, i.e. the interdependence of
its internal components, and the degree of autonomy vis-a-vis the environment. His
hypothesis was that the way parties were formed, their 'genetic model', affected their
level of institutionalisation. The degree of institutionalisation in turn shaped the dominant
coalition's internal cohesion. The greater the institutionalisation, the less organised the
internal groups were and the more cohesive the dominant coalition (Panebianco 1988:60).
The JiyUto and Minshuto were parties which fitted into Panebianco's (1988:50) model of
a fairly institutionalised party created through penetration and internal legitimacy; i.e. the
centre controlled and directed the development of the periphery, leading to a cohesive
parliamentary elite rallying behind a prestigous leader. The LDP, on the other hand, was
created more through diffusion, as local party organisation already existed when the party
Was established through the two previous conservative parties. Such a genetic model,
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according to Panebianco (1988 :63), leads to weak cohesion of the dominant coalition and
the 'presence of many competing elites controlling conspicuous organisational
resources'. The centre was not strong enough to control the development of the
periphery.
Regarding its relationship with the external environment, Panebianco argued that if the
party controlled resources centrally then there was greater interdependence between sub-
party groups and limited autonomy for factions. If, however, the sub-party groups had
autonomy in their relations with external actors, such as the business community, then the
systemness of the party would be low and factionalisation greater (Panebianco 1988:51).
The Jiyfito and Minshuto were institutionalised to a greater degree than the LDP, and the
party leadership had greater control over political funding, giving less leverage to
factions. The LDP, on the other hand, was decentralised and the factions were able to
gain great financial autonomy at the party's expense. This model thus provides
convincing explanations of the differences in level of factionalism. However, because the
theory is so focused on the formative stage of party development its disregard of
institutional dynamism makes it rather inadequate in explaining changes over time.
Panebianco's model (1988) captures well organisational development where institutions
change from their genesis through institutionalisation to maturity, changing their aims
and focusing more on survival. Although Panebianco argued that a natural history for
Parties does not exist and that 'the fact that a party is highly institutionalized is no
guarantee that de-institutionalization, loss of autonomy vis-a-vis the environment, and
decline in .. I ·1 k I hen d .orgamzatlOna "systemness" WI I not ta e pace w en Its environment
undergoes radical changes' (1988:63), his theory does not allow adequate theorising
about such Changes away from the institutional characteristics prescribed by the original
organisational environment, and thus places too much emphasis on continuity in
institutional development. As will be seen in Chapters 4 and 5, the history of postwar
factional" .Ism 10 Japan needs a more dynamic theory to account for changes in
f· .
actJonahsm in the 1950s. I argue that two main adjustments need to be made to
in r
s Itutional approaches to factionalism in Japan in order to offer a deeper understanding
of the development of factionalism in the postwar period.
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First, taking my cue from Thelen and Steinmo's 'dynamic constraints model' (Thelen and
Steinmo 1992:17), I propose that the institutional approach to factionalism needs to be
refocused in order to recognise the interplay of institutional factors and political
strategies. Institutionalism as an approach has had to deal with the dilemma of explaining
the complex interplay between institutions, where institutions can be viewed as an
independent variable shaping politics, and as a dependent variable, shaped by political
forces at times of breakdown (see Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 15). Krasner argued that
stable institutions were occasionally 'punctuated' by crises that brought about change,
then reverted to institutional stasis again (Krasner 1984; see also DiMaggio and Powell
1991:30). According to Thelen's 'dynamic constraints' model, institutional breakdown
could occur without such crises. Institutional changes take place in a:
pattern in which changes in the meaning and functioning of institutions (associated with
broader socioeconomic and political shifts) set in motion political struggles within but
also over those institutions that in fact drive their development forward (Thelen and
Steinmo 1992: 17).
Such critical junctures when institutional changes occur lay down the course of
development and limit the range of viable policy options (March and Olsen 1989:64).
This captures very well the changes that took place within the LDP after its formation in
1955 where, through power struggles, tactical alliances and movements between factions,
the conservative factions changed so dramatically that the 'faction' as an institution
acquired a new meaning and new roles. Strategic manoeuvring and conflict can influence
the institutional parameters to such an extent that clear institutional change becomes
evident (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 17). This relates to Panebianco's assertion (1988:7-8)
that organisations are often concerned with survival of power positions only, which in
itself can produce change. The institutional pressures changing the factions in the late
1950s were manifold and worked together in a much more complicated process than the
current approaches can account for. The party was already susceptible to internal
divisions because of the division of the leadership caused by the way the party emerged.
The presidential elections adopted in 1956 were a major catalyst in encouraging changed
factional patterns within the party, leading to more permanent groups. This is discussed
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in Chapter 4. As seen in Chapter 5, changes in political funding patterns were also a
major factor changing the nature of factionalism within the conservative parties, and
giving factions greater permanency. The factions did not appear out of the
decontextualised rationality of political actors, as the rational choice approach would
have it. On the other hand they were not a natural development of the factions as they had
existed either. The LOP factions took on functions and shape that the old factions did not
have, enabling them to react to a new institutional environment. Thus there was clear
discontinuity in their development.
Second, my critique of both the rational choice approach and the conventional historical
and cultural approach to factions is directed towards the narrow institutional focus they
Use with respect to factionalism within the LOP. Both approaches have argued that the
multimember electoral system, established in 1925, is the main cause of factionalism
(Baerwald 1986; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993; Kohno 1997). The factional systems of
the Jiytito and the Minshuto, on one hand, and the LOP, on the other, existed within the
same electoral framework, yet were very different. The former was elitist factionalism
with restricted elite competition, while that of the latter was open factionalism, organised
through the party ranks (see Beller and Belloni 1978c:437-8). Rational choice has had
difficulties in explaining institutional change; the rationality of politicians defined by the
structural environment of multi-member electoral districts does not explain why the
Jiyfito and Minshuto politicians behaved so differently. I argue that the electoral system
alone cannot explain changes in factionalism in Japan. The electoral system did come to
play a role in maintaining factionalism but while the electoral system may explain
continuity of certain kinds of factionalism, it was only one of many forces shaping it (see
Reed 2003: 185), and furthermore, it does not allow adequate theorising about how this
factionalism came about. Contrary to most analyses, I find that the changes in the
organisational parameters within the party and the power struggle they produced led to
factionalism spreading out to the electoral districts, giving the factions new roles. The
constraints of the electoral system: which has been the main focus of factional analyses in
the past, did not affect factionalism in any major way until this process had commenced.
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Thus a closer look at the interplay between constraints such as the electoral system, and
political strategies and the broader political context, will give us a better picture of
factional change, and of how factions come to play new roles for new ends. The same
institutions (such as factions) can produce different outcomes at different times; political
manoeuvres can affect the institutional environment; and the strategies of the actors can
also change to accommodate changes in the institutions themselves (Thelen and Steinmo
1992:17). But I will also argue that political discourses on factions also play their role in
defining factionalism. Factions changed in organisational terms but, more than that, the
very notion of what factions are and what effect they have was transformed as well. The
political factions of the early postwar period in many ways resembled the prewar factions
of the Seiyukai and the Minseit6, and thus retained much of their prewar character until
the mid-1950s when the LDP was formed. As pointed out by many scholars (Tominomori
1994; Uchida 1983), the first ten years after the war were characterised by great
instability and continuous splits and mergers of political groups. However, in spite of
their fluidity, unclear boundaries and limited relevance to political processes, the factions
of the Jiynto and Minshuto were viewed as highly destabilising entities that disrupted
political life. In the LDP, this notion of factionalism was slowly replaced as the factions
adopted new functions and became tightly knit entities. The factions came to be viewed
as a 'binding agent' that kept the party together, increased unity, gave all party members
the Opportunity to air their views, and allowed leadership changes. It can thus be argued
that in the early 1960s a major transformation occurred in a discursive sense as well. To
this aspect I tum now.
1.4.3. Entrenching the new factions
In Chapters 2 to 5 I describe how the old factions of the Jiyuto and the Minshuto were
fundamentally different from the ones that later appeared in the LDP. I detail how and
Whythe old factions changed into the new ones. Through that I show that the 'traditional'
characteristics of the LDP factions, considered by many observers to have survived into
the present, were not evident in the political factions in the 10 years preceding it. The
personalistic and non-ideological LDP factions were described as a 'feudal inheritance'
(Kurzman 1960:277), but as will be seen, the early factions were more policy based and
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personal allegiance was not as deep as in the LDP factions. The LOP factions performed
'traditional' roles that factions had not served before. These traditions had not come from
the factions preceding them. And so-I finish this thesis on an interesting paradox. Just as
the new LDP factions had emerged they began to be described, by scholars and other
observers both Japanese and foreign, as typically and traditionally Japanese. In Chapter 6
I ask: why was it that a form of factionalism that had only just come into being was
described as traditional and Japanese and what where the consequences of those
descriptions?
Evoking Dryzak's (1997) study on discourses I ask what 'faction' was in the 1960s, what
Wassaid about 'factions' at that time, how they were understood, and what the perceived
effects of factionalism were. I describe movements to dissolve factions in the LOP in the
early 1960s and how they were related to debates in and about Japan on modernisation
and democracy. I distinguish between two different discourses existing at the time: one
which sees factionalism as premodern, traditional, typically Japanese and a hindrance to
modernisation and democracy; and another which sees factionalism as traditional,
typically Japanese but democratic, and working against autocratic power within the LDP.
I argue that the new LOP factions can be described as 'invented traditions' (Dirks et al.
1994:4; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Immergut 1998; Vlastos 1998) and suggest that the
movements for the dissolution of factions may, ironically, have unwittingly had the
opposite effect of what they intended. In the late 1950s and early 1960s the Japanese
moved somewhat away from the self-criticism they had practised in the early period, and
became more interested in exploring their own culture as a tool to aid modernisation.
This change in perspective affected Japanese views of their own political system and thus
affected the political development (see Davis 1992; Kersten 2000). Describing
factionalism within the LDP as typically and traditionally Japanese, at a time when, with
the re-emergence of Japan as an economic power, 'Japanese values' were being
reasserted, may, I suggest, have lent legitimacy to factionalism and have thus helped to
entrench the LDP factions.
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1.5. Methodology
This thesis relies solely on written data. For data on the development of factionalism I
have relied on both English and Japanese material on factions and the political history of
Japan. There is an abundance of material to be found on the period after the formation of
the LDP in 1955 but analytical material on factionalism in the early period is scarce. Very
little information is available that tells us anything about ordinary rank-and-file
politicians, and their own views of the factional manoeuvres. As well as relying on the
few existing political and factional analyses from the early period I have tried to build a
coherent picture of factionalism through newspapers, biographies of and autobiographies
by Japanese politicians of this period, and journal articles. This material has provided
important historical information about the period in question.
However, the material for the first 10 years of the postwar era is rather sketchy in that
there are very few sources that provide detailed information about factionalism,
membership, movements between factions, and the functions of factions. This
information has had to be collated from a wide variety of historical sources. Unavoidably
there are gaps in the information. However, it has been possible to gather enough
information to give quite a full picture of the factions that existed and their general
movements. The material available in the early postwar years says little about what the
factions were, but more about what the factions were not. This has given some insight
into where and when factions featured in political life.
Information on factional membership is also very scarce for the early postwar period
because membership was fluid and ill-defined. The functions of factions were also far
from clear. I have been able to assemble a number of faction lists for the first years of the
postwar period. In his book in 1948 Sakano presented lists of the internal divisions of the
JiyUto in 1946 after Yoshida had taken over the leadership, and in 1947 after the general
election. SCAP made their own lists of internal divisions within the conservative parties
in 1949 and 1951, including the JiyiitO and the Minshuto, For the period 1952-55 I have
relied on Japanese newspapers and historical analyses of the time, such as Watanabe
(1958) and various memoirs of politicians, to build a picture of factional membership.
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As factions did not keep official membership lists, the lists made by various observers
may have been largely based on observations and conclusions drawn from a variety of
connections between politicians and their actions. The criteria used for making the lists
Were not specified. The lists may thus not be completely accurate but are all the same an
important historical source, and an indication of the nature of membership in the early
postwar factions.
Information on factions in the Minshuto is much more scarce than on the Jiytito, perhaps
primarily because the latter was bigger and in government for much of the early period in
question and thus received more scholarly attention. The only complete factional lists that
I have for the Minshuto are in 1949 and 1951, put together by SCAP. I have tried to
expand these lists by using a variety of contemporary sources but there are still
unavoidable gaps that prevent full use of the data. This lack of material is unfortunate as
it has prevented me from discussing the Minshuto in as much detail as I would have
liked. I decided however to include the party in my analysis as I felt the material was
SUfficientto give indications as to the type of factionalism that existed within it. Data for
the Jiyiit6 is also sketchy in the early 1950s. For 1952-54 I only have complete lists of
the forces opposing Yoshida in 1953 as well as a list of neutral forces in the centre
faction. The remaining Dietmembers are taken to be Yoshida supporters or otherwise
neutral people. Biographies give some insight into the internal discord in the parties and
these are used as much as possible to fill in the picture. 'These sources have been
SUfficient to build a database that can give us a broad idea of factional development
between 1946 and 1954, movements and membership of internal party groups, and
appointments to cabinet posts and the three most important party posts.
Information on the period 1956-1964 is much more abundant and bears witness to the
changing nature of the factions. For information on this period I have relied on the daily
newspapers which started to print lists of membership, as well as historical sources such
as Watanabe (1958) and Kokkai Binran, which give almost yearly accounts of factional
developments and movements.
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The data on faction membership I gathered were used to create a large database holding
information on all Jiyuto, Minshutocand LOP Dietmembers in the 1945-64 period. The
data include information on their party affiliation, election district, years elected, party
and cabinet posts held, and affiliation with a number of formal and informal intra-party
groups. This database was used extensively in Chapters 2-5 to compare early postwar
factions with the later LOP factions, and to test existing theories on the importance of the
electoral system to factional development, which scholars invariably emphasise. The
database gives us an idea of the extent of factional divisions in the early conservative
parties and tells us important things about the role that factions played in recruitment
within party and cabinet. As far as I am aware, never has so much data on factional
divisions in early postwar Japan been put together before.
For an analysis on the changing discourse on factions in 1945-1964 I relied on Japanese
and English speaking newspapers, contemporary scholarly commentaries and
biographies. The initial analysis was done by going through all articles written on
factions in the Asahi Shimbun. Asahi Shimbun was chosen for the initial analysis as the
newspaper is available on CD-ROM, which makes it very convenient to work with. By
using CD-ROM I was able to find all newspaper articles which had 'faction'
(ha/habatsu), or the names of any of the factions, in their heading. Well aware of the
leftist leanings of the newspaper, I then compared my findings with articles in some of
the other main newspapers, such as Mainichi Shimbun and the Yomiuri Shimbun. There
Were no discernible differences between the sources in the samples I took, so I feel
confident that the Asahi can be taken as a reliable source on political factionalism in this
period. The Japan Times also turned out to be a very valuable source for tracing the broad
changes in the discourse on factions. Many of the political columnists writing for the
paper in this period were Japanese, although quite a few articles could also be found by
foreign analysts.
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1.6. Scope
The thesis covers the 19 years between 1945 and 1964. When first approaching my topic
I was increasingly drawn to the factional history of the early postwar period, largely
because so little was known about it. The many analyses of factionalism after 1955 have
been built on certain ideas and assumptions about political factionalism historically, but
there was very little material to consult to confirm these views. A number of approaches
have been used to explain how factionalism is sustained within the LOP, but few, if any,
have extended their approaches to the development of factionalism before 1955. I
therefore decided that it was paramount in theorising about LOP factions to gain a greater
understanding of factionalism within the early postwar conservative parties. We know
very little about the nature and activities of factions that existed between 1945 and 1955.
Without such background information, it is impossible to understand how factionalism
has changed, as we do not know exactly what it was changing from. This 19 year period
was chosen in the end to make possible a historical approach to the study of factions-
one that compared the nature of the early postwar factions with the factions that
developed within the LOP, and allowed me to theorise about the factors that shaped those
changes.
The closing date for the thesis is 1964, and the reasons for that are twofold. First, Ikeda
Hayato's term as prime minister ended late in that year, giving some sort of historical cut-
off point. Sato Eisaku, his successor, was to be the longest serving prime minister Japan
has had in the postwar era, serving for eight years. Second, in the first few years after its
formation in 1955, rapid changes took place within the LOP which changed the factions.
Kohno has argued that a major change in factional patterns emerged in the late 1960s and
early 1970s, reducing the number of factions while increasing their size, and leaving
important political processes to five major factions. The internal organisation of the LOP
also showed signs of formal structure akin to a political party, with factional posts
mirroring party posts, and formal channels established for interaction between factions
and party leadership concerning promotion and distribution of posts (see Kohno
1997:92-96). However, by 1964, this brief transitional phase in which factions developed
from the fluid factions into structured entities had already started, as they had come to
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show many of the characteristics that Kohno (1997) identifies. My aim was to gain an
understanding of how factions within the LOP differed from the preceding factions, and
to shed some light on the process whereby the factions changed. I felt that this aim could
be achieved by ending the study in 1964.
1.7. The Chapters
The thesis is divided into three main sections. This includes the introduction discussing
the theoretical framework of the thesis and constitutes the first part. Part 2, with Chapters
2 and 3, discusses the factions within the early postwar conservative parties, the Jiyiit6
and the Minshuto (which was later to be known as the Kaishinto) between 1945 and
1955.
In Chapter 2, I look at the Jiyiit6 and Minshuto factions, their characteristics and place in
the political system. I argue that the factions were fundamentally different from the LDP
factions as the developed in the late 1950s. In spite of factional struggles, the factions
were not the bases of the political parties. It was of more significance that the early
postwar conservative parties were polarised in ways similar to the prewar parties and
were considered to be highly destabilising entities. Ideology and policy were important to
some of the factions, and then primarily in exacerbating polarisation. Factional conflict
was of political relevance primarily when the two wings of the parties clashed internally.
In particular, the factional struggles between these two wings were considered highly
destabilising for the political system. Factionalism was bad for party unity and tore both
parties apart.
Chapter 3 discusses more specifically what purpose the early factions served. I argue that,
as in the case of the LDP factions, the early conservative factions served a role as
distributors of financial aid to the rank-and-file. However, this function was limited by
the economic and political environment of the era and the relatively centralised nature of
the conservative parties. This limited the political importance the factions could have.
Factions could not build up permanent membership. Factions did not have the leverage to
influence the party leadership with any consistency and thus did not distribute posts in
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party or cabinet to faction members. Factions were not the basis for decision making in
the party in terms of leadership selection or candidate selection. I further argue that
factionalism did not reach out to the-electoral districts because of the limited political
importance it had at the core of the party. The multimember electoral system can thus not
be considered a defining influence on the factions in this period.
Part 3 focuses on the transformation of factionalism in Japan from the destabilising
factionalism of the early postwar period towards a clearly visible factional system which
could increase political stability. It discusses the institutional environment and the effect
the electoral system, political funding systems and internal party rules had on the
character of factionalism. It also considers the discursive forces at work which
increasingly presented factionalism as cultural, traditional and Japanese.
Chapter 4 focuses on the way factionalism changed after the formation of the LDP in
December 1955. The notion of a polarised party faded after the first year of the party. As
membership formed and the factions took on new functions as primary participants in the
distribution of cabinet and party posts, and the main forums for discussion on party
policy, policy became less important as a binding agent for the factions themselves. The
factions became patronage groups with clear membership and invoked loyalty through an
extensive system of material awards. The new factional system was consequently
different from the one that existed in the first ten years of the postwar period when
factionalism had been considered deeply disturbing for the political system. Within the
LDP, factionalism became a potential stabilising force, holding the party together through
more widespread internal representation.
Chapter 5 deals more specifically with the question why factionalism changed in the first
years of the LDP, and focuses on the institutional and wider political and economic
environment of the first few years of the party. It is argued that, contrary to most
institutional analyses of conservative factionalism in Japan, the election system cannot be
considered as a primary factor in causing the factionalisation of the party. More important
were a series of institutional changes brought about by power struggles such as the
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presidential elections; the establishment of factions as financial associations; and then the
rapidly growing economy which allowed closer relations between politics and business,
and created an environment where political leaders were encouraged to use organised
support to secure their power. The centralised power conflict within the party then spread
out to the periphery, with the result that by 1964 the electoral districts were becoming
dominated by factional conflict.
Chapter 6 shows what influence the debate on Japan's modernisation in the early 1960s
had on discourses on factionalism in the LOP. In the early 1960s a debate commenced on
the success of Japanese democracy and how Japan could embrace modernity without
having to give up Japanese traditions for Westernisation. The movement within the LOP
in the early 1960s to abolish factionalism and create a modern party, which has usually
been dismissed by scholars and observers as a failed attempt of little historical
importance, was heavily influenced by this debate on democracy and modernisation. I
argue that while the movement failed to disband factions, it influenced the perception of
factions greatly. It put into the limelight issues such as the nature of party management,
intra-party democracy, and cultural influence. As the LOP factions took on new
functions, views of their value varied: many argued that factions were a part of Japan's
past that ought to be abolished, since they stood in the way of democratic development
and modernisation, but to others, factions were a tool to achieve democracy.
Simultaneously, the discussion on Japanese culture and traditions merged with the debate
on factionalism, with the result that factions came to be increasingly described in cultural
terms that were resonant of Japan's feudal past. Although the LOP factions were in many
ways new groups, with new functions and new characteristics, they were increasingly
seen to be traditional and thus Japanese. While the connotations of this were negative in
the debates on democracy and modernisation, portraying the factions as traditional and
Japanese, I suggest, gave them certain amount of legitimacy.
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis and draws together the main findings of the research. A
historical approach shows that factionalism has changed significantly in the postwar
period. Institutionally, the factions have changed. The Jiynto, Minshuto and LOP factions
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had very different levels of organisation and their importance for the political system was
very different. I argue that in order to understand factional development in the postwar
period we need a dynamic institutional approach that allows us to theorise about complex
institutional changes and the way political tactics and power politics produce unintended
changes. A more general and genetic approach, looking at the way the parties emerged,
like Panebianco's, is more powerful in explaining changes and differences than the more
narrow focus on the electoral system found in rational choice and institutional
approaches. Using a discursive approach we can better understand how institutional
changes were made sense of and given legitimacy. Factions have changed in discursive
terms. The LDP factions in 1964 were very different political groups from the 1940s
conservative factions. In this period journalistic, scholarly and political discourses reveal
a number of competing paradigms for understanding factionalism. Cultural rhetoric was
much used throughout the period in discussion of politics in Japan, but it is interesting to
note than in the early 1960s there was a noted difference in the discourse, with increasing
use of cultural references to describe factions, and to explain why they existed, and why
they couldn't be eradicated. I believe that a comparison of institutional frameworks and
discursive practices can provide meaningful understanding of factional development and
a basis for cross-cultural comparison with factionalism in other political systems.
Notes
I The Jiyiit6 and Minshuto changed names a number of times during the first ten years of the postwar
period. The Jiyuto was called Minshu Jiyuto from March 1948 till March 1950 when it changed back to
its original name, Jiytito. The Shinpoto, formed in 1945, changed its name toMinshuto in March 1947, to
Kaishinto in February 1952, and then back to Minshut6 in 1954. For reasons of simplicity these parties
will be termed Jiyiit6 and Minshuto throughout the thesis, unless otherwise required to prevent
misunderstanding.
2 Scholars have not agreed as to exactly how to categorise the works that adopt institutional approaches.
Thelen and Steinmo (1992) see two main approaches, a historical institutional tradition and a rational
choice approach, while some scholars have identified a third approach, social institutionalism, arguing
that cultural theory should be considered an institutional theory (Grendstad and Selle 1995:6; Hall and
Taylor 1996:936). Others, such as Lichbach and Zuckerman (1997) argue that the field of comparative
politics can be divided into three distinctive approaches: rational choice theories, cultural theories, and
structuralism.
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CHAPTER2:
THE EARLY CONSERV ATIVE PARTIES: FACTIONALISM AND
POLARISATION
2.1. Introduction
Ever since the end of the Second World War, Western scholars have emphasised the
factionalised nature of Japanese society and the influence factionalism has had on politics
in Japan (Nakane 1970:3; Maki 1962:161; Quigley and Turner 1956:277; Stockwin
1982:66). This view has informed many of the studies on factionalism within the LDP
and the point is frequently made that factions have always formed the basis of politics in
Japan (Baerwald 1986: 17; Maki 1962; Mitchell 1996; Ward 1969; Quigley and Turner
1956:277; Scalapino and Masumi 1962:149). All the major approaches to factionalism in
Japan have emphasised continuity and sought to find similarities rather than differences
between factionalism in different periods (see for example Baerwald 1986; Fukui 1970;
Hrebenar 1986; Kohno 1997; Maki 1962; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993; Scalapino
1968; Scalapino and Masumi 1962; Stockwin 1983:209; Totten and Kawakami
1965:113). A noticeable exception to this tendency is Leiserson (1968:770), who argues
that until presidential elections were introduced in the LDP in 1956, 'factions in the LDP
were more or less what factions in Japan-or anywhere-had always been: a nucleus of a
few lieutenants around a leader, with a rather unreliable following'. All the same,
factional studies frequently lead us to conclude that conservative politics in Japan have
always been factionalised and that the LDP factions are typical Japanese factions (see
Stockwin 1982:36-7).
This chapter will discuss the nature of factionalism within the Jiyuto and the Minshuto
between 1945 and 1955 and the effect it had on the political environment. First, a number
of observations will be made about the structural features of the factions and the factional
system. It is argued that the Jiyiito and Minshuto factions were fundamentally different
from the later time LDP factions. The early factions were not uniform groups resting on a
clearly defined patron-client relationship between leader and follower. Structurally, the
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intra-party groups called ha (faction) in Japanese, in the first decade following the end of
the war, ranged from being very small groups, often of very short duration-what some
scholars refer to as 'cliques' or 'tendencies' (Beller and Belloni 1978:422; Rose 1964:37-
8)-to more structured and personal patron-client groups, where the leader served a more
unifying role (see Beller and Belloni 1978:422-27; Rose 1964:37). This leads to a second
major observation. Because of their loose structure, the factions had a very different place
in the political system in the early postwar period than they came to have within the LOP.
Most of these factions were not important to the political process in this period and were
not the 'vital center of the political process' that Scalapino and Masumi (1964:149)
argued them to be. I contend that it was much more important to the political system that
the parties themselves, like the prewar conservative parties, tended to polarise. Third,
although, or perhaps because, the factions were not the basis of political decision-making,
they were considered politically very destabilising entities. This was certainly the
prevailing scholarly understanding of party factions at the time (Stockwin 1970:362).
Factional conflict often caused irreparable rifts within parties, especially within the
conservative parties. The structural characteristics of the early postwar factions made
them significantly different from the LOP factions. In conclusion, I argue that policy
differences played a more important role in differentiating between the factions in early
postwar Japan than in the LOP, and that these differences reinforced the polarisation of
the parties.
2.2. The conservative factional divisions
Before discussing the characteristics of the factional groups within the Jiytuo and the
Minshuto, I will provide a brief overview of the factional landscape within these parties
between 1945 and 1954. The Jiyuto and Minshuto were the two main parties formed on
the right wing following Japan's surrender in August 1945. Other minor parties existed to
the right of centre, the most important being the Ky5d5t5 (Cooperative Party), the only
party with no organisational roots in the prewar period (Reed 1988:315).
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2.2.1. The Jiyiito
The Jiyuto was established on 9 November 1945 by a leading prewar conservative
politician, Hatoyama Ichiro, and included 43 existing Dietmembers most of whom had
been in some opposition to the military regime during the war (Uchida 1987:310). The
party was relatively free of factionalism at the time of its formation because the majority
of its members had supported Hatoyama within the prewar Seiyukai.' The Jiyuto was the
leading government party in the first decade of the postwar era. The party was in
government in 1946-472, and again in 1949-54, after brief spells of coalition
governments led by the Shakaito (Socialist Party) in 1947-48 and by the Minshuto in
1948.
Both the main conservative parties were heavily affected by the removal from office by
the Allied Powers of 'undesirable influences'-the so-called purges of 1946-48.3 The
Jiyuto lost more than half of its 45 founding members through the purges (Baerwald
1977:84; Fukui 1970:38; Sims 2000:247). Hatoyama himself was purged in May 1946,
only a few days after he had been recommended to SCAP as the next prime minister
following the Jiyuto victory in the general election. Yoshida Shigeru, a former foreign
ministry diplomat, took over the leadership of the party and was to lead the party for the
next eight and a half years (Baerwald 1977:21-24; Stockwin 1982:61).
Until 1948, the factional divisions of the Jiyuto were based mostly on prewar affiliations
and the division into old and new politicians. The earliest factional chart available, in
1946, divides the Jiyiito into two wings, Fudai and Tozama (Sakano 1948:78). The
terminology dates back to Tokugawa times and was used to distinguish between those
close to the leadership, the Fudai wing, and those further removed from it, the 'Tozama
allies' (Koschmann 1982:82). As seen in Table 2-1, the factional divisions were not
conspicuous in 1947 and the factions Sakano (1948) identifies mirrored largely prewar
groupings such as the Nakajima support faction, the Hoshijima faction and the Matsuno
faction. Yoshida, as the new leader of the party, had formed a small group of supporters,
but his group did not become conspicuous until after Yoshida recruited a number of
former bureaucrats into the party in 1948 who came to form the core of his
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support faction. Ono Bamboku and Okubo Tomejiro led the old party politicians, who
now felt threatened by the leadership change. A group of former supporters of Ashida
Hitoshi existed within the party in 1947 but quiekly dispersed (Sakano 1948:78). Ashida
himself had by then split from the Jiyuto, A Shidehara faction emerged within the party
in 1948 when a group of dissidents from the Minshuto, led by Shidehara Kijuro, joined
their ranks. In 1949 the factional pattern looked fairly simple. In addition to the Yoshida
and Ono factions, a Hirokawa group started forming between 1948 and 1950 which was
closely aligned with Yoshida," The Shidehara group continued to exist for a few years. In
addition there was a group of neutral politicians.
The early 1950s saw a large number of small factions appearing that seemed largely sub-
factions within the large Yoshida and Hatoyama factions (see Table 2-1). Most of these
were very small and had a very short lifespan. The Ono faction (supporters of Hatoyama
Ichiro), the Yoshida faction, the Hirokawa faction, the Shidehara faction and the Inukai
faction, another group of defectors from the Minshuto who had joined the JiyUto in
March 1950, remained the biggest and most powerful (SCAP Miscellaneous Political
Parties 1951 GS(B) 02674-5).
In late 1952 and early 1953 there was much factional activity within the party. This was
in large part caused by the return of purged politicians to politics in 1950-1951. The
depurgees were returned in three main waves but Hatoyama himself was one of the last to
be depurged in August 1951 (Calder 1988:83-4; Masumi 1985:279-81). The general
elections in October 1952 caused great upheaval in Japanese polities as many districts
saw fierce battles between the 'new politicians', who had been elected following the
purge, and the 'depurgees', who now sought to retrieve their Diet seats. The depurge
affected the JiyUto in particular, making clearer the internal divisions within the party and
starting a major leadership struggle.
The return of Hatoyama and the depurged party politicians sharpened the struggles
between the party politicians and party leader Yoshida and his supporters. This
culminated in the establishment of the Minshuka Domei or the Democratisation League
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(Mindoha for short) in October 1952, a group of party members disillusioned with
Yoshida's leadership and in favour of Hatoyama taking over the party reins again. A
Maeda faction, housing many of the newly depurged politicians returning to politics, was
also established. These factions joined in the factional struggle taking place between the
Yoshida and Hatoyama factions. The factional struggle led to a split in the Jiyuto in
March 1953 as the Mindoha and the Hirokawa factions left to form their own party,
Buntoha Jiytito (Bunjito). These groups joined the party again in November 1953. By
then a faction had started to form around Kishi Nobusuke in the Jiyuto, but he had just
joined the party, and it, along with the Hatoyama and Ishibashi factions, split in spring
1954 to form the Minshuto (Democratic Party) with the Kaishinto (Reformist Party)
(Nagata 1953). As Ogata Taketora established himself as leader of the Jiyuto, following
the resignation of Yoshida in 1954, a faction formed around him.
2.2.2. The Minshuto
The other main conservative party, the Nihon Shinpoto (Japan Progressive Party), was
formed on 16 November 1945 and included mostly existing Dietmembers who had been
associated with the wartime Imperial Rule Assistance Political Association and sought to
preserve the prewar political system. Of the 273 Dietmembers affiliated with the party
when it was established, more than half had been elected before 1937. The majority of
those-89 members-had belonged to the prewar Minseito and then mainly the Machida
faction, while 39 had been members of the Seiyukai's Nakajima faction, which had
,
bitterly fought Hatoyama in the prewar period. Seven came from the Kuhara faction, and
a few from the neutral Kanemitsu faction (Colton 1948:943-4; Fukui 1970:36; SCAP
History of Political Parties 1945-1951 GS(A) 02519). However, 45% of the party
members were first term Dietmembers (Colton 1948:943-44).
In the purges of 1946, 250 party members were removed from political life (Fukui
1970:38). As new candidates came forward, the prewar political divisions decreased
greatly. Seiyukai's influence dwindled particularly, and Inukai Ken was the only one
remaining of the old Seiyukai leadership (Colton 1948:945). The party came to rely
mostly on Minseito politicians and the division became that of the Minseito and the
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newcomers. The party changed leaders frequently in the first years due to the purges.
Ugaki Kazushige was the first president of the party but he was purged shortly afterwards
and Machida Chuji of the old Minseito was made president. Machida was also purged
along with secretary general Tsurumi Yusuke (Uchida 1969:57) and Shidehara Kijuro
was made leader of the party in April 1946. As with the Jiyuto, the party seemed at first
divided along prewar party lines.
As seen in Table 2-2, the Minshuto, like the Jiyuto, had a number of internal groups that
increased in number in the early 1950s. In spite of the relative lack of data about the
factions it seems safe to state that, unlike the Jiyuto, these factions were all small' In
early 1947 the Shinshinkai, led by Inukai Ken, Chairman of the Executive Council, and
the Taiyokai, led by President Shidehara Kijuro, were the main factions within the party.
In March 1947 the party changed its name to Minshuto when Ashida Hitoshi and a few
other members of the Jiyuto and other minor parties joined the party, and Ashida was
made party president. Although this wing of the conservative forces was largely in
opposition it participated in the Katayama cabinet from May 1947 to March 19486, and in
the short-lived Ashida cabinet that succeeded the Katayama cabinet and only lasted until
October 1948.7
As seen in Table 2-2, the Ashida and Shidehara factions were the main factions within
the party in 1947-48, and fought bitterly for control of the party. Ishiguro Takeshige,
,
minister in the Shidehara cabinet, also had a small faction around him. He was purged in
1947 but the faction existed until 1949, although very small. The Shinshinkai was also
left without a leader when Inukai was purged in April 1947. One of its members,
Kitamura Tokutaro, acted as leader and the faction threw its support behind Ashida in the
leadership struggle that ensued within the party (Uchida 1969:58). When Inukai returned
to the party in 1949, a new faction, the Inukai faction, formed around him (Watanabe
1958:204). The Shidehara faction decided to split from the party in 1948 to join the
Jiyuto in 1948. In 1949 two loosely organised factions, the Coalition (renritsu ha) and
Opposition (yato ha) factions existed briefly, as the party split over the issue of
cooperation with the Jiyuto (see Table 2-2).
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The struggle between these two groups resulted in another split in 1950 when Inukai Ken,
after a year as party president, left the "party along with many of the Coalition faction, to
join the Jiyuto, Following the split, the party changed its name to the Kokumin Minshuto
(National Democratic Party) as it joined with the Kokumin Kyodoto (National
Cooperative Party). Many of the Coalition faction who did not leave formed a new
faction within the Minshuto, led by Kimura Kozaemon. In February 1952 the party
changed its name again, this time to the Kaishinto (Reformist Party), as it merged with
the small Shinsei Club, a group of depurged Minseito politicians in 1952, and Shigemitsu
Mamoru became leader. These mergers led to some new factional groups emerging: the
Miki and Matsumura factions from the Kyodoto, and the Oasa faction, consisting of
recently depurged politicians. In 1954 the Kaishinto disbanded as it joined with dissident
elements from the Jiyiit5 to form the Minshuto (Democratic Party). The Minshuto was in
government again between 1954 and 1955, following the fall of the long lived Yoshida
administration.
Table 2-2: Factional divisions within the Shinpoto/Minshuto/Kaishinto 1947-1954
e.I947 1.1947 1948 1949 1951 1953 1954
Opposition: Conservative:
Shidehara Shidehara Shidehara Taiyokai
Ashida Ashida Ashida Ashida Ashida Ashida
Shinshinkai Shinshinkai Shinshinkai
Ishiguro Ishiguro Ishiguro
Oasa Oasa
Tomabechi Tomabechi Tomabechi
Neutral Neutral Neutral Neutral
Coalition: Radical:
Inukai Inukai Inukai Kimura
Keisetsu kai
Miki Miki Miki
Kitamura Kitamura Kitamura
Matsumura Matsumura
40
Chapter 2: The Early Conservative Parties
Sources: Asahi Shimbun; SCAP Miscellaneous Political Parties and Groups 1949 (GSB)
02683; SCAP Miscellaneous Political Parties 1951 GS(B) 02674-5; Watanabe 1958.
After this short overview of the factions, I turn now to an analysis of their characteristics
to provide a fuller picture of their structure.
2.3. The factions and their structural characteristics
The JiyOto and Minshuto factions were not of uniform character. The diversity in
visibility, durability, organisational tightness and political importance is in fact
confusingly varied. Although, as explained in Chapter 1, I will view and refer to all of
these groups as 'factions,' these factions were fundamentally different from the factions
that came to develop within the LDP in the late 1950s. In order to clarify the structural
differences between the early postwar conservative factions and the LDP factions, I will
use categorisations developed by scholars of factions, in particular those of Beller and
Belloni (1976, 1978c) and Rose (1964). Beller and Belloni argued that all intra-party
groups could be divided into three main groups: tendencies, patron-client groups, and
institutionalised, organisational factions (1978c:422-27). Beller and Belloni (1978c:427)
define the last category, institutionalised factions, as groups with developed
'organizational structure and ... relative formalization'. They may build on the appeal of a
leader, like smaller patron-client groups, but that appeal is more public and symbolic than
personal and private. The group resembles a corporate group because it has developed
organisational features such as membership, leadership, procedures and durability,
recruitment is important and aggressively prosecuted and the members' 'consciousness of
their factional identity is one basis of the existence of the faction' (1978c:427-8). This
description is very apt for the LDP factions (Baerwald 1986:21-22; Scalapino and
Masurni 1962: 19; Richardson and Flanagan 1984: 102-3; Stockwin 1989: 163).
I will argue, however, that the Jiyuto and Minshuto factions fall variously into the first
two categories. Some factions resembled more tendencies, others patron-client groups,
but most showed some characteristics of both types of factions. Tendencies have been
defined in varying terms but scholars using this term agree that they are intra-party
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groups which have very little structure, are almost totally lacking in organisation and are
of very short duration (Beller and Belloni 1978c:422). They often emerge as consolidated
support for a single issue or an electoral campaign. In Rose's view tendencies have a
clear policy-based foundation, and a stable set of attitudes rather than a stable group of
politicians (Rose 1964:37). To both Beller and Belloni and Rose, membership of
tendencies is very vague, often externally ascribed or dependent on the individual's self-
identification, and usually there is no purposeful recruitment. 8 These groups can have
leadership but they do not have the clientelistic character the patron-client groups have
(Beller and Belloni 1978c:422).
On the other hand, political scientists who have researched patron-client groups define
them as small groups based on the relationship between leader and followers, where the
leader grants favours to his clients, party members or electorate, in return for loyalty,
political allegiance or other services (Hall 1977:510; Weingrod 1968:324; Beller and
Belloni 1978c:427). Patronage refers to the way political leaders 'seek to turn public
institutions and public resources to their own ends' (Weingrod 1968:324). Perhaps
because anthropologists were the first to study factions as groups which structured
conflict within communities in non-Western societies (Beller 1978a:7), patron client
groups have often been viewed through a cultural lens. Beller and Belloni ignore the
cultural aspect in their definition and attempt a structural description of client groups as
based on the person of their leader, more structured than tendencies, and of 'intermediate
duration' although rarely lasting longer than the leader (1978c:424-5). Like the
tendencies, these groups are rather informal, they do not have headquarters or regular
meetings although they may meet at a leader's home. Usually such groups are small,
although they may become larger when they include sub-leaders, each with their own
following (1978c:424).
A number of factions within both parties lacked the durability ascribed to institutionalised
factions such as the LDP factions and were often established for a specific purpose, e.g.
electoral campaign or a specific political issue. The Maeda faction, for example, also
called the Hatsukakai (20th Day Club), was a group formed in 1952 by Maeda Yonezo
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following his depurge and aimed to assist depurgees to win their seats back from the
'postwar faction' (sengoha), which had run in their stead after the purges. In the general
election of 1952, great tension was observable between the depurgees and this 'postwar
faction' (Colton 1948:944; Kaijo gumi to sengoha gumi 1952). 25 of the depurged
politicians who joined the Jiyuto entered the Maeda faction, but most others joined the
Hatoyama faction. The faction was thus established for a specific electoral campaign.
The Jiyuto Ipponka Domei (Jiyuto Union Alliance), formed within the Jiyuto in 1952,
was another group formed for a specific, short-term purpose and thus resembled closely
the tendency as described by Rose (1964:37). It was a group of people, who, through
their neutral standing within the party, sought to reconcile the warring Yoshida and
Hatoyama factions. All those who attended a meeting in October 1952, calling for an end
to factional infighting, were assumed to be members of this faction but the group
depended less on the sense of membership than an agreed goal (see AS 8.10.52). It did
not expect to continue to operate as a group (see Rose 1964:38), and it was soon whittled
away as its members dispersed.
Within the Minshuto a number of factions also existed united more by issues than
leadership. The Shinshinkai and the Taiyokai were groups that did not adopt the name of
their leader and did not possess formal organisation or continuity but tended to be
mobilised for specific issues (see Beller and Belloni 1978c:423). The Taiyokai consisted
mainly of party members interested in a merger with the Jiyuto (Colton 1948:952). When
the group joined the Jiyiito in 1948 it slowly faded away. The Shinshinkai was initially
led by Inukai Ken but his leadership was not as crucial to its existence as the common
view that collaboration with the Jiyuto was not desirable and the group continued to exist
after Inukai had been purged (Fukui 1970:41; Colton 1948:952). Other groups within the
Minshuto also had characteristics of being formed around topical issues. The 'Opposition
faction' and the 'Coalition faction' emerged within the party in 1949 as party members
were forced to take a stance on the issue of whether or not to cooperate more closely with
the Jiyuto, but they dissolved when the issue was solved.
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All the Jiyiito and Minshuto factions differed from the LDP factions in that none had
permanent offices. Some set up offices temporarily, to fight in general elections or when
a split was imminent, but more often they would meet intermittently at the leader's
home," The meetings did not have many formal procedures as far as can be seen,
although some would meet on certain days of the week. All of these groups had at least
one leader at the centre, and sometimes two. The core of the faction was usually referred
to by journalists and politicians as the 'executive,' but there were no posts or clearly
defined hierarchy within the groups.
Furthermore, the early factions varied greatly in size-some were very small while others
reached many dozens. The bigger groups took on a character of machine-type client-
group factions, built on layers of leaders and followers, or had a dual structure of an inner
and outer circle of members where the latter would not be closely or clearly attached to
the faction. A large number of small factions, that were essentially patronage groups,
existed within the Hatoyama and Yoshida wings of the Jiyuto in the early 1950s. In the
Yoshida faction small groups, such as the Fukunaga, Aso, Tsubokawa, Hori, SaW, Ikeda
and Masuda factions, could be found. Within the Hatoyama faction, the Ishibashi,
Uehara, Hayashi, Matsuno, Masutani and Hoshijima factions could be found (Dower
1979; Fukui 1970:45; Tominomori 1994:72).10 These groups were very small with an
estimated membership of 4-6 members, and were centred on personal relations with the
leader (Masumi 1985; Tominomori 1994).
Most factions resembled the LDP factions in that they were named after their leaders (for
example, the Yoshida, Hatoyama, Miki, Kimura and Ashida factions), indicating that the
appeal of the leader was important. 11However, there was an important difference in the
role of the leader between the early factions and those of the LDP. Beller and Belloni
note that in machine-type patron-client factions there were often layers of sub-factions
whose members were leaders of other sub-factions (1978c:424). Many small factions
existing within the larger Hatoyama and Yoshida factions of the Jiyiito appeared to be
groups of this kind. A faction leader was linked to another leader higher up who in tum
was linked to the leader of one of the biggest factions. However, these sub-factions
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resembled tendencies as well because of the way they lacked visibility, often surfacing
when the leader needed to assert himself, and then disappearing from public view again.
In spite of the large number of such small groups in the early 1950s, they had no visible
impact on political developments, and rarely feature in historical material from the period
or in the newspapers. They did not act independently as groups or take part in decision-
making as formal entities, but always acted in relation to one of the two wings-the
Hatoyama or Yoshida factions. These factions did not meet regularly, or have exclusive
membership; in fact, it is doubtful whether the members consciously identified with
them. The groups were probably held together rather by vertical links between leaders
and followers than by horizontal links between members. There are indications that the
members of these very small client groups had multiple identities.i'' Because of their
small size, unorganised nature and lack of purposeful recruitment, these groups may be
described as tendencies with a patron-client element (see Beller and Belloni 1978c:422).
Although policy could be important in some factions, many groups in both Jiyuto and
Minshuto rested to some degree on the personal relationship between leader and
followers like the LDP factions. Party members would join factions in the hope that it
would help them advance in exchange for support of some kind. Tanaka Kakuei was, for
example, said to have joined the Shidehara faction in 1947 to increase his chances of
breaking 'into the fraternity of elites' in exchange for financial backing (Hunziker and
Kamimura 1994:47). However, because the big factions, such ~ the Hatoyama and
Yoshida factions were multi-layered machine-type patron-client groups they could not
act as uniform patronage factions. The Hatoyama faction, led by Ono Bamboku and
Okubo Tomejiro following Hatoyama's purge in May 1946, counted up to 100 members
and could be said to be a machine-type faction, including sub-groups of a leader-follower
nature. The faction was considered by many observers to be a prime example of an 'old
fashioned' patronage faction (Watanabe 1958; Colton 1948; Nippon Times, hereafter NT
5.5.47; Fukui 1970)-an entourage of the personal friends of Hatoyama from the prewar
political scene. These party politicians stood for 'the earthly, unsophisticated, rustic and
occasionally uncouth and blunt ways for which the Seiyukai used to be outstanding'
(Yanaga 1956:275). Such negative connotations also owed much to the fact that many of
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these politicians had strong relations with gamblers, gangsters, black marketeers,
brothels, restaurants and industrialists, as well as with the construction business.v'
However, the Ono faction was a group with an externally ascribed identity as the 'party
politicians' within the party, in opposition to Yoshida and his support faction but the core
of the Ono faction, which stayed within its fold, was much smaller than the group of
people who would occasionally provide the faction with support, depending on
circumstances and issues (see Rose 1964:38). Many of the leading members of the core
faction even worked closely with Yoshida, while the group retained its image as
Hatoyama's 'party politician' faction. Ono Bamboku, along with Masutani Shtiji and
Hayashi JOji,14came to be a powerful and important link between the 'party politicians'
and the 'bureaucrats' that Yoshida Shigeru recruited into the party (Masumi 1985:278).
When Hatoyama returned to the party, Ono was still a member of the Hatoyama wing
within the party and was one of the eleven politicians surrounding Hatoyama and
preparing his comeback to politics. But he had also moved close to Yoshida and was not
willing to take the aggressive stand against Yoshida that Hatoyama did. More than a third
of those considered members of the Okubo/Ono faction in 1947 had moved over to
Yoshida in 1949 (Sakano 1948: 80; SCAP Miscellaneous Political Parties and Groups
1949 GS(B) 02683).15 Because of the fluidity of the Hatoyama/Ono faction it never split
clearly, but slowly dispersed as some decided to stay within the Yoshida wing, while
others decided to ally with Hatoyama as he returned to politics in 1951 (Hatoyama
1957:139; Ono 1964:66; Fukui 1970:45-6).
Size was not always indicative of political power. In spite of the size of the Ono faction
and its patronage image, the faction had limited political impact. It was important
politically in the late 1940s and early 1950s as a group of party politicians resisting
Yoshida's leadership of the party, but it did not act independently as a group until after
the depurges when Hatoyama, Miki and Kono returned. Ono was given the post of
secretary general because of his prominent status as a party politician, but in spite of his
leadership of such a big faction he was never considered party leadership material. While
Ono was secretary general of the Jiyato from 1946-4816 he used his position to further his
interests and build up a following, but it was a blow to his status when he got embroiled
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in the Showa Denko scandal in 1948 and lost much personal support (Watanabe
1958: 119). This incident showed that only few were willing to follow Ono personally
(Watanabe 1958:127).17
The discrepancy between size and political power in the early factions was in large part
due to the lack of clearly defined membership and the limited emphasis on recruitment,
which made the factions very different from the LOP factions. Even in factions such as
the Hirokawa faction, within the Jiyuto. which aggressively sought to recruit members,
this different understanding of membership was obvious. The faction rested clearly on the
personal leadership of Hirokawa Kozen who formed the faction and led it throughout its
lifetime. However, the patronage was limited by the fact that the faction was dual ringed
with a large number of politicians considered 'quasi-Hirokawa faction members'
(Igarashi 1952:20).
Hirokawa was a party politician aligned with the Ono-Okubo group in the first few years
of the postwar period (Sakano 1948:75; Masumi 1985:278) but when he was made vice
secretary general in 194618 he started to build support around him. While secretary
general of the party between October 1947 and April 1950 he further consolidated his
support of largely new politicians and worked closely with Yoshida.19 He was firmly
entrenched in the Yoshida camp until 1952 as leader of the biggest anti-Hatoyama party-
politician faction and was one of Yoshida's closest associates (sokki'} ) between 1949 and
1952 (Igashira 1952:22; Tominomori 1994:72). He used his faction as a bargaining chip
for his own advancement within the party apparatus, showing his influence through sheer
numbers and thus enabling him to stay at the party centre (Watanabe 1958)_2o An
observer commented in 1952 that the faction was 'Hirokawa's own show' and that 'the
growth of Hirokawa is the growth of the faction' (Igashira 1952:20). As seen later,
Hirokawa decided to move from the Yoshida wing in 1953 to the Hatoyama wing and left
the party in 1953. After that the faction slowly dispersed.
Yet another characteristic of the early factions, differentiating them from the LOP
factions, was that they were not permanent organisations and leadership was never passed
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from one leader to the next. Groups dispersed rather than disbanded. This was seen with
the Shidehara, Inukai, Hirokawa and Maeda factions. The Shidehara and Inukai factions
dispersed after entering the Jiyiito in 1'948 and 1950 respectively. The Shidehara faction
maintained itself until 1951 when 26 of its 28 members from 1948 were still in the
faction. Twelve of those were still in the party in 1952, but ten were by then either neutral
or had joined the Yoshida faction, while two had joined the Hatoyama faction. Eight of
the twelve Inukai faction members in 1951 did not have known factional affiliation in
1952. Two had, however, joined Hirokawa, one had joined the Yoshida faction and one
was neutral.
As in the LDP, the patronage groups were groups serving the purpose of political
expediency rather than policy. However, they were built around a prominent politician
who used his position to attract followers with the foremost goal of promoting himself.
Throughout the early 1950s many of these groups were very big and claimed a
membership of up to 100 members. The factions were multi-layered with smaller patrons
inside the faction. The outer, and much bigger, circle of these factions was not built on
the same patronage links with the leader. This made the machine-type client factions
disparate groups with no unifying character.
Factionalism within the early postwar parties was also significantly different from that of
the LDP, which cut through the party ranks (see Beller and Belloni 1978c:437-8), in that,
although a great number of factions existed within the early parties, a large section of the
parties either chose to stay outside the factional struggles or participated marginally by
taking a neutral stance. The antagonisms and political manoeuvrings which were evident
within both parties in the 1940s and 1950s occupied the highest echelon of the party, and
not the whole of its rank-and-file. This fact has often been ignored in analyses of
factional politics in Japan. The result has been an exaggerated picture of widespread and
pervasive factionalism in early postwar Japan (see Scalapino and Masumi 1962;
Scalapino 1968).
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That section of the parties which chose to stand outside the factional ranks was often
referred to as the 'Centre faction' (chiikan ha) in both parties, but it was not a united
group. Rather, it involved a number of transient groups that could change rapidly. Rose
pointed out that such a group could 'represent a slack resource which disputants attempt
to mobilize in order to shift the balance' at times of intense differences within a party
(1964:38). This was very true of the neutrals within both the Jiyuto and the Minshuto. At
times of internal turmoil the neutrals would emerge as a faction standing between the
biggest rival groups, trying to act as a mediator. The rival factions would also try to woo
neutral party members to expand their own ranks.
There is less information available about the centre faction in the Minshuto than about the
corresponding faction in the Jiyuto, All the same, it is clear that a significant number of
party members remained non-aligned. This group became visible at the height of the
struggle between the Coalition faction and the Opposition faction in 1949 when it urged
both sides to become reconciled so as to keep the party together (SCAP, Review of
Government and Politics in Japan, February 1951 GS(B) 02558-60).
At the height of the factional strife within the Jiyuto after the general election in 1952 a
neutral group, called the Ipponka Diimei, mentioned before, was established, calling for
an end to factional fighting (Nagata 1953:37; AS 8.lD.52)?l The group was neutral in the
sense that it stood outside the polarised struggle although many individuals had
connections to one camp or the other. The group held a meeting in October 1952 with 74
participants. Of these, 35 were in the Jiyuto in 1951 with differing factional identities
(fourteen in the Yoshida faction, eight were neutral, six were in the Shidehara faction,
five in the Ono faction, and one in the Inukai faction).22 The criticism was often heard
that the centre faction was taking advantage of the difficult situation in order to improve
its own standing, and Miki Bukichi was quoted as saying that the central faction should
be called the 'Opportunistic Alliance' (Binjo Diimeit (Nagata 1953:37). However, the
centre faction was of great importance before and after the general elections in 1952 as
both the Yoshida and Hatoyama factions openly called for the faction to join them in
order to obtain total control of the party (AS 1.10.52). But the Ipponka Diimei did not act
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as a unified group for long, and by 1953 its members had merged with other factions
(Nagata 1953:37)_23Sixteen of the 74 joined the Maeda faction, two were Hatoyama
supporters, one joined the Hirokawa 'faction, four the Mindoha, and 48 had unknown
affiliations, suggesting neutral status or alignment with Yoshida (AS 8.10.52; AS 1953).
Another section of the 'centre faction' in 1952-3 was the Maeda faction, mentioned
above. The Maeda faction emerged following Maeda Yonezo's return to politics and had
around 30 members (Nagata 1953:37-8; Yanaga 1956:256). This group, which included
mostly prewar politicians who had been affiliated with the Seiyukai's Maeda and
Nakajima factions and had been purged following the end of the war, was significant in
the power struggle within the JiyUto because of Maeda's history as a political enemy of
Hatoyama in the Seiyukai (Nagata 1953:37; SCAP Concerning the Recent Political
Situation, April 1951 (GSB) 02683; NT 20.10.52)_24 After the depurge, however, his
faction stood outside the struggles between the Yoshida and Hatoyama factions and was
thus often labeled 'centre' in the press. However, it tried to use the hostilities between the
Hatoyama and Yoshida factions to its advantage by maintaining connections with both
camps. The Maeda faction was generally aligned with other pro-Yoshida forces and
against Hatoyama but some members of the group were more pro-Hatoyama and some
had connections with the Hirokawa faction (Nagata 1953:37; Hatoyama 1957: 133)_25In
early 1953, Maeda and leading members of his faction joined the Mindoha in putting
pressure on Yoshida to withdraw his selection of SaW Eisaku as party secretary general
(NT 28.1.53). On this occasion, the Maeda faction was able to affect the political balance
within the framework of the Yoshida-Hatoyama struggle, but was otherwise an
inconspicuous group. It was believed to have the potential to become influential within
the party in 1953 (Nagata 1953) but with the split of the Mindoha in 1953 the basic tactic
of the group of keeping a foot in both camps ceased to be effective. The Maeda faction
came to play a role again in early 1954 when Maeda joined Hatoyama and his forces
within the Jiyuto and the Kishi faction in talks with Kaishinto (Hatoyama 1957:133).
However, with Maeda's death in March 1954 the group dispersed.i" Its strong prewar
character hindered its growth, with most of its most influential members having been
prewar former bureaucrats."
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In spring 1952 another group emerged within the Jiyuto that claimed to be neutral on the
issue of whether elections were required following Japan's full independence. It included
people like Ishida Hirohide, who was close to Ishibashi and Hatoyama; Sasaki Hideyo
and Fukunaga Isshin, who were close to Hatoyama; and Yamamoto Takeo, who was of
the Shidehara faction and closely connected to Ishibashi (Ishida 1985:62). After Yoshida
announced he would continue with his administration until the end of its term the anti-
Yoshida leanings of this group became evident. After this group, along with the
Hatoyama forces, opposed the appointment of Fukunaga Isshin as secretary general in
1952-an issue which led to fist fights in the Diet-and attended a party in support of
Hatoyama, it came to be called the hanrangun (rebel army) by the Yoshida faction
(Ishida 1985:62). The group had dispersed by the general elections of October 1952.
Although the Jiyuto and Minshuto factions varied greatly in their characteristics, they
were all very different from the LDP factions. They resembled the tendencies and patron-
client groups as defined by a number of scholars and not the institutionalised,
organisational factions that Beller and Belloni discuss (1978c:427). Furthermore, the
existence of a large group of non-aligned party members in both the Minshuto and the
Jiyuto tells us much about the limits of factionalism at this time and is an important
indicator of a dualistic power struggle within the two parties. I will now turn to a
discussion of the tendency of both parties to polarise, rather than factionalise, throughout
the early postwar period, and the political consequences of this polarisation.
2.4. Polarisation and instability
As can be seen from the above discussion, the Jiyiit5 and the Minshuto had a number of
factions with different structural characteristics which has led scholars to argue that
factionalism was rife in the early postwar period (Scalapino and Masumi 1962: 149). I
have argued that these factions were very different from the LDP factions-a point which
has also been made by a number of Japanese scholars (Kitaoka 1995; Tominomori
1994:72; Goto, Uchida and Ishikawa 1982: 138; Iyasu 1984: 122). Kitaoka for instance,
argues that 'it is a misunderstanding that the [LDP] factions are a Japanese peculiarity
51
Chapter 2: The Early Conservative Parties
and a traditional feature. Factions like those in the LDP where almost all party members
would join did not exist in prewar Japan' (1995:27-8). Rather, the factions were
described as 'free comrade groups that met and parted' (Tominomori 1994:72). Watanabe
(1962:103) pointed out that 'there were no factions at the height of Yoshida's 'one-man'
rule comparable to today's eight army (gundan) factions, although the Hatoyama faction
had a few members.' Matsuno Raizo (1994:203), a member of the Jiyuto similarly
emphasised that
at that time there was no 'mainstream factional system' or such like. They were
meaningless words. You could meet up with other faction leaders and say what you
wanted without worry. That feeling of freedom was strong. Those were the times of the
good old factions.
I would like to take this argument a step further and argue that not only was the
factionalism of the early postwar period different from that of the LDP, but that most of
the factions were of limited importance. They were not at the centre of the political
process. What was of greater importance was that both the Jiyiito and the Minshuto were
dominated by intra-party polarisation between two large, fluid groups rather than by
factionalisation. These wings, rather than the factional system itself, were important
political groups affecting political stability greatly as a result of their confrontations,
debate over policies and fight for political power.
This situation within each party of two wings contending over leadership and causing
political instability resembled strongly the prewar factionalism within the Seiyukai.i" The
Seiyukai, formed in 1900, developed an organisational structure similar to the JiyiitO and
the later LDP (Fukui 1970:18). It had factions based originally on regional and
prefectural ties but these started to give way to different cleavages around 1920 (Fukui
1970:231; Kitaoka 1995:27; Scalapino 1953). Fukui (1970:23) argues that factionalism
naturally thrived within conservative parties in prewar Japan as influential politicians
'engaged in factional manoeuvres against one another' to get hold of the post of party
president. As in the postwar Jiyuto and Minshuto, this factionalism was largely polarised
between two groups vying for the presidency. In 1922, Prime Minister Takahashi and his
'dominant faction', which was in favour of a cabinet reshuffle, and a group led by
52
Chapter 2: The Early Conservative Parties
Nakahashi Tokugoro and Motoda Hajime, which opposed it, fought for control of the
party. The infighting between them led to a split in district organisation, funds and
personnel in 1924, as in the JiyiitO in 1953 (Fukui 1970:23; Scalapino 1968:275).
Another fight erupted in 1929 between Suzuki Kisaburo and Tokonami Takejiro
following the death of president Tanaka Giichi (Fukui 1970:24 )_29 A similar situation
arose again in 1938 when Suzuki, then president of the party, had to withdraw from
politics because of bad health. His departure led to a split between a Hatoyama support
factiorr'" on the one hand, and the anti-mainstream, anti-Hatoyama, anti-Suzuki faction
led by Maeda Yonezo and Shimada Toshio on the other. The latter grouping became the
Nakajima faction when they put the wealthy Nakajima forward as presidential
candidater" Many within the party did not take part in this struggle and stayed neutra1.32
Many scholars in the early postwar period have pointed out the resemblance between
prewar and postwar factional politics (Brines 1948; Colton 1948; Fukui 1970; Quigley
and Turner 1956; Scalapino 1968). More controversially, it was also often claimed that
LDP politics closely resembled the prewar pattern because of the dominance of factional
conflict (Fukui 1970; Scalapino 1968). Fukui asserts for example (1970:23), that the
polarised factionalism within the Seiyiikai, starting in the 1920s, was 'clearly a harbinger
of the postwar type of factionalism, particularly that of the LDP' .33
However, I would like to argue that there are important contrasts to be observed between
the factionalism of the pre- and early postwar periods and that of the LDP. The prewar
Seiyiikai and the postwar Jiyuto and Minshuto closely resembled each other because of
the fluid nature of the factions and the dominating polarised division of each party into
two groups contending for leadership, even while a large section of each party remained
neutral and outside the factional struggle (Kitaoka 1995:27-8). The similarities between
the Jiyuto and the Seiyiikai were thus extensive and significant, but many of their key
characteristics were greatly modified or changed after the formation of the LDP in 1955.
This will be discussed further in Chapter 4.
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I would further like to argue that this polarised nature of both the prewar and early
postwar conservative parties made the parties and the political system very unstable. The
perceived instability caused by the- ha, in particular in the context of the polarised
conflict, was widely seen in the press at the time. The term 'meeting and parting'
(rigoshusan) was much used by Japanese observers in the early postwar period to refer to
the fluidity of the conservative parties and the instability caused by their incessant splits
and mergers. In a polarised political environment factions were a tool to achieve political
power. As Quigley and Turner commented,
it is not surprising that the parties have become faction-ridden in the mad scramble for
power and advantage ... Politicians attract following by personality, money, status, and
prestige, then when seniority or size of the group allows it, the leader tries to expand his
holding on the party. If not recognized, the leader will leave with his 'flock' (1956:357-
59).
The common view of factions was that they were groups producing strife, stress and
strain in party organisation (see Beller and Belloni 1978a:6). Newspapers did not discuss
factions much in the 1940s and the first half of 1950s, but they featured much in the
period 1952-3 when confrontation between the Yoshida and Hatoyama wings was at its
height." The vocabulary of this conflict was dominantly aggressive and often had
militaristic undertones. Factions fought (arasoi), they gathered strength (ikioizuku),
attacked each other (oiuchi), fought battles (kessen), and worked underground to
undermine the other side (senki5teki ni yaru). Each wing within the Jiyuto was said to
have a camp (jinei) and commanders (shosui) and factional manoeuvres were compared
to natural disasters: Asahi Shimbun reported in 1952 that strong undercurrents could be
detected under a quiet surface (hageshii teiryiiy, with tremors and fires, and that the Jiyuto
was like a volcano waiting to erupt because of factional infighting. The formation and
choice of name for the centrist group Ipponka Diimei (Unification Alliance) in October
1952 was demonstrative of the view of factions as disruptive forces that caused parties to
fall apart. The opposite of factionalism was 'unity' (ipponka) and 'stability' (seikyoku
antei).
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The polarised wings of both the JiyiitO and the Minshuto were highly unstable and were
intent on splitting from the mother party if they could not realise their goals. There were
two major defections from the Minshuto in 1948 and 1950 when the Shidehara and
Inukai factions left, and in 1953 and 1954 the Hatoyama, Hirokawa, Ishibashi and Kishi
factions left the JiyiitO. Reed notes (1988:309) that in this period 'elite maneuvering was
vigorous and vicious, parties formed and failed, and factional groups switched parties and
undermined the leadership of their own parties.' The next two sections will describe the
polarised structure of each party.
2.4.1. The Jiyuto polarisation
Totten and Kawakami (1965:113) argue that 'one reason why he [Yoshida] was less
troubled by factionalism [than the LDP] was simply the fact that his strongest
conservative contenders were to be found in the rival conservative party.' This was not
true. Yoshida faced a formidable opposition within his own party and for most of its
lifetime, the JiyiitO was divided into two main wings. This polarisation was visible in
1946-51 but became acute in 1952-54 and was the most prominent cleavage of the party.
Sometimes these camps were referred to as the mainstream and anti-mainstream (to
shuryii, han-shuryiit but more often they were referred to by their names (see for example
Sakano 1948:73). The polarisation occurred at a number of different levels. It involved a
struggle between the new and the old, as was evident in the division between the Tozama
and Fudai wings; between types of political leadership, such as a reform/parliamentary
group and the machine faction (Sakano 1948:73; Colton 1948:947);35 and between the
leadership and those in opposition to it. In the late 1940s these different levels came
together in the JiyiitO in the struggle between the Yoshida and Hatoyama factions.
When Hatoyama was purged in May 1946 the Jiyuto was left without a leader. It was
decided, after complicated manoeuvres behind the scenes, that Yoshida Shigeru, a foreign
ministry diplomat, should assume the party reigns (Dower 1979:310; Kono 1958:146-51).
This met resistance within the party from the outset and was criticised as a 'resurgence of
the bureaucratic regime' (see NT 14.6.46). The rift between the old and the new
politicians became more pronounced after Yoshida took over the leadership. The old
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party politicians who had been involved in the formation of the Jiyuto in 1945 were
against Yoshida as he was a high ranking former foreign ministry bureaucrat and they
opposed many of his political decisions. Yoshida was considered lacking in political
fervour and was described as being 'lazy' and politically 'inept' by General McArthur
(Dower 1979:311), but he was also dictatorial, as suggested by his nickname 'One Man'.
In contrast, Hatoyama was considered by many a very skilled politician who maintained
good relations with most political forces (Finn 1992: 108).
In 1946 and 1947 the 'Old Guard', sometimes also referred to as the 'anti-Yoshida
faction', protested against Yoshida's decisions to appoint a number of non-party people
to the cabinet (NT 6.46; 2.47). The Fudai wing was weakened in 1946-7 as many of its
most prominent leaders were purged but it retained its mainstream status within the party,
including more than half the Jiyiit6 members (Sakano 1948:77).36 After the general
election in 1947 the party was clearly polarised, as Sakano noted that there 'were two
factions within the party that were easily visible to the public' (1948:73).
A split between the new leadership and the old became apparent at the party convention
in 1948 when Yoshida became more involved in appointments (Sakano 1948:84) and a
great number of former bureaucrats were recruited into the party, many at Yoshida's
instigation (Finn 1992:218). This weakened the Fudai wing further (Sakano 1948:73). In
1949, 42 bureaucrats were elected, raising the percentage of bureaucrats from 2.7% to
,
18.9% of the HR members (Johnson 1982:46; Masumi 1985:279). Some became known
as the 'Yoshida School' (Yoshida GakkO).37 Eleven people were said to have been
members of the school in the late 1950s (see Dower 1979:315; Masumi 1985:279).
Bureaucratic power had been strong in Japan, especially during the previous 20 years,
when the power of politicians had been curtailed. Political distrust of bureaucrats was
thus deeply embedded. But in the 1946 election the drastic decline in the number of
politicians with bureaucratic backgrounds and the necessary administrative and legal
skills, caused great problems for the political parties and the Diet (see Fukui 1970:40). It
meant that bureaucrats became again indispensable to the novice politicians who were
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unable to draft legislation on their own (Johnson 1982:45). The historical distrust
between politicians and bureaucrats underscored the polarised factional divisions in the
JiyOto, especially after the depurge in 1951, as many of the former bureaucrats came to
form the core of Yoshida's support faction, while many of the party politicians supported
Hatoyama. This division dominated party affairs in 1951-54 and was to continue into the
1960s. The antagonisms between the Yoshida camp and the party politicians during the
purge were fuelled by the personal antagonisms between Ono and Hirokawa that started
in 1949 (see Ono 1964:71). Ono felt that Hirokawa was getting into Yoshida's favour at
his expense and was trying to gain control over the anti-Yoshida Hatoyama group within
the party (Ono 1964:71-2; Tominomori 1994; Watanabe 1958: 120). This led Ono to
threaten to leave the party (SCAP Review of Government and Politics GS(A) 02553-
02555; see Ishida 1985:60).
After the depurge, layers were added to the polarisation. The division between the old
and the new was renewed as depurged politicians fought the new politicians who had
taken their seats, the division between the party politicians and the bureaucrats continued,
and a clearer split between the old and new leadership emerged (see Ishida 1985:75;
Johnson 1982:46).38
Hatoyama and Keno were both reluctant to return to the Jiyuto in 1951 after the depurge
and were in favour of forming a new party, as the party had, in their opinion changed too
much from its original state (Tominomori 1994:74-5).39 However, Hatoyama collapsed
with a brain hemorrhage in June 1951 shortly before his depurge and it seems that the
matter did not move any further. This made Kono and Miki determined to try to get the
leadership of the party into Hatoyama's hands again (Tominomori 1994:74).
In spite of the polarisation, the fluidity between these two groups was considerable.
Views within the Hatoyama differed considerably after the depurges. Keno and Miki led
those forces which wanted to get Yoshida to resign immediately (biiryoku kakumei)
(Watanabe 1958:121).40A number of Hatoyama faction members such as Ono Bamboku,
Masutani Shtiji and Hayashi Joji, had moved closer to Yoshida during the purge and were
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in favour of a peaceful shift (heiwa kakumei) of leadership. Some other prominent
depurged party politicians like Sudo Hideo, Okubo Tomejiro and Ishii Mitsujiro, who had
all been close to Hatoyama before the purges, also moved closer to Yoshida (Watanabe
1958:163; Nagata 1953).
Yoshida sought to isolate the dissident elements of the party. He decided to dissolve the
Lower House in what was called the 'surprise dissolution' (nukiuchi kaisan) in August
1952 and called for an election. This surprised the Hatoyama forces as they had expected
elections in October or November to give the public the opportunity to vote on the Peace
Treaty (Fukui 1970:44; Ishida 1985:71-2,59-60).
Yoshida also decided to expel two key members of the Hatoyama faction, Kono Ichiro
and Ishibashi Tanzan, just before the elections as a retaliation for what he considered
criticism of the party leadership. This caused a split in the party and the Hatoyama faction
fought the general election on 1 October 1952 separately, with its own headquarters and
separate election funds (Ishida 1985:72). The Jiyuto got 240 seats in the election, of
which the Hatoyama faction got 68 and the Yoshida faction 73 (Masumi 1985:285). The
depurgees won a great victory: winning 79 seats for the JiyUto (Fukui 1970:45).
The opposition to Yoshida's rule became even clearer after the election, when Hatoyama
opened an office in the Nikkatsu International Hall on 16 October, where he waged a
,
campaign against Yoshida, calling for internal party 'democratisation.' As will be seen
later, the two poles represented different economic and foreign policies, but their conflict
was also personal. A major demand was that Kono and Ishibashi be readmitted to the
party (Ishida 1985:77; Masumi 1985:286).41When, on 24 October, the Hatoyama faction
felt that Yoshida had not taken notice of these demands the Minshuka Domei was formed
with 35 founding members and sixteen other party members (Ishida 1985:80).42
The formation of the Mindoha made the polarisation of the party clearer than before but it
also divided the anti-Yoshida forces further. These two factions, the Hatoyama and
Yoshida factions, had one feature in common, which distinguished them from most other
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factions at the time: neither was clearly based on the personal authority of its leader. In
both camps party members were taking a stance on who would be a better party leader,
Yoshida or Hatoyama. The Mindoha was under the apparent leadership of Hatoyama but
it was actually led by Kono, Miki and Ishibashi, while Hatoyama was more of a
figurehead, partly because of his bad health (see Ishida 1985:81; Tomioka 1953:107). It
included close followers of Hatoyama, such as Ando, Makino and Okubo, and also more
independent politicians like Miki, Ishibashi and Kono, who were key strategists of the
movement and led it behind the scenes and had some followers of their own." There
were also some centrist figures driven by their dislike of Yoshida (Masumi 1985:287).
They all wanted changes to Yoshida's policies, and some, like Ishibashi, wanted an
immediate resignation of the Yoshida administration (Ishida 1985:75). Most were
reluctant to split, but some, like Ishibashi, declared they would do so if necessary (Ishida
1985:75).
The core of the Yoshida faction, the 'close associates' (sokkin), were those people
Yoshida trusted best, including Sato Eisaku, Ikeda Hayato, Hori Shigeru and Hirokawa
Kozen, This group was sometimes referred to as the 'Four-man Alliance' (Yonsha
Domeii, or the 'three houses and four shogunate administrators' (gosanka yonbugyo)
(Hori 1975:82).44The three houses in this context were Hayashi, Ono and Masutani, and
the four shogunate administrators were Hirokawa Kozen, Ikeda Hayato, SaW Eisaku and
Hori Shigeru.f According to Hori 'this was not an organised group, but a group in the
sense that Yoshida would consult with us on important matters' (1975:82; Iyasu
1996:151).
In the Yoshida wing there were also various forces that were not very close to Yoshida.
Old Hatoyama politicians now in the party executive, such as Hayashi and Masutani,
maintained links with both wings by attending meetings of the Hatoyama faction and
may have been instrumental in softening Yoshida's approach and securing party
nomination for Hatoyama faction candidates (Ishida 1985:73). The Maeda and Hirokawa
factions were also independent groups within the wing.
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The Mindoha showed its clout in a series of conflicts with the Yoshida wing in the Diet,
first in November 1952 when they absented themselves from a no-confidence motion on
Ikeda Hayato, the finance ministervand again in February 1953 when they supported a
disciplinary motion against Yoshida after he shouted bakayarii ('fool') at a member of
the Shakaito in the Diet (see Hatoyama 1957:123; Kitaoka 1995:56; Masumi 1985:292).
These radical actions of the Mindoha split the Hatoyama faction further as well as
widening the gap between the two factions vying for the leadersbip/'"
The Hirokawa faction was instrumental in shifting the balance in the Jiyuto between the
Yoshida and Hatoyama factions. Between 1952 and 1953 there were a series of conflicts
over appointments which in most cases involved Hirokawa (see Masumi 1985:282). In
early 1953, after internal wrangles over party posts, Hirokawa left the Yoshida camp and
joined the Hatoyama forces in their bid to pull down the Yoshida administration. There
were also personal considerations involved, such as the promotion of Ogata Taketora to
cabinet secretary in 1952 just after he had been elected to the Diet for the first time. He
was considered to be a likely successor to Yoshida (Ishida 1985:84; Masumi 1985:288).
Hirokawa's actions were intended to destabilise the party and split it, and were thus of
great importance for the party because they were situated within the wider framework of
polarised conflict. Hirokawa worked in close cooperation with Yoshida in the late 1940s
and into the 1950s. During his term as secretary general he gathered around him a group
/
of followers, but this factional gathering became increasingly important in 1952 and 1953
when Hirokawa deliberately moved away from Yoshida and towards Hatoyama. It was
observed at the time that
since he took over the secretary generalship from Ono, Hirakawa has preserved his
contact with Yoshida, but now that he understands Yoshida's way of working he has
concluded that he is not going to be controlled by him. Yoshida's puppet government
under the Occupation is now weakening because of the widespread feeling that maybe he
cannot continue his political life endlessly (Tomioka 1953:104).
Hirokawa thus strengthened his following in an obvious attempt to boost his position
within the party. After he lost his post of secretary he was eager to push out close
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associates of Yoshida and regain the post (Tomioka 1953:104). However, the Hirokawa
faction was not united in its attitude to Yoshida-some were more pro-Yoshida than
others-and Hirokawa could not force the faction to support his actions when he turned
away from Yoshida (Nagata 1953:36). He kept the support of around fifteen members
and in March 1953 the Mindoha and Hirokawa factions, a total of 44 people, finally split
from the Jiyiito (Kitaoka 1995:57; Masumi 1985; Togawa 1980:271).47 Yoshida then
dissolved the Diet again on 14 March 1953 in what came to be known as the 'Bakayarii
Dissolution' tbakayaro kaisan), only five months after the 'surprise dissolution'. The
loose organisation of the Mindoha was revealed in the fact that Miki, Kono and around
20 people of the Mindoha decided to split from the party on that day to form the Bunjito,
without consulting Hatoyama (Hatoyama 1957:125) while many others decided to stay in
the Jiyuto. Hatoyama wrote in his memoirs:
It was unfortunate that the Mindo split in two. But those who split from the Jiyfito, Miki,
Kono and Ishibashi, left with around ten of Hirokawa's men and they reported the
establishment of a new party. They supported me as president and I was happy to accept
it (Hatoyama 1957:126).
The Mindoha joined the Jiyuto again in November that year, almost in its entirity." after
pleas from Yoshida, who had difficulties forming a minority cabinet.l" But the
polarisation continued and the party suffered another split in 1954.
The dominating importance of the struggle between the Yoshida and anti-Yoshida forces,
and not the factional divisions of the party as such, on the stability of the political system
was clear, and this was obvious in reports made by observers and the press (Asahi
Shimbun; Burks 1964; Nagata 1953; Japan Times). When the Mindoha and the Yoshida
faction came head to head before the general election in 1952 the Asahi wrote that 'the
Jiyuto has until now been divided in two factions' (AS, 1.10.52). The Nippon Times
pointed out that the Yoshida, Hatoyama and neutral factions were of similar strength, and
concluded that
Chances of an amicable solution of the differences appear to be very slim. Essentially, it
is not the two individuals [Yoshida and Hatoyama] who contend for the Premiership, but
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their henchmen who scramble for power. And there is a third group definitely critical of
the two other groups (13.10.52).
According to many observers, the factional warfare within the party was no natural state
of affairs but a direct consequence of the fighting for leadership within the party. In the
Saiken journal in 1953 it was observed that
The Yoshida-Hatoyamapresidential fight has become the origin of the factional fighting
in the Jiyuto. The party leadership fight has become the source of such intense factional
antagonism. The illegitimate child is the Mindoha, The Mindo started moving under an
anti-Yoshida banner and then the Yoshida support faction [Yoshida shijiha] emerged as
an opposing force to the Mindo,with the central faction floating in the middle of the fight
between the Yoshida and anti-Yoshidaforces (Nagata 1953:36-7).
Judging from political analyses of the time, it was mainly the Yoshida faction and the
Hatoyama faction that were believed to be of political importance. The myriad of factions
that could be found within the Jiyuto between 1951 and 1953 featured very little in
political discussions. Even groups of considerable size, such as the Ono, Maeda and
Inukai factions, and the central faction had very little visible effect on the political
development of the early 1950s. The same can be said of the large number of small
patronage groups. These groups and factions stayed within the wings and did not act as
separate entities in times of instability. Their activities in-between the struggles that
erupted every now and then within the party were not clearly known and did not affect
the political development.
2.4.2. The Minshuto polarisation
The Minshuto was also divided into two main groups-a division that played a primary
role in the politics of the party. These groups were polarised between support for the
leadership and opposition to it, as well as being split over policy and the basic orientation
of the party. The polarisation was more complicated than that of the Jiyiit6 because the
leadership of the party changed more often.
The Minshuto/Kaishinto was almost permanently divided over the basic ideological
orientation of the party. There were major disagreements over whether the party should
cooperate or even merge with the more conservative Jiyuto, or whether it should be more
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progressive, aligning with the Socialists when possible. These issues came to the surface
whenever cabinet formation or merger issues were raised.
Factional conflicts based on these ideological issues started in 1947. Ashida Hitoshi, a
Jiyuto member, had entered the Shidehara cabinet in 1946 against the will of some of the
leaders of the Jiyuto, which caused a rift in the party (see Kono 1958: 140; Watanabe
1958:198).50Ashida, and Shidehara within the Minshuto, had been in favour of a merger
of the two parties but this was opposed by groups in both parties (Quigley and Turner
1956:280). A partial merger happened a year later, in March 1947, when Ashida bolted
from the Jiyuto and the Minshuto was formed. Some of Ashida's supporters within the
Jiyuto went with him into the Minshuto (see Keno 1965:189; Masumi 1985:135) where
he was made secretary general.
At the time of the merger in 1947, two factions existed within the party, the Taiyokai and
the Shinshinkai. The former, led by Shidehara, leader of the party, represented the more
conservative elements within the party in favour of expanded links with the Jiyuto
(Colton 1948:952; NT 9.5.47; Quigley and Turner 1956:281). On the other hand, the
Shinshinkai," led by Inukai Ken, who was then chairman of the Executive Council, was
opposed to collaboration with the Jiyiito and 'insisted on building a middle-of-the-road
party to promote the idea of 'modified capitalism' against the traditional conservatism
embodied by the Liberals' (Colton 1948:952; Fukui 1970:41; Quigley and Turner
1956:281).52
These two factions were ideologically opposed to each other but they also represented a
generational divide within the party. The Taiyokai included many older Dietmembers
who had been prewar Minseito Dietmembers, while the Shinshinkai included largely new
Dietmembers (Colton 1948:952; Quigley and Turner 1956:281; Concerning the Recent
Political Situation April 1951, GS(B) 02683). The struggles between the two wings thus
resembled in some ways the struggle between Hatoyama and Yoshida (Watanabe
1958:203).
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Ashida's entrance into the party caused disagreements over leadership and the general
direction of the party. A presidential committee had to be set up with six members
representing the two factions. Those representing Ashida in the committee were Ashida,
Kitamura Tokutaro and Nagao Tatsuo, while Saito Takao, Ichimatsu Sadakichi and
Tanaka Kakuei represented Shidehara (Watanabe 1958:203).53 At the same time, Inukai
Ken was purged and the Shinshinkai was left without a leader.54It was rumoured that the
purge of Inukai, along with Narahashi Wataru, Ishiguro Takeshige and Chizaki Usaburo
in 1947, was political (Baerwald 1977:84). Their purge aided Shidehara's efforts to quell
the revolt by this wing of the party, and increased the likelihood of a merger between the
JiyUt6 and Minshuto (Baerwald 1977:84). The conflict continued, however. The
Shinshinkai threw its support behind Ashida and the conflict was now centred on Ashida
and Shidehara (Uchida 1969:58). This shift in the factional support led to Ashida being
nominated party president of the Minshuto on 18 May 1947 by a special nine-man
committee. Shidehara was made honorary president and Saito advisor (Uchida 1969:58).
After Inukai's purge, the Shinshinkai chose Kitamura Tokutaro as its leader. The bulk of
this group eventually became the Kitamura faction (Watanabe 1958:203).
After Ashida was chosen as president, a struggle ensued between the two factions. In
spring 1947, the Shidehara faction started working with forces within the Jiyuto to fight
against communism and the Ashida faction. The Ashida faction was not interested in
cooperation with the Jiyuto as it 'would doom the Democratic Party permanently to the
unimportant and ignoble role of a tail wagged at will by the Liberal dog' (JT 9.5.47).
Instead the party, under Ashida's leadership, decided on participation in a cabinet led by
the Shakaito with the Kokumin Kyodoto. The Katayama cabinet spelled the end of the
cross-party anti-communism movement (Sakano 1948:83) but the Shidehara faction
made clear its discontent with the socialist Katayama cabinet (Quigley and Turner
1956:284).55 The inner instability of the Minshuto was considered to be the main danger
to the Katayama government (JT 1.6.47). The Jiyuto, anxious to overthrow the Katayama
cabinet, considered a union with a part of the Minshuto or even a union of all
conservative groups (see NT in November 1947) but it was clear that the Ashida faction
would not support such a merger (see NT 21.11.47).
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Although the Shidehara and Ashida factions were mainly at odds over leadership, there
were also clear ideological differences between them. Shidehara and the Taiyokai were
ideologically identical to the Jiyuto, in favour of laissez-faire and supportive of the
constitution created by the Occupation Authorities (see Fukui 1970:41). Ashida and the
supporting Shinshinkai were considered the stronger and 'the more progressive and
conciliatory element' of the Minshuto (NT 5.5.47), aiming for 'revised capitalism' (NT
21.11.47). In the autumn of 1947 these differences culminated in the coal mining issue
(Watanabe 1958:203; Masumi 1985:145).56 The coal-mine state-control measure led 23
members of the Shidehara faction to leave the party in 1948 and form a temporary group,
Doshi Kurabu (Quigley and Turner 1956:285), which joined the Jiyuto in March 1948 to
form the Minshu Jiyuto,
Although the right wing of the party had defected, the problems within the Minshuto
were not over. Fierce factional fighting ensued when Ashida retired from the presidency
in the summer of 1948 following his implication in the Shipbuilding Scandal (Watanabe
1958: 199).57Inukai was returned to the Diet in the 1949 general election, but was now in
opposition to the Shinshinkai which had supported him in 1947 (Watanabe 1958:204). He
was chosen president by the end of the year. Inukai's attitude to the Jiyiito changed and
he became an advocate of a closer relationship with the Jiyiito (Uchida 1969:60). The
conflict was now between Inukai and his new group on one hand, and Ashida and his
supporters on the other.
The main issue that divided the party was its relationship with the Jiyuto, resulting in
great shifts in factional divisions as many of those formerly associated with the
Shinshinkai shifted to a coalitional stance.58 The Coalition faction (renritsu ha) wanted
cooperation with Yoshida and a merger of the two parties, while the Ashida wing was
against such cooperation (Quigley and Turner 1956:288; Watanabe 1958: 199). The
Nippon Times declared that the internal debates over whether or not to join the third
Yoshida cabinet had 'created a schism which nothing can now bridge' (NT 15.2.49).
When Yoshida's third cabinet was formed in February 1949 after a massive electoral
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victory, the Minshuto was effectively divided into two parties. On the one hand, the
Coalition faction, numbering around 33 people, felt confident that they could get the
whole party to follow them into the coalition government (NT 22.2.49; Watanabe
1958:177).59 On the other hand, the Opposition faction (yato ha), led by Tomobechi
Gizo, around 37 people (see Watanabe 1958: 177), was pushing for an outright split and
had elected their own officials and an acting president by late February. 60 The two
factions went on to occupy separate floors of the party headquarters in February, with
separate leadership and different rooms in the Diet (NT 22.2.49). In March 1949 the
Minshuto finally split into two political groups-the Coalition faction led by Inukai, and
the Remaining faction led by Tomabechi-and reported this to the Diet (SCAP
Concerning the Recent Political Situation April 1951 GS(B) 02683).
The overtures of the Coalition faction to the Jiyuto were, however, not welcomed by all
Jiyuto members (Quigley and Turner 1956:288-9; Hori 1975:50). Many in the Hatoyama
faction, and especially Ono Bamboku, were against the merger, arguing that it would
weaken the party, and Shidehara and his group, who had joined the party in 1948, were
adamantly against Inukai (Hori 1975:50; see SCAP Review of Government and Politics
January 1950, GS(A) 02553-02555). The issue therefore divided both the Minshu Jiyuto
and the Minshuto as the 'amalgamation question became caught in the crosscurrents of
the factional struggle between the "bureaucratic" and "party" groups, the latter seeking
issues and devices by which to break Yoshida's tightening control of the Minshu-Jiyuto'
(Quigley and Turner 1956:289).
However, in late 1949, after pleas by the neutrals in the Minshuto that both groups should
'forget their differences' and 'reunite into one strong party' (SCAP Review of
Government and Politics 1949, GS(A) 02551-02553), it seemed that the Coalition and
the Opposition factions were ready to be reconciled, and it was agreed that the incumbent
ministers in the third Yoshida cabinet would be allowed to retain their positions (NT
24.12.49). However, at the same time, the Opposition faction had reached an agreement
on merger with the New Political Council, which was headed by Miki Takeo of the
Kokumin Kyodoto, and included the Farmers' Party and several independents (NT
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24.12.49). This move led to a breakdown in the reconciliation process taking place
between the two factions, because the policies of the New Political Council were not
compatible with those of the Coalition faction or the Minshu Jiyuto, In February 1950 the
Minshuto split again, and this time it was Inukai and his faction who left to join the
Minshu Jiyuto, It was not known until the last minute how many would be leaving the
Minshuto. Pessimistic estimates said five to six people (Hori 1975:53) but in the end 23
of the 34 members of the Coalition faction, led by Hori Shigeru, moved over to the
Minshu Jiyuto and the party changed its name to the Jiyuto once more (Hori 1975:52).61
Most of those who did not leave, joined the Kimura faction in the Minshuto. Because of
opposition of some forces within the Jiyiito, Inukai did not join the party with his faction,
but stayed an independent. He was, however, accepted as a member in February 1951
with Hori Shigeru and Hirokawa Kozen as his sponsors (SCAP Review of Government
and Politics, June 1950, 02555-02557).
This split transformed the factional pattern again within the Minshuto, Efforts by the
Opposition faction to merge with Miki Takeo and his party, the Kyodoto, led to the
formation of Kokumin Minshuto (People's Democratic Party) in April 1950 (with 67
representatives in the Lower House, and 43 in the Upper) (Quigley and Turner 1956:289;
Uchida 1969:61; Watanabe 1958: 199, 178).62 The polarisation had, until 1950, been
between the Cooperative and Opposition factions. After the merger, the party remained
polarised but this time between the Ashida group, including Kitamura and the
Shinshinkai, now considered to be the right wing, and the left wing, headed by Miki
Takeo, the party's new secretary general (see Watanabe 1958:183; Igarashi 1985:334).
Miki's group consisted mainly of former Kyodoto members (NT 9.5.52). Miki was
clearly anti-Yoshida and joined the Kaishinto in aiming to defeat the Yoshida
administration (Watanabe 1958:184).
The depurge affected the factional divisions within the Minshuto, as it did those in the
Jiyuto, leading to a number of new factions appearing. 32 depurgees were elected for the
Kaishinto in 1952 (Fukui 1970:45) but a few depurgees from the old Minseito, Oasa
Tadao, Matsumura Kenzo and Miyazawa Taneo, formed a political group called the
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Shinsei (New Politics) Club in August 1951. Before the 1952 elections, they merged with
the Minshuto, a few anti-Yoshida liberals and scattered groups to form a new party, the
Kaishinto (Quigley and Turner 1956:293; Tominomori 1994:75).63However, because the
party was unable to reach an agreement on who should lead the new party, it was decided
to try to find a leader outside the party ranks.64 Shigemitsu Mamoru revealed his
willingness to accept the presidency and had the support of the Ashida faction, but the
Miki faction was against this choice (NT9.5.52).65 However, after Oasa threw his support
behind Shigemitsu and became part of the mainstream (Watanabe 1958: 192), Shigemitsu
was made leader and Ashida special advisor. The right wing was thus put in control of
the party.
The polarisation of the Kaishinto was more complicated than that of the Jiyiito in that the
factions moved with greater frequency between the wings. The Ashida faction, for
example, which was in the opposition arm of the party between 1948 and 1952, became
the 'right wing' of the party in 1953 when the issue of a conservative merger came up
again. The descriptive terms for factions in the party often referred to this polarisation:
there were progressive and conservative, oppositional and coalitional, left and right
factions. The party was now led by Shigemitsu, and the conservative factions-the Oasa
and Matsumura factions-aimed for constitutional revision (Watanabe 1958: 183). The
Kitamura faction, which had been situated within the Ashida wing in 1947--49, was now,
along with the Miki faction, at the centre of the progressive or radical faction (AS
3.12.52). Again, as in the early postwar years, there were traces of a generational
polarisation. The progressive faction included many younger members while the
conservative faction was led by people who had been associated with the prewar
Minseito (Uchida 1969:61). Although the Miki and Kitamura factions were both in the
'radical wing', they did not cooperate very closely. The two factions had fought over the
presidency in 1950 following Inukai's defection, but Narahashi Wataru of the Centre
faction was elected (Watanabe 1958:204), and they clashed again over the secretary
generalship in 1952.
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As the issue of a merger between the Jiyiito and the Kaishinto progressed in 1954, the
two wings within the Kaishinto distanced themselves from each other. The factions
within the party in 1953-54 were largely four: the Radicals, including the Miki and
Kitamura factions; the Conservatives, led by Oasa and Ashida; the Neutrals, who
included the 'collaboration group', which aimed at unification with the Jiyuto, and the
'bureaucrats'; and the Matsumura Kenzo group, closely connected to the Miki faction
(Fukui 1970:46). The Miki and Matsumura factions were anti-Jiyuto while Ashida
represented the cooperative forces (Fukui 1970:47; Quigley and Turner 1956:296; Uchida
1969:65). In April 1954 the Shakaito put forward a no-confidence motion against the
Jiyuto in relation to the Shipbuilding Scandal, but in spite of Miki's support, 20 Kaishinto
people were absent from the vote (Kitaoka 1995:59). This was probably due to the
possibility of a merger between the two parties but Ogata had publicly spoken for a
merger in March that year. Ashida and Oasa were keen on conservative unification and
although initially interested in cooperation with Yoshida, they switched to seek
cooperation with Hatoyama, Kishi and Ishibashi from April 1954 to discuss a merger
(Kitaoka 1995:60; Hori 1975).
Although, as seen earlier, both the Jiyuto and Kaishinto had a number of factions, they
were characterised by a polarisation which represented multilayered antagonisms. These
polarised groups fought over leadership and policy, and also represented antagonisms
between the prewar and postwar generations. The two poles, rather than the factions,
were important political entities, determining party policy orientation and general
political strategies. I will now turn to discuss the way ideology and policy served to
sharpen the polarisation of the parties.
2.5. Factionalism and ideology
It has often been argued that conservative factions in Japan are based on personality and
not ideology. Scalapino (1968:272) argues that in the prewar conservative parties there
were no ideological confrontations, although at times 'non-ideological practical
problems' such as fiscal policy, agricultural policy, and subsidies may have divided the
parties. Kurzman (1960:277) argues similarly that factional divisions within the early
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postwar conservative parties were of little substance. It is argued here that although
policy was usually not the underlying or exclusive principle for factional formation,
policy differences were very important in creating and maintaining the polarisation
within the Jiyutc and the Minshuto until after the end of the Occupation.
There can be little doubt that there were important ideological differences between the
Minshuto and JiyiitO in the immediate postwar period that spilled over into intra-party
groups as well. These differences centred on economic policy and foreign policy.
Yoshida and the JiyiitO executive were pro-American and supported the postwar
constitution. In September 1951, Yoshida concluded a 'separate peace' with the signing
of a peace treaty in San Francisco, which ended the Occupation, and was linked to a
military agreement with the USA. The latter agreement, the Security Treaty, committed
Japan to rearmament and indefinite stationing of US forces in Japan (Dower 1979:370;
Igarashi 1985:324). The San Francisco Treaty built on the assumption that Japan would
gradually assume responsibility for self-defence-a notion which emerged from the US's
'reverse course' and plans to make Japan central to its strategic defences in Asia (Dower
1979:378). Yoshida opposed these plans initially but a change was detected in his
speeches around 1949 or 1950 (Dower 1979:381). Yoshida became convinced that
neutrality, wished for by the Socialists, was not an option and that a bilateral agreement
with the USA was the only option to end the Occupation (Dower 1979:373). He felt that
Japan should be an ally of the USA rather than seek a neutral position in the world
(Uchida 1969:20-21). He also believed that relations with China should be cultivated in
order to prise it away from Communism (Braddick 1998:208). A 75,000-man National
Police Reserve (Kokka Keisetsu Yobitai) was formed in July 1950. It was enlarged into
the National Safety Force in 1952. Rearmanent thus commenced, but it was slower than
both the US and the Hatoyama faction and the Minshuto wanted. Yoshida, although
considered in favour of self defence through international cooperation, resisted US
pressures and would not refer to his policy implementations as 'rearmament' (Dower
1979:438-9). Until 1952 he argued, in fact, that the Police Reserve was not part of
remilitarisation (Dower 1979:384; Igarashi 1985:329).
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Yoshida's foreign policy was in clear opposition to that of the Minshuto. The Minshuto
generally positioned itself between the Jiyuto and the Shakaito and was 'critical of the
untempered conservative approach'(Quigley and Turner 1956:311). It saw itself as a
centrist force and an advocate of 'reform capitalism' and some form of economic
planning (Babb, unpublished paper). Regarding foreign policy, it was clearly opposed to
Yoshida's pro-US approach and his emphasis on national self-defence. In the early 1950s
the party called for the early conclusion of a peace treaty and full independence, entry
into the United Nations, economic self-sufficiency, bipartisan foreign policy, retention of
the Bonin, Kurile and Ryukyu Islands, independent self-defence, and rearmament, with
the Security Treaty being changed into a Mutual Defence Treaty (Igarashi 1985:335;
Tominomori 1994:75). As will be seen below, however, the party was divided internally
on these issues.
Foreign policy, particularly in relation to the peace settlement and the presence of
American military bases, was also a contentious issue within the JiyiitO and hotly debated
in the Diet in 1949-51 (Igarashi 1985:333-5). The cleavage within the Jiyuto over
foreign policy was between the Hatoyama faction and the Mindoha on one hand, and the
Yoshida leadership on the other, and thus coincided with the main polarisation of the
party. Although there were no fundamental ideological differences between the Yoshida
and Hatoyama groups, there were real differences in policies. This was clear in 1951
when Hatoyama gave a speech at Hibiya in preparation for his return to the JiyiitO after
the lifting of the purge, and again in August 1952 when pro-Hatoyama people and the
party executive met to discuss party policy (Ishida 1985:71). There was real disaffection
within the Hatoyama group after the depurge over the direction in which the Jiytlto
policies had moved, and particularly over Yoshida's cautious approach to
remilitarisation, his close cooperation with the USA, and the Security Treaty (Hatoyama
1957:116). The Hatoyama group promoted constitutional revision and rearmament, and,
after the formation of the Mindoha in 1952, called for party democratisation
(Tominomori 1994:74). It has been suggested that the depurge helped to reinforce
ideological differences within the conservative parties (Babb, unpublished paper). This
may well have been the case in both the Jiyuto and the Minshuto. The depurged
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politicians were mainly prewar politicians who were eager to establish and differentiate
themselves from the politicians who had replaced them. This was seen in particular in the
Hatoyama and Maeda factions withinthe Jiyuto.
Hatoyama also supported a foreign policy 'independent of external pressures' by seeking
reapproachment with China and the USSR (Quigley and Turner 1956:313) and joined
those forces critical of Yoshida's agreement to 'subordinate independence' in 1951
(Dower 1979:371-2). It has been argued that Hatoyama and his allies in fact stole the
normalisation issue with China from Yoshida in the early 1950s and used it to undermine
his leadership (Braddick 1998:230). The policy differences were made even clearer in the
1953 general election, after the Mindoha and the Hirokawa factions split from the Jiyuto
to form the Bunjito, Rearmament was a crucial issue separating the two parties. In open
opposition to the Jiynto's policy of gradual increase in defensive capacity, the Bunjito
called for constitutional revision and rearmament (Ishida 1985:88).66
An important contribution to the policy cleavage within the JiyiiW was made by the Kishi
faction that emerged in the party in 1953. The faction built on old friendships and
patronage but its policies differed from those of the leadership. Kishi Nobusuke was
imprisoned after the end of the war as a class A war criminal but was released in 1948
and depurged in 1952. He formed his own party, Nihon Saiken Remmei (Japan
Reconstruction Federation) in 1952 with a number of depurged friends/" The Saiken
Remmei advocated the 'removal of communist aggression and adherence to liberal
diplomacy, cooperation with the Japanese and American economies, increased commerce
with Asia, as well as the establishment of an independent nation and the revision of the
constitution' (Kitaoka 1995:54). These policies resembled those of the Kaishinto and the
Hatoyama faction much more than the policy of the Jiyuto. Kishi, however, entered the
Jiyilto in 1953,68after Yoshida's initial refusal to admit him (Kurzman 1960), and ran in
the 1953 elections for the Jiyuto from Yamaguchi prefecture. His influence grew rapidly
within the party and after a meeting in November with around 40 Dietmembers, the Kishi
faction was formed (Kitaoka 1995:57).69 Kishi quickly emerged as critical of Yoshida in
spite of being Sate's brother, and was the main opposition force to the Yoshida wing after
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the split of the Hatoyama faction in 1953 (Ashida 1986 vo1.4:328). The faction showed
clear alignment with the policies advocated by the Bunjito, Hatoyama's party in 1953, on
armament and constitutional revision. The Kishi faction thus became an important
addition to the issue-based struggle between Hatoyama and Yoshida in the JiyiitO. These
forces, favouring more rapid rearm anent, joined hands with the left-wing forces which
supported neutrality and were against rearmament. Their common enemy was Yoshida
and the dependence on the USA (Dower 1979:446). Yoshida's policies were under attack
from the left and from various groups within the right wing which argued that he had
agreed to the subordination of the country in 1951 while at the same time criticising him
for rearming too slowly (Dower 1979:418).
The Minshuto was also internally divided on the basis of policy. The early factional
differences centred around the basic ideological orientation of the party and the future of
conservatism in Japanese politics. As seen earlier, a recurrent issue was whether the party
should seek to cooperate or even merge with the Jiyiito-an issue which caused internal
divisions from the start. The Shidehara faction was formed in the early days of the
Minshuto, when the party was debating whether it should look left or right in its coalition
strategies. The Shidehara faction had been formed partly on the basis of its willingness to
join the JiyiitO. The Inukai faction similarly formed as a group in opposition to those
plans. (Ishida 1985:57). The Ashida faction was similarly opposed to collaboration with
the Jiyiito and preferred the party to stay independent of the more conservative forces.
There were also differences in the economic policies of the factions. The Miki faction
brought into the party from the Cooperative Party an emphasis on reform capitalism and
the cooperative spirit (Uchida 1969:62).
The official foreign policies of the Kaishinto and the Bunjito closely resembled each
other (Kitaoka 1995:56). However, the internal divisions of the Kaishinto were clearest
on foreign policy. The party was largely against the Security Treaty since it opposed the
continued presence of the US in Japan but there were factional differences in the extent
of party members' opposition to the treaty. These differences became clear following
negotiations between the Jiyuto and Minshuto on the formation of a delegation to the
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Peace Conference in San Francisco in 1951. Tomabechi Gizo, chairman of the Minshuto,
accepted an offer to join the delegation, but the Miki, Kitamura and Ashida factions
opposed the plans (Igarashi 1985:337). Miki and Kitamura were critical of the peace
settlement and the latter also thought Yoshida's pro-US approach prevented a sound Asia
policy (Igarashi 1985:338). After the peace conference, factional conflict centring on
foreign policy continued. A number of people in the opposing factions voted against the
Security Treaty, while others voted against both the Security and Peace Treaties (Igarashi
1985: 339).70
The policy similarities between the Bunjito and certain forces within the Kaishinto, in
particular the Mild Takeo faction, did not pass unnoticed (Quigley and Turner 1956:293).
Links were between forged between the Kaishinto, Bunjito and certain businesses to
discuss trade with communist countries. This group wielded considerable influence
within the Diet in the Dietmember's League (Braddick 1998:221). Hatoyama, Ashida and
Shigemitsu all attacked Yoshida's programme of camouflaged rearmament, hinting that
the outright rebuilding of defence forces would be a wiser course (Dower 1979:391;
Quigley and Turner 1956:313; Tominomori 1994:79). The press commented on the
election results in relation to these issues. The Asahi Shimbun noted especially that the
socialist parties, opposing rearmament, had gained votes, while support for the Jiyuto,
which did not advocate rearmament openly but did so de facto, and for the Kaishinto and
Bunjito, both of which supported rearmament, had not changed (Masumi 1985:293). The
Jiyiitd did not manage to get a majority in the election.
There were also differences over economic policy. The third Yoshida cabinet followed
the Dodge Line." ending subsidies to industry, but Ishibashi was openly against the
economic policies of Yoshida and finance minister Ikeda. He was considered an
inflationist, supporting a 'positive fiscal policy' (sekkyoku zaisei), expansion of
industries, full employment and continuing subsidies to industry (see the Osaka hatsugen
mondai) (Babb, unpublished paper; Ishida 1985:83). Although the economic policy
differences were largely between Ishibashi and Ikeda, both of whom had very small
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factional followings, they added to the policy divide between the Yoshida and Hatoyama
wings (Ishida 1985:71).
The internal conflicts within the Jiyuto, the cooperation of the dissident elements with
both the Kaishinto and the left wing, and the weakened position in which Yoshida found
himself forced Yoshida to seek the Kaishinto's cooperation on the reformulation of
Japan's defence policy so as to make it compatible with the Mutual Security Assistance
Act in 1953. This cooperation led to major compromises on the political issues that had
separated the parties and the two main factions of the Jiytito. After the election, the Jiyutc
and the Kaishinto reached an agreement on gradual reduction of foreign forces and on the
establishment of a long-term defence plan (Masumi 1985:297; Kitaoka 1995:58). Within
the Jiyuto, Yoshida was forced to reach some concessionary agreements with his
opponents. In November 1953, when most of the Hatoyama faction returned to the fold, a
committee for the revision of the Constitution and rearmament, chaired by Kishi
Nobusuke, was set up (Uchida 1969:64). Following this, it was agreed in 1954 to revise
the Safety Agency Law, and upgrade the National Safety Force (Hoantai) into the Self-
Defence Forces (SDF, in Japanese Jieitai), a decision which was approved by the USA
(Masumi 1985:297; Sims 2000:273). The Mutual Security Assistance (MSA) agreement
with the USA was signed in April 1954, formalising Japan's rearmanent and industrial
remilitarisation (Dower 1979:417; Masumi 1985:298).
It has been commonly argued that after the end of the Occupation: and especially after the
agreements between the Jiyuto and the Kaishinto in 1953, which made the fifth Yoshida
cabinet possible, the issue-based differences gradually decreased and the conservative
parties moved closer together (Uchida 1969:64). Quigley and Turner (1956:313-4) said:
As the frequent defections and ententes led to a cross-fertilization of personnel and
policies, the doctrinal differences between the two conservative parties became more
obscure, and the Minshuto had to content itself with lines of action which, in many
respects, closely resembled those of the rival Jiyuto.
The cooperation of the Jiyuto and the Kaishinto in the fifth Yoshida cabinet and the
signing of the MSA in 1954 certainly did signal a narrowing of the division over foreign
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policy between the Jiyuto and the Minshuto, and between the Yoshida and Hatoyama
factions, leading politicians like Kishi and Ishida to argue that these were so minimal that
a merger was natural (Ishida 1985:93). However, although the parties had reached a
compromise on defence issues, the policy differences did not disappear altogether. In
spite of the similarities between the Hatoyama faction's policies and those of the
Kaishinto, there were differences that became clear when these forces came together in
the Minshuto in 1954. The newspapers speculated at the time about the policy differences
between the different groups within both sides and pointed out that for instance, the
reform faction within the Kaishinto, led by Mild Takeo, did not support the
remilitarisation proposed by both Hatoyama and Ashida, nor constitutional revision (AS
9.11.54).
Policy was important in creating divisions on the conservative wing of Japanese politics
and in reinforcing polarised factional divisions in early postwar Japan. However, it is not
easy to separate the power politics and the policy differences. In some factions,
leadership considerations, not policies, were the basis for the formation of these groups.
The Yoshida group had slowly emerged as the 'executive faction' of the party, while the
Hatoyama faction, first formed in 1945, was clearly contending for the leadership in
1951. Even the Mindoha was the result of a combination of forces within the Jiyuto that
were primarily concerned with Yoshida's leadership style, and was initially driven by the
desire to get Keno and Ishibashi readmitted to the party (Ishida 1985:80). The Hatoyama
faction always emphasised the need to return leadership of the party to Hatoyama, and
this, rather than policy, drove the faction on. All the same, policy or issue stances did
play an important part in increasing cohesion in the groups and in distinguishing them
from other factions, in particular within the polarisation within the parties. On the whole
it can be said that policy differences polarised the parties rather than fragmenting them.
2.6. Conclusion
Although the Jiyuto and the Minshuto had a number of internal factions between 1945
and 1955, these factions have to be distinguished from the LDP factions which scholars
later came to view as representing typical Japanese conservative factions. A great number
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of factions existed throughout the first ten years of the postwar period and proliferated
further in the early 1950s. Although the Jiyuto and the Minshuto were rife with
factionalism between 1951 and 1954; with up to eighteen groups existing within them at
different times, we should be careful about giving them the importance the LDP factions
were to have. The factions varied greatly in size, for while some comprised more than a
hundred members, others had a very small and unspecified membership, which
overlapped with other factions, and were of such limited importance that they hardly
feature in historical references. Many groups appeared for a limited time when a political
leader got to a prominent position, such as secretary general or vice secretary general, but
then dwindled again. Factions were never passed on to new leaders but died. Members of
small factions had multiple membership to different groups while the big groups had a
small core of supporters and a big outer layer where people moved freely. These factions
represented the leader rather than the membership of a group.
All these characteristics made the Jiyuto and Minshuto factions fundamentally different
from the LOP factions. They had structural features more commonly associated with
patron-client groups and tendencies than with organised factions such as those found
within the LOP. It was consequently of much greater importance for the political system
that the factions in the conservative parties were divided into two wings which contended
for leadership. The factions were important for the political process only as part of either
of the two poles or wings of the parties. What affected the political landscape in both
,
parties and in the political system at the time was their polarisation into two wings, which
represented not unified groups but an amalgamation of many forces. This polarisation
resembled that seen within the prewar conservative parties. It was in this context that
policy differences were important. The divergent views of the polarised factions of the
parties accentuated the polarisation of the parties. The struggle between these wings led
to political instability when groups split and merged with or formed other parties. This
instability contrasted with the commonly perceived stability of the factionalism in the
LOP in the 1960s onwards when it came to form a part of the institutional framework of
the party. But before discussing LOP factionalism in depth, I will seek to establish in
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more detail how the early postwar factions differed from the LDP factions in terms of
inner organisation and functional relations with the parties as a whole.
Notes
1 Seventeen of the nineteen former Seiyiikai members had belonged to the Kuhara faction to which
Hatoyama belonged, and only one to the rival Nakajima faction (Fukui 1970:35, 40). Seven party
members came from the Minseito, the main rival to the Seiyukai in prewar Japan (Fukui 1970:40; Colton
1948).
2 The Jiyiit6, however, only had five cabinet members. The Shinpot6 had four ministerial posts and four
were given to non-partisans.
3 Two main issues guided the purges: involvement with the war, and/or perceived undemocratic
inclinations of individuals (Baerwald 1977: 10).
4 SCAP Miscellaneous Parties and Groups 1949-50 GS(B) 02683.
5 In 1953 for example, the Miki faction was estimated to have eight members, the Kitamura faction three or
four, and Oasa five or six (Ashida 1986:327).
6 The Katayama cabinet was a coalition and included seven members from the Shakait6, seven from the
Minshut6, one from the Ryokufiikai (Green Wind Society in the HC), and one independent from the
House of Councillors (Sims 2000:256).
7 The Ashida cabinet was a coalition with the Shakait6 and included eight Socialist ministers.
8 Zariski argued, on the other hand, that an intra-party group was not a faction unless the members shared a
sense of common identity (1960:33).
9 Hatoyama Ichiro, Hirokawa Kozen and Yoshida Shigeru all had frequent meetings at their homes
(Watanabe 1958; Hatoyama 1957).
10 Tsubokawa Shinz6 was a member of the Inukai faction when it entered the Jiyiit6 in 1950 and at least
until 1951 (Hori 1975; SCAP 1949 Miscellaneous Parties 1951, GS(B) 02674-5). He was made vice
secretary general of the Jiyiit6 in 1951 and may have acquired a small following then (see Hori 1975:61).
According to some sources, the Hori, Inukai and Shidehara factions that came from the Minshut6 were
outside the Yoshida camp, although anti-Hatoyama (Tominomori 1994: 72). According to Hori himself,
he only led the Inukai faction into the Jiyiit6 in 1950 and did not have a faction of his own (Hori
1975:60). It seems more likely that Hori acquired an independent following in the end of 1951 when he
was made cabinet secretary.
Little is known about the Sat6 faction. It is believed to have had seven members (Tominomori 1994:71-
2). Tanaka Kakuei, a member of the Yoshida Gakkii was considered a 'member' (Babb 2000). Hashimoto
Tomisaburo was also considered close to Sat6 (Watanabe 1958).
The Ikeda faction was of a similar size (Tominomori 1994:71-2). Maeo Shigesaburo was said to be one
of his closest supporters (Togawa 1980:242). '
Masuda Kaneshichi was a bureaucratic politician who entered the Jiyiit6 in 1947. His rise within the
party was fast: he was made transport minister and chairman of the Policy Affairs Council in 1947
(Sakano 1948: 105). He was described as a 'bureaucratic boss' (Sakano 1948:107) but the Masuda faction
did not come into public view until 1951 when Masuda became secretary general. The faction reportedly
had 25 members in 1952, situated in the Yoshida wing (kei) (SCAP Conservative Parties 1951 GS(B)
04352; see also Tominomori 1994; Masumi 1985:283; Igashira 1952:20). Aoki Masashi may have been a
Masuda kobun. The Masuda faction seems to have faded soon after and aligned with Ono Bamboku
(Watanabe 1958:125).
There seems to have been a consolidation around Ishibashi after he returned to the Jiyiit6 in 1953 and
became an icon of anti-Yoshida sentiment. Before this, and in the short lifetime of the Bunt6ha Jiyiit6,
the group did not behave like a faction (see Ishida 1985). Ishida was probably closest to Ishibashi at this
time and aided his comeback in 1951, supporting him on election tours (Ishida 1985:65). He split from
the Jiyiit6 with him in 1953 but advocated returning later in the year (see Hatoyama 1957: 129). Others
close to Ishibashi were Matsuda Tetsuzo, Nakagawa Shunji, SaW Torajir6, Shimamura Ichiro, Sasaki
Hideyo and Tsuji Kanichi (Watanabe 1958:136, 165-66). They were all in the Mindoha and split from
the Jiyiit6 in 1953, with the exception of Tsuji.
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Hayashi was an old Hatoyama supporter but became close to Yoshida as well during the latter's rule of
the Jiyiito. He played a political role primarily as a close associate of Yoshida and not as a faction leader.
11 It was only rarely that a faction was given a formal name in the Jiyuto, The Hirokawa faction decided on
February 18, 1953 to be called the 'Comrade Club' (Doshi Kurabu-the name the Shidehara faction had
in the late 1940s) to strengthen their presence within the Jiyiito as an anti-Yoshida group. This was a first
step towards a split from the party which materialised in March (see AS 19.2.53). Most other factions
bore the name of their leader.
12 Ishida Hirohide, for example, was close to Ishibashi Tanzan and was thus considered a member of the
Ishibashi faction. However, Ishida was also prominent within the Hatoyama faction and in the Mindoha
(Ishida 1985:58). His factional identities may thus have included all of these. Tanaka Kakuei is also a
good example. He was a member of the Shidehara faction when he entered the Jiyiito in 1948 but became
close to SaW Eisaku too following Sate's support to him during a bribery case (Togawa 1980; Hunziker
and Kamimura 1994:55; Johnson 1986:6). However, he was also close to Yoshida, and was sometimes
considered a member of the Yoshida Gakko (Togawa 1980).
13 Ono Bamboku, Hatoyama Ichiro, Miki Bukichi and Okubo Tomejiro were all said to have such
connections (Sakano 1948:101-2).
14 Kono says Ono and Hayashi formed the mainstay of the Hatoyama sokkin within the Seiyukai (Kono
1958:133). When Kuhara was made the mainstream candidate against Nakajima for the party leadership,
Hayashi refused to work with the former because of his 'loyalty' to Hatoyama (Kono 1965:152; Kono
1958:138).
15 Many of the Traditional faction had moved to Ono in 1949 but three of the ten had transferred their
support to Yoshida. The majority of the Nakajima faction went to the Ono faction while the Hoshijima
and Matsuno faction in 1947 had almost moved in their entirety to Yoshida by 1949.
16 He was made chairman of the House of Representatives in 1952 which boosted his position further.
17 In his memoirs Ono talks for the first time about the 'Ono faction' in 1954 when the party turned against
Yoshida and his intention to dissolve the Diet (Ono 1964: 79-80). The faction did exist before that
though, but the membership is very unclear. It is though clear that Konishi Hideo was a member of the
group from the late 1940s and into the 1950s (see Ono 1964:96; SCAP Miscellaneous Parties 1951
GS(B) 02674-5). Key members of the Ono faction that did not leave in 1953 or take part in the Mindoha
were Tsukada Jiiichiro and Murakami Isamu.
18 Hirokawa's appointment was made after Okubo's recommendation. Ono felt resentful that he had aided
Hirokawa's promotion within the party after seeing the way Hirokawa got into Yoshida's favour and
received patronage from him (see Ono 1964:71-2). Ono and Hirokawa had a number of clashes, first in
the 'Kitchen attacks' and then over Ono's nomination after his involvement in the Shoden scandal (Ono
1964:73).
19 Fukui has asserted that Hirokawa created his faction in 1953 after distancing himself from Yoshida
(1970:45). However, it is clear that he had personal following from the late }940s but was firmly situated
within the Yoshida camp.
20 Hirokawa was very aggressive in recruiting followers concentrating on new politicians and former
Minshuto members (Igashira 1952:20). Of the fifteen Hirokawa faction members in 1954 who had also
been in the party in 1951,60% had been outside the Yoshida camp (where the Hirokawa faction was
situated) in 1951; 27% had been in the Ono faction in 1951; while one had been a Shidehara faction
member and one in the Inukai faction. Of those belonging to the Hirokawa faction in 1953, 50% had
been in the Yoshida camp in 1949, and 50% in Ono, Shidehara, Inukai and neutral groups (SeAP
Miscellaneous Parties and Groups 1949, GS(B) 02683; SCAP Miscellaneous Parties 1951 GS(B)
02674-5; Watanabe 1958; Hatoyama 1964) ..
21 It was led by Hoshijima Jiro, Omura Seiichi and Yamaguchi Kikuichiro, At its first meeting 74
Dietmembers attended (AS 8.10.52).
22 This information comes from my database and builds on information from the AS 7.10.52, and SCAP
Miscellaneous Parties and Groups 1951, GS(B) 02673.
23 Another ipponka group existed around the same time, which was led by the secretary general, Hayashi
Joji, and Masutani, Chairman of the Executive Council.
24 See Nagata 1953 for a list of members.
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25 In 1952, when the struggle between the Yoshida and Hatoyama factions was at its height three of the
Maeda faction's members were considered Hatoyama faction members, two were thought to support
Yoshida, while the rest were either neutral or claimed by both camps (see AS 3.10.52).
26 Hatoyama says in his memoirs that he thinks the Yoshida administration would have crumbled much
earlier had Maeda lived (Hatoyama 1957:134). In 1954 four members had joined Kishi but in the
database affiliation of twelve is not known, indicating that they were either neutral or affiliated with
Yoshida. The faction thus became powerless after Maeda's death.
27 The rift between the 'postwar group' (sengoha) and the prewar politicians, or depurgees, was evident in
1951-3 when the SCAP depurged a great number of politicians (see Kaijo gumi ha to sengo gumi ha
1952; Fukui 1970:44). The return of the depurgees caused great problems in electoral districts where
postwar politicians had run in their place and were unwilling to give their seats up (Kaijo gumi ha to
sengo gumi ha 1952).
28 This was pointed out in the press too. The Nippon Times said at the height of the struggle within the
Jiylito over appointments in 1952 that 'The present situation of the Liberal Party curiously reminds us of
the last days of its prewar forerunner the Seiyukai. A litle [sic] before the Pacific War, Hatoyama wanted
to become president of the Seiyukai. But his influence was not powerful enough. His ambition merely
caused definite breakup of the party into three factions-one led by Hatoyama, the second by
Fusanosuke Kuhara, who was also elected in the recent elections as an independent, and the third by the
late Chikuhei Nakajima, an aviation tycoon. The decadent groups were then easily smothered by the
military' (NT 13.10.52).
29 Suzuki won with the assistance of his brother-in-law, Hatoyama Ichiro (Fukui 1970:24).
30 The most prominent members of the Hatoyama camp in the Seiyukai were Ota, Ono, Okada, Matsuno,
Inukai and Funada Naka (Kono 1965:150--1). Others were Ando, Ashida and Kojima (Hatoyama
1957:112). Inukai, Ota and Funada were said to be the 'interim faction' or the young Dietmembers, but
they gradually deserted Hatoyama. They were not close to Hatoyama in the postwar Jiylito (Kono
1958:133).
31 The Hatoyama faction was said to have 30--35 followers within the 71-member Kuhara faction, while the
Nakajima faction had 96 members. Eleven were said to be neutral- 'the ambitious who sought to offend
neither faction' (Colton 1948:941).
32 The Yamamoto faction, for example, was a centrist faction, to which Kono Ichiro belonged. He moved
closer to Hatoyama around this time, following Yamamoto's death (Kono 1965:148; Kono 1958:129-
130). Another was the faction led by Kanemitsu Tsuneo (Fukui 1970:24).
33 Fukui further argued that the period between 1945 and 1950 was an aberration from the prewar period
because of the less conspicuous factionalism under the Occupation (Fukui 1970:41).
34 A computer-aided search in Asahi Shimbun between 1945 and 1959 for the word 'habatsu' reveals that
of 108 entries for this word only fourteen appear before the merger of the two parties in 1955, or 13%.
The rest, 87%, appeared in the period 1956--9. ,
35 In the Jiylito, Ashida was one of the leaders of the reform faction, but he left the party in 1947. The
machine faction was led by Hatoyama (Colton 1948:947). The machine faction was dominant in the first
year, especially after Ashida left, but after the 1947 purges and the removal of more of its leaders, Okubo
Tomejiro and Hanashi Shingoro, the reform faction was strengthened again (Colton 1948:947).
36 This included Hatoyama Ichiro, Kono Ichiro, Miki Bukichi, Ando Masazumi, Matsuno Tsuruhei and
Makino Ryozo.
37 The bureaucrats recruited in 1949 were, among others: Sato Eisaku, Ikeda Hayato, Okazaki Katsuo,
Yoshitake Eichi, Sakata Eiichi, Endo Saburo, Fukui Isamu, Okada Goro, Kogane Yoshiteru, Hashimoto
Ryiigo, Fukuda Tokuyasu, Kitazawa Naokichi, Minami Yoshio, Nakamura Kohachi, Nishimura Eiichi,
Mitsuo Kimisuke, Kodama Haruyuki, Setoyama Kazuo, Nakamura Junichi, Tamaki Minoru, Tsukahara
Toshiro, Ohashi Takeo, Nakamura Kiyoshi, Tanaka Keiichi, Fukunaga Kenji, Fujieda Sensuke, Aoyagi
Ichiro, Nishimura Naomi (Togawa 1980:91-2). Because of their bureaucratic background and the fact
that they were recruited by Yoshida himself, these politicians have been considered Yoshida faction
members or even members of the Yoshida School. However, some of these politicians did not stay close
to Yoshida. A substantial number kept a neutral stance. Mitsuo Kimisuke, Nishimura Eiichi, Nakamura
Kohachi, Minami Yoshio, Fujieda Sensuke, Nakamura Kiyoshi, Tamaki Minoru, Nakamura Junichi were
not fully entrenched in the Yoshida faction and kept a neutral stance while Aoyagi was associated with
80
Chapter 2: The Early Conservative Parties
the Shidehara group (SCAP Miscellaneous Political Parties and Groups 1949, GS(B) 02683 and SCAP
Miscellaneous Political Parties 1951, GS(B) 02674-5).
38 A number of groups, such as the Kisaragi Kai, the Ni Hachi Kai, and the Tokakai, were established in the
HR in 1949 for Jiyiito Dietmembers which crossed the factional divide but at the same time served to.
consolidate the division of the party into. two. camps. These groups served as support groups for
Dietmembers who. had been elected once, twice or three times, respectively (SCAP Political Parties and
Groups 1949,GS(B) 02683).
39 Miki Bukichi was depurged in June 1951 along with Ishibashi Tanzan (Tominomori 1994:73) but
Hatoyama was not depurged until August 1951.
40 Those instrumental in paving the way for Hatoyama to.return to.politics were Miki Bukichi, Kono Ichiro,
Okubo Tomejiro, Ono. Bamboku, Ando Masazumi, Ishii Mitsujiro, Makino. Ryozo, Uehara Etsujiro,
Hoshijima Jiro, Hayashi Joji and Hiratsuka Tsunejiro. Of these eleven people only four left the Jiyiito
with Hatoyama in 1953: Miki, Kono, Uehara and Hiratsuka. Ando and Okubo. had led the group of
Hatoyama supporters who. advocated a return to.the Jiyiito in 1951 in the hope of getting hold of the party
again but they turned out the be the more conciliatory elements of the group and refused to.leave in 1953
(see Tominornori 1994:73).
41 Hatoyama made four demands: that political stability be reached through cooperation with other parties;
that a reshuffle take place to. show dedication to. liberal rule over autocratic politics; that the party stop
secret diplomacy and seek cooperation and peace with other nations; and that the expulsion of Kono and
Ishibashi be rescinded as it endangered the unity of the party (Ishida 1985:78).
42 Ando Masazumi was chosen chairman and Hiratsuka Tsunejiro vice chairman. Members of the
committee were Miki Bukichi, Sunada Shigemasa, Makino. Ryozo, Uehara Etsujiro, Mori Kotaro and
Kawai Yoshinari (Ishida 1985:80).
43 Matsuda seems to.have been a follower of Miki at this time (Kono 1958: 182) and followed him into. the
Bunjito and then into. the Minshuto and through the Hatoyama cabinets (Hatoyama 1957: 156).
44 Tomioka calls those who. surrounded Yoshida at this time the 'unio.n o.f fo.ur descendants' (chokkei
yonsha remmei) (To.mio.ka 1953:105; see Ho.ri 1975).
45 Yo.shida started to. distance himself from Hirokawa, o.ne o.f his 'administrato.rs' in the early 1950s. He
was o.ne o.f the few sokkin who. was no.t to.ld abo.ut Yo.shida's intentio.n to. disso.lve the Diet in 1952
(To.mio.ka 1953: 105).
46 So.me o.f Hato.yama's clo.sest allies, the so.-called 'cautio.us factio.n' within the Mindoha, Ando, Okubo
and Makino., sho.wed signs o.fwanting to.ease the pressure o.nYo.shida at this po.int (Masumi 1985).
47 This data builds o.nmy database. Their factio.nal affiliatio.n in 1953 had been as fo.llo.ws:30 people had
belo.nged to. the Hato.yama factio.n and/o.r Mindoha, thirteen were members o.f the Hirokawa factio.n and
o.ne came from the Maeda factio.n. They left the party and ran fo.r the Bunto Jiyiito in 1953.
48 Miki, Kono. and Ishibashi had decided to. fo.llo.wHato.yama back into. the Jiyiito, acco.rding to. Kono.'s
auto.bio.graphy, but they changed their minds after two.members o.f the Bunjito, Matsuda Takechiyo. and
Yamamura Shinjiro, said reso.lutely that they wo.uld no.t return. Miki and Kono. then decided to. stay as
well, and were jo.ined by Matsunaga Higashi, Nakamura Umekichi, Ikeda Masano.suke and Ando Kaku.
They came to.be called the 'eight samurai' (Kono. 1958:182).
49 In the 1953 electio.n the Jiyiito go.t 199 seats and with the co.o.peratio.no.f the KaishintO, fo.rmed the fifth
Yo.shida cabinet (Masumi 1985; To.gawa 1980).
50 There were disagreements between Ashida and the Hato.yama sokkin o.ver who. sho.uld take o.ver from
Hato.yama in 1946, as well as o.ver the appo.intment o.f the secretary general when Kono. was appo.inted.
Ho.stilities between Kono. and Ashida in particular were co.nsiderable (Watanabe 1958:198).
51 Party members asso.ciated with the Shinshinkai were Ho.ri Shigeru, Chizaki Usaburo, Kitamura To.kutaro,
Ko.saka Zentaro, Kawasaki Hideji (Uchida 1969:58), as well as Shiikuma Saburo, Nakaso.ne Yasuhiro,
Yamashita Harue, and Sakurauchi Yo.shio.(SCAP Political Parties in Japan 02519-22).
52 In 1949 the Taiyo.kai had been reduced to. a 'o.ne-man party' with Hashimo.to. Kinichi representing the
group. Hashimo.to was a member o.f the Inukai group but jo.ined the Oppo.sitio.n group at the party
co.nference o.nMarch 8. The Shinshinkai o.nly had two.members in 1949, Shiikuma Saburo and Kawasaki
Hideji, and was o.n the anti-co.alitio.n side (SCAP Concerning the Recent Political Situation April 1951
(GS(B) 02683; SCAP Miscellaneous Political Parties and Groups 1949 GS(B) 02683).
53 There seems to. have been a neutral group which wanted Saito. Takao. as president o.f the party (NT
9.5.47).
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54 Four important leaders of the Minshuto were declared ineligible in the 1947 general election: Inukai Ken,
Narahashi Wataru, Ishiguro Takeshige and Chizaki Usaburo (Colton 1948:947).
55 The Anti-Communism League had nineteen Jiyfito members, sixteen Minshuto members and two from
the Kokukyoto (Sakano 1948:83). .
56 The coal mining issue revolved around the government's plans to nationalise the coal mines.
57 The Ashida faction was affected by Ashida's involvement in the Showa Denko scandal which boosted
the anti-Yoshida elements in the party (NT 22.2.49).
58 They were Inukai Ken, Hori Shigeru, Kozaka Zentar6, Kimura Kozaemon (Uchida 1969:60).
59 A number of small groups existed in 1949 as seen in Table 2-2. The Keisetsu Kai Group was in the
Coalition faction, had many former Minseito members and was against the Ashida faction (SCAP
Miscellaneous Parties and Groups 1949 GS(B) 02683). Its members were close to Inukai and six of eight
members left with Inukai in 1950. The Kyojin Kai had two members who both left with Inukai in 1950.
In the Opposition faction the Taiyokai, Shidehara's old faction, had become very small as the Shidehara
faction had mostly defected in 1948. The Kyojin Kai included former Jiyfito members who were centrist.
The Ishiguro group was very small, but Ishiguro himself was in the Upper House. The Shinshinkai was a
group of Minshuto members who had lost the election in 1947 or 1949 and included 34 members (SCAP
Political Parties in Japan 02519-22).
60 On 23 January five members of the coalition group resigned from their group to join the anti-
coalitionists. They were Yoshida An, Hara Takeshi, Amano Hisashi, Komatsu Yiiji and Yamamoto
Toshinaga. The anti-coalition group thus came to number 43 members in the HR (SCAP Review of
Government and Politics January 1950 GS(A) 02553-5).
61 It seems that although the Shinshinkai had distanced itself from Inukai following his purge in 1947, a few
members decided to side with him when the party split in 1949, but the group was very small (SCAP
Miscellaneous Parties and Groups GS(B) 02683). The Jiyfito also got seven Dietmembers who had run as
independents in 1947, giving them a total of 30 new party members (Reed 1988).
62 Miki Takeo, who was later to become a politician central to conservative politics, was secretary general
of the People's Cooperative Party in March 1947 and had been Postal Minister in the Katayama cabinet.
In June 1948 he was elected chairman of the Executive in his party. In April 1950 he led the party in its
merger with the Minshuto to form the Kokumin Minshuto (Quigley and Turner 1956:289).
63 The Shinsei Club was initially called Minsei Kyfiyii Kai (Old Comrade Society) and included depurged
former Minseito members. They were anti-Jiyuto but also critical of the Minshuto and decided to watch
developments for a while (SCAP Conservative Parties 1951, GS(B) 04352-3).
64 Hopefuls were Ishiguro, former agriculture minister (elected to the HC from Shizuoka prefecture for the
Ryokufukai with Jiyfito recommendation, NT 9.5.52), Ashida, Murata Shozo, Ichimanda Hisato,
Kitamura Tokutaro, Miki Takeo and Tsurumi Yiisuke, former secretary general (Watanabe 1958: 192).
65 Shigemitsu Mamoru was a wartime foreign minister and was purged by the SCAP. According to the NT
the Chief Prosecutor at the International War Crimes Trials, however, later; admitted that 'his inclusion
among the war crimes suspects was solely a result of Soviet insistence' (NT 9.5.52).
66 Not all in the Bunte Jiyfito were as adamant that constitutional revision was necessary. Ishibashi was
quite favourable to the constitution and was most interested in changing the economic policy (Ishida
1985:88).
67 His closest supporters were Miyoshi Hideyuki and Kawashima Shojiro as well as Ayabe Kentaro, Arima
Eiji, Iko Yoshiaki, Yuki Takechi and Morishita Kunio (Kurzman 1960:258).
68 Kishi's party had fared badly in the 1952 elections, winning only one seat when Takechi Yuki was
elected in Ehime 1st district. The party's days were numbered after that.
69 Kishi attracted people who had been neutral in the party until then. Of the ten Kishi faction members in
1954, six had unknown affiliation in 1952, while four were neutral, being claimed by both the Hatoyama
and Yoshida factions (AS 23.11.54,3.10.52).
70 See Uchida 1969:18 and Igarashi 1985:339.for more detailed information on the way votes were cast.
71 Joseph Dodge arrived in Japan in early 1949 with the aim of curbing inflation and increasing export
production in industry. This demanded austerity in domestic consumption, a reduction in public works
and services, the sacrifice of smaller businesses, restriction on wage increases, and repression of labour
acti vism with layoff of workers (Dower 1979:416).
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CHAPTER3:
THE EXTENT OF FACTIONALISM: ADVANCEMENT, FUNDING
AND ELECTORAL POLITICS
3.1. Introduction
In Chapter 2 it was established that in early postwar Japan the factions within the
conservative parties were different to those of the LDP and that this affected the overall
characteristics of factionalism. Having discussed the structural characteristics of the early
postwar factionalism I will now turn to the functions and political consequences of
factionalism. Why did the factions exist, what attracted leaders and followers to them,
and how far did they reach within the political system?
Nicholas (1966:57) pointed out that the aim of organising a faction was to 'give the
leader an advantage in political conflict' and that the aim of entering into such a conflict
was to 'increase one's control over resources' (see also Zariski 1960:29; Beller and
Belloni 1978c:437). The patronage element of factionalism has been much emphasised in
studies of Japanese factions and it been widely argued that factions are tools to distribute
posts in cabinet and party and funding to their members (Baerwald 1986:23; Leiserson
1968:770; Stockwin 1989:168; Thayer 1969:35; Totten and Kawakami 1965:115).
Factions thus serve a purpose for both leaders and followers. t will look at first, how
factionalism affected promotions within the parties and in government. I will show that
the factions were used to elevate leaders to posts but that they were ineffective in
promoting faction members in any systematic way. Second, I will look at the electoral
districts and seek to establish to what extent factional struggles within the parties affected
electoral politics. I will argue that in spite of the multimember electoral system, there are
indications that factional manoeuvers played less a role than is usually assumed and that
conservative factional conflict in the immediate postwar period did not reach the electoral
districts. In the few instances when it did, splinter groups suffered (Reed 1988:310).
Third, I will look at political funding patterns and the role of factions in distributing
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funding to the rank-and-file. I hope to show that funding arrangements created a certain
level of factionalism but that financial assistance was not provided within the strict limits
of the factions. Candidates did not avoid running against members of their own factions,
and because of the fluid nature of the funding system, did not run and fight their electoral
campaigns with exclusive financial aid from factional sources.
I will argue that an important indicator of the nature and extent of factionalism in the
early postwar period is the nature of faction membership. It has been widely assumed in
studies of factions in Japan that faction membership has always been fairly well defined
(Fukui 1970:45-6; Scalapino 1953: 118; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993:60). It will be
shown here that faction membership in the Jiynto and the Minshuto factions was very
different from that of the LOP, they had very vaguely defined membership and ill-defined
roles for members and leaders. This affected the functions that the factions served and the
political importance these groups could have, making factionalism significantly different
from that which is usually taken to characterise conservative parties in Japan. The reasons
for the relatively loose nature of the factions and the differences in the functions they
carried, compared to the LOP factions, can not be explained with the usual institutional
emphasis on the electoral system. Taking my cue from Panebianco, I argue that the
relative institutionalisation of the Jiyuto and Minshuto allowed the leadership to control
vital resources, such as recruitment and distribution of selective incentives so as to curb
factional activity (Panebianco 1988:60). Although challenged by other groups, the party
centre was strong enough to maintain centripetal power and mai~tain the support of the
majority of the party, making horizontal power games among leaders in the parties, rather
than vertical power games between leaders and followers, more important (see
Panebianco 1988:23).
3.2. Distribution of party and cabinet posts
As noted earlier, factions are said to define struggles for control of the party; they
distribute party patronage and generate rival candidacies for office (Beller and Belloni
1978c:437). The LOP factions have been studied as the main distributive organs of party
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and cabinet posts (Baerwald 1986; Leiserson 1968; Masumi 1967, 1995; Totten and
Kawakami 1965). Masumi (1967:35) described them thus:
The factions have various functions but their most important function is that of distributor
of government and party posts. When cabinets are formed or reshuffled, the factions put
pressure on the Prime Minister to have their own candidates chosen based on their
wishes. The effectiveness of the pressure depends on the degree of cooperation with the
Prime Minister until then, as well as the number of affiliated Dietmembers and the
capacity for united action.
It has been widely put that the distribution of posts to faction members as a reward for
their support is a historic feature of factionalism in Japan (Fukui 1970:22-3; Totten and
Kawakami 1965: 111). In relation to the early postwar conservative parties, Ike
(1958: 177) argued that:
[b]y the judicious distribution of party posts and committee chairmanships, cabinet posts
(when the party is in power), and material rewards, several factions can be kept together
under one party banner.
However, when we look at the distribution of cabinet posts and appointments in the three
most important posts in the Minshuto and Jiyuto;' apart from the presidency, it becomes
clear that these appointments were not generally decided upon on the basis of factions.
Panebianco (1988:60) observed that in highly institutionalised parties, recruitment tends
to have a centripetal movement and therefore 'there is thus only one way to make one's
career in the party: To allow oneself to be co-opted by the centre.' In the following two
sections, I will look at the distribution of posts within party and cabinet and show that the
Jiynto and Minshuto conformed largely to this model. The most fruitful way of advancing
within the parties was to align with the dominant leadership and not the factions.
3.2.1. Appointments to the three highest party posts
Appointments to the three main party posts (t6 sanyaku), the secretary-general, the
chairman of the Executive Council and the chairman of the Policy Affairs Council in the
Jiyuto and Minshuto, show, in spite of some changes over time, a very limited factional
pattern. The party leadership tried to exclude dissident elements from the executive and
therefore, the most fruitful way to advance was to align with the dominant elite.
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In both parties the secretary-general was usually handpicked by the president, as he was
considered the 'alter ego' of the president (see Yanaga 1956:250).2 The Executive
Committee took decisions on various matters, including candidacy to the Diet, and party
endorsements (Yanaga 1956:251).3 The Policy Research Committee, drafted policies and
was assisted by around 5 deputy chairmen (Yanaga 1956:250).
Turning first to the Jiyuto, Yoshida did not start to exert any real influence on party
appointments until 1948. Until then 'the partisans, the technicians and mechanics,
were .. .left safely in control' (Colton 1948:946; see Sakano 1948:75).4 Sakano noted that
the Fudai wing (party politicians) was still influential in 1947 in spite of the purges and
that they were very skilful with party management (Sakano 1948:75). Until 1948 the
main party posts went to people of varying factional alignments but all close to
Hatoyama. In 1945 Hatoyama made Kono Ichiro secretary-general, but they had become
close in the last years of the Seiyukai although Kono had not been a member of
Hatoyama's inner support circle. Miki Bukichi, an old friend of Hatoyama although they
had not been political allies in the prewar period, was made chairman of the Executive
Council, and Ando Masazumi, a close friend of Hatoyama, was made chairman of the
Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC). Kono, Miki and Ando were purged in spring
1946 and Ono Bamboku, a central figure amongst the party politicians, and a close
associate of Hatoyama since the Seiyukai days, was made secretary-general.' Hoshijima
Jiro was made chairman of the Executive Council", and the PARC chair too went to
people close to Hatoyama.
Another reshuffle took place in March 1948 as the party changed its name to the Minshu
Jiyuto. The domination of the party politicians was still evident although Yoshida's
influence seemed to be growing. Yamazaki Takeshi was elected secretary-general. He
was a party politician but considered neutral and above the fights between the wings of
the party (Sakano 1948: 107).7 Saito Takao was made chair of the Executive Council, but
he had joined the party in the Shidehara group in 1948, which was positioned in the
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Yoshida wing. Sudo Hideo, who had belonged to the Ono/Okubo group in 1947, but was
now moving closer to Yoshida, was made PARC chairman.
From the time of the reshuffle in October 1948 discontent amongst the party politicians
was rising (Sakano 1948:94). Yoshida's interest in party appointments was increasing
(Sakano 1948), he was recruiting bureaucrats into the party, and forming the Yoshida
GakkO.8 Yoshida had also received extra support with the merger of the Shidehara faction
in 1948. This changed the pattern of appointments to the three party posts and Yoshida
started to exercise much greater independence, slowly introducing a policy of isolating
elements critical of him. From this time on, all three posts were given to people who were
either firmly in the Yoshida wing or neutral.
In the reshuffles that followed, close associates of Yoshida came to play a more
important role. Sato Eisaku was appointed PARC chairman in 1949 after being elected to
the Diet for the first time. Hoshijima Jiro served as chair of the Executive Council for
four years. Hoshijima was a party politician but considered to be quite neutral in the
conflict between Yoshida and Hatoyama (see Sakano 1948:103). Although their factional
leanings varied, all three supported Yoshida's leadership. This support, much more than
their factional affiliation, was of critical importance. In the election for the executive
posts in April 1950 all three posts went to the Yoshida wing; Sato Eisaku was in the
Yoshida sokkin, Masutani Shuji was neutral but in the presidential faction as he was
supportive of Yoshida, and Nemoto Ryutaro was in the Hirokawa faction, which was
then well entrenched in the Yoshida wing.
In May 1951 all three posts again went to the president's group. Masuda Kaneshichi was
made secretary-general, Hirokawa Kozen became chairman of the Executive Council,
and Yoshitake Keiichi, in the Yoshida faction, became PARC chairman. These
appointments were made with some influence from the Hatoyama faction. The latter had
strongly opposed a proposal that Hirokawa be made secretary-general and so Masuda was
appointed. This confrontation was not only between the two wings but included personal
antagonisms between Masuda and Hirokawa. Masuda thus worked with the Hatoyama
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group to curb the influence of Hirokawa. The ill feeling between Masuda and Hirokawa
continued until the party split in 1953 (Ishida 1985:60). The appointment of Masuda
rather than Sato Eisaku, whom Yoshida had wanted, was also made in light of the
anticipated reaction of the Hatoyama group as Sato was very close to Yoshida (AS
26.5.51).9
In 1952 a reshuffle to all three posts was made but at different times. All the posts were
given to people close to Yoshida. Mizuta Mikio was made chair of PARC in February,
Fukunaga Kenji, a first term Dietmember, was made secretary-general in July, and
Masutani Shuji became chair of the Executive Council in December 1951. 10 The
opposition to Fukunaga in July 1952 was widespread within and outside the Yoshida
wing. A centre faction led by Ishida Hirohide to which Fukunaga himself belonged, was
also against the appointment on the basis that Fukunaga was too inexperienced (Ishida
1985:61). Fukunaga was replaced almost immediately by Hayashi Joji, who like
Masutani had a centrist position in the party, but was more to the liking of the Hatoyama
wing. I I Their appointment into these posts did not have direct factional relations. Both
Masutani and Hayashi had been situated outside the two camps and it was only after their
appointment to these posts that they were clearly seen as situated within the Yoshida
wing (AS 30.9.52).12
Yoshida's decisions on appointments in main posts were not fundamentally based on
advice from factional leaders. There are a number of examples where prominent faction
leaders recommended people in posts but these were not explicitly factional appointments
as the people recommended were not nearly always members of their faction. Politicians
at this time did of course try to move upwards in the party, sometimes by recommending
themselves or through the recommendation of others but such interferences were usually
ignored (Kono 1965:179).13 There were no structures in place whereby faction leaders
could put forward their recommendations. Yoshida did not consult with factional leaders
and in fact shunned Hatoyama, his greatest contender. Yoshida instead consulted with
people with whom he had cooperated closely, the sokkin, some of who were factional
leaders but many of who were not. In the 1953 party post reshuffle, for example, he
88
Chapter 3: The Extent of Factionalism
consulted with Ogata Taketora," Ono Bamboku, leader of the party politicians but close
to Yoshida, Hayashi Joji, the outgoing secretary-general, and Masutani Shiiji, the
outgoing chairman of the Executive Council. Ono was the only one of those politicians
who was a factional leader at the time (Tomioka 1953:106-7). When appointing Miki
Bukichi as chairman of the Executive Committee Yoshida conferred with Ogata,
Hirokawa and SaW, all in the Yoshida wing (Yanaga 1956:250-1). Of these, only
Hirokawa led a substantial faction.
In the early postwar conservative politics, an informal system of 'elders' (choro),
sometimes called 'advisers', was in place, who would advise the president and the
Executive Council. Watanabe refers to this system as 'politics of the elders' (chore seiji)
(Watanabe 1966:34; Watanabe 1958:132). The elders of the Jiyuto varied in numben "
they were not faction leaders but acquired their special status because of their age, long
service to the party and political connections and, as Quigley and Turner note, were
'perhaps unconsciously patterned after the prewar genrii [senior statemen] in their
relation to the governmental structure' (see Quigley and Turner 1956:340; Yanaga
1956:249).16 Yoshida would look to the elders for advice but often he nominated people
into the top party posts without such assistance. His freedom was increased in that from
1953 onwards Yoshida removed a rule demanding the approval of the Board and
Dietmembers' Assembly as a method of ' ... tightening his control of the party against the
threat of the Hatoyama faction' (Quigley and Turner 1956:339). The selection power of
the three main party posts was thus basically put into the hands of Yoshida.
As seen in Figure 3-1, in the period 1948-1952, promotional success within the party
hinged on good relations with the president or someone close to him. Key party posts
were increasingly given to those supportive of Yoshida and until 1953 distribution of
posts seems to have been used to exclude dissident elements.?" The three party posts were
largely given to prominent politicians within the party who were sometimes factional
leaders, like Hirokawa and Ono, but often influential politicians without their own
political following, like Hayashi, Masutani, Miki, Kono, Hoshijima, and Yamazaki.
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Chapter 3: The Extent of Factionalism
However, Yoshida was also well known for disregarding such rules and often appointed
new Dietmembers in high posts, such as in the case of Fukunaga's appointment as
secretary-general in July 1952 (see 'Kitaoka 1995:53). By 1952, the Hatoyama faction
was effectively barred from influence, which contributed to the image of factionalism as
a destabilising force, as discussed in the previous chapter. Voices could be heard that
argued that the problems of the Jiyiit6 stemmed from Yoshida's unwillingness to listen to
the party members and accommodate the Hatoyama wing (see Nippon Times, hereafter
NT 17.12.52). Wildes (1954:139) pointed out that:
Of all the men who revived the prewar Liberal Party after surrender, but two remained in
1953 as high party officers, and both of these, Masazurni Ando and Tsuruhei Matsuno,
had been politically inactive during the greater portion of the postwar period, because of
the purge. All others who had helped Hatoyama form the Liberals were either driven
from its ranks and in active rebellion against the man they had raised from political
obscurity to high office [i.e.Yoshida], or if still in the party, were silent and ineffective
members of the rank and file.
No attempts were made to accommodate the Hatoyama faction for some time after the
depurge'" in 1952. The Hatoyama faction tried to reach an agreement with Yoshida that
Hatoyama be consulted on appointments in both party and cabinet until leadership could
be passed on to him (AS 5.10.52) but such demands were not met with much enthusiasm
in the Yoshida camp." The Yoshida faction hoped to continue the isolation of
'antagonistic' forces within the party and thus tried to win over neutral forces to
strengthen their hold on the party (AS 1.10.52). The antagonism of the two groups thus
escalated. The Hatoyama faction criticised the leadership of the party for its 'sokkin
appointments' and started manoeuvres with the Hirokawa faction within the Yoshida
wing to seek to topple Yoshida (AS 30.1.53).
However, the return of the depurgees to the political arena in 1952 and the ensuing
struggle between Yoshida and Hatoyama forced Yoshida to change his tactics. A number
of intra-party conflicts arose between the Yoshida and Hatoyama wings between July
1952 and January 1953 that involved personal warfare between the Ono and Hatoyama
factions on one hand and the Hirokawa faction on the other (see Masumi 1985:282; AS
25.2.52; Ishida 1985:64; Igashira 1952:21). These conflicts centred on disagreements
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over appointments to party and parliamentary posts. However, these factional
manoeuvres were usually designed so as to curb the influence of certain politicians rather
than to increase their own representations.i"
The formation of the Mindoha in October 1952 increased the ability of the Hatoyama
faction to disrupt party affairs. In October the Mindo stalled Yoshida's plans to make
Tanaka Isaji chairman of the House Management committee in the Diet by putting
pressure on the party executive to accept Fukunaga Kenji instead (Ishida 1985:80),
another example of mutual concessions. After the clashes between the Hatoyama
faction/Mindoha and the Yoshida faction late in 1952, Hayashi secretary-general and
Masutani, chairman of the Executive Council, declared their intention to resign from their
posts to allow a reshuffle. They resigned in January 1953 but factional fighting between
the Yoshida and Hatoyama factions flared up again on this occasion. Hirokawa was
unhappy with the intended reshuffle as he had wanted the secretary-general chair for
himself. Hirokawa then joined hands with Mindo to stop Masutani being reinstated as
chairman of the Executive Council. These struggles had, however, a cumulative effect
and at the party convention on January 25 the party reached a stalemate over the
secretary-general post. After negotiations between the Yoshida and Hatoyama factions,
Sato Eisaku was made secretary-general and Miki Bukichi, one of the leaders of the
Mindoha, was made chairman of the Executive Council (Ishida 1985:84-5; AS 30.1.53).
Yoshida's change in tactic had the effect to alienate the Hirokawa faction further, leading
to a split when the Mindoha left the party along with the Hirokawa faction in March
1953.
The left and right wing factions of the Kaishinto also fought over the party executive
posts in 1952-54. As in the Jiyiito, party leaders were, at times, forced to listen to
factional objections but the factions were not part of the decision making process nor was
there a system whereby each faction could be guaranteed representation. Appointments
were primarily affected by the polarisation of the party. It seems that in the Minshuto, as
in the Jiytito, the leadership tried to keep the discontented elements out of the three main
posts and until 1952, one wing tended to dominate the three party posts, but after that
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there were increased attempts at balancing between the left and the right. In the
Minshuto, the General Affairs Committee was consulted on the appointment of the
secretary-general and the chairman of the PARC, and the president then appointed him
(Quigley and Turner 1956:341). According to Quigley and Turner (1956:342), the deputy
secretaries-general were 'frequently appointed to represent the intraparty factions, but
may be selected on a geographical basis.' Unlike the Jiytito, the party changed president a
number of times so the elements kept out were not always the same. In 1947, most
Minshuto party posts were held by former Minseito people (Colton 1948:949). Inukai
Ken21 was made president at the end of 1948 and sought to exclude the main opposition,
Ashida faction, from executive postS.22 Inagaki Heitaro, member of the House of
Councillors, was elected secretary-general but in February 1949 Hori Shigeru replaced
him (NT 2.2.49). Both were supportive of Inukai. The party was split in 1949 and the
Opposition faction and the Coalition faction set up separate party posts. In 1950, after the
split of the Inukai faction, Chiba Saburo of the Ashida faction, was made secretary-
general.
1952-54 saw greater conflict over the three party posts between the two wings of the
party who fought for these posts in order to be able to influence the basic policy
orientation of the party with the result that the early 1950s saw increasing attempts to
keep both wings content. After Shigemitsu Mamoru was made president, supported by
the Oasa and Ashida factions, factional conflict forced him to ask his party to ratify his
choice of party personnel (Ashida 1986 vol.4:356). The left wing of the party gained
influence as Miki Takeo, who had been against Shigemitsu's election as president, was
made secretary-general. Kitamura Tokutaro, who had been closely aligned with Ashida
until then, but was now moving into the left wing of the party, was chosen chairman of
the Policy Research Committee.
Appointments to the three party posts.in 1953 and 1954 revealed further struggles over
the basic orientation of the party but at the same time attempts to balance the demands by
both wings. The Ashida faction was increasingly interested in closer cooperation with the
Jiyuto, while the Miki faction was strongly against such moves. There was disagreement
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over the secretary-general post between the Miki faction on the one hand, and the centre
faction and the Ashida faction on the other. The Ashida and Centre factionsf felt
shunned in the party and tried actively to curb the influence of the Miki faction. The
Centre faction wanted Narahashi Wataru of the Centre faction or Matsumura Kenzo
chosen secretary-general (AS 10.2.53). In the end Shigemitsu appointed Kiyose Ichiro of
the Miki faction. Another disagreement concerned the appointment of the chairman of the
Policy Research Committee. The Miki and Kitamura factions temporarily cooperated
with the conservative Oasa faction in order to get Kawazaki Hideji of the Kitamura
faction chosen in this post to ensure that the party kept its distance from the Jiyuto (AS
30.1.53, 10.2.53). The Ashida faction was vehemently against this and threatened to split
if Araki Masuo of the Ashida faction was not chosen (AS 9.2.53, 10.2.53). The Centre
faction supported the Ashida faction in its opposition to the appointments. Shigemitsu
then decided to appoint Miura Kazuo who was more to the liking of the Ashida faction,
instead.
In June 1953 Matsumura of the left faction was chosen secretary-general but Miura
continued in his post as chairman of the Policy Research Committee, giving both wings
representation. After the Kaishinto merged with the anti-Yoshida elements of the JiyUtO
in November 1954 to form the Minshuto there was much internal strife surrounding the
distribution of posts between the factions of the party. Again, the struggle seemed to be
mostly between the Progressive faction and the Ashida faction (AS 25.11.54).
Individual factions within the parties tried at times to attract followers through the
distribution of posts, but they were unable to retain such support and membership as there
was no system in force that allowed such rewards. Hirokawa Kozen was the clearest
example of this practice. The Jitsugyii no Nihon journal remarked in 1952 that 'Hirokawa
secretary-general, Yoshida's close associate, is attracting followers (doshi) by sprinkling
posts in every direction' (Igarashi 1952:40). Hirokawa tried to appoint his faction
members in the Executive Council in 1951 when he replaced standing directors in the
Council with his own men causing uproar in the Ono faction.24 He also established a
'Directors Board' and put his own men in there as well as Ozawa Saeki as Chief of
94
Chapter 3: The Extent of Factionalism
Secretary (SCAP Conservative Parties 1951, GS(B) 04352). He got a supportive majority
in the Executive Council to aid him in his struggle with Masuda, who had been made
secretary-general in May 1952 (Masumi 1985:282). But this was such an unusual and
blatant misuse of power that it was noted. The Occupation authorities remarked that
This is an unprecedented matter and there arose from the inside and outside of the party a
criticism that it is an evil matter apt to extend the influence of factional conflict to the
Secretariate by dividing the party into voting and executive organs (SCAP Conservative
Parties 1951 GS(B) 04352).
Nemoto Ryutaro, one of Hirokawa's best known followers, was also made Agriculture
Minister for a few months in 1951 while Hirokawa served as chair of the Executive
Council. Generally, however, the factions were at this time tools to promote the leader to
one of the three top party posts and party members would put pressure on the leadership
to realise that goal. 25 The aggressive strategy of Hirokawa to expand the influence of
factionalism was said to be one of the main reasons why he was removed from his post as
chairman of the Executive Council in December 1951 (Igarashi 1952:20). On the whole,
a faction was not considered a tool to distribute posts to members of the factions.
In both parties, faction leaders were often able to attract followers by being elevated to
one of the three party posts, rather than the opposite, whereby they would get these posts
because of their following, as in the LOP. Politicians like Ono Bamboku, Hirakawa
Kozen, Masuda Kaneshichi, Sato Eisaku and Ikeda Hayato attracted following within the
Jiyiito while serving as secretary-general or chair of the Executive Council. Hori Shigeru,
Kitamura Tokutaro, Matsumura Kenzo and Miki Takeo are also good examples of
politicians who were able to strengthen their position within the Kaishinto through the
secretary-generalship. There were however also many instances where the secretary-
generalship failed to attract a considerable following as in the case of Hoshijima,
Fukunaga, Masutani and Hayashi.
Factions and factional leaders tried to affect who was elected into the three party posts in
the conservative parties, as the struggles of the early 1950s show in both the Jiyuto and
Kaishinto. However, these struggles were primarily coloured by the polarisation of both
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parties as party leaders in opposition to the party executive fought for a more balanced
relationship between the two wings of the party. The pattern in the Kaishinto was more
complicated but, as in the Jiyilto, itrevealed a struggle between the two wings of the
party, rather than a factional struggle.
3.2.2. Cabinet appomtments'"
It became a distinctive feature of the LDP early on that the party leadership distributed
cabinet posts to factions and sought to achieve factional balance in cabinets. Many
scholars have argued that this is a 'traditional concern' and that the early postwar cabinets
were formed with similar balancing principles (Ike 1958:177; Hoffman 1981:253). Ike
(1958:177) argued that factional affiliation was needed to advance within institutions, and
according to Quigley and Turner (1956:357)
[l]oyalty in Japanese politics has been complicated by the lure of government office, the
cash nexus, and the informal contact and association which develop in club and office.
Personal loyalties, financial favors, the promise of a government post, and similar appeals
are utilized by political leaders to build, hold, and expand their "following".
However, my data shows that distribution of cabinet posts in the five Yoshida cabinets
shows a pattern of party executive dominance similar to that of the party appointments,
and no attempts at factional balancing in cabinets.
Turning first to cabinet appointments, as seen in Figure 3-2, most cabinet posts went to
the mainstream in Jiynto cabinets between 1946 and 1954, i.e. those who supported
Yoshida. Yanaga pointed out that '[m]ost of the leading party members in effect choose
themselves so that the party's inner circle is well represented. Cabinet positions are the
reward for faithful party men' (Yanaga 1956:162). Party and cabinet posts were used as
rewards. Still, they were not rewards to factional leaders, but to those who supported the
leadership of the party (see Yanaga 1956:247). Yoshida was able to appoint people at his
own will in so many cases partly because one of the conditions that he had set for
becoming leader of the party following Hatoyama's purge was that he could decide on his
personnel without interference from the party (Ono 1964:68; Keno 1965: 195-6).
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Yoshida did not consult with factional leaders about cabinet formation but conferred with
his sokkin or the party executive as well as his son-in-law, Aso Tagakichi. Thayer
(1969:184) notes that until 1955:
The Prime Minister, of course, held consultations before selecting a cabinet. Every prime
minister had his advisors. But these advisors were not always even politicians. Many of
them were simply personal friends of the prime minister or, in the case of Yoshida
Shigeru, members of his family. They rarely met as a group.
In October 1952, when he was preparing his fourth cabinet Yoshida consulted with
Hayashi, secretary-general, Ikeda finance minister and Hirokawa agriculture minister,
who were among his closest sokkin (JT 27.10.52). He asked Hatoyama for his views at
this point but Hatoyama claimed he was not interested even if members of his faction
were offered new cabinet posts (AS 16.10.52). Ono (1964:85) described Yoshida's
methods thus:
Today [1964] the method of selecting ministers is that it is divided between factions in
accordance with their influence, but during Yoshida's time things were completely
different. When he was starting forming cabinets, some names floating in Yoshida's head
became ministerial appointments, just like that. He planned two people in each
ministerial chair and then he would ask us to help form the cabinet: "this man or that,
which one is better?" Even though he listened to our views in the executive it was a
"one-man like" process.
Yoshida was famous for his frequent reshuffles of cabinets and a large number of
Dietmembers held cabinet posts in the period between 1948 and 1954 (see Iyasu
1996: 151). The number of new Dietmembers was high due to the purges and so many
were unknown entities. Judging by the many accounts of Yoshida's selection methods, it
seems that personality issues were often decisive (Masumi 1985; Ono 1964; Hatoyama
1957).27 Financial capacity was also said to be important (lyasu 1996: 152).
As faction leaders were not consulted with any regularity on appointments, it was
difficult for them to exert influence on the process. It seems that factional influence on
cabinet appointments was even less than in the case of party appointments. Hatoyama
recommended Ono, Hayashi and Masutani for posts in the first Yoshida cabinet when he
was purged, which was to be expected as they had been his main supporters in the
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Seiyukai (Kono 1958:139).28 Their promotion did not maintain and sharpen the factional
divisions but in fact resulted in them slowly moving closer to Yoshida, becoming central
to the Yoshida system' after this (Kono 1958:139). There are a number of examples to be
found where politicians recommended people outside their own factions for posts. Their
recommendation only rarely resulted in the nominee joining that faction.29
There were, however, times when faction leaders would put forward their own members.
Ono Bamboku tells the story of how he convinced Yoshida to choose a member of his
faction, Tsukada Juichiro, as postal minister in the fifth cabinet in 1953, rather than
Nadao Hirokichi, whom Yoshida had wanted to choose (Ono 1964:85-6).30 It is,
however, indicative of the way faction leaders did not habitually recommend their own
followers for posts that Tsukada did not know that his faction leader, Ono, had helped
him to get this post and thought it was Sato Eisaku who had got him the post (Ono
1964:86-7).
Seniority rules had guided promotions before the war in both politics and bureaucracy
(see Johnson 1982:66), and although there was no set practice of faction leaders being
consulted or putting forward their own preferences for appointments in the political
world, the party seemed to have worked on a broad principle of seniority and ranking
(junjo).31 Yoshida, however, often ignored these principles. Ono said that Yoshida's
practice was to 'choose close to one hundred ministers he didn't know personally. It
seems that many of them were simply a sudden idea and this upset the party at times'
(Ono 1964:89).32Whenever a party leader appointed people without regard to seniority it
caused uproar, as was seen a number of times during both Hatoyama and Yoshida's
. 33reign.'
Second, there were few attempts to achieve factional balance in the Yoshida cabinets.
There were times in the prewar period.when the Prime Minister sought to achieve some
sort of balance within the cabinet by appointing members of the two main factions within
the Seiyukai (see for example AS 23.8.62).34 The Hatoyama faction put pressure on the
Yoshida cabinets after the depurge arguing that both main factions should be represented
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in the cabinet, and this was sometimes echoed in the press, (NT 17.12.52). However,
appointments to cabinet had no clear factional pattern until the Hatoyama cabinets in
1954 and 1955, when factional appointments started to increase. Attempts at achieving
factional balance was in fact only seen once within the Jiyiito during its time in power,
and that was in 1953 when one Hatoyama member got a post (Fig.3_2.).35 The Yoshida
cabinets were mostly composed of people whom Yoshida trusted. The same could be said
of the cabinet Hatoyama had started planning in the spring of 1946 before he was purged.
It included many of those he trusted most and with whom he conferred, when planning
the establishment ofthe JiyiitO.36
The Yoshida cabinets were characterised by the relative absence of party forces critical of
his leadership, which contributed to the nickname 'One Man Yoshida' (wanman
Yoshida). Yoshida, however, included representatives of new elements joining the party
in his cabinets to reward their joining the party. This was clear in 1948 and 1950 when
the Shidehara and Inukai factions joined the Jiyuto and were given representatives in
cabinets at that time." Almost immediately after joining the Jiyiito in 1950, Hori Shigeru,
de-facto leader of the Inukai faction, was made labour minister in the third Yoshida
cabinet (see Hori 1975:54). Itwas said that a cabinet post had been reserved for Inukai as
well but he had not yet joined the JiyiitO at that time (Hori 1975:54-56).38
However, as seen in Figure 3-3, there were no attempts to give all factions representation
within cabinets and the largest challenge to the Yoshida administration, the Hatoyama
faction (the anti-mainstream), was largely left out. Tominomori argued that 'the
Hatoyama people were indeed treated coldly after Yoshida established his one man rule
in February 1949' (Tominomori 1994:72; see also Watanabe 1958: 159-60). In the first
Yoshida cabinet in 1946, seven Hatoyama people got posts. In the second and third
cabinets in 1948 and 1949 three Hatoyama supporters got posts, Hayashi, Masutani and
Mori Kotaro, but all were increasingly supportive of Yoshida by this time.39 In addition,
Higai Senzo, of the Ono faction was made state minister. In the fourth cabinet 1952, after
the depurgees had been returned to the Diet, and in spite of the pressure the
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Mindoha had been putting on the party leadership in form of demands for various posts,
all Hatoyama people were barred from the cabinet."
Most ministers were Yoshida supporters. In the fifth cabinet in 1953, almost all posts
went to people close to Yoshida. One minister had been in the Maeda faction (Kato
Ryogoro) and one Hatoyama supporter was given a post, Ando Masazumi. The Ono
faction, which by then had moved much closer to the Yoshida faction, got two: Ono
himself and Tsukada Juichiro, who was made postal minister (see Watanabe 1958 and
Tominomori 1994:72).
The fact that the Hatoyama faction had been left out of the fourth Yoshida cabinet led to
the hardening of anti-Yoshida feeling (see Kitaoka 1995:35). The Hatoyama faction, and
in particular the Mindoha, after its formation in October 1952, complained about the lack
of intraparty democracy and the isolation of the Hatoyama forces in the party. Yoshida
had considerable power in choosing personnel for party and cabinet, and the way in
which he exercised that power excluded the Hatoyama wing from posts, especially in the
third Yoshida cabinet and onwards (see Tominomori 1994:74). There is however little to
suggest that at the time other factions voiced such concerns or felt that they had a right to
representation in cabinet as independent forces. Indeed, even factions like the Hirokawa
faction and the 0no faction do not seem to have voiced any concerns.
The first Hatoyama cabinet, formed in 1954 after the merger of the anti-Yoshida forces
from the Jiyuto and the Kaishinto, was the first postwar cabinet to seek a balance in
cabinet appointments between forces of the two parties. Apart from the fact that half of
the cabinet consisted of depurgees, a much greater proportion than in the Yoshida
cabinets (Quigley and Turner 1956:299), Hatoyama stated in his memoirs that when he
formed his first cabinet in December 1954 his primary concern in appointments had been
to
treat well those politicians who had stood together since the creation of the Bunte Jiyuto,
and to respect the Kaishinto people's intentions. The people from the Bunte Jiyuto had
over the years shared hardship and knew each other hearts, and we felt gratitude to the
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Kaishinto because they had assisted in creating the Hatoyama cabinet (Hatoyama
1957:143).
This cabinet was notable in that factional appointments were more obvious than before,
as seen in Fig.3-3, partly because it was a party created out of groups from two parties.
The two parties divided the cabinet posts between them but there were factional
appointments as well, indeed the clearest factional appointments so far. Hatoyama sought
to reward his closest friends and allies, Miki, Kono, Ando and Ishibashi who had a total
of five posts," while Kaishinto got five.42 None of the Kono/Miki Jiyutc's eight members
got cabinet posts but Miki supported Matsunaga To, one of the 'eight samurai' for
speaker of the Lower House (gicho).43 Kishi recommended three people for posts - his
long time friend and political ally Miyoshi Hideyuki from the Upper House, and Takeichi
Yiiki and Omura Seiichi from the Lower House (Hatoyama 1957:145; Togawa 1982:196;
Kitaoka 1995:62).44 Miki, Kishi, Keno and Hatoyama jointly supported Ichimanda,
president of the Japan Bank, as finance minister in the hope that this could help the
finances of the new party (Ishida 1985:104).
In the 'Hatoyama boom' elections in 1955 the Minshuto did not get a majority, but they
increased their seats from 121 to 185 and became the biggest party in the Diet. 45 The
second Hatoyama cabinet was formed on March 19th, 1955. Contrary to the Yoshida
cabinets, the Hatoyama cabinets were nearly void of bureaucrats (Watanabe 1958: 159).
Hatoyama says about the appointments:
In the first Hatoyama cabinet the thinking was strong that my own friends (dashi) from
old times should be rewarded as well as men of distinguishing service from the time of
the establishment of the Minshuto. In the second cabinet we moved away from the
previous way of thinking and formed the cabinet with men of talent (Hatoyama
1957:155).
All the same, distribution of posts in the second Hatoyama cabinet in March 1955 was
similar to that of the first cabinet as posts were distributed to former Kaishinto members,
Hatoyama faction members and Kishi members (see Hatoyama 1957:155-6). The
factional character was in part understandable as it was a coalition of two very recent
parties or sections of parties. Division of posts between Jiyiito and Kaishinto was thus
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natural. The factional division into the Kishi and Hatoyama factions was, however, an
addition to these cleavages and clearly showed the increasing power of Kishi as
secretary-general within the party.
Yoshida's appointments in cabinet and party and the tendency to choose close supporters
with very limited experience in the Diet, led to much criticism from within and outside
the party. Yoshida was accused of ignoring all rules of seniority" and was said to
practice 'sokkin politics' (close associate politics) and 'backroom politics' (Ishida
1985:57; Kitaoka 1995; Watanabe 1958). Such criticisms could be heard during the purge
but increased greatly after the return of the depurgees, in particular after the formation of
the Mindoha in 1952. Watanabe Tsuneo (1962: 103) commented on the dominating power
of the Jiyuto president and said:
With the support of the Occupation Yoshida 'one-man' exercised autocratic power so a
few close associates (sokkin) grasped hold of the cabinet and the administration. People
Yoshida disliked were stepped over for administrative and party posts and were not given
a political voice (hatsugenken). Through nepotism and pedigree they supported Yoshida
and incompetent people were made ministers with great amount of funding.
The Jiyuto was ruled by the president and the executive (sokkin) who were handpicked by
him. Yoshida's ousting in 1954 was seen as a reaction to this type of politics. Watanabe
vehemently criticised Yoshida's style of leadership and argued that the development of
factionalism within the LDP was a step in the right direction, giving the rank-and-file a
greater voice (Watanabe 1962:97). However, the Hatoyama cabinets that followed did
,
not show much deviance from this practice, in that they ignored dissident elements.
Joining a faction did not represent an open path up the party and governmental ranks
within the early postwar parties. In both parties the leadership attempted to keep dissident
elements out of key party and government posts. In the Jiyuto, this tactic was largely
effective as Yoshida managed to limit the Hatoyama faction's ability to gain power,
thereby limiting factionalism. Within the Minshuto, there were greater attempts at
representing dissident elements within the party, but in both parties appointments were
determined by the polarisation of the parties rather than the factionalisation. In
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government, cabinets were the cabinets of the dominant elite. I will now turn to the
electoral districts and the influence factionalism had on electoral politics.
3.3. Factionalism and electoral politics
The first postwar elections held in 1946 were conducted under a new large district
electoral system where each prefecture was a single district with up to fifteen seats, while
seven prefectures were divided to maintain the fifteen seat maximum (see Reed
1988:316). In the 1947 election, the electoral system was changed back to the prewar
multimember system where each district had between three and five seats.47 In the
literature on factions in Japan the influence of the multimember electoral system on party
organisation has almost invariably been considered crucial. This type of electoral system,
it has been argued, maintains factionalism as it forces members of big parties to compete
against each other in electoral districts. It has been argued that factions have come to
provide candidates with the financial and electoral support the party executive of a big
party cannot give to all its candidates when they compete against each other in the
districts. Second, it has been argued that the factions soften the intra-party conflict as they
try to prevent running more than one candidate in any given district. It has been argued
by both those who favour historical and cultural explanations of factions and those
promoting rational choice explanations of factionalism, that the medium sized electoral
system plays in this way a considerable part in at least sustaining political factionalism, if
not causing it in both prewar and postwar Japan (Baerwald 1986; Curtis 1988; Kohno
1997; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993; Thayer 1969; Watanabe 1958). Scalapino
(1968:272-3) argued that in prewar Japan 'the multimember district system abetted
factionalism within the major parties by making possible the election of several
candidates from the same party and thus encouraging intraparty rivalry.' Ramseyer and
Rosenbluth (1993:61), in their study of factionalism in the LDP, also argued that the
electoral system sustained factionalism in the prewar parties.
Contrary to these theories, I argue that the electoral system played a very limited role in
early postwar conservative party politics. The parties were centralised enough for the
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leadership to manage nominations and prevent factional politics from affecting the
nomination process.
Calder (1988: 193) argued that the electoral system is one of the major factors
contributing to factionalism in the LOP. Noting that the level of factionalism within the
Jiyuto and Minshuto seemed lower than in the LOP, he argued that the increased
factionalism within the LOP was caused by the size of the party, adversely affecting the
party in the electoral districts:
Until 1955 intraparty competition in conservative ranks was moderated by the relatively
small size of parties. Neither the Liberal nor the Democratic Party, nor any of their
various permutations over the first postwar decade, was large enough to run more than
one, or occasionally two, candidates in a single constituency. Hence there was relatively
little pressure from the electoral system for intraparty competition (Calder 1988: 193).
This interpretation is, however, not altogether persuasive. The election system did cause
problems within the big parties, even in prewar Japan, as Kitaoka (1995:27) shows:
If three people ran from one district in elections at this time [1920s and 1930s], they
would divide the vote as equally as possible to get all candidates elected. If the outlook
was bad they would abandon one and try to get the other two elected. But a great waste of
votes could not be avoided when one candidate was more prominent than another. It
caused great problems.
In early postwar Japan the parties continued to battle with the electoral system. My data
shows that although the Jiyiit5 was not as big as the LOP, it was very common for two
members of the party to be elected from the same district." As seen in Figure 3-4, there
were 29 districts where two Jiyuto members were elected in 1947, while in 1949 the
number rose to 49 districts." In the 1952 general election, which showed a postwar peak
in voter turnout, the number rose further when 58 districts elected two Jiyiit5 candidates.
In 1953 it was at 52 districts.
In 1949,41 districts elected three Jiyiit5 members, the biggest ever number for the Jiyuto,
while the 1947 election had only seen five districts electing 3 members of the party. In
1952 the number had dropped to 22 and to 16 in 1953 when the party had split. What
these figures show is that it was very common for 2 or even 3 members of the Jiyuto to
compete in the same district. Although such intraparty competition increased
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after the merger of the JiyiitO and the Minshuto in 1955, it did exist before the merger
too. It is thus unconvincing to explain increasing factionalism within the LDP after 1955
in terms of party size and number of candidates.
Let us now look at the electoral districts in more detail and focus on factional affiliation
of politicians running against candidates of their own party. In spite of the large number
of districts with more than one candidate of the same party being elected, there are few
indications that politicians used factions to manage the intra-party struggles that the
multi-member district caused in the early postwar period. The data I have available is
incomplete for many elections, but in 1949, for example, a number of factions ran and
elected members in the same district.i" As seen in Figure 3-5, the Yoshida, Ono,
Shidehara and Neutral factions all had a number of districts where two faction members
were elected. In the Minshuto, in spite of the small size of the factions, there was also a
number of cases where members of the same faction ran and got elected in the same
district. The Ashida faction ran two members in three different districts in 1949 and the
Inukai faction did so in two districts.
It makes an interesting contrast to the LDP that there are indications that candidates of
the same party running against each other in districts actually sought to work together
rather than create a distance between themselves through different factional affiliation.
This appears to be the case particularly when one of the candidates was a faction leader.
Hatoyama and Ando Masazumi, for example, were political allies and personal friends
and both ran in Tokyo first district for the Jiyuto in 1952 after the depurge, and again in
1955 for the Minshuto. Yoshida Shigeru and Hayashi Joji in the Yoshida faction both ran
in Kochi district in 1947-1952. In that district, a third Yoshida faction member, Hamada
Yukio, also ran in 1952. Kono Ichiro and Ando Kaku were both elected from Kanagawa
third district in 1953 for the Bunte Jiyuto. Ando had left the Jiyuto before the election
with Kono and went on to form the Nihon Jiytito with Kono later that year. Ono
Bamboku and Kimura Kohei of the Ono faction, both ran in Gifu first district in 1947.
Kimura, however, joined the Hirokawa faction around 1952, and it was speculated that
this was due to a personal discord between him and Ono (Igarashi 1952).51Miki Takeo
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and Okada Seiichi were both elected from Tokushima district between 1949 and 1953
and both were in the Miki faction in the Kyodoto and then the Minshuto (Uchida
1969:59).
However, there were times when factional struggles reached the districts. These were
mainly instances where faction leaders sought to manipulate nominations to work against
other factions, and not to secure nomination of their own faction members. There were
signs of a factional fight between the Hirokawa faction and the Ono faction over
nomination in Tokyo's sixth district in 1952 where they fought over who should be
nominated, but it was resolved (Kaijo gumi to sengo ha gumi 1952).52 In 1953 the
Yoshida sokkin decided to put a new candidate, Yasui Daikichi, against Hirokawa in
Tokyo third district as a retaliation for Hirokawa's betrayal of the Yoshida wing in 1953,
with the result that Hirokawa lost his Diet seat (Ishida 1985:87).
The behaviour of the depurgees when running in elections again in 1952 was also
indicative of the limited relevance the factions had in the electoral districts. The
depurgees, often having to defeat incumbents of their own parties to regain their seats
(see Reed 1988:327), did not seek to enter factions straight away to aid them, but rather
sought to organise amongst themselves to fight for the eventual return of their electoral
districts from the 'postwar politicians' (sengoha).
The data compiled for this study shows that the Jiyuto politicians did not use factions to
help them manipulate the multimember district system. Although the Jiyuto was running
multiple candidates in many districts, the factional fighting did not reach the districts.
Candidates would not seek to avoid running in districts where their political or factional
friends were running. Indeed, there are indications that regional factionalism was still
quite prominent and that leading politicians supported and helped candidates of the same
party in their own district. Keno Ichiro, for example, relates in his memoirs (1958: 156)
that as secretary-general of the JiyiitO in 1945 he sought to help politicians in his own
prefecture. This is synonymous with Reed's (1988) argument that in early postwar Japan
it was not the factions and the candidates who were the main political actors, but that the
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electorate had a considerable effect on political results. The electorate treated splinters
badly and favoured government parties (1988:338). The electorate were not given
factional choices and party labels mattered. They preferred bigger parties to splinter
groups as seen in the election results of the Bunjito in 1953 (Reed 1988:338).
The formation of personal electoral support groups, the kiienkai, in the districts in the
early 1950s played an important role in spurring increased intra-party competition in the
districts. Tanaka Kakuei' s kiienkai, the Etsuzankai, which has been said to be the 'model
for all Dietmember's local organizations' (Johnson 1986:4), was formed in June 1953. It
sponsored all sorts of social events to raise money, received donations from businesses to
promote candidates and was very active in campaigning (Hunziker and Kamimura
1994:65).53 Kiienkai formation could also be fuelled by intra-party clashes. In Hiroshima
second district, Ikeda Hayato's district, three Jiyuto members planning to run, came out
in support of Ishibashi Tanzan when he went there in August 1952 on an election trip.54
Ikeda, who had clashed over economic policy with Ishibashi, then went on to form a
support organisation, the 'Ikeda Kai,' against these competitors for votes in the district.
There were thus indications before the mid-1950s that factional divisions and personal
antagonisms at the centre of the party were spreading out to the electoral districts.
However, the relative centralised control of the party and the centralisation of political
funding in the Jiyiit6 and Minshuto worked against electoral factionalism. It is to this
latter point that we now turn.
3.4. Political funding and party leadership
It has often been argued that the reason factionalism has been so pronounced in the LDP
is that under the multimember district system the party cannot provide funding for all
candidates running against each other in the districts (Kohno 1997:102; Thayer 1969:35).
Under such an electoral system factions thus serve an important role by creating a
diversified system of financial assistance. There can be no doubt that in the early postwar
parties, personal power was considered important and that financial power was used to
bolster that power. Sakano (1948:76) pointed out that 'the conservative parties are built
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around money power and jiban [personal constituency] strength and personalities and
therefore they have many factions'. It was in their function as distributors of political
funding, that the Jiyiito and Minshuto factions most resemble the LDP factions. However,
there were important differences in the structure of political funding that affected the
factional setup in the earlier period, and made it significantly different from that of the
LDP.
The structure of political funding related to the degree of institutionalisation of the
parties. As Panebianco (1988:58-9) pointed out, highly institutionalised parties are more
likely to have a plurality of sources. The Jiyiito and Minshuto were fairly institutionalised
and this affected funding patterns and thus factionalism.
As in the prewar conservative parties, political funding channels to the party were
relatively centralised. Political fundraising was left to the party leader (Iseri 1988:73;
Kitaoka 1995:23) and the secretary-general (Fukui 1970: 11). Fukui noted that as the
regional character of factions faded in the 1920s and with the increasing ties with the
rising zaibatsu, the conservative factions came to be increasingly based on political
finance (Fukui 1970:24). The Seiyukai had strong links with Mitsui and the Minseito
with Mitsubishi (Yanaga 1956:258; Fukui 1970:25; Watanabe 1958:17-18), but as
pointed out by scholars, these links were volatile and the parties had to 'search for funds
in all directions' (Colton 1948:942; Kitaoka 1995:25). Moreoever, Watanabe pointed out
that funding from the zaibatsu 'flowed into the hands of the president, or the president
and secretary-general, or only the latter, and was then distributed to the rank and file'
(Watanabe 1962:98; Fukui 1970:25). Iseri argues that those who were good at gathering
money got into party leadership, but once there, they would use funding ability to tie
themselves to the presidency (Iseri 1988:73). This was apparent at the time when the
Seiyukai split into the Kuhara and Nakajima factions in 1939. Winning the factional
struggle hinged on financial power.
The financial power of the party president and the secretary-general continued to be
important after the war (Yanaga 1956:248). The zaibatsu were abolished during the
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Occupation, eliminating big business contributions to political parties as well as secret
government funds. However, construction companies and industrial loans controlled by
the government became a new source for the political parties (Mitchell 1996:94).55
Colton pointed out that 'the growing importance of money in winning support for the
new faces in the post-war political battles, plus the element of favoritism involved in the
award of government construction contracts, made an expose of such political
contributions headline news' (Colton 1948:955). A flourishing black market was also a
source of campaign funds (see Colton 1948:955; Wildes 1948: 1152; Mitchell 1996:96).
In both the Shinpoto and the Jiyuto, the president had extensive financial connections. It
was said that Machida Chuji won the presidency of the Shinpoto over Ugaki Kazushige
because of his overwhelming ability to collect funds (Babb 2000:25; Hunziker and
Kamimura 1994).56 In the Jiyuto, Hatoyama had access to a wealth of funding, which was
largely due to private and personal connections with wealthy businessmen. He supplied
funds into the party from a well known nationalist, Kodama Yoshio (Fukui 1970:43),
who had acquired his wealth in Asia through the opium trade while an employee for the
navy in Shanghai (Hunziker and Kamimura 1994:43-4). Another major source was
Ishibashi Seijiro, chairman of Bridgestone, but Hatoyama's son was married to
Ishibashi's daughter (Wildes 1954:108).57 Hagiwara Kichitaro of the Hokkaido Coal
Mines and Steamship company was another source of funds. He helped Hatoyama when
the latter returned to political life following the depurge in 1951 (Fukui 1970:43).
Although politicians of all parties were suspected of accepting funds from illegal sources
in the early postwar years (NT 2.5.48, 20.4.48; Thayer 1968; Yanaga 1956), prewar party
politicians like Hatoyama and Ono were particularly well connected to blackmarket rings
and famous middle men like Tsuji Karoku.58 Tsuji was a friend of Hatoyama and had
helped to fund the Jiyuto from the time it was formed (Kono 1965: 179; NT 20.4.48). The
Jiyuto and the party politicians became closely linked in people's mind to the
underworld. As Colton observed,
Control of the government also exposed the party to the liaisons traditionally tempting to
partisan political machine leaders of Japan. That such elements as the 'gumi' (company)
gang leaders, Ozu Kennosuke and Sekine Ken, were affiliated in any way with the
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Liberal party is probably an inevitable result of that party's control of the government
during the early stages of the occupation (Colton 1948:952).
Yoshida seemed to deviate from the norm as he made it one of his preconditions for
taking over leadership of the party from Hatoyama in 1946, that he would not be involved
in funding efforts (Hatoyama 1957; Keno 1965:197). However, he built up financial
contributions with the support of his son-in-law, Aso Tagakichi, who had zaibatsu
connections and was very wealthy. This independent source of funding was important to
assure Yoshida's 'independence from the old guard' - i.e. the Hatoyama faction (Wildes
1954:108).
Sources of financial contributions are not easily identified but it seems clear that the
conservative parties were being funded largely through personal connections of
politicians in key posts such as the presidency and the secretary-generalship. The SCAP
Government Section concluded that
This might be the result of the real state of affairs that election campaign in Japan has
been much influenced by individual power of the leaders of the political parties and
contributions for the political leaders themselves have been estimated more than for the
parties and that they have appropriated them at their own discretion, to the fund of their
individual political activities as well as to the candidates under their influence without
putting them in the political parties' fund (SCAP Financial Supporters 1947-48, GS(B)
00832-3).
In spite of the fundraising ability of the president it was largely, the responsibility of the
secretary-general 'that the party coffers are kept full' (Yanaga 1956:250; Watanabe
1958:18). Diversification of political contributions during the Occupation may also have
contributed to a more extensive involvement of the party executive in fundraising. In the
Jiyuto the chairman of the Executive Committee and the Policy Research Council became
involved (Yanaga 1956:257), while in the Minshuto, even more party members were
involved in fundraising. Yanaga reports that in 1953, all electoral policy committee
members, the secretary-general, ex-secretary-general and the PARC chairman helped out
(Yanaga 1956:257).
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However, fundraising remained relatively centralised and the politician chosen as
secretary-general had to have strong financial connections. This was a major
consideration for the choice of people like Keno Ichiro, Ono Bamboku, Hirokawa Kozen
and Ikeda Hayato in the Jiyuto as secretary-general, as well as men such as Yamaguchi
Kikuichiro as vice secretary-general (see Colton 1948; Sakano 1948: 111).59The post was
important as it was one of the three most senior posts in the party. The political power of
the secretary-general was also increased by the fact that it acted as a magnet on rank and
file Dietmembers who needed access to political funding.
It has often been noted that election campaigning in Japan is very expensive and that
" ... candidates and their sponsoring organizations are driven into the arms of those who
possess wealth" (Quigley and Turner 1956:346). The financial power of the secretary-
general was often used to build up a personal factional following. Watanabe points out
that 'because of this power the secretary-general attracted 'kobun' [protegees or
followers] and fostered a feeling of obligation amongst those who received a lot of
money from him' (Watanabe 1958:19; Tomioka 1953:105).
In the Jiyuto, Kono Ichiro, Fukunaga Kenji, Ikeda Hayato, Masuta Kaneshichi, and
Hayashi Joji acquired a few factional protegees, while others, such as Ono and Hirokawa
actively attracted large factional followings which they were able to maintain (Tomioka
1953:105). Ono Bamboku attracted a following while he was secretary-general and
admitted, when called before the Illegal Property Transactions Committee in 1948, to
have received loans from friends60 for 'pocket money.' Some of this money had been
donated to the party but Ono was also suspected of having distributed the money to 80-
100 members of his party running in prefectural or municipal assemblies (NT 25.6.48). In
the Minshuto, those holding this post also frequently built up a factional following.
Tomabechi Gizo formed a faction following his term as secretary-general in 1947-48,
and the Kitamura faction appeared in. 1949 when Kitamura was in the post. Matsumura
Kenzo's faction also appeared around the time he was secretary-general, in 1953-54.
Miki Takeo already had factional following after his term as secretary-general in the
Kyodot5 but his faction strengthened further after his term in the Kaishinto in 1952.
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It is, however, indicative of the different uses of political funding in the fight for
influence within the early conservative parties compared to the LDP, that many of the
most able fundraisers of the party were not prominent factional leaders but used their
financial ability to raise funds either for the party as a whole, or even for other factions
(Yanaga 1956:257). Keno Ichiro, for example, did not have a substantial faction within
the Jiyuto and worked instead with Hatoyama Ichiro in the fight with Yoshida in the early
1950s. Miki Bukichi, who was also a very able fundraiser (Kono 1958:143), had no
faction either. Miki and Keno seem to have had stronger business connections than
Hatoyama himself and were very active in providing funding for Hatoyama's political
activities, both in the Seiyukai and in the Jiyiito (Kono 1958: 132-3).
Politicians with the financial ability but not the status to go with it seemed to face
difficulties in using money to assemble a faction. Tanaka Kakuei, when elected to the
House of Representatives in 1947, attempted unsuccessfully to build up following.
Matsumura Kenzo explained what he did when Tanaka gave him a large sum of money:
I had no reason to receive the money so I went to return it. Two well-known MPs did not
return it but I did. That was decisive. Tanaka was a simple person. He distributed money
and those who accepted it were his friends but those who did not take were enemies
(Babb 2000:23).
Kitaoka argued that in prewar Japan 'there were few faction leaders who supplied
political funding like today' and that those who did were frowned upon (Kitaoka
1995:24). The same still held true in early postwar Japan.
The power of the secretary-general post in building up a following was clearly exhibited
in the fact that most of these politicians lost their factional following once they left the
post. It was said that Hirokawa was able to maintain his influence for some time after
losing hold of the secretariat by gathering around him Dietmembers related to agriculture
and fisheries (Tomioka 1953: 105), and still have lucrative connections to the business
world (Tomioka 1953: 107). Ishibashi Tanzan, though not secretary-general of the Bunjito
in 1953, was said to be the party's most able fundraiser (Ishida 1985:90) and this may
have helped to increase his following within the Jiyuto after he returned to the fold in
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November that year. When Ono was implicated in the Showa Denko scandal?' in 1948
most of his followers left him (Watanabe 1958: 119). He continued to head the Hatoyama
faction in Hatoyama's absence, but his personal following was small. Kono supported
representatives of his own prefecture while he was secretary-general (Kono 1958: 156).
He writes:
Tsuji Karoku was a powerful sympathiserof Hatoyama. I had known him since the days
of the Seiyiikai but we became first friends when I became secretary-general [in the
Jiyuto]. He turned to me one day and said "when you are purged the representatives of
Kanagawaprefecture will face difficultieswith election costs. Invite the necessarypeople
so that I can offer to look after them". I was grateful as I had been worrying what to do
about the representatives that I had looked after when I was secretary-general (Kono
1958: 156).62
The secretary-general post was thus clearly used for personal faction building. Yoshida
tried to counter this development while at the same time trying to encourage financial
contributions from the business community, which was growing increasingly reluctant to
support the party as the struggle between the Hatoyama and Yoshida factions increased.
Businessmen told Yoshida that they would be willing to give him, but not the party,
money under these circumstances (Hori 1975:80). In 1953, Yoshida decided to create a
new institution within the party, the Funding Office (shikinkyoku). Hori related that it was
Yoshida's view that:
It is essential for a political party to get essential funding and if we don't make that clear
we will not get any. It is my opinion that it is not appropriate that the secretary-general
can freely use the party's funds, and so I have made a Funding Office. The chair will
have the power to manage the party finances at his discretion...He did not say more, but
it meant that the presidentwould exercise direct supervision(Hori 1975:80).
This 'reception' created by Yoshida was meant to enable businessmen to contribute to the
party finances more freely and to counter the factional buildup around the secretary-
general. But the influence wielded by politicians with financial ability was obvious as
seen when Hori Shigeru and then Tsubokawa Shinzo acquired factional following whilst
in charge of the Funding office.63 Politicians with fundraising ability were put in financial
posts at all levels. When the Shidehara faction defected from the Minshuto in 1948 and
briefly formed the Doshi Club before joining the Jiyuto, Tanaka Kakuei, a very wealthy
member of the faction, was put in charge of the group's political funds (Hunziker and
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Kamimura 1994:48). When the group joined the Jiyuto to form the Minshu Jiyuto,
Tanaka was again put in charge of the party's election campaigns (Hunziker and
Kamimura 1994:49).
It was conducive to factionalism that while political fundraising was relatively
centralised, there were other politicians who had some access to political funding
themselves and were able to attract a small following through that financial power.
Wildes (1954: 109) was aware of the problem caused by this leverage of politicians
outside the immediate party leadership on party unity and warned that:
Collection of campaign contributions by others than the party president or the party
managers weakens the grip of the figurehead president upon party machinery and
facilitates both interparty shifts and supposedly independent action. Each leader in party
management may withdraw, taking with him his financial following, as did Ashida and,
in 1952, Hatoyama, in seceding from the Liberals, and Shidehara, and later Inukai when
deserting the Democrats and Progressives.
The effect of these trends towards factional formation was however limited by the wider
structural characteristics of the political and financial environment. Although politicians
would use money to build up factional following, the financial relations of the secretary-
general and other fundraising politicians with the rank-and-file were not as exclusive as
they were in the LDP. This tempered the need for clearly defined factional relations.
Financial benefits could be obtained through a variety of channels (see Panebianco
1988:31). Although the secretary-general might give more to his own faction he was
responsible for distributing funding to party members for election purposes and to tend to
their electoral districts (Watanabe 1958:19). Other politicians with financial connections
also supported a very limited number of rank and file Dietmembers on a regular basis.
Much more common seems to have been the practice of temporary and somewhat
random 'rewards' disregarding factional, and even party, lines. Dietmembers of this
period have noted that they would go to more than one leader of the party to ask for
funding (AS 23.8.62). Sakano emphasised this fleeting character of the financial bonds
between leaders and followers when he pointed out that factions built on money power
but that the 'coming together and parting is a daily thing' (Sakano 1948:76). Therefore,
when leading Dietmembers were reported to be trying to buy the support of rank and file
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members in the struggle for the leadership of the Jiyuto in 1952, for example (AS
5.10.52), it was a temporary support with a specific aim and not long term. Kishi
Nobusuke was also said to have distributed between 500,000 and 1 million yen to 60
Jiyuto candidates and 30 Minshuto candidates in the general election of 1952, although
he was then leading the Saiken Renmei which itself ran 16 candidates (Masumi
1985:300). Money was thus given without the clearly defined obligations that came to
characterise contributions within the LDP. This temporary character of financial
provisions created a very fluid factional environment where, in Sakano's words, 'what
may be the anti-Ono faction can in a month's time become an Ono faction, and then the
Ono faction can become anti-Ono again' (Sakano 1948:76).
Two structural factors seem to have been responsible for this vague financial relationship
between leaders and party members. First, the ties between political fundraisers and
business were of a very personal nature and on a much smaller scale than is the case
today. Prominent politicians such as Yoshida Shigeru, Hatoyama Ichiro, Kono Ichiro and
Ono Bamboku all had their personal connections to individual businessmen, rather than
to organisations, to provide funding for their party. SCAP noted that Ono had 'many
financial supporters to himself because he has been elected several times ... and he has
money which he can dispose of freely that is, money he can use to assist his party at his
own discretion' (SCAP Financial Supporters 1947-48, GS(B) 00832-3). A number of
politicians thus had their own personal connections to businessmen. In Fukui's (1970:43)
,
words:
the pattern of relationships between the conservative parties and extra-party groups which
thus emerged during this pre-independence period was basically transitional and unstable.
Often they were based on purely personal ties and involved obscure individuals, rather
than established firms or business associations.
Examples of the transitional ties between politicians and businessmen can be found in
many of the autobiographies by politicians of the period. Keno Ichiro mentions that while
public sympathy was with the Hatoyama faction in the Jiyiit5 in 1952 (the time of the
Surprise Solution) the faction had no problems getting funding. However, when the
faction split from the Jiyuto, public sympathy was not as strong, and Keno says: 'funding
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problems in the Hatoyama JiyiitO prevented us from fighting the Yoshida Jiyiito
effectively and thus only 35 were elected' (Keno 1958;181; Ishida 1985:90). It was
rumoured that the Jiyuto offered to pay the Bunjito's outstanding debts if Hatoyama
returned to the fold in November 1953 and that money from the Shipbuilding scandal
may have been used for that purpose (Masumi 1985:297; Kitaoka 1995:59). The eight
member Nihon Jiyuto formed late in 1953 led by Keno and Miki Bukichi, also faced
serious financial difficulties:
At the end of the year [1953] we were in funding trouble and even living fees were
lacking. Miki and I were burdened with loans of 7-8 million yen from the time the
Hatoyama JiyiitO was formed. Around this time, one day a message came from the ...
chairman of the Meiji Company. The eight of us were called to a restaurant and ... [he]
gave us 1 million yen with the words 'please use it'. I will never forget this (Kono
1958:183).64
Other members of the Jiyiito in the House of Representatives known to have ability to
gather funding were Nakajima Moritoshi, Hirokawa Kozen, Yamaguchi Kikuichiro,
Kimura Kohei, and Kuraishi Tadao (Sakano 1948:111-12). SCAP assumed that although
individuals seemed largely to bear the cost of elections and funds, it was likely that
'substantial amounts' were being given to officers and party members without it being
reported (SCAP Financial Supporters 1947-48, GS(B) 00832-00833).65 Many
candidates had financial connections to local businessmen in their electoral districts but
Wildes pointed out that it was not viable at this time to rely on such sources for long as
'many contributions pour into central headquarters' (Wildes 1954:109). The party was
thus an important and indispensable distributor of funds, with business sources often
small and unreliable.66
The second structural factor explaining why funding was only used in limited ways for
factional purposes, was the restricted relationship between politicians and interest groups.
The Occupation affected the relationship between the political parties and the emerging
interest groups. The 'four economic .organisations' were formed in the 1940s. Keizai
Doyukai (Committee for Economic Development) was established in April 1946,
Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organisations) in August 1946, Nihon Shoko
Kaigisho (Japan Chamber of Commerce) in November 1946, and Nikkeiren (Japan
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Federation of Employers' Associations) in April 1948. Fukui (1970:43) has argued that
interest groups and pressure groups were discouraged from forming relations with the
parties because it was the bureaucracy and the parties that were central to the execution
of SCAP orders. Itwas thus more sensible to put pressure on bureaucrats.
In the first decade of the postwar period the relationship between big business and the
conservative parties was thus not very close. Business distributed money to a variety of
political parties so as 'not to be left out on a political limb in the event of a change of
government involving a shift in power from one party to another' (Yanaga 1956:259)-
the bulk of the campaign funds from such sources went to the conservative parties (NT
27.3.46; 16.9.45). As seen before, Ishibashi Seijiro, chairman of Bridgestone, was a
major source of funds for Hatoyama Ichiro, but he also gave money to Hatoyama's rivals,
as was customary. Major contractors for example gave to all the parties without
discrimination (Wildes 1954: 108). In the early 1950s the three biggest contributors of
political funds'" gave to all three main parties, although most was given to the Jiyuto
(Yanaga 1956:259).
Business pressure on the conservative parties was mainly to call for political stability, i.e.
a halt to factional infighting, and in 1952-54 when factional conflict between Yoshida
and the Hatoyama was at its height, both sides were urged to solve the factional problems
(Masumi 1985:248, 286, 295-301; Uchida 1969:85-61, 86). Business may sometimes
have donated money to the parties with the condition that stability be maintained. Ashida
related in his diary that Nagano Mamoru had been given money twice to stop the
apparent split of the Jiyutd in the early 1950s, and that after the split in 1953 he saw no
chance of receiving any more assistance (Ashida 1986 vo1.4:328).
The external institutional and structural environment changed in fundamental ways in the
first decade of the postwar period and. thus heavily affected the funding patterns and the
political organisation. Fundamental changes took place in the late 1950s that altered the
relations between conservative politicians and business, and diversified funding routes.
Fukui argued that as economic diversity increased in prewar Japan, so factionalism
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increased in the Seiyukai in the 1930s (Fukui 1970:25-6). The same happened in the
1950s. The big economic federations by the mid-1950s had come to replace the zaibatsu
but there was a much greater 'inclusiveness and totality' in the relationship between
parties and business (Fukui 1970:52). Fukui has shown the process of change whereby
industrial organizations became increasingly involved in political fundraising in the
1950s. During the Occupation, individual entrepreneurs were the main contributors to the
parties. In 1951, 80% of the donations reported by the Jiyuto to the National Election
Administration Committee came from such sources, while only 20% came from
employer organisations. In 1955, more than 50% came from individual associations and
national organisations creating a more stable relationship between politics and business
(Fukui 1970:51). What was of great significance was the fact that a greater number of
politicians were getting involved in funding. Babb has argued that a new type of self-
made elite was appearing in the postwar period which was wealthy and spread money
within the political world (Babb 2000:33). As Japan's economy accelerated in the late
1950s, the capacity of businesses to give, as well as the capacity of politicians to gather
funding, increased substantially which transformed the funding methods of the LOP and
formed the basis for the LOP factions (Uchida 1969:85). The move away from one major
channel into the party, through the secretary-general, towards multiple channels through a
number of factional leaders, was a major factor making possible the permanence of
factions as the political centre of the LOP. Through these new channels emerged the
ability of a large number of faction leaders to hold on to the factional support they had
,
attracted, and as a result the factions became a vital provider of political funds. This will
be discussed further in Chapter 5.
3.5. Perceptions of faction membership
It has been argued in the preceding chapters that Panebianco's genetic model of political
parties is helpful in understanding the way internal party politics developed in the Jiyuto
and Minshuto. Both parties were formed through penetration rather than fusion, making
the party leadership more cohesive and the party structure relatively centralised. This
affected the extent to which factional divisions could develop and how extensively they
could affect the parties. Factionalism could not affect the appointments to party and
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governmental posts, it did not affect nominations and electoral politics greatly, and
funding ability was largely restricted to the dominant leadership. The structure of the two
parties also affected the nature of faction membership. Panebianco has argued that all
parties rely on varying amounts of collective and selective incentives to attract members
(1988:26). He also believed that if party members are mainly attracted by the former then
many will not be participating in factional games. The party member is loyal to the party
and will thus support the leadership (1988:30). This was the case in Minshuto, and in
particular in the JiyUto. Selective incentives were not many because of the cohesiveness
of the leadership. The factions could not offer clear paths for advancement or secure
funding. These restrictions were reflected in the limited factional conflicts.
The limited incentives the faction leaders could offer their members both affected the
nature of faction membership and was in turn affected by it. As seen earlier, scholars
have differed in their view of how to define factions, but their views on membership also
differ. Zariski (1960:33) argued that a intra-party group could only be called a faction if
its members shared 'a sense of common identity and common purpose and are organised
to act collectively-as a distinct bloc within the party-to achieve their goals'. Other
scholars, such as Rose (1964:37) and Beller and Belloni (1978c:425) offer a wider
definition and argue that although factions are self-consciously organised, the discipline
and cohesion can be limited. Beller and Belloni (1978c:425) argued that in patron-client
factions, in particular, members could be aware of a common identity but were 'not,
necessarily mobilised by that awareness' because of the vertical links within the group.
Scholars have tended to give us a very simplified picture of intra-party relations in Japan
(Baerwald 1986; Nakane 1966; Thayer 1969). Quigley and Turner (1956:354) argued that
In the basically hierarchical social system, the individual who seeks advancement is
expected to enter into a personal relation with men of influence. The leader under whom
he serves and to whom he must give allegiance thus becomes a guarantor of security and
status. At the same time the individual must enter into a similar relation with his proteges
of his own who will enable him to overcome the power of his rivals. In both situations the
reciprocal obligations are those of paternalism and obedience which exist between master
and servant.
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As seen earlier, the rank-and-file did enter into relationships with party leaders, but it is
also clear from the data we have on advancement, electoral politics and political finance
that the relationships were not well defined or exclusive. The Jiyiito and Minshuto
factions conform largely to Beller and Belloni's definition of faction membership. As
seen in Chapter 2, the factions tended to situate themselves within the two poles of the
party and faction members could thus act as members of a variety of groups within the
wing.68Many of the Jiyuto and Minshuto factions were very big and in the former, could
count over one hundred members. As seen in Fig.3-6, of the Jiyuto's 134 members in
1947, 32 were in the Okubo/Ono group, 13 in the Traditional Faction and a handful in
Nakajima, Hoshijima, Matsuno and ex-Ashida groups, while 50 were neutral (Sakano
1948:78). Thirteen had unknown affiliation. In 1949 when Yoshida had secured his
position within the party, the Yoshida wing (including the Hirokawa faction) had 92
members (34%), Ono had 47 members (18%) and the Shidehara faction which had joined
in 1948 had 29 members (11%) (SCAP Miscellaneous Political Parties and Groups 1949
GS(B) 02683).69 The neutral group had 88 members. In 1951, 94 were in the Yoshida
wing,70 59 in the Ono faction (22%), 28 in the Shidehara faction (10.6%) and 24 in the
Inukai faction (SCAP Miscellaneous Political Parties 1951, GS(B) 02674-5). In October
1952, after the surprise dissolution, the Jiyuto had practically split into two. The
Hatoyama faction set up an office in the Station Hotel for the elections with separate
funding. The Asahi Shimbun reported that the Hatoyama faction had 67 members against
101 of the Yoshida faction (AS 2.10.52). A mad scramble commenced over the many
neutrals and the new Dietmembers by both factions and the Hatoyama faction announced
on that same day that it had 119 members (AS 3.10.52; Hatoyama 1957:116; Masumi
1985:283; Tominomori 1994:77). After the election the Hatoyama faction secured 66
seats compared to the Yoshida faction's 73 seats (Masumi 1985:284).
As seen in Figure 3-6 the neutral group in the Jiyuto was consistently big and between
1947 and 1953 around a third of the. party stood outside the factional conflict between
Yoshida and Hatoyama. In 1947 and 1949, 33% of Jiyuto members were neutral, and in
1951 30% were neutral (Sakano 1948; SCAP Miscellaneous Political Parties and Groups
1949, GS(B) 02683). In 1952 at the time of the election, 27% were neutral. After the
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election, when the confrontation between the two wings of the party was reaching its
peak, the number of non-aligned members rose rapidly and went to 41%, or 99 people
(Masumi 1985:284). In October 1952, 76 people attended the Ipponka Diimei meeting
calling for a halt in factional fighting, most of whom had a centrist position in the party.
In 1953, 30 people belonged to the centrist Maeda faction (Igarashi 1953).
Minshuto factions were generally smaller, partly because the party was usually much
smaller than the JiyiitO (Figure 3-7). The biggest factions of the party in 1949 when the
party split were the Coalition and Opposition factions. Both groups were trying to win
over as many freshmen Dietmembers from the neutral group as possible before a final
split. Of the 60 party members, 37 were in the Opposition group while the Coalition
group had 34 members. In 1951, the Ashida faction had 28 members, the Miki faction 20
members, the Kimura faction nine, the Kitamura faction four, and six were neutral
(SCAP Miscellaneous Political Parties 1951, GS(B) 02674-5).
The Jiyuto and Minshuto factions thus varied greatly in size, but the two poles within the
parties, in particular, could be very large. What did this membership entail? Looking at
the behaviour of factions in times of political struggles it seems that membership was not
very binding and that many members were indeed 'not necessarily mobilised' by the
faction membership (Beller and Belloni 1978c:425). First, none of the factions held any
membership lists over time. Even when such lists were made, as happened in October
1952 when the factional struggle between the Hatoyama and Yoshida factions was at its
peak, they were highly inaccurate and did not reflect clear or even conscious
membership, but rather vague and temporary support. The use of the terms 'Yoshida
faction' and 'Hatoyama faction' was very imprecise. The 'Yoshida faction', for example,
referred to all those Dietmembers who were broadly in favour of Yoshida's leadership,
but could also refer to a smaller group, sometimes called the 'President's faction' or the
'Yoshida faction', more closely connected to Yoshida,71 or the former high-level
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bureaucrats 'reared' by Yoshida, the so-called 'Yoshida School' (Yoshida gakkO) (Dower
1979:315).72 The 'Hatoyama faction' sometimes referred to all those party members who
had been close to Hatoyama from the time of the establishment of the Jiyuto, or even
before the war; at other times it referred to those opposing Yoshida or in favour of the
party leadership being returned to Hatoyama at some point. The use of factional terms
was imprecise and did not represent clearly defined internal divisions but rather broad
divisive tendencies.
When observers tried to clarify the internal divisions of the Jiyiito their, and politicians',
definition of the faction membership was very broad. Kono Ichiro, speaking on behalf of
the Hatoyama faction in October 1952, defined Hatoyama faction 'members' as all those
'hoping to see a Hatoyama cabinet realised' (AS 3.10.52), and by the same token the
Yoshida faction included all those supportive of Yoshida's continuing leadership. These
wide definitions of membership allowed both factions to contest the others' list and argue
over the stance of individual party members (AS 3.10.52). The Yoshida faction refuted
Keno's list, and the faction's spokesman, Hirokawa Kozen, announced that around 71 of
those Kono had listed were Yoshida faction members or neutral and thus had other
'funding or personal relations' (AS 3.10.52; Reed unpublished paper). The notion of
membership was often temporary and arbitrary to show outside strength for a specific
purpose.
Other factions had smaller and more public membership, such as the Hirokawa faction.
Factional movements in times of crises show, however, that these factions had a small
inner ring and a much larger outer sphere of 'members' which was fluid. At the centre
was a handful of core members ready to follow factional leadership when clashes
occurred. The outer ring of the faction was much bigger and consisted of people with
vague membership links to the faction (see Thayer 1969). The outer sphere was by far the
largest part of the faction and those members had very loose ties with the faction (see AS
3.10.52). Accordingly, the big factions showed very little cohesiveness (Reed,
unpublished).
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Second, although many factions seemed to consistently have a massive membership there
was considerable movement of the rank-and-file between these groups. A significant
number of the bureaucrats that Yoshida recruited into the party in 1949 took a neutral
stance in the party, while others moved closer to other factions, such as the Ono faction.73
The party politician faction, under Ono's leadership during the purge, also dispersed
somewhat. Of those belonging to the Okubo/Ono group in 1947 and who were still in the
Diet in 1949, 11 were still in the Ono faction, 10 had joined the Yoshida faction, 4 were
neutral and 3 not known (Sakano 1948; SCAP Miscellaneous Political Parties and
Groups 1949, GS(B) 02683). In 1951, 10 former Ono faction members were still in the
Ono faction, 13 in the Yoshida faction and 11 neutral (SCAP Miscellaneous Political
Parties 1951, GS(B) 02674-5). Of those who had been considered members of the Ono
faction in 1951, 11 people (50%) had left the faction in 1953. Of the other 50% who did
not leave, 6 were still in the LDP in 1956. Of these 3 were still Ono faction members, one
in the Yoshida faction, one with no factional affiliation and one in both the Kono and
Ishibashi factions. Seven people (11%) of the Yoshida faction in 1951 had left the faction
in 1953.
The number of people belonging to the Yoshida faction was believed close to 100
between 1949 and 1952 (see SCAP Miscellaneous Political Parties and Groups 1949,
GS(B) 02683; SCAP Miscellaneous Political Parties 1951, GS(B) 02674-5; AS 3.10.52).
,
When the purge was lifted Yoshida's faction decreased somewhat in size but remained
large-because being in the Yoshida wing had few political risks while Yoshida was the
party leader. Yoshida's support, as party leader, thus stayed fairly constant. However, just
before the unification of the two conservative parties in 1955, after Yoshida had lost
power the faction only had 13 key members (Masumi 1985:283).
The factions could not count on the· members to follow faction lines in voting, or to
follow the faction out of the party. Between October 1952 and March 1953, the
Hatoyama faction gradually became more opposed to Yoshida's leadership of the party.
The faction increasingly sought to show its force against Yoshida by voting against the
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party line in the Diet. These actions affected the size of the faction and it started
decreasing rapidly in size, losing quite a few members to the Yoshida wing (Fig 3-8).
After the general election, membership had decreased further and the faction decided
therefore not to split from the party yet (Hatoyama 1957:116; Tominomori 1994:77). The
Mindoha was formed after the general election, late in October 1952, by 35 Dietmembers
but the first meeting was attended by 51 people (Ishida 1985:85-6). The groups behaved
similar to a tendency. Politicians shifted their support between issues, making it difficult
to predict the party cleavage (Rose 1964:48). In November 1952, 35 members were
absent from the no-confidence motion on Ikeda, while 47 attended a meeting calling for
the readmission of Kono and Ishibashi after their expulsion from the party in the electoral
campaign in 1952 (Ishida 1985:79-81; Reed unpublished). 38 were absent from a Diet
session when a reprimand on Yoshida was put forward after the Bakayaro incident in
March 1953. In spite of this, Ashida estimated that the Mindoha had around 70 members
in early 1953 (Ashida 1986 vo1.4:303). However, before the elections in 1953, the anti-
Yoshida forces were estimated to have 33 members (ten definite Hatoyama faction
members and another 22 first and foremost connected to Mindo) in addition to the 17
Hirokawa faction members, a total of 49 against the Yoshida executive (Watanabe
1958:91; AS 16.3.53).
The Mindoha decided to leave the Jiyuto on March 19 1953 after the opposition parties
had decided to put forward a no-confidence motion on the Yoshida cabinet (Ashida 1986,
vo1.4:303). However, even in a fairly tight organisation like the Mindoha, which acted
under the clear aim to pass leadership of the party to Hatoyama, the group split and only
22 'die hards' (ky6kiiha), or 61%, of the group left with Hatoyama (AS 5.10.52; Fukui
1970:45-6; Ishida 1985:85-6). It seems that five other Dietmembers left a little later
(Tominomori 1994:78-9), and they formed the Buntoha JiyiitO.74 In 1954, after
Hatoyama had returned to the party, the faction counted 24 members, most of who had
been in the Bunjito." Some of Hatoyama's oldest supporters, like Ono Bamboku and
Ando Masazumi did not leave. Hatoyama's closest associates criticised Ono for his
'betrayal' and said he had sacrificed his friendship with Hatoyama for political gain (Ono
1964:114; Kono 1958; Hatoyama 1957:123-4; Kitaoka 1995:56).
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A similar decrease in membership could be seen in the Hirokawa faction when the faction
was forced to act. The faction had at its height between 70 and 80 members as a result of
Hirokawa's aggressive methods within the Executive Council to attract people (Masumi
1985:283; Igarashi 1952:20). Hirokawa tried to increase the distance between himself and
Ono by aligning more closely to the bureaucratic forces in the Yoshida wing, particularly
Sato and Ikeda (SCAP Conservative Parties 1951, GS(B) 04352; AS 28.4.50). He used
this group to put pressure on the party leadership, e.g. in the controversy over party post
appointments late in 1951 (Igashira 1952:21). A small group, the so-called 'four
emperors' (Takahashi Eikichi, Kimura Kohei, Suzuki Shimpachi, and Makino Kansaku)
led the core followers, but the faction had a much larger outer sphere of 'semi members'
(jun Hirokawa ha) which counted a few dozen (Igarashi 1952:20). Observers at the time
commented on the fleeting nature of the faction, knowing that membership numbers were
not an accurate estimate of real following. It was observed in 1953 during the tug of war
between Hirokawa and Yoshida which resulted in the former's move to the Hatoyama
wing, that
Hirokawa was pushed out of the secretary-general seat and if he loses his status the unity
of the faction will be weakened as the riff-raff around Hirokawa act on self interest. It is
obvious that many would leave (Tomioka 1953: lO6).
By early 1953 the Hirokawa faction had gone down to around 40 followers (Ashida 1986
vo1.4:303). When it was clear that a split was likely in February, 1953, 15 members of the
Hirokawa faction held a meeting and decided on a formal name, Doshi Kurabu (Comrade
Club) (AS 19.2.53). At the disciplinary motion against Yoshida in March at least 30
Hirokawa faction members absented themselves from the vote. On March 16 the faction
decided to split from the party but only 14 members left with Hirokawa to run for the
Bunjito (Ishida 1985:86; Tominomori 1994:78). Hirokawa lost his Diet seat in the 1953
election and in 1954 when the party split again, the Hirokawa faction had nearly ceased
to exist (AS 9.11.54; Watanabe 1958:88).
The Minshuto factions seemed more cohesive. 24 members of the Shidehara faction
showed their opposition to the party leadership when they voted against the government
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bill on coal nationalisation in November 1947, and 25left the party to join the Jiyiit6 (see
Masumi 1985:148).76 The Coalition faction of the Minshuto had 33 members in 1949, as
seen above. Of this group nearly 70%, or 22 members, left with Inukai in 1950 to join the
Jiyuto.
The Kishi faction also showed relative cohesiveness, which may be due to the fact that
the faction only existed within the Jiyuto for about a year between 1953 and 1954. During
that time, Kishi built up a following very rapidly in the Jiyuto. All but three of the Kishi
faction members in 1954 (Ishida 1985:101-2; Kitaoka 1995:57) had been elected to the
Jiyuto in 1953, meaning that they had not been active in the fight against Yoshida along
with the Mindoha. 13 left the party with him in November that year, at least five of whom
had been connected to Kishi since the prewar days (Watanabe 1958:102).77
Scalapino and Masumi (1962: 122) argued that Japanese factions were exclusive mutual
help groups that relied on the consensus of the group and that faction members thus
showed 'subordination' and loyalty which 'in terms of voting, ... means essentially
subordinating one's personal choice for the choice designated by the leader.' As seen in
this chapter, the relationships between leaders and followers were, however, much more
complicated and multilayered to be explained in such simple terms. Politicians were
connected to political leaders but also participated in factional activities at other levels
within the party. They could have financial connections to a number of leaders, and fixed
relationships to ensure advancement did not exist. Although a sense of identity with a
faction may thus have existed it was corrupted by multiple identities which prevented the
formation of clear and extensive factional loyalties. Factions did not have clearly defined
membership and did not hold membership lists. There were no attempts to prevent
overlapping loyalty, as many Jiyuto members were close to a number of leading
politicians. In times of struggles factions tried to attract new members for increased
political force, promising financial and political assistance." However, these tactics did
not lead to a greater institutionalisation of these factions because the factions did not have
the means or the institutional structure to keep such promises. There were few attempts to
achieve conformity of the group and factions participated in few attempts to establish
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organisational tightness. Permanent membership could thus not form and the factions
remained fluid.
3.6. Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated, by looking at promotions within party and government,
electoral politics, and political funding, that factionalism within the Jiyuto and Minshuto
was much less extensive than it later became within the LDP. The factions were used to
elevate leaders to posts but they were ineffective in promoting faction members in any
systematic way. The polarisation of the parties was much more influential in determining
advancement and so the most effective way of being promoted through party or
government was to align with the dominant elite. Furthermore, in spite of the
multimember electoral system, factional maneouvers played less a role in electoral
politics than is usually assumed. The Jiyiito often had two to three party members elected
in the same district, as did the LDP, but in spite of that candidates did not seek opposing
factional alignments. The multimember electoral system created problems in that
members of the same parties had to stand against each other. However, the system did not
create factionalised electoral politics. The factions did not seek to interfere with the
nomination process in the electoral districts to increase the possibility of winning over
another candidate of the same party. Politicians sought to temper the effects of the system
by supporting each other. Funding arrangements created a certain level of factionalism
but financial assistance was not provided within the strict limits of the factions. Because
of the fluid nature of the funding system, candidates did not run and fight their electoral
campaigns with exclusive financial aid from factional sources. This tempered the need to
move factional conflict into the electoral districts further. The electoral politics of the
Jiyuto and the Minshuto show that the multimember electoral system cannot be said to be
the most important contribution to factionalism in Japan.
The nature of membership within the factions affected and was affected by the limited
functions the factions served. Taking my cue from Panebianco (1988:60), I argued that
the relative institutionalisation of the Jiyuto and Minshuto allowed the leadership to
control vital resources, such as recruitment and distribution of selective incentives so as
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to curb factional activity. Although challenged by other groups, the party centre was
strong enough to maintain centripetal power and maintain the support of the majority of
the party, making horizontal power games among leaders in the parties, rather than
vertical power games between leaders and followers, more important. Panebianco's
model is useful as a starting point to an understanding of why factionalism was not as
persistent within the Minshuto and Jiyuto as in the LDP. The parties' emergence allowed
strong leadership and a coherent dominant coalition that prevented factionalism from
escalating. This structural environment prevented factionalism from taking on the
prominence that it took in the LDP, and made polarised struggle within the parties much
more important.
I will now move on to the formation of the LDP in 1955. Part III will discuss factional
development within the LDP after its formation in 1955 and the reasons for the great shift
in the underlying principle of the conservative factions. I will show that the changes in
factionalism after the formation of the LDP represent a fundamental shift in the structure
and role of factionalism, and in the meaning of factionalism as a political phenomenon,
compared to the factionalism of the Jiyiito and Minshuto.
Notes
1 For reasons of manageability my discussion here will be confined to the three main party posts. A more
detailed study needs to be done on the distribution of other posts in committees in party and Diet, such as
the chairmen of the Diet's Upper and Lower Houses, and vice secretary-general of the party, but
unfortunately that is outside the scope of this thesis.
2 There were a number of deputy secretaries-general too, as many as six (Yanaga 1956:250).
3 The Jiyiit6 Executive Council had 30 members: 10 chosen by the president, 20 chosen from the regions.
The Minshuto Council had 21 members. The Bunjito in 1953 had only 10 members in the Executive
Council, because of the party's small size (Yanaga 1956:251).
4 Colton argues that the 'parliamentarians' were left relatively isolated after the purges and that the
'machine elements' took over, leading to the defection of the former, as seen in Ashida's split in 1947
(Colton 1948:946).
5 In the Seiyiikai, Ono was one of the Hatoyama faction's inner circle, or sokkin (Kono 1958: 133).
6 Hoshijima was considered amongst Hatoyama's allies and held the chairmanship of the Executive
Council between 1946 and 1948. In 1948 he took part in a plot to have Yamaguchi Yukuichiro replace
Yoshida as president of the Jiyuto because of opposition to Yoshida returning to power by key people in
SCAP (Masumi 1985; Babb 2(00).
7 When he entered the party he was considered a member of the Matsuno faction from the old Minseito
(Sakano 1948: 107).
8 The Yoshida Gakkii was not a formal establishment but an idea by Yoshida to train some of the
bureaucrats he was recruiting into the party in 1949 as politicians and elevate them into high positions
(Togawa 1980:94). Only a small portion of the bureaucrats recruited became 'members' of the school.
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9 The Hirokawa faction felt threatened by the increasing influence of Masuda during his term as secretary-
general and when Hirokawa left his post as chair of the Executive Council to enter cabinet again, the
faction feared that his influence woulddiminish and the Masuda 'sub-faction's' influence expand. Both
Masuda and Hirokawa were situated within the Yoshida wing (AS 26.12.51).
10 Masutani had been close to Hatoyama in the Seiyiikai and Hatoyama recommended him to Yoshida for
promotion when he made his first cabinet in 1946 (Kono 1958:139). He however moved closer to
Yoshida over the years (Kono 1958: 138).
IIHayashi, like Ono, had historical ties with Hatoyama since the days of the Seiyukai (Hori 1975: 139).
12 Hayashi and Masutani approved of Ishibashi Tanzan and Kono Ichiro's expulsion from the party in
September 1952. This was a great shock to Hatoyama and after this those close to Hatoyama considered
both Hayashi and Masutani to be members of the Yoshida wing (Kono 1958:139; Hori 1975:85).
13 This practice was referred to as 'jisen tasen' (recommending oneself and others) by observers at the time
(see e.g. Nagata 1953:39).
14 Ogata was made vice prime minister on November 28 1952 but had been cabinet secretary before that
(Hori 1975:76).
15 In 1953 the Jiyiito had five, the Bunjito six, and Kaishinto 36 (Yanaga 1956:249).
16 Sometimes the appointment of an elder was an attempt by the party leadership to remove the politician
from the front line, or 'kick him upstairs'. Yoshida asked Hatoyama to become an elder in 1952 after the
depurge, in an apparent attempt to pacify him and his group without having to include him in the
executive of the party.
17 The prewar parties seemed similarly to allot posts to those favourable to the leadership. Totten and
Kawakami point out that in the prewar conservative parties 'party factions had served as channels for
advancement' (1965: Ill). There is, however, nothing to indicate that such posts were distributed on
basis of factions within the 'mainstream'.
18 The depurge was done in four waves between October 1950 and August 1951: In October 1950 10,090
members of the bureaucratic, finance and political worlds were depurged. This included Jiyiito members
such as Okubo, Ando and Makino Ryozo. In June 1951,2,958 were depurged, including Ishibashi, Miki
and Kono, In July 1951 a further 66,425 were depurged and in August 13,904 were depurged, including
Hatoyama (Masumi 1985:279-81).
19 There were speculations in the newspapers that Miki Bukichi, Ando Masazumi or Sunada Shigemasa of
the Mindoha might be chosen chairman of the Executive Council, but at the same time acknowledged
that the Yoshida group did not see need to give in to Mindo pressures (AS 24.1.53).
20 This was clear in 1951 when the Hatoyama faction opposed to Hirokawa's reinstatement as secretary-
general as discussed before (Ishida 1985:64; Igashira 1952:21). Hirokawa in turn objected to Masuda's
appointment and insisted on his removal late in 1951and again in March 1952 but had no suggestions as
to who should replace him (Masumi 1985:282). Another incident centered around the Speaker of the
Lower House. Hirokawa wanted Hoshijima Jiro to take over from Hayashi as Speaker but the Hatoyama
faction threw its support behind Ono Bamboku who was elected in August (Ishida 1985:71). Again in
July 1952, Fukunaga Kenji's appointment as secretary-general, supported by Hirokawa, was opposed by
Ono, Hayashi, Masutani and Uehara who decided to support Hayashi instead but he was a party
politician and old Hatoyama supporter but had moved close to Yoshida. In this case the Hatoyama
faction thus sought primarily to curb the influence of the Yoshida wing. Again in January 1953,
Hirokawa vehemently opposed the appointment of Sato Eisaku as secretary-general. Hirokawa had at
that point moved from the Yoshida faction to work with the Hatoyama faction. Unsurprisingly therefore,
the Mindoha also objected to Sate's appointment (Masumi 1985:292).
21 Inukai changed his first name from Ken to Takeru in 1952 (Wildes 1954: 142).
22 Some of the most influential members of the Ashida faction in 1949 were Tomabechi Gizo, Narahashi
Wataru, Shiikuma Saburo, Kawasaki Shuji, Ogawa Hanji and Nakasone Yasuhiro (NT2.2.49).
23 The centre faction was then led by Narahashi Wataru and Chiba Saburo.
24 When Hirokawa became chairman of the Executive Council in 1951 he immediately replaced three
members of the Council who had connections with Hatoyama, Yamaguchi Kikuichiro, Mori Kotaro, and
Omura Seiichi, with three Hirokawa faction men, Suzuki Senpachi, Ikeda Masanosuke and Tsuchikura
Somei (SCAP Conservative Parties 1951, GS(B) 04352; AS 31.5.51).
25 Four members of the Hirokawa faction, for example, the so-called 'four emperors' (yon tenno) are said to
have visited Yoshida in 1953 to wam him that it would be a mistake if Ogata, who had replaced
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Hirokawa as a close associate of Yoshida, ignored Hirokawa. This was exertion of pressure on Yoshida
to reinstate Hirokawa as secretary-general (Tomioka 1953:106).
26 This chapter deals only with the Jiyiito as it was mostly in power in the period in question. This includes
all the Yoshida cabinets in 1946-7, and 1948-54. The two cabinets that the Minshuto participated in
were coalition governments which makes it difficult to draw any conclusions about the principles behind
the party's appointments. However, it can be noted that Ashida Hitoshi rewarded leading members of his
faction in the Ashida cabinet and both Kitamura Tokutaro and Ichimatsu Sadakichi, who had made his
election as president of the Minshuto possible, were rewarded with cabinet posts. Tomabechi Gizo was
also given a post (Ashida 1986 vol.4).
27 See Masumi 1985:278-9 on an account oflzumiyama's appointment.
28 In the late 1930s Masutani had some connections with Hatoyama but did actually belong to the rival
Nakajima faction (Kono 1958:133).
29 Ono recommended for example Fukuda Tokuyasu for vice minister, but Fukuda was in the Yoshida
faction in 1951 (SCAP Miscellaneous Parties 1951, GS(B) 02683). He later joined the Ono faction and
became one of Ono's most trusted followers (Sumitomo 1959:125). Ono also recommended Honda
Ichiro for an Administrative Management Agency post in 1949 but Honda was a member of the Yoshida
faction (Ono 1964:85; SCAP Miscellaneous Parties and Groups 1949, G(SB) 02683). Recommendation
sometimes had a reverse effect. Ono Bamboku recommended, for example, Yamaguchi Kikuichiro, who
was in the Hatoyama wing, for a cabinet post in 1949 because of his good services to the party, with the
support of Hoshijima, chairman of the Executive Board, Hayashi Joji and Masutani, (Ono 1964:64).
However, by 1951 Yamaguchi had joined the Yoshida faction (SCAP Miscellaneous Parties 1951,
G(SB) 02674-5).
30 It is unclear when Tsukada entered the Ono faction but he was believed to be a member of the Yoshida
faction in 1951 (SCAP Miscellaneous Parties 1951, G(SB) 02674-5).
31 Johnson notes that seniority increased in importance after the war within the bureaucracy. He shows that
in the early 1950s there were eruptions within ministries over appointments that disregarded the seniority
hierarchy and Johnson notes that 'It was during this period of poverty and firings that seniority became
entrenched in all Japanese organizations as a vital source of job security' (Johnson 1982:214).
32 Ono mentions that Suzuki Masabumi from Yamanashi prefecture, first elected in 1947, was made labour
minister in 1949, despite objections from the party executive (Ono 1964:89).
33 A good example is the appointment of Ikeda as finance minister in February 1949. His appointment
caused much discontent within the party, as he was a first year legislator being appointed to one of the
top ministerial posts (Ono 1964:91). Similar discontent was expressed when Okazaki Katsuo was made
foreign minister (Ishida 1985:57).
34 Prime Minister Inukai felt for example compelled to give cabinet posts to both main factions in the
Seiyilkai in 1931 to avoid schism within the party (AS 23.8.62).
35 Ando Masazumi was made state minister in Yoshida's fifth cabinet.
36 This included people like Kono Ichiro, Ashida Hitoshi, Hoshijima Jiro, Kita Reikichi, Okubo Tomejiro,
Sudo Hideo, Ishii Mitsujiro and Yamazaki Iwao (Watanabe 1958:162-3).
37 Shidehara became advisor to Yoshida in March 1948 when his group joined the party (Watanabe
1958: 199) and two of his faction members were given cabinet posts: Inoue Tomoharu was made Director
of the Reparations Agency and Furuhata Tokuya became Communications Minister.
38 Wildes argues that Inukai was finally allowed to enter the party with the understanding that no posts
would be given to him (Wildes 1954:141-2).
39 It should be noted that SCAP considered Mori a member of the Yoshida faction in both 1949 and 1951
although he later joined Mindo (SCAP Miscellaneous Parties and Groups 1949, GS(B) 02674-5).
40 This cabinet was composed of sixteen Jiyiito members, and two from political groups in the Upper
House, the Ryokufiikai and Minshu Club (Quigley and Turner 1956:294). In the intended reshuffle in
February 1953 the Mindoha pressed to get at least one seat, and thought about Ando Masazumi in that
respect (AS 10.2.53).
41 Ishibashi was however unhappy that he had not been given the finance ministry as he had strongly
advocated certain economic policies in his opposition to the Yoshida administration (Ishida 1985:103-4).
42 Two of the Kaishinto ministers were from the Miki faction, one from the Oasa faction, one from the
Ashida faction, and then Shigemitsu Mamoru.
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43 Hatoyama and Miki actually disagreed on this appointment. Hatoyama had wanted to reward Hoshijima
with this post but Matsunaga was chosen (Hatoyama 1957:145).
44 Takechi was the only candidate for Saiken Renmei who got elected in 1952 and then joined the Jiyiito in
1953 with Kishi. Omura Seiichi had been neutral in the Jiyuto in the early 1950s but joined the Kishi
faction in 1953.
45 The Minshuto had 124 Dietrnembers at the time of the dissolution. In the election the Jiyiito got 112
seats, down from 180 at the time ofthe dissolution (Hatoyama 1957:143; Kohno 1997:70).
46 Hatoyama had though not always observed such rules himself as was clear when he made the young and
inexperienced Kono Ichiro secretary-general in 1946 (Kono 1965:180).
47 The data used here ignores the 1946 election as the results from that election are not comparable to those
of later elections under the multimember electoral system.
48 The following discussion only takes account of members of the same party elected from the district, and
not all those running for the party in the district.
49 Reed (1988:319) points out that the Minshuto was the first party to utilise the strategy of reducing the
number of candidates in this election, running 87 fewer candidates and thereby gaining seats in spite of a
drop in votes.
50 Data on factional affiliation is very incomplete for the general elections in 1952 and 1953, with factional
affiliation not known for nearly half the parties. It is therefore not possible to make accurate estimates.
51 Kimura became a member of the Ono faction again in 1960 in the LDP.
52 Hirokawa wanted Amano Kimiyoshi to run, while Ono supported Arai Kyota, Neither of these
candidates was a protege of Ono or Hirokawa; Arai was neutral in 1952 and in the Maeda faction in
1953, while Amano was in the Yoshida faction.
53 At its peak the Etsuzankai had nearly 100,000 members and 317 local chapters in Tanaka's district in
Niigata (Hunziker and Kamimura 1994:66).
54 They were Nakagawa Shunji and Tanigawa Noboru who were both neutral in the party, and a Hatoyama
faction member, Nagano Mamoru.
55 The Jiyiito was believed to be more dependent on the construction and broker funding than Minshuto,
However, Ashida, then president of the Minshuto, was prosecuted for accepting bribes from a
construction company in relation to the Showa Denkii scandal (Mitchell 1996: I00). One of his main
supporters for the presidency was Sugawara Michinari but his brother in law was Hinohara Setsuzo,
president of Showa Denko (Mitchell 1996: 102)
56 Hunziker and Kamimura (1994:38) state that the party decided to 'elect as president the first member
who could come up with three million yen .. .in campaign funds.' Babb (2000:25) points out that
Machida was supported by Tanaka Kakuei who was then not yet a Dietmember, but a wealthy
construction businessman.
57Through his financial support Ishibashi tried to contribute to unity within the Jiyiito. In the summer of
1953 he approached those in the Jiyiito still close to Hatoayama, after the latter had split and asked them
to try to get along and work for the unity of conservatives (Hatoyama 1957: 127). Ishibashi also put
constant pressure on Hatoyama, probably through their family connections, to return to the Jiyiito
(Hatoyama 1957:128).
58 There were attempts to curb corruption in the first years of the postwar period through Political Funds
regulations. In July 1948 a law was passed requiring political parties to provide periodic reports on
funding (NT 9.10.47). In April 1950 a Public Offices Law was passed, consolidating all local and
national election regulations and placing severe restrictions on campaign activities. However, little
change was detected and Mitchell in his study of corruption concluded that the legislators' ... failed to
stop the old custom of using illegal fund and bribery to win elections' (Mitchell 1996:107). The
Shipbuilding scandal of 1954 was a case in point (see Mitchell 1996: II 0).
59 Kono Ichiro had good business connections and was nicknamed 'God of elections' (Wildes 1954:108;
Colton 1948:942). This made him ideal for the post of secretary-general in 1945 in spite of his young
age. Ikeda was chosen because of his connections since his days in the Finance Ministry (Watanabe
1958:20). Ono also had extensive financial ties (SCAP Financial Supporters 1947-8, GS(B) 00832-3).
Financial connections were also a criteria for appointments in cabinet posts, and in particular the Finance
Ministry post. Ikeda Hayato and Mukai Tadaharu were chosen in that post partly because they were
principal fundraisers for the party (Yanaga 1956:257).
60 These were Niwa Hyokichi, Mitsui Kyujiro and Hanabusa Toshio (NT 25.6.48).
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61 The scandal arose over bribes offered by the largest fertiliser producer to politicians for special
consideration in arranging low-interest loans from the Reconstruction Finance Bank. Only two of the 64
persons implicated were found guilty in .1962 (Calder 1988:77).
62 This came about when Kono was imprisoned for receiving money from Tsuji while he was purged in the
SCAP's efforts to decrease the influence of 'wirepullers' (kuromaku) (Kono 1958:156-7).
63 Hori had also been secretary-general of the Coalition faction in 1949 before joining the Jiyiito but he was
a member of the Inukai faction when he entered the party (Hori 1975:81). A Hori faction was said to
exist only after he joined. Hori says he did not recommend Tsubokawa specifically for the post though
they were in the same Inukai faction (Hori 1975:81).
64 The Nihon Jiyiito then went on to organize election meetings around the country with entrance fees to
collect money for the party (Kono 1958: 184). This may have been the first time a political party asked
for entrance fees.
65 Wealthy party members sometimes donated money to the party, especially after 1947. The Jiyiito gained
from some wealthy party members in the House of Councillors, such as Itaya, Matsushima and Terao
(Sakano 1948: 108-11 0).
66 Hoshijima Jiro, chairman of the Executive Council of the Jiyiito for much of the period between 1946
and 1950, established his own supporting society, the 'Hoshijima Fujimura Kai', voluntarily formed by
members of the "cooperative society of Middle School Uniforms of all Japan' (zengoku chuto gakko
seifuku kyodo kumiai). This society provided Hoshijima with election funds and political activity funds,
estimated at 5-600.000 yen (SCAP Financial Supporters 1947--48, GS(B) 00832-3) but it is unclear
whether he distributed money to other party members.
67 These were Kokusaku Pulp Co, Yamata Steel Work and Japan Steel Pipe Co. (Yanaga 1956:259).
68 The following analysis relies on a number of lists over membership to factions. Complete lists were
found for the Jiyiito in 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1951, and for the Minshuto in 1949 and 1951 (Sakano
1948; SCAP Miscellaneous Parties and Groups 1949, GS(B) 02683; SCAP Miscellaneous Parties 1951,
GS(B) 02674). Later lists are based on newspaper reports and historical material but they are incomplete.
69 The Shidehara faction had gained four members as it joined the JiyutO. One new member had been
elected for the Kyodoto in 1947, another was a Jiyiito member, while two new Dietmembers in 1949
joined them (SCAP Miscellaneous Parties 1951, GS(B) 02674-5).
70 The Yoshida faction in 1951 included the Hirokawa faction.
71 Of those Ikeda Hayato, Sato Eisaku, Masuda Kaneshichi, Yoshida's son-in-law Aso Takakichi, Okazaki
Katsuo, Kosaka Zentaro and Fukunaga Kenji were most prominent (Tominomori 1994:72).
72 The Yoshida Gakkii does, however, not feature much in contemporary sources and did rarely feature as a
political group.
73 Aoki Masashi, Kano Hikokichi, Komine Ryuta, Koyama Osanori, Hirai Giichi and Suzuki Zenko had
connections with Yoshida but were also considered to be neutral or connected to Ono by some observers
(SCAP Miscellaneous Parties and Groups 1949, GS(B) 02683; SCAP'Miscellaneous Parties 1951,
GS(B) 02674; Togawa 1980).
74 Hatoyama was chosen president of the new party, Miki Bukichi secretary-general, Kono Ichiro chairman
of the Executive Council (siimukaichoy; Ishibashi chairman of the Policy Deliberation Council
(seisakuiincho), and Hirokawa chairman of the Election Polling Committee (senkyotaisakuiincho),
(Ishida 1985:86; Tominomori 1994:79).
75 Seventeen had been in the Bunjito and seven had been elected for the Jiyiito but returned to the
Hatoyama faction after Hatoyama's return in November 1953.
76 Sources differ on how many left the Minshuto with Shidehara, some say 20 (Masumi 1985), others say
36 incumbents defected (Reed 1988:311). According to my sources 25 joined Jiyiito, two of whom had
been elected as independents in 1947.
77 However, of the seven candidates for Kishi's Saiken Renmei in 1952, five ran for Yoshida's JiyiitO, and
two for Hatoyama's Bunjito in 1953 (Reed 1988:332).
78 Both the Hatoyama and Yoshida factions tried to appeal to the Neutral faction with promises of financial
support following the general election in 1952 (AS 5.10.52; 8.20.52; 6.10.52). The Hatoyama faction
formed the Jiyuto New Dietmembers' Discussion Group (Shingiin kondankai) in an effort to recruit new
Dietmembers (AS 6.10.52). Those central to the formation of the group were Matsuoka Matsuhei, Ando
Masazumi, Okubo Tomejiro, Makino Raizo, Hiratsuka Tsunejiro, Shigemasa Seiji, Sakomizu Hisatsune,
Utsunomiya Tokuma, Tokuyasu Jitsuzo, Kawai Yoshinari and Matsuoka Matsuhei (AS 6.10.52). The
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Yoshida faction used similar tactics, inviting Dietmembers returning to Tokyo after the elections to
Yoshida's residence (AS 6.10.52).
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CHAPTER4:
THE LDP FACTIONS: FACTIONALISM AS A FORCE OF
STABILITY
4.1. Introduction
Having discussed the characteristics of factionalism within the Jiyilto and Minshuto, I
will now turn to the development of factionalism within the LOP. This chapter will
discuss the changes in factionalism in the LOP in 1955-64. As many scholars have
pointed out the LOP became characterised by the division into a number of clearly
defined factions, with extensive functions of great political importance. The factions
became the unofficial basis for the party organisation, distributing funding and posts to
party members in exchange for support in presidential elections (Masumi 1967; Baerwald
1986; Kohno 1997; Hrebenar 1986a, Stockwin 1989:161). They became
'institutionalised, organised factions' (see Beller and Belloni 1978c:427), much more
formal than the factions of the Jiyuto and Minshuto, their membership cut through the
party, and they had clear leadership and formal procedures.
Extensive research has already been done on factionalism in the early years of the LOP,
which has focused on the institutionalisation of the factions (W~tanabe 1958, 1964; Sate
and Matsusaki 1986; Uchida 1983; Thayer 1969; Goto et al. 1982; Masumi 1995, Curtis
1971, Fukui 1970, Kohno 1997, Stockwin 1970). As seen earlier, the Jiyuto and the
Minshuto were polarised. Similarly, the LOP was divided into two main currents: a
mainstream: tshuryii) and anti-mainstream (han shuryu)-the balance between them
representing the shifting alliances between the party leaders (Baerwald 1986; Thayer
1968; Leiserson 1968). However, I will argue that after the party's first year, this
polarisation became very different from the polarisation of the early postwar parties.
Whereas the divisions within the Jiyuto and Minshuto were a major source of instability,
threatening the political system, the divisions within the LOP were a source of stability,
maintaining the political system. It was often pointed out in the first years of the LOP that
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a 'factional system' (habatsu kOza) emerged where the factions became "parties within
parties". This phrase truly reflected a process whereby the factions had taken on
organisational features commonlyassociated with political parties;-they became stable
entities that distributed both collective and selective incentives to their members (see
Panebianco 1988). The LDP factions carefully constructed both collective (identity,
solidarity or ideology) and selective incentives (power, status and material incentives) to
acquire stable membership, which Panebianco (1988:10) argues are necessary for an
organisation to acquire 'organisational continuity and hierarchical stability.' They were,
however, less successful with ideological incentives, as seen in the weak ideological
colouring of the LDP factions compared to the earlier factions. As a new factional system
was being born, policy became less significant in creating internal divisions which helped
create stability (see Babb, unpublished paper). The LDP factions became the basis for
cabinet and party appointments, and efforts were made to allow greater balance in power
between the factions within the party. Factionalism thus ceased to be destabilising; it
came to be widely, though not exclusively, considered a tool to aid party cohesion and
political stability by observers and politicians (Shiratori 1988: 170; Ward 1969:64-5;
Stockwin 1989: 162).
4.2. 1956 - A year of fluid factions
Although scholars have noted a greater tendency towards factionalism in parties created
out of a merger of two or more parties (Beller and Belloni 1978c:436), it has also been
argued that the origin of the LDP factions can be traced back to 1952 and that these
divisions were to be prominent within the LDP in its formative years (Tominomori
1994:76; Dower 1979:316; AS 11.10.56). At that time, the Jiyuto had a bureaucratic
faction and a party politician faction, the Kaishinto was split into the left and right
factions, and Kishi had just established his own political party, the Saiken Remmei.
Tominomori (1994:76) argues that:
after this [1952] the parties and the factions split and merged, they vanished like clouds
or went through a process of breaking up, but the origin of today's factions can be seen in
the confrontation between the factions of each of the conservative parties in the last years
of Yoshida's rule.
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It is true that the factions found within the LDP at its inception were the groups that had
existed within the Jiyiito and the Kaishinto and had emerged out of the splits and mergers
of the conservative parties between. 1953 and 1955. However, it is argued here that at the
inception of the party, these factions were still the fluid groups they had been within the
Jiyuto and the Kaishinto and that it was not until 1957 that the factions started to take on
a clear organisational form (Goto, Uchida and Ishikawa 1982:138; Iyasu 1983:110;
Leiserson 1968:770).
Soon after the formation of the LDP a few politicians from each of the previous
conservative parties became most prominent. These politicians formed three main
currents (iro wake), the Jiyuto, Minshuto, and Kaishinto wings (Watanabe 1958:143).
Those most prominent from the Minshuto with a Jiyiito background were Hatoyama
Ichiro, Ishibashi Tanzan, Kishi Nobusuke and Miki Bukichi.1 A number of powerful
politicians came from the Jiyilto. Of those, Yoshida Shigeru, Ono Bamboku, and Ogata
Taketora were possibly the best known, but Hayashi Joji, Masutani Shuji, Ishii Mitsujiro,
Ikeda Hayato and Sato Eisaku were also well known.' The most prominent politicians
with roots in the old Kaishinto and then the Minshuto, were Miki Takeo, Matsumura
Kenzo, Ashida Hitoshi, Oasa Tadao and Kitamura Tokutaro. All these politicians had
some personal followings but as seen in previous chapters, these groups were not formal
entities. From the factional history of the LDP presented in Table 4-1 it can be seen that
there were thirteen factional groups in the party in 1956 before the presidential election.'
In spite of all these factional groups, the LDP was a polarised party as its predecessors
had been: the politicians grouped themselves together in various combinations crossing
the old party lines, forming two main wings. The leadership issue was a main point of
contention and the party seemed largely divided into the 'traditional' bureaucratic and
party politician groups like the Jiyiito (Nester 1990:160). After Hatoyama was chosen
president in April 1956, the mainstream was led by the party politicians, Hatoyama, Kono
Ichiro and Ono Bamboku (Table 4-2). Although the mainstream included most of the
Minshu and anti-Yoshida forces, Ishibashi stood outside the alliance (Ishida
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Table 4-2: Mainstream-antimainstream divisions in the LDP 1956-1964
Year Mainstream anti mainstream Neutral
1956 Hatovama cabinet Hatoyama Yoshida (Ikeda/Sato) Kishi
Kono Miki Takeo Ishibashi
Ono Ashida
Ishii Oasa
Kitamura
1956 Ishibashi cabinet Ishibashi Kishi Ono
Ikeda SaW Ishii
Miki Takeo Kono
1957 .Julv Kishi cabinet Kishi Ikeda
Ono Ishii
Keno Miki-Matsumura
SaW Ishibashi
1958 2nd Kishi cabinet Kishi Ishii
Ono Miki-Matsumura
Kono Ishibashi
SaW Ikeda
1959 .TuneKishi cabinet Kishi Kono Ishii
Sato Ishibashi Ono
Ikeda Miki -Matsumura
1960 Julv Ikeda cabinet Ikeda Kono Ishii
Sato Miki-Matsumura Ono
Kishi Ishibashi
1960 Dec. Ikeda cabinet Ikeda Kono Ono
SaW Miki -Matsumura Ishida
Kishi Ishibashi Ishii
Fuiivama
1961 Ikeda KishilFukuda
Kono Sato
Ono Fuiivama
Miki
Kawashima
1963 Ikeda cabinet Ikeda Sato
Ono KishilFukuda
Kono Fuiivama
Miki Ishii
Kawashima
1964 Ikeda cabinet Ikeda
Kono KishilFukuda
Ono SaW
Miki Ishii
Kawashima Fuiivama
Sources: Approximated from Watanabe 1958; Masumi 1995, Leiserson 1968; Iseri 1988; Uchida 1983;
Fukui 1970; JT.
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1985: 110). The mainstream was believed to have around 80 members; the Hatoyama
faction thirteen members; and the Kono faction somewhere between 37 and 52 members
(JT 16.10.56). This polarisation was further reinforced in the summer of 1956 over the
issue of Japan-USSR negotiations (JT 13.7.56).
The 'anti-Hatoyama faction' supported Ogata Taketora as president. It was led by the
Yoshida faction but also included many who had been against the merger (JT 4.4.56; AS
13.7.56).4 Ikeda was the de facto leader of the Yoshida group because Yoshida had
chosen not to join the new party, but the name and membership was that of the Yoshida
faction. Kishi was believed to have around 30 supporters but he was positioned more
towards the centre, aligning at different times with each camp (JT 11.12.56). The Ishii
faction was also centrally positioned but was more vocal in its opposition to Hatoyama
than Kishi was. It was noted in February that 10 factions existed within the party 'each
aspiring for leadership of its own' (JT 16.2.56) and there were various references to the
activities of the factions. However, the general feeling at the time was that the factions
were not of primary importance for political developments. More important were the two
currents, the mainstream and the anti-mainstream, splitting the party (e.g. IT 22.5.56;
Iyasu 1983:110).
Until 1957 it seemed to many observers that the factional manoeuvres within the newly
formed LDP were not very different from the struggles taking place within the Jiyuto.
There were two wings fighting over leadership of the party and there were personal
antagonisms between individual politicians. Party members moved between groups,
many were undecided and stayed outside the groups, and personal leadership as well as
the issue of party leadership was important in shaping the factional movements. The
Asahi Shimbun noted that 'the factions do not have solid membership but count a little
over lOin each battle array and thus do not individually hold decisive power. Their
influence is scattered ... ' (AS 6.4.56). In October 1956 the Japan Times wrote:
Factionalism within the conservative camp (not to mention the leftists) has always
existed. But it became especially notable when the question of whether or not Prime
Minister Hatoyama should go to Moscow arose. The nature of political factions being
what it is, any attempt at listing them would necessarily be arbitrary. There are no
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'memberships' of course, to mark them clearly. Besides, the groups in the changing
domestic and world conditions have been highly volatile and variable. A faction may be
considered to comprise a certain number today, and the figure may have to be revised in a
few weeksbecause of shifting loyalties (16.10.56).
As in the early postwar period, the factions had very limited definable membership and
the groups changed from one issue to the next. The party was unable to reach an
agreement on the party's leadership and so a leadership committee (sosai daiko iin sei)
was set up with Hatoyama, Ogata Taketora, Miki Bukichi and Ono Bamboku as
representatives (Watanabe 1966:24). Ogata died suddenly in January 1956 and Hatoyama
was made president of the LDP in April 1956 (Ooto et al. 1982: 141).5 All the same, until
the presidential election in the LDP in December 1956, the LDP factionalism was
identical to that of the JiyQtOand Minshuto, the tendency to polarise was strong and the
factions did not have clear membership. However, this fluidity of membership was to
decrease greatly following the first presidential election in December 1956.
4.3. Factional reorganisation and the 1956 presidential elections
The first secret ballot presidential elections held in the LDP in December 1956 started a
process which was to alter the factional divisions which had existed in the party's first
year. First, politicians sought to build alliances between groups to secure victory in the
election. Second, smaller groups gravitated towards the most prominent politicians as
their power rapidly expanded.
It was tactical thinking amongst the party leaders that led to the adoption of secret ballot
elections for the party president. Ogata had believed he could win in spite of the support
Hatoyama seemed to have secured, if a secret ballot election was held (Watanabe
1966:24). Hatoyama was against the idea but was forced to accept it after negotiations
broke down. The party leader was to be chosen at a party convention attended by around
500 LDP members of both houses of the Diet and representatives of urban and rural
prefectures (Ooto et al. 1982:138).However, because of Ogata's death in January 1956,
Hatoyama was made president without a rival candidacy. He, however, announced his
intention to resign in the autumn of 1956 and the first secret ballot presidential election
was scheduled for December. Three candidates ran in the election, Ishii Mitsujiro, Kishi
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Nobusuke and Ishibashi Tanzan, and these politicians aligned across the old party lines to
create extensive support groups around them. Personal and political preferences as to
who should lead the party (see Kohno 1997 chapter 5), rnixed with issues relating to
bureaucratic and political power, heavily affected the alliances (Watanabe 1958:208).6
The factions surrounding the two Jiyuto politicians running in the election, Ishibashi and
Ishii, grew rapidly following their decision to run in the election. Ishii and Ishibashi's
candidacy largely recreated the polarisation of the Jiyuto. The Ishii faction was in effect
the old Ogata faction, which had come under the new leadership of Ishii Mitsujiro when
Ogata died in January 1956. This was the first time that a faction was passed on to a new
leader. The only other similar incident was in 1946 when Hatoyama was purged, and Ono
and Okubo carne to lead the party politicians in the Jiytito. That was, however, unofficial
leadership over an ill-defined group. The Ishii faction was considered the closest knit
before the second presidential election and Uchida noted about the leadership succession
in the Ogata faction: 'this was the first time that I felt that I was corning across a
'habatsu' [faction], (Goto et al. 1982:142). Ishii's support came from the Jiyuto, from his
own faction and the Ikeda faction (GoW et al. 1982:138; Iyasu 1983:110; Watanabe
1966:29; Watanabe 1977:85;). Ishibashi also drew most of his support from the Jiyiito,
mainly from those who had been against Yoshida. Of these, the most influential was the
small group around Ishibashi and Ishida, and the old Hatoyama forces led by Okubo
(Watanabe 1966:29). Many of Ishibashi's supporters, having fought against Yoshida and
with Hatoyama within the Jiyuto, now strongly disliked Kono (Watanabe 1966:29;
Watanabe 1958:167).7 But Ishibashi also got support from the Kaishinto factions, the
Matsumura and Miki factions, who all disliked Keno (Watanabe 1958:180).
Kishi's support came from two very different political directions. Kishi, who had built a
strong faction while serving as secretary-general in the LDP's first year, got support from
his own faction, as well as from two Jiyiito factions: the SaW faction, led by Kishi's
brother, SaW Eisaku, and the Kono faction, in spite of Keno's general dislike of
bureaucrats. Because of Kishi's close relations with many of the old Kaishinto groups, he
also ensured the support of the Oasa faction (Watanabe 1966:29; Watanabe 1977:85).
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The presidential election led to a split between the two groups of the Yoshida faction as
Sato followed Kishi and Ikeda decided to support Ishii (Hori 1975: 104; AS 2.2.56,
5.1.58,),8 but nineteen other members of the Yoshida faction were still undecided which
group to follow shortly before the election (AS 11.10.56).
Ono was indecisive at first as to whom to support. He did not want a Kishi-Sate alliance
to win because it would result in a revival of bureaucratic politics. At the same time, Ono
disliked Matsumura Kenzo and Miki Takeo and thought they differed too much from him
politically (Watanabe 1958: 112; Watanabe 1966:30). However, he disliked Ishii even
more, and was against Kono after a disagreement over personnel decisions (Iyasu
1983:11O;Watanabe 1977:85). He thus supported Ishibashi in the end."
The presidential candidates did their best to attract support to ensure victory in the
election. But it was not only the presidential candidates who were attracting other smaller
groups. Other politicians, and in particular Sato, Ikeda, Ono and Kono, were also
attracting independent following although the growth of their groups was not as rapid as
that of the groups around the presidential candidates (AS 11.10.56). The internal groups
varied in nature but in the press, a 'faction' referred to both the small groups around each
leader, and also the wider support groups for the presidential candidates. Thus the Japan
Times wrote in November 1956 that since Ono 'is not avowedly running in the current
race, his 'faction' as such is necessarily smaller than some others which have formed
around the 'candidates' for the Liberal-Democratic president' (27.11.56). Kono and Miki
Bukichi had been political allies, having formed the Nihon Jiyuto together in 1953, but
after the latter's death in July 1956, Keno became a more independent leader. Many of
Hatoyama's followers stayed outside factions until the presidential election, when the
members dispersed, moving to either Kono, or Ishibashi who had decided to run in the
election. Some moved over to the Kishi faction.i'' The old Jiyuto Hirokawa faction also
largely joined Kishi (Watanabe 1958: 108).
Many of the smaller factional factions conferred closely on the presidential election and
tried to strengthen their unity to deal with this event (see Ashida 1986 vo1.6). However,
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these attempts ended in most cases with a merger with one of the bigger factions. The
former Kaishinto forces had split into three main groups, left, centre and conservative
groups. Of these, the only groups "to remain more or less intact from the Kaishinto were
the left wing Miki and Matsumura groups that formed the Miki-Matsumura faction
around year end 1956 (Watanabe 1958:183; JT 20.11.56). The Kitamura group gravitated
towards Kono and Kishi (Watanabe 1958: 106:183; Hayashi 1957a:34), but Kono and
Kitamura had been on good terms since 1953 because of their mutual interest in ousting
Yoshida (Watanabe 1958:207). Kitamura himself, however, voted for Ishibashi in the
1956 election!! and his faction ceased to exist as a group in 1957 (Watanabe 1958:106;
AS 11.10.56). Oasa Tadao, who had been close to Matsumura until then (Watanabe
1958: 100) and a leader of around ten member conservative faction (hoshuha), parted with
his old friend late in 1956. His group created the Juichi nichi kai (11 th day Society) as a
link with the Kishi faction and came out in support of Kishi in the election (AS 11.10.56;
Watanabe 1958:194). Oasa had been close to Kishi before the war and gravitated towards
him in the presidential election in 1956 because of that connection. It is said that Kishi
was providing funding for Oasa by this time (Watanabe 1958:193). It is, however,
interesting to note that most members of the Oasa faction in 1956 were new
Dietmembers, elected in 1955. After Oasa died in February 1957 the group joined the
Kishi faction but led a somewhat separate life there, getting a member appointed in both
the Ishibashi cabinet and the first two Kishi cabinets (Watanabe 1958:194). The centre
faction of the Kaishinto formed the Sannokai in November 1956. Six of its eight
members joined the Kishi faction, while one went to the Miki faction (Watanabe
1958:106; AS 11.10.56).12 The Ashida faction only had seven members in October (AS
11.10.56) and had disappeared by end of 1956. An entry in Ashida's diary December 11
1956 shows the fluid nature of the factions that had been carried over from the Jiyuto and
Kaishinto and the ease with which they disbanded and joined more influential politicians:
Today at 2 o'clock I went to the Tokyo Club to discuss matters with Kojima Tetsuzo and
Chiba Saburo. They asked me if I would ask Shiga [Kenjiro] and Takase [Den] to join the
Kishi faction too but I answered that it was not for me to dictate to other people (Ashida
1986 vo1.6:253).
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Ashida's limited ability and willingness to exert leadership over his faction was clear and
the faction dispersed. Some of its members like Chiba Saburo and Kojima Tetsuzo joined
the Kishi faction, while others, like Ashida, joined Miki.13
Before the elections, the press referred to the internal groupings as the 'seven divisions
and three regiments' (shichika shidan, sanrentai), using military language to portray the
varying strengths and sizes of the groups (Iyasu 1983:109; Watanabe 1958:96; JT
11.12.56).14With the mergers of groups around the election, the number of factions went
down from thirteen to eight and their organisational tightness started to increase (see
Table 4--1). Most LDP factions opened election offices where supporters would meet
weekly to exchange information and form strategies (Watanabe 1958:112; Iyasu
1983: 110; JT 27.11.56). The Yoshida faction formed the Heishin Kai and met twice
weekly at their headquarters (JT 10.11.56). The Ishii faction had headquarters in
Akasaka, owned by the main strategist of the party, Tanaka Isaji, and met daily (JT
6.11.56). Oasa's Juichi nichi kai met once a month (Watanabe 1958:194). The Ono
faction had not yet established headquarters and although one of the leaders, Aoki
Masashi, said 'We only maintain constant contact with other groups toward our aim' (JT
27.11.56), the group was meeting regularly (Go1Oet al. 1982:142).
It is true, as Fukui has argued, that the presidential election encouraged the building and
maintenance of a bloc of supporters (1978:57). Scholars have argued that this election
transformed the fluid factions to established units (Iyasu 1983:110; Uchida 1989:101).
However, the Jiyuto and Minshuto had at times seen the formation of such blocs, and
factions had been known to open temporary factional offices to fight in elections, as seen
in Chapter 2 (Kono 1965: 150-3). In 1956, the reorganisation of the factional structure
was more extensive than ever before and there are indications that party leaders were
using financial aid to attract smaller factions, but the smaller factions had still not joined
the bigger factions but offered support for the election. The presidential election was,
however, an important stepping stone towards factions with clear membership, to which
we now turn.
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4.4. Consolidation of faction membership
The effects of the new presidential election system on the factions became only gradually
clear. Slowly, after the election "in 1956, a new pattern of factionalisation started to
emerge. Rather than disband the factions after the presidential elections of 1956 or
whittle them down to a few core members, as had been the case in the past, faction
leaders organised a number of events, for example inviting Dietmembers to parties, to
create a more stable support group (Thayer 1968:23). The formation of membership was
a crucial factor changing the factions from the fluid tendencies/patron client groups they
had been. Personal relations ceased to be as important as the expansion of the faction,
which became a goal in itself. Beller and Belloni (1978c:427) describe the formalisation
of membership thus:
Recruitment is ordinarily aggressively prosecuted, the goal being not so much to bring
new individuals into a personal relationship with a faction leader as to add sheer number
to the ranks of the faction.
With the advent of presidential elections party leaders had a new incentive to attract
permanent followers. The factions were going through a process similar to that of a
political party trying to attract members through a variety of incentives. Panebianco has
described two main kinds of incentives used by parties to attract members: collective
incentives distributed to all, such as identity, solidarity and ideology; and selective
incentives in form of power, status and other material benefits to individual politicians
(Panebianco 1989:9-10; Ware 1996:68-9). As seen later' the LDP used selective
incentives very effectively, but the use of collective incentives, such as the creation of
sense of identity and solidarity, has been underestimated by scholars. The membership
formation was incremental and initially very informal as Thayer (1969:23) describes:
Kono's only factional membership list was the banquet books, and the only yardstick of
factional loyalty was the distance the Dietmen were willing to travel to eat and drink with
him.
However, in what seemed a chain effect, factions were launched formally, with parties
and media attention; faction leaders openly appealed to party members to join; and
factions sought to show their influence by opening offices and holding parties (Thayer
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1969:22-3). These faction offices did not represent a split in the party, indicating that the
group was trying to separate itself from the party leadership as had been the case in the
Jiyuto and Minshuto, but became' a symbol of power. Thus, for example, when Ishida
Hirohide went ahead to establish his own office in late 1958 this was seen as a direct
attempt to establish Ishida as future leadership material (AS 2.10.58). In September 1957
the Kono faction, along with the old Kitamura faction, had:
formed a society called the 'Shunju Kai' and have registered it as a political association.
Actually, it is a sort of political party. It almost amounts to a 'Kana Party' though it is
within the Liberal Democratic Party. In opposition to this, the Ikeda faction has formed a
political association called the 'Kochi Kai' while the Miki clique plans to create a
'Sanboku Kai.' Things having come to this pass, the Liberal-Democratic Party has
completely deteriorated into a mere coalition of factions (JT 6.9.57).
The fact that the journalist refers to the Shunjukai as a 'sort of political party' (or 'party
within the party', to chii to), a term never used about factions before, reveals how the
factions had changed. The faction as a 'political party' was a group with organisational
visibility (habatsu kyoka). Membership was a major feature of the faction as a 'political
party'. For the factions to acquire stability and continuity they needed clear collective
incentives to attract members. Factions invited members to training courses to attract
membership and nurture a feeling of belonging through a variety of activities (Thayer
1968:23; AS 28.10.63). A variety of factors affected the pattern of membership,
friendships.l" atmosphere of the faction," or ideological incentives like policy (especially
the Miki-Matsumura group). However, as seen in the following chapter, financial support
and proximity to power played a major role in defining membership. An anonymous
article in the Asahi Shimbun in January 1956 tells of a real or fictional Dietmember who
joined a faction because of the electoral support received in his first election from the
faction leader (AS 6.1.56). Thayer pointed out that the faction could also be a great help
to candidates in other ways. Because of the political power the factions were acquiring
they became a major player in giving the candidate value as a politician, elevating him 'to
the status of a major contender', establishing connections that reached to the core of the
party (Thayer 1969:36-7). The Prime Minister's faction was particularly successful in
attracting members in this way because of its proximity to power, and in 1957 when
Kishi became prime minister it was reported that 'the number of Dietmembers situated in
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the mainstream and aligning with the Kishi faction that holds power, keeps on increasing
day by day' (Hayashi 1957b:45).
In the following sections I will discuss faction membership in further detail. Three main
observations will be made. First, in the party's first years, certain historical continuity is
visible as party members joined factions to which they had some sort of personal
connection. Second, in the late 1950s the factions increased in size while the number of
neutral party members decreased rapidly. Third, as the factions established themselves
diversity in membership increased. These changes reveal a process where the LDP
factions were increasingly taking on the characteristics of political parties-stable
membership was vital for their survival as power brokers, and recruitment became a goal
in itself.
4.4.1. Historical continuity in factional composition
The largest factions in the LDP in 1956 were not the same factions as they had been 2-3
years previously as they were in the process of incorporating many Dietmembers who
previously belonged to one of the small factions or had no factional affiliation. However,
most factions showed relative continuity, in that most of the faction members in 1956
came from the same party as the faction leader, and a significant portion had been
politically close to the leader in the past, indicating that policy issues played some part in
forming the factions.V
Of the Ishibashi faction's eleven members in 1956 all but one had previously been Jiyiito
members, and 6 had been in Mindo (see also Watanabe 1958:164). The 25 members of
the Kono faction in 1956 came in roughly equal numbers from Kaishinto and Jiyuto, but
most, or 23, had been elected for the Minshuto in 1955, two of who were new
Dietmembers'", while only two had run for the Jiyuto. Twelve members had been elected
for the Jiyuto in 1952 and of those ten split in 1953. The Miki faction had 26 members in
1956, 25 of who had come from the Minshuto but one had been a member of the
Hatoyama faction in the Jiyuto. Seven of the former Minshuto members had belonged to
the Miki faction in the Minshuto/Kaishinto, four had been members of the Ashida
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faction, while 14 had unknown affiliation.19 The 21 member Ishii faction was composed
of three new Dietmembers, three former Kaishinto members, and 15 former Jiyuto
members, the majority of who had been neutral in the party." The Ono faction's 20
members all came from the Jiyuto, but only three had been Ono faction members in the
early 1950s, Kanda Hiroshi, Murakami Isamu and Kano Hikokichi. Murakami and Kanda
had become Ono faction members during Ono's stint as secretary-general in the Jiyuto
(Watanabe 1958: 119).21Two others had been in the Mindoha and thus been situated in
the Hatoyama wing, while one had been close to Yoshida. Eight had been neutral in the
party while three were former Hirokawa faction members.
The members of the Ikeda and SaW factions had all been elected for the Jiyuto in the
early 1950s. The Ikeda faction members showed closer relations to the Yoshida faction of
the Jiyuto than the Sato faction members. Of the nineteen Ikeda faction members, ten had
been in the Yoshida faction in the early 1950s, eight had been neutral and one had been in
the Shidehara faction and thus within the Yoshida wing. Of the SaW faction's 16
members, eleven had been relatively neutral in the Jiyuto although some had been
favourable to the Yoshida faction, two came from the Hirokawa faction, one from
Hatoyama and Ono factions each, and then SaW himself, from the Yoshida faction. Of
the nineteen Yoshida faction members who had not aligned with either SaW or Ikeda in
1956 all but one came from Jiyuto. Five had been neutral in the Jiyiito, eight had been in
the Yoshida faction, while four were of unknown affiliation, and one had been first
elected in 1955. One had been a member of the Kaishinto,
The Kishi faction, the largest faction with 34 members, showed most diversity; nine
members were elected for the first time in 1955 for the Minshuto, ten had been elected
for the Kaishinto in the early 1950s and came from a variety of factions, while fifteen had
been members of the Jiyuto, Of this last group, thirteen had left the Jiyuto in the split in
1954, but two had been of neutral standing. The faction thus included a considerable
group of anti-Yoshida elements and new Dietmembers.
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4.4.2. Faction size
Turning to faction size, as the factions sought to attract new members faction
membership fluctuated between 1956 and 1958, but as seen in Figure 4-1, most factions
were rapidly growing. Only the Ishii faction stayed at roughly the same." The LOP
factions varied in size but ranged between three and 55. They were thus considerably
smaller than the biggest factions in the Jiyuto. The factional membership still showed
some resemblance to the Jiylito factions as seen in the rapid increase in the size of the
Kishi faction after Kishi became prime minister in January 1957, when it was estimated
to have around 100 members (Hayashi 1957b:43). This very much resembled the
'presidential' Yoshida faction within the Jiylito.
It has been widely argued that from the time of the Kishi cabinet in 1957, the factional
divisions became visibly entrenched (Iyasu 1983: 122; Goto et al. 1982). However,
although the factions had acquired considerable membership and organisational visibility
at this time, there were still considerable movements between factions. As factions
became more important, disagreements started arising within them over individual
promotions and political strategies, leading to splits (Watanabe 1958:131)_23 The
temporary phenomenon of 'rising factions' (shinkii habatsu) in the late 1950s was made
possible because of these shifts between the established factions (kisei habatsu) but when
membership was stabilised such fissures stopped appearing (see Watanabe 1958:210).
,
Between 1958 and 1960, all factions decreased in size, apart from the Ikeda and SaW
factions which saw their biggest growth spurt in those years. This decrease in
membership was largely due to the emergence of a number of new factions, the so-called
'rising factions,' raising the number of intraparty factions to twelve-though several of
them were short lived (Watanabe 1958:210). For example, the Ichimanda and Kaya
factions were small groups that emerged in the end of the 1950s but they had more or less
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dispersed by 1961.24The Ishida faction may also be considered a 'rising faction' although
it emerged out of the Ishibashi faction in 1957 after internal disagreernents.f but by 1963
it had disappeared altogether (see Fukui 1970: 111). However, the Fujiyama faction,
which appeared in the presidential election in July 1960 (Fukui 1970: 110; Fujiyama
1976:232),26 was more resilient-membership of the faction increased after Kishi
declared that Fujiyama was to be his successor (Fujiyama 1976:233), and many Kishi
faction members joined the faction (Fujiyama 1976:233-4).
A rapid increase in faction membership occurred again between 1961 and 1963, as many
of the rising factions failed to establish themselves and the number of factions dropped
again to nine. The Miki, Ono and Keno factions grew rapidly, while the Ikeda and Sato
factions went slightly down. The Kishi faction disbanded in 1962 and split into two
groups (Iyasu 1983: 117). The group led by Fukuda Takeo went on to form the TofU
Sasshin Remmei in 1962 which became the Fukuda faction by 1965. The group led by
Kawashima Shojiro was called the Koyii Kurabu and was jointly led by Kawashima and
Akagi Munenori (Fukui 1970: 110). The Koyil Kurabu and the Fukuda factions had their
own political funds, political opinions, office and staff, reported the Japan Times. 'To all
intents and purposes, these factions are small-size political parties' (JT 11.10.63).27 The
Ishii faction, on the other hand, continued to decrease in size after continuing internal
disagreements and a failed attempt to seize the leadership of the party in 1960 (see
Hayashi 1958; Fukui 1970:117).
In the first year of the party, while the factions were still fluid and in the process of
acquiring membership, a significant portion of the party, a total of 31, had not aligned
with any faction (AS 11.10.56).28 In November 1956, it was even speculated in the media
that only 150 of the 290 LDP members had joined a faction (JT 13.11.56). Kawashima
Shojiro of the Kishi faction was quoted as saying that: 'it's hard to say where the loyalty
of the rest belongs. Itmay shift from day to day, depending upon political developments'
(JT 13.11.56). Moreover, 37 members were said to be connected to more than one faction
(AS 11.10.56). This group included Dietmembers first elected in 1955, former Jiyuto
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members who had been neutral, and Jiyuto and Kaishinto members who had belonged to
one of the factions (see AS 5.1.58).
However, as seen in Figure 4-2, the overall growth in faction membership after the
presidential elections in 1956 was accompanied by a rapid decrease in the number of
LDP Dietmembers not belonging to any faction or connected to more than one faction.i"
In 1958, only eight members were not affiliated to factions, according to Watanabe
(1958:223). Four of the eight non-affiliated in 1958 had been first elected in 1955 or 1958
and had never been members of any factions. Two had been members of the Hatoyama
faction. It is however interesting to note that between 1961 and 1963, the number of
unaffiliated members grew again. This was because a number of factions were
disappearing around that time. For example, in 1963 the Kishi, Ichimanda, Kaya, Ishida
and Ishibashi factions all had ceased to exist, leaving their members without factional
affiliation. This group counted for ten of the sixteen unaffiliated members in 1963, while
five were new Dietmembers in 1963. In 1964, ten of these were still unaffiliated and
more members of the Kishi faction joined this group. Although there was still a number
of LDP members not affiliated with factions, membership to factions was becoming
much clearer as double membership had been almost totally eradicated.f" By 1960,
factional fluidity had decreased greatly with most faction members belonging to a
faction. Moreover, the exact memberships were known and the members could be named:
indeed by 1963 membership had become so explicit that the press presented general
election results in terms of factional affiliation."
In 1964-5 the number of factions increased again as a number of faction leaders died.
Ono Bamboku died in May 1964 leading to a split in the Ono faction into the Funada and
Murakami factions. Keno Ichiro died July 1965, but a split had started to develop within
the faction in spring 1964 when three rival groups emerged: the dominant group led by
Shigemasa Seishi and Mori Kiyoshi, a dissident group led by, amongst others,
Yamaguchi Kikuichiro, and Matsuda Takechiyo, and a neutral group led by Nakasone
Yasuhiro and Sakurauchi Yoshio (Fukui 1970:111). The faction eventually split into the
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Nakasone faction and the Shigemasa faction. When Ikeda died in August 1965 the Maeo
faction was formed (Watanabe 1977:87; Fukui 1970:111).
4.4.3. Increasing diversity in membership
Not surprisingly, as the factions expanded and took on clearer form, the membership
became more diverse and they lost the historical continuity they had shown in 1956. If we
look at the composition of the factions in 1963, we see that the historical continuity
lessened, primarily because of the influx of new Dietmembers after the formation of the
LDP. The Kono, Ikeda, Sato, Miki and Ono factions had the largest groups of new
members elected in or after 1958.
The Kishi/Fukuda faction had seventeen members in 1963. Five came from Kaishinto
and nine from the JiyiitO. Of the former Jiyuto members four had left in 1954, four had
been neutral and one had been in the Hatoyama faction. The faction also had one member
elected for the Minshuto in 1955 and two members elected after 1958.
The Kawashima faction had nineteen members and had a similar composition to that of
the KishilFukuda faction. Three came from Kaishinto but nine from Jlyuto. Of the JiyiitO
members, five had split in 1954, two had been neutral, one had split in 1953 and formed
the Nihon Jiyuto with Keno and Miki, and one was a Yoshida supporter. Six members of
the faction were first elected in 1955 for the Minshuto. Only one was elected after the
,
formation of the LDP, making it the faction with the least regeneration in terms of
membership.
The Fujiyama faction was the only faction in 1963 to have been formed after the
formation of the LDP and therefore not surprisingly showed least historical continuity. Of
its 21 members nine had come from JiyiitO and seven from Kaishinto. Of the Jiyuto
members three had left with Kishi in 1954, three had been in the Hatoyama faction in the
early 1950s, two had been neutral and one had been in the Yoshida faction. Five faction
members in 1963 had been first elected after the formation of the LDP.
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The Keno faction had 44 members in 1963, and almost half, or 20, had been first elected
in or after 1958. Eleven of those had been first elected in 1963 following Keno's drive to
enlarge his faction (see Chapter 5). Five came from the Kaishinto and 15 from Jiyfito who
all but one had been anti-Yoshida. 32
In 1963, a large section of the 31 member Ono faction, or 22 members, were former
JiyfiW members. Only one came from Kaishinto, but ten had been elected after the
formation of the LOP. Nineteen of the former JiyOWmembers may have been connected
to Ono in some way in the Jiyuto, Two had been in Mindo but did not leave in 1953, four
had been Ono faction members.v' while 13 had been neutral or possibly with some
connection with the Ono faction. One had been in the Hirokawa faction and two were
first elected in 1955.
By 1963 both the SaW and Ikeda factions had acquired some former Kaishinto members.
Of the SaW faction's 47 members six had been in Kaishinto and 28 came from Jiyutc. Of
those, eleven had been in the Yoshida faction, three in the anti-Hatoyama camp and
fourteen neutral. The Ikeda faction showed a similar pattern. 27 of the 48 faction
members had been members of the Jiyuto, fourteen had been in the Yoshida faction, two
had been anti-Yoshida and ran for Bunjito in 1953, and eleven had been neutral. Four
faction members had been in the Kaishinto. Both the SaW and the Ikeda factions had a
large number of members first elected after the establishment of the LOP: the Ikeda
,
faction had sixteen new members and the Sato faction thirteen.
The Miki faction was composed of 24 former Kaishinto members, one Jiyfito member
and two people first elected for Minshuto in 1955. In addition, almost half of the faction,
or ten members, were first elected after the formation of the LOP. The Ishii faction had
fifteen members in 1963, eleven of whom came from a neutral section of the JiyOW,one
came from Kaishinto, and three were first elected after the formation of the LOP.
As seen from these figures, the factional composition changed as the factions recruited
new Dietmembers and they gradually acquired clear membership. The Asahi thus
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declared in 1960, 'it goes without saying that the factions have acquired a public status'
(AS 12.4.60). Even so, following the presidential election in 1960, the press believed a
major rearrangement of the factions possible because of the split in support to the
presidential candidates in many factions (JT 13.7.60). But the process towards
consolidation continued; the factions were slowly shedding the party colours they had
held and were being forged as independent groups.
The LDP factions had by the late 1950s acquired clear membership, which cut through
the party. The factions consolidated and the number of neutral party members decreased
rapidly. It changed the nature of conservative factionalism considerably that the factions
now had members. The conservative factions no longer resembled the 'tendency' (Rose
1964; Zariski 1960) or even the 'patron client group' described by Beller and Belloni
(l978c). They were 'self-consciously organised' factions (Rose 1964:37), with a
developed structure (Beller and Belloni 1978c:427), that used multiple incentives to
attract stable membership which acted collectively (Zariski 1960:33). As the factions
took on clear form, historical connections mattered less and expansion of the faction
became a goal in itself (see Morris 1989:156). I will now turn to the role ideology played
in the formation of membership.
4.5. Factions as Policy Groups
As Panebianco (1989: 10) points out, political organisations can use ideology as one form
of collective incentive to attract members (see also Ware 1996:70). As seen in Chapter 2,
there had been some issue-based cleavages between and within the Minshuto and the
Jiyuto that played a part in accentuating the polarisation of the parties. Within the LDP
ideology was less of an incentive to join a faction. The main reason for this is the power
politics which drove the factionalisation on and encouraged expansion as an end in itself.
Some conservative politicians, Kurogane Yasumi and Sakata Michita, for example,
argued that there were policy differences in the LDP too, and 'similar patterns of
thinking' within individual factions (Thayer 1969:46). Factions with many bureaucrats,
like the Ikeda and Maeo factions, were seen to be more finance and economy oriented,
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while the Keno faction was interested in agriculture. The Ikeda faction was pro-
American, while the Ishibashi faction focused on Japan-China trade, and the Miki-
Matsumura faction focused on disarmament and Asian diplomacy (Shiratori 1988: 174;
AS 5.1.58).34 Some, like Kono Ichiro, argued that the policy differences ran deeper than
that and maintained that the party was split into progressive and reactionary groups,
centering on the issue of communism." The progressive stance was that 'the best
countermeasure against communism will be an advanced welfare-state program with
which to make Japanese soil "infertile for communism," while the reactionary advocate
the curbing of communist activities' (iT 30.10.56). Iyasu represented a more moderate
view, acknowledging the importance of the factional and personal nature of the
disagreements, but at the same time arguing that there were clear ideological differences
between different politicians (Iyasu 1983: 108-9). Indeed, some commentators saw such
differences well into the 1960s, arguing that there were two conservative parties within
the LOP (Watanabe 1977:140; it 22.7.60)
On the other hand, Watanabe argued that the factional alliances igassho renki5) and the
shifts in factional formations in the first two years of the LOP, had nothing to do with
ideology and policy but were entirely pragmatic (Watanabe 1958:160). Similarly, Kohno
has argued that the death of Ogata in January 1956 caused the old party divisions to
vanish, leaving the factions that were subsequently formed out of alliances between
groups of politicians from various groups largely untainted by previous ideological and
policy differences (Kohno 1997:Chapter 5).
I will argue here that the LOP factions had an ideological basis in the first year of the
party, while the old factional divisions remained. As seen in the previous section, there
was a relative continuity in terms of party and factional affiliation within the factions in
1956 which indicates that common political views played a part in creating the internal
divisions within the party. However, as a new factional system emerged, policy came to
play less of a role, with power politics replacing it.
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The politicians who came together in the LDP had different backgrounds and the
criticism could be heard from the very start that unification was unnatural because of the
basic differences between the bureaucratic and party factions that came together. As
discussed earlier there had been clear policy differences within the early conservative
parties over foreign policy, economic policy, rearmament, and constitutional revision.
These issues affected the factional reorganisation before and just after the presidential
election in December 1956. These policy differences coincided with the polarised divide
within the party and continued to divide the party as they had done in the early postwar
conservative parties. After unification and during the first Hatoyama cabinet, the debate
over Japan's future course was heated, and the differences between Yoshida and
Hatoyama over the issue of constitutional revision, restoration of military might and
Japan-Soviet relations continued (see Uchida 1983:103). Hatoyama, and his supporters in
the 'progressive faction,' wanted to make normalisation of relations with the USSR his
last major political achievement (AS 2.2.56). This faced most opposition from Ogata, who
led the 'caution faction', and the Yoshida faction, which was also personally against
Hatoyama leading the party in government (Hori 1975: 102), and had the support of big
business (Iyasu 1983:109). The factions in the first year of the LDP showed a character
similar to that within the Minshuto and Jiyuto, Until the USSR agreement was approved
in November 1956,36 the fight between the mainstream and the anti-mainstream was
heavily coloured by the fight between those in favour of pro-USSR relations and
rearmament through constitutional revision, and the pro-US faction (JT 10.11.56).
But there were also clear power based issues that largely revolved around the question of
succession to Hatoyama as president of the LDP. Such issues also drove on the factional
consolidation (see Uchida 1983: 103-4). Iyasu argues that Yoshida's stance on the USSR
policy was directly related to the Hatoyama forces' plans to have Kishi secretary-general
succeed Hatoyama (AS 2.2.56).37 Matsumura Kenzo, of the old Kaishinto, then went
ahead to consolidate his own faction in his opposition to these plans, and argued that
Shigemitsu Mamoru should be put forward as a candidate (Iyasu 1983:108). The Asahi
Shimbun commented: 'the factional resistance is not built on policy but centers on the
party's personnel and especially the presidential problem. It is bad that it is deriving from
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interests and personal feelings and linking up with oyabun-kobun relations within each
faction' (AS 6.4.56).
After the first year of the party, the issue-based divisions within the party were being
replaced by factional divisions based on political strategy (see Babb unpublished paper,
for a similar argument). Thayer pointed out that moves to establish membership to
factions inevitably decreased the importance of ideology (Thayer 1969:48). The need to
expand membership could not take too much heed of policy. The ideological divisions
that had been visible became blurred as politicians formed strategic alliances across the
dividing lines with the result that 'differences in policies have little to say about factional
fusion and fission' (AS 5.1.58).
The new factional system that was in creation did not allow ideological divisions to the
same extent the polarised party environment of the JiyiiW and Minshuto had. The new
factional system rested on permanent factional memberships, and the use of factional
polities to distribute positions of power. Under such a system policy considerations had to
come second.
Kishi continued Hatoyama's policies in his cabinets (Goto et al. 1982) with the Police
Duties Act in 1958 and the renewal of the US-Japan Security Treaty (Anpo), but his
political allies included SaW, who had been anti-mainstream during the Hatoyama
cabinet, while Kono had become anti-mainstream. Watanab~ points out that the Ono,
Ishibashi, Kono, Ikeda mainstream of 1956 or the Ono, Kono, Sato and Kishi mainstream
of 1957, would not have been possible if policy issues had formed the foundation of those
alliances, considering the confrontation between Ikeda on one hand and Kono and
Ishibashi on the other, when the latter sought to bring down the Yoshida cabinet in 1952-
53, and the long-time antagonisms between Sate and Keno (Watanabe 1958:160). The
way personal and issue-based disagreements were intertwined can be seen in the fact that
after the House of Councillors election in June 1959, which ended in a vietory for the
LOP, Ikeda joined Kishi's cabinet, the cabinet he had criticised heavily for its plans to
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revise the Anpo, while a member of the anti-mainstream (Iyasu 1983:115; Uchida
1989:142).
Observers have sometimes noted the internal policy differences in the LDP and spoken of
a right wing and a left wing faction. The former consisted of Ikeda, Sato, Ishii, Kaya and
Ono though they varied in their views on China, in spite of their pro-US stance and anti-
USSR stance (JT 31.10.62, translated article from Bungei Shunju).38 At times some
faction-based differences could be seen, such as when the Kono and Kishi factions
opposed the Ishibashi cabinet's plan for a rise in the consumer rice price. These factions,
however, accepted this policy a little later in the Kishi cabinet (AS 5.1.58).
Politicians also sought to create a distance between factions in terms of policy when
running for office. Matsumura ran against Kishi in 1959 and his 'money based politics'
(Watanabe 1977:140), while Fujiyama presented his planned challenge to prime minister
Ikeda in 1962 as a challenge to Ikeda's 'expansionist economic policy'. His candidacy
was though undoubtedly personal as he was trying to ensure the support of the Ono,
Kono and Kawashima factions, which had all been more distant from the Ikeda
administration than the Kishi and SaW factions.
Another major policy difference erupting within the party surrounded the Anpo in 1960.
The factions took different stances on the issue. The Matsumura-Miki faction, with its
leftist colouring and pro-China approach, took a cautious approach (shinch6 ron) and
Miki was absent when the bill went through the Diet (Uchida 1989:162; Ashida 1986
vo1.7:105). The Ikeda faction argued it was premature to act (jiki shoso ron), while
Ashida wanted the remilitarisation question to be settled first (saigunbi senketsuron). As
in the case of the Hatoyarna-led negotiations with the USSR, the Japan-US negotiations
became intra-LDP negotiations (Iyasu 1983:113). The issue became strongly related to
the power struggle within the party as opposition to the Anpo became concentrated in the
anti-mainstream factions, which used the issue to attack the Kishi cabinet publicly. 27
members of the anti-mainstream, led by Keno and Miki Takeo, voted against the bill on
May 19, 1960 (Scalapino and Masumi 1962). Masumi has suggested that the
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disagreements over diplomacy and foreign policy in the late 1950s and early 1960s were
not about issues, but about power and personalities (Masumi 1995:36). As seen in the
factional opposition to Anpo, policy had clearly become secondary to considerations of
power politics and political alliance building within the party.
It is ironic, that as the factions lost their historical continuity in terms of membership and
thereby their common policy outlook, the factions took 'on a formality and major
influence over the conservative policy-making process in Japan which they previously
had not assumed' (Calder ]988:142).39 In order to deal with this role, and to aid them in
factional conflicts, the factions tried to emphasise policy and sought to consciously
educate their members on policy. Many factions had policy themes to their weekly
meetings and set up specific study groups. Fujiyama Aiichiro, one of the first faction
leaders to establish such a factional study group, admitted that the varying policy views
within his faction were making management difficult, especially with old Kishi
supporters (Fujiyama ]976:238) and he thus sought to educate his members about his
policies in order to unite the faction (Fujiyama ]976:235).40
Policy was also used in more basic power struggles. In the autumn of 1957, for example,
the anti-mainstream factions: Ishii, Ishibashi, Miki-Matsumura and Ikeda factions,
formed a foreign policy issue group (gaiki) mondai kenkyiikai) to create a united front
against the Kishi administration (Hayashi 1958). Each faction formed a policy research
group to fight the administration more effectively. In the controversy over Anpo the
factions presented an 'official' policy, formed at policy meetings in their resorts, based
on the existing mainstream/anti-mainstream divisions (Iyasu 1996:9-10). These policy
fronts were created to more effectively participate in the factional fights within the party
and not vice versa.
Policy differences continued to playa prominent role within the party in its first year as
they coincided with the polarised division of the party. As membership to factions was
established and party expansion became a goal in itself, common policy or ideology
ceased to provide the common denominator. However, the factions were becoming
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primary actors in forming policy within the party and as a consequence of that role they
took up policy studies. However, with the formation of membership the factions' role as
distributors of party and cabinet 'posts became far more important and expansive. The
following section will discuss factional promotions.
4.6. Factional distribution of posts
It is widely acknowledged that the LOP factions have developed clearly defined functions
for both members and leaders. This involves electoral and financial support to the
members in elections, and assistance in promotion within party and cabinet (Stockwin
1983:221). Substantial analyses have been done on the development of factionalism
within the LOP focusing on its institutionalisation since the 1970s (Kohno 1992, 1997).
Over the five decades of LOP dominance, the factions have changed significantly,
becoming formal political entities. A number of interfactional principles developed, with
proportionality and separation of powers guiding appointments in cabinet and party
(Kohno 1997:92-3).41
The LDP took a few years to change into such promotional, electoral and financial
bodies. Panebianco's theory of party development (1988) is a useful tool to understand
the changes in factional patterns in the first years of the LOP. As scholars have pointed
out, the party was a merger of different forces, a party born out of diffusion, which
affected leadership cohesion. The weak institutionalisation of the party and the lack of
centralised control allowed the factions to acquire members and take on the distribution
of organisational incentives. Panebianco (1989:61) notes that in such parties
[M]any groups at the top control important power resources and are thus able to
distribute organizational incentives .. .in order to succeed, one needs to politically define
oneself as belonging to a group (a specific faction) which is "opposed" to all the other
groups (1989:61).
The party leadership could therefore not prevent the factionalisation of the party
executive where promotional rewards were important tools to attract a following.
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As seen in Chapter 2, faction leaders within the Jiyiito and the Kaishinto did not
systematically reward their supporters with posts in party or government. However,
within the LDP, posts soon came to be a very important tool to buy loyalty in order to
form permanent factions. Indeed, Kuraishi Tadao, LDP Dietmember and chairman of one
of the organisation committees established to modernise the party in 1961, argued that it
was the nexus of party and government posts that lured rank-and-file members into the
factions, much more than the promise of financial assistance (Masumi 1967:38). The
promise of promotion within party and cabinet became one of the main tools of the
leaders of the LDP to attract Dietmembers to their factions. So, two main changes took
place in the late 1950s and early 1960s which made the factions politically important
entities. First, faction leaders came to be consulted on cabinet formation and factional
affiliation became the basis of promotion within cabinet. Second, factions became central
to the promotion process within the party. I will now examine these two changes in tum.
4.6.1. Factions and cabinet formation
As seen in Chapter 3, Yoshida had not consulted faction leaders within the Jiyuto on
cabinet formation, and in the Hatoyama cabinets faction leaders were not formally
consulted, although, as discussed earlier, cabinet posts in the Hatoyama cabinets were
distributed factionally. There were, however, no mechanisms in force for faction leaders
to put forward their wishes and posts were distributed to party members by the leaders as
a reward for past support. It was only under the Kishi cabinets of 1957-60, when Kishi
formally created a 'cabinet formation staff (sokaku samb6), that the practice became
established. Thayer (1969: 184) argues that the motive behind the cabinet formation staff
was to counter factionalism:
Wishing to emphasize the role of the party rather than the factions, he [Kishi] stated that
he would meet with the four highest party officials and hold consultations on the election
of the cabinet. Each succeeding prime minister has followed this practice.
However, this venue for consultation became dominated by faction leaders, and by 1960,
the party president had come to base his selection of cabinet ministers on a list of
candidates issued by faction leaders when cabinets were formed (Masumi 1967:35; JT
8.12.60). The factions would make their lists, sometimes through a meeting of faction
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members, sometimes through consultation with staff, or in some cases without
consultation (Thayer 1969: 191). Later on, such decisions came to be taken by faction
leaders in accordance with seniority, i.e. how many times elected and whether the person
had served previously in cabinets (Sato and Matsuzaki 1986; Kohno 1997). Thayer
(1969:184) thus concludes that the cabinet formation staff 'owes its birth to the
development of factionalism.' The staff did not recommend particular candidates in their
meeting with the prime minister, but commented on nominations made by various
factions (Thayer 1969:193; see also Masumi 1967:35). The duties of the cabinet
formation staff also included justifying the Prime Minister's choices to other elements of
the party. The importance of the staff varied, according to Thayer. One of Ikeda's
cabinets was reportedly left to the decisions of the staff although Thayer (1969: 185) notes
that the prime minister had a much greater role in the Sato cabinets of 1954-72.
After the first presidential election, faction membership consolidated quickly, giving
cabinets a stronger factional colour. The third Hatoyama cabinet, formed just after the
unification of the LDP in November 1955, was based on a principle of 'distribution of
awards' (ronkii kOsho) (AS 20.7.56).42 The Minshuto got three posts, Kiyose Ichiro was
appointed with the recommendation of Kaishinto, Makino Ryozo was recommended by
Hatoyama, and Shoriki Matsutaro was appointed by Miki and Kono (Hatoyama
1957: 173). The old Jiyiito got eight posts for people mostly connected to Ono and Ogata,
and the following were chosen: Murakami Isamu, Kuraishi Tadao, Ota Seiko, Funada
Naka, Baba Motoji, Yoshino, and Kobayashi (Hatoyama 1957:173).43
However, as the practice of distributing posts to factional members became established,
posts ceased to be given only as a reward for past support (ronkii kiisho], and they formed
part of a more complicated pattern of coalition building. Prime ministers tried a variety of
coalition formations building on the principle that '[P]osts are given not simply as
rewards for supporting a Prime Minister in the past, but also as encouragement to support
him in the future' (Leiserson 1968:779).
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Two main trends can be identified in cabinets between 1956 and 1964 as factions became
the basis for cabinet formation. First, there were trends towards greater inclusion of all
factions in cabinets. As seen in- Fig.4-3, between 1957 and 1964, the prime minister
moved away from the exclusion method that that had been used in the past. Faction
leaders sought to form wider alliances, and anti-mainstream factions got a bigger share of
posts. This was a clear indication of the very different polarisation from that of the
Minshuto or Jiyfit6 where supporting factions had mainly been rewarded. In the LDP the
divide between the two wings had been modified and demands focused on increasing
balancing (habatsu kinkO).44 Second, the president's faction got significantly greater
representation than other factions.
The Ishibashi cabinet was the first to be described as a 'factional balance cabinet'
(habatsu kinkii naikaku). Factions were clearly the basis for appointments, and posts were
distributed as a tool to balance forces rather than to reward supporters of the prime
minister (Watanabe 1966:41; Ono 1964:94).45 Ishibashi was the first prime minister to
have been voted president through open elections where he had to appeal for support by
promising rewards (Watanabe 1966:30).46 Got6, Uchida and Ishikawa have argued that
Ishibashi offered cabinet posts to faction leaders and faction members because he did not
have financial aid to offer (Goto 1982:146). Kishi used similar tactics, although he had
more financial ability, using cabinet posts as a bargaining chip to secure support and split
the groups participating in the ni-san irengo agreement (Watanabe 1966:34).47
In spite of his efforts to balance the factional demands, it proved difficult for Ishibashi to
fill all posts in party and cabinet because of factional pressures. Ono had been promised
posts for his faction's support to Ishibashi in the presidential election." but he moved
into opposition to Ishibashi after being refused the post of vice president (Watanabe
1966:43). Ishii also felt shunned in spite of his support (see Watanabe 1958:186;
Watanabe 1966:42).49
As seen in Figure 4-3, Ishibashi rewarded those factions that had supported him in the
election, the Ishibashi, Miki and Ikeda50 factions but also gave posts to neutral factions
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and all anti-mainstream factions except the Sato faction. The Miki faction got three posts,
more than the president's faction, which got two posts, causing resentment amongst other
factions (Watanabe 1958:186).5J The Ikeda faction also got two posts. Two anti-
mainstream factions got posts, the Kishi faction got three posts and the Kono faction got
one.52Because of Ishibashi's efforts to pacify all the main factions while at the same keep
his support group, the Asahi Shimbun concluded that 'The LDP is not a united party but
rather there are many examples of factional heterogeneity. The new cabinet is not a
united cabinet (kyoto itto naikaku) like Ishibashi says, but a "factional balance cabinet'"
(AS 30.12.56, 21.12.56). Ishibashi himself said in October 1956 that 'we don't appoint
the right people in the right place today. We appoint in cabinet and party on the basis of
factional relations (habatsu kankei) and think "we must pick one from there'" (AS
29.10.56). Miki (secretary-general) and Ishida (cabinet secretary) also admitted that in the
formation of the Ishibashi cabinet, the cabinet posts were a reward for support in the
presidential election (AS 30.12.56).
All cabinet formations after this were factional in nature as prime ministers sought to
achieve a balance between certain factions (see for example AS 17.7.57; 13.1.59). In a
newspaper interview in October 1956, Kishi criticised Hatoyama for isolating forces
against him and called for inclusion of all groups (AS 29.10.56). The Kishi cabinets saw a
trend towards greater inclusion of factions in cabinets, but throughout Kishi continued,
however, the practice of excluding elements considered undesirable. Kishi included all
factions apart from the Ono faction in the cabinet in July 1957.53In that reshuffle Kishi
was made to promise that he would 'pay due regard to the opinions of the 'antimain
current' group' (JT 7.7.57).54 The mainstream factions got 11 posts'" while the anti-
mainstream had six posts. The Kishi faction got five posts. Although the mainstream Ono
faction got no posts, Ono himself held the post of vice president (see Hayashi 1957b:42).
Kishi said again in 1958 that he would 'listen to the opinions of each faction' (JT 6.6.58),
the reason being, observers mused, that the influence of anti-mainstream factions could
not be ignored (JT 9.1.59). This strategy was clearly seen in the second Kishi cabinet in
June.56 All factions got represented but the mainstream factions were given greater
rewards than had been the case in the past, getting fourteen of seventeen posts (Iyasu
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1983:112; Thayer 1969: 188-9). The Kishi faction got five posts, the SaW faction four,
and the Keno faction three, while the Ono faction only got one. The anti-mainstream
factions got one post each.57 In spite of the increasingly balanced appointments, the anti-
mainstream factions were not content in the cabinet58 and in December 1958 Ikeda, Miki
and Nadao Hirokichi of the Ishibashi faction resigned citing policy differences.59
The instability caused by mainstream-anti-mainstream divisions and partial coalition
building, favouring mainstream factions when forming cabinets, was obvious (Kohno
1997:110; Leiserson 1968:781).1t was noted in the Japan Times that:
the rivalry between the 'main current' and 'antimain current' factions of the Liberal-
Democratic Party will become a perennial seesaw game if left unattended. Kishi should
take bold steps to eliminate the rivalry between the two factions. In concrete terms, the
posts of the Government and party officers should be equally divided between the 'main
current' and 'antimain current' factions (19.12.58).
Although Kishi was including more of the anti-mainstream than had been done in the
past, he was still excluding certain elements of the party, causing discontent. The
complicated coalition strategies not only caused friction between the two wings of the
party, but also within many of the factions. Kishi had, for example, primarily rewarded
long-time supporters in the Hatoyama cabinets." but by 1957, his intra-faction strategies
were changing, including a wider group of past and potential supporters. When the first
Kishi cabinet was formed, Kishi did not only reward his closest supporters, but also gave
,
posts to new and more distant supporters such as members of the Oasa faction, which had
moved closer to Kishi since the presidential election of 1956.61 These new strategies
caused rifts within the Kishi faction in the summer of 1957 (Watanabe 1958:99)62 and in
the Ishii faction in 1956-57.63 This coalition building was therefore unstable, though it
was not as destabilising as the divisions and the polarisation within the Jiyutc had been.
In the reshuffle of his third cabinet in June 1959, Kishi changed his tactics and decided to
change his coalition partners. Kishi's plan was to give key posts to the SaW and Ikeda
factions and exclude the party factions, and so he took Ikeda into the mainstream while
Keno moved to anti-mainstream position. All the same, the Kono faction got two cabinet
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posts. The mainstream factions got twelve of the seventeen posts. Two anti-mainstream
factions, the Ishii and Ishibashi factions, got no posts.
Although there were calls for greater balance between the two wings of the party, the first
Ikeda cabinet in July 1960, like the Kishi cabinet in 1958, left out a number of factions.
As seen in Fig. 4-3, the mainstream factions (Ikeda, Sato and Kishi factions, including
the Fujiyama faction) held thirteen of seventeen posts and of those the Ikeda faction got
seven. Two anti-mainstream factions got posts, the Ono and Ishii factions. Three anti-
mainstream factions, the Kono, Miki-Matsumura and Ishibashi factions, were left out.
This cabinet saw a continuation of the trend from the Kishi cabinet in 1958, whereby the
president's faction got most posts.
Clear moves towards the principle of including all factions in cabinet began in 1960. In
Ikeda's second cabinet in December 1960 the all-round representation of factional groups
was first introduced, perhaps because of the failure of the isolation method in keeping
discontent in check. Factions were given seats in proportion to size and their closeness to
the president.i" The strategy shifted 'from the consolidation of the existing coalition to
the avoidance of making future enemies' (Kohno 1997:112) by representing mainstream
and anti-mainstream factions in a more regulated manner.
Ikeda appointed central figures from all factions, excepting the actual leaders, in the hope
that involvement of all factions would strengthen his cabinet (JT 9.12.60). The
mainstream factions got twelve posts, but all other factions, apart from the ailing
Ishibashi faction, were also given posts. Keno and Miki were brought into the cabinet
with one post each, and the Ishida faction got one member. The Ishii faction stayed
outside the cabinet to begin with because he was unhappy with the allocation of posts and
refused to take up the post of Lower House Speaker (JT 9.12.60). The Japan Times
commented:
The list is pretty near making everybody happy. Although ex-Foreign Minister Fujiyama
and ex-vice president of the party Bamboku Ono got only one each instead of two. No
doubt the factional groupings in the party, in a sense, facilitate the Cabinet formation by
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reducing the process into a seat allocation system. The temptation is strong, therefore, to
accept factionalismas an established institution (10.12.60).65
The reshuffle in July 1961 sought to strengthen the cabinet further by appointing faction
leaders to the cabinet." creating the 'first "all-star cast" cabinet to be formed since the
war, in line with the slogan of a united conservative party' (JT 21.7.61). The Ishii faction
was brought into the cabinet for the first time. In the reshuffles in 1962 and 1963, all
factions were given seats again (Masumi 1967:42).
The third Ikeda cabinet, formed in December 1963, included all factions again apart from
the Kishi/Fukuda faction, which was openly criticising the Ikeda administration and had
formed Tofu Sasshin Remmei in 1962. The Ikeda faction held five of the seventeen posts,
the mainstream Ono and Keno factions got two posts each, but the Sato faction, the main
challenge to Ikeda's reign, was given three posts." Ikeda's support from other factions
was considered unstable (JT 1.1.61), and this may have led him to seek full inclusion of
all factions in cabinet. As all factions were given representation the divide between the
mainstream and anti-mainstream became blurred although commentators still referred to
personal and political animosities between groups.
Ikeda's attempts to strengthen his cabinet in 1961 by appointing faction leaders rather
than faction members, highlighted another major change in the effect of factionalism on
cabinets. As seen in Chapter 2, Jiyiito leaders used factions primarily for their own
promotion. However, within the LDP faction leaders chose to stay away from cabinets
when they were planning to run in a presidential race. It thus became more commonplace
for leaders to put their members in the cabinet but to stay outside and keep their distance
from the fate of the administration. This highlighted the role of the LDP factions as
distributors of posts to their members. The leaders were able to use their power as faction
leaders outside the factions and could influence politics greatly even without holding a
cabinet post, which faction leaders in the early postwar parties had not been able to do.
Cabinet appointments showed a trend towards the creation of stability between the
factions, enabling them to co-exist and dividing the spoils.
178
Chapter 4: Factionalism as a Force of Stability .
4.6.2. Appointments to the three highest party posts
A second major trend making factions important political entities was their role in
appointing people not to the cabinet, but to the highest party posts: the secretary-general,
the chairman of the Executive Council, and the chairman of the Policy Affairs Research
Council (PARC). As in the JiyiitO and Minshuto, the LDP secretary-general controlled
administrative staff and party funds. Within the LDP the latter two posts became
faction alised at all levels. The PARC was a complex organ which formally initiated and
determined most legislative policy decisions of the party. It was headed by a chairman
and a few vice chairmen, a deliberation commission and fifteen divisions. It also had ad
hoc 'special investigation committees' that steadily rose in number from the original nine
in 1955 (Fukui 1970:83; Shiratori 1988:171). The Deliberation Committee was the organ
that became most factionalised within the PARCo It consisted of the PARC chairman, ten
vice chairmen and eighteen members specially appointed by the chairman from the two
houses of the Diet. The number of specially appointed members increased to 25 at the
end of the 1950s but was pushed down again to fifteen in 1961 (Fukui 1970:88-9). The
vice chairmen met prior to a meeting of the whole Commission and so constituted the
more powerful part of the organ. Until 1963, these vice-chairmanships were distributed
between the factions, but in an attempt to reduce factionalism within the party it was
decided in that year to reduce the number of vice chairmen to four. However, this did not
eliminate factionalism from the organ and the specially appointed members of the
Deliberation Commission became the 'interfactional coordinators in the policy making
mechanism of the party' (Fukui 1970:89).
After policy recommendations were approved in the PARC they were sent to the
Executive Council where they became official party decisions. The Executive Council
had members elected from both houses and some who were specially approved by the
president. From 1957, ten of the 40 members were approved by the president, 20 were
elected from the Lower House, and,ten from the Upper House. In 1960 the members were
reduced to 30 (eight approved by the president, fifteen chosen from Lower House and
seven from Upper House). The Executive Council, like the PARC, became heavily
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influenced by the factional divisions, and posts were distributed between the factions
(Fukui 1970:91).68
All these organs were thus used by factions to ensure their representation and the
factional distribution of key party posts. At first, however, as seen in Figure 4-4, the
three party posts were not given exclusively to the mainstream factions as had been the
norm within the Jiyiito.69 For example, in November 1955 the appointments did not
reflect a clear mainstream current as members of the Kishi and Ishii factions, both
considered 'middle roaders' at the time, were appointed as secretary-general" and
chairman of the Executive Council respectively. The Yoshida forces did not get any
posts. A guiding principle may have been to give representation to the different parties
that had merged to form the LDP.
A shift towards mainstream representation began late in 1956. When the Ishibashi cabinet
was formed, Ishibashi made Miki Takeo of the mainstream Miki faction secretary-
general, as a reward for his support in the presidential election, and Sunada Shigemasa,
who was affiliated with both the anti-mainstream Keno and Kishi factions, chairman of
the Executive Council. Tsukada Jtiichiro, connected to the Ono faction and the neutral
Ishii faction, was made chairman of PARC in February 1957. Ishibashi's choices were
criticised by factional leaders, especially Kishi, who wanted more consideration for
bigger factions (AS 21.12.56). In February 1957, when Kishi took over from Ishibashi,
Ono and Keno put pressure on Kishi to be given these posts but Kishi decided to let Miki
Takeo continue (Hayashi 1957b:43).
As seen in Figure 4-4, from the formation of the Kishi cabinet in July 1957 onwards, all
the three top posts were drawn from mainstream factions (see Thayer 1969). An
exception was made in September 1957 when the Miki faction got the PARC chairman
while in the anti-mainstream. After this, all appointments for the three posts adhered to
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mainstream-antimainstream divisions, where only the mainstream or at least neutral
factions were represented." A pattern was visible, similar to that of the Jiyuto, where the
secretary-general was usually drawn from the Prime Minister's faction.72 An exception
was the appointment of Miki Takeo in December 1956, when Ishibashi was prime
minister and again in July 1964 during the Ikeda administration.
The changing institutional and structural environment of the late 1950s made possible the
transformation of factions into promotional units providing permanent support to party
leaders. Yoshida Shigeru, while leader of the Jiyuto, was allowed great freedom in his
personnel decisions because of a promise made by Hatoyama Ichiro in 1946, that when
Yoshida took over the leadership of the party he would be allowed to choose people
without interference from the party (Ono 1964, Keno 1958; Hatoyama 1957). Yoshida
chose to exclude the dissident elements from important posts. This was not possible
within the LOP; the political circumstances from the time of the first Hatoyama cabinet
did not allow any factional leader to ignore other factional leaders in his appointments. In
the first Hatoyama cabinet each of the prominent politicians from each of the parties was
given an opportunity to recommend a few members for cabinet posts. The same was done
in the LOP. In order to maintain the new distribution of power party leaders needed to
reward other faction leaders, to enable them to reward their own supporters. Because of
the advent of presidential elections, there was an added incentive to maintain such
support, because it would be needed again.
The factions of the LOP acquired clear membership in the first years of the party and
established mechanisms for the distribution of spoils within party and government
between the factions. This changed the character of factionalism and it became a tool to
increase stability within the party, creating a factional system very different from that of
the early postwar period.
4.7. From instability to stability
We now turn to the final section in this chapter: the examination of the major differences
between factionalism in the LOP and factionalism in 1945-55 and the shift from
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instability to stability. The changes in the factionalism of the LOP in the first few years,
with formation of membership, and the expanding political roles of factions in
distribution of posts in party and cabinet, created a notion of stability but at the same time
changed the overall factional character of the conservative politics, away from the
polarised politics of the first ten years of the postwar period. Two main stages in this
process can be identified. In the first year of the LOP, the divisions were very much in
line with those found in the Jiyuto and the Minshuto with the party polarised between
those for and against the leadership. Between the end of 1956 and 1964, a second stage
commenced, whereby the two wings of the party moved closer, with growing demands
for the inclusion of opposition forces in both cabinet and party. As factional inclusion
increased, factional polarisation decreased and factionalism became much less of a threat
to political stability in the sense that it no longer threatened basic party unity.
4.7.1. Polarisation and political instability
In the first year of the LOP, the factions continued to be viewed in terms of polarisation,
i.e. the way they aligned with or against the leadership of the party. They were involved
in power struggles from before the time the party was formally established, lining up in
relation to their views on the leadership of the party and the method of choosing party
president. The Asahi Shimbun commented in early November 1955, after a Standing
Intermediate Committee working for the preparation of establishment of a new party was
formed, that
the Committee includes representatives from each faction from within both parties as
defined by circumstances within the parties. The so-called 'influential men/bosses' (kao
yaku) have to deal with factionalism, and in the committee you can see the rise and fall of
political influence of each faction. They are acting out a fight over leadership of the new
conservative party (1.11.55).
As seen before, the presidential elections in December 1956 weakened the polarisation of
the party. In the first year of the LOP, the factions maintained their fluid character as the
'members' moved between groups with relative ease, and formed new groups to connect
with other factions that were more dominant in order to adapt to a new party
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environment. However, the factional infighting in 1956 resulting from the presidential
elections was considered highly destabilising:
The big question for Japan's political circles in 1957 is whether or not Prime Minister
Ishibashi will be able to unite the rebellious factions within the Liberal-Democraticparty
and bring political stability to the nation. Political events during the past year were
marked by the disgraceful display of factional strife within the Government party. But
now the New Year gets under way with a new PrimeMinister, and concurrentlypresident
of the majority party. As he took office as head of the Liberal-Democratic party, he
pledged himself to wipe out the feuding cliques (JT 3.1.57).
In the first couple of years of the party the view remained prominent amongst
commentators that factions were not groups that worked on the basis of compromise and
consensus; they fought each other until one side won. Therefore, in the presidential
elections of December 1956, all sides took the view that the factional divisions were
dangerous for party unity and that the election would cause a serious split. An entry in
Ashida's diary (1986 voI.6:253) at the time of the presidential elections in December
1956 reveals that worry:
Today, Kono [Ichiro] and Uehara [Etsujiro] said to me that a vote [for the presidency]
would cause much confusion and could result in a split in the party, but Kiyose [Ichiro]
and I said that this was a matter for each party member's conscience, and that wemust be
content throughdiscussions and vote.
A meeting was held between the three candidates at which they agreed, first, that they
would accept the result and go wherever the party wanted, second, that they would
harden unity after the election and let bygones be bygones (Watanabe 1966:35). Ishibashi
said he wanted to abolish factions (habatsu kaishiit, while Ishii emphasised that it was
going to be imperative for the future of the LDP that the election results be accepted by
all. Kishi emphasised the historical value of this election (Watanabe 1966:37).
The factional struggles within the LDP were still struggles between two blocs in which
one side would come out as winner. However, there were no signs of one side winning
the battle. In October 1956, the Japan Times asked: ' .. .in view of the already protracted
period of party warfare, why has factionalism continued, and why has no winner or
winning bloc emerged?' (7.10.56). The formation of mainstream and anti-mainstream
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blocs was an attempt to form such two blocs, one with hegemony and the other as the
challenger. This was seen in a comment in the Japan Times after the presidential election:
While all sub-factions and cliques will never fully disappear, it may well be that the two-
bloc alignment seen in the showdown vote over Hatoyama's successor may be a portent
of what 1957 is capable of producing, a fusing of the existing multiple party blocs into
two rather large, but definite groups, paralleling, although not exactly duplicating the
divisions of mid-December's party election. At least that is the challenge for next year
(30.12.56).
The presidential elections in December 1956 were, however, a first step towards the
abolition of this polarised conflict between two groups vying for leadership. As the eight
factions which emerged out of the presidential conflict began to increase their
membership, the instability of factionalism started to decrease.
4.7.2. Factions as a force of stability
The presidential elections in December 1956 started a second stage in the development of
factionalism within the LDP. First, as discussed earlier, the 1956 presidential election
signalled a new era in political factionalism since the factions did not disband as they had
done largely in the past, but consolidated further. The 'eight army divisions' emerged
with growing power of the Kishi, Ikeda, Sato, Ono, Kono, Miki, Ishii and Ishibashi
factions (lseri 1988:12). Second, the division of the party into two poles for and against
the leadership, became mutated as the power centres multiplied and the contest for power
became more complicated. Although there were some signs of polarised conflict-as
when the TofU Sasshin Konwakai and the Ninshin Isshin were established in January
1962 and December 1963 respectively in direct opposition to Prime Minister Ikeda (see
Chapter 6)-the factional fights were increasingly multipolar.
Many scholars have pointed out that the decade between 1955 and 1965 was a decade of
increasing stability, during which the 1955-system became entrenched. The presidential
elections in 1956 shook up the' factional divisions of the LDP by encouraging the
movement towards fewer power centres. The fluidity in the factional system was such
that the party until then could not be described as a coalition of factions as has been
maintained by some scholars (see for example Baerwald 1964:224). The presidential
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election presented a watershed, as Leiserson (1968:771) argued, because of a new
innovation in politics, the 'skilful coordination of factions into a coalition which was
numerically a majority.' The new LDP factions were not typical, traditional conservative
factions, but a new political phenomenon.
The control of a faction became a power tool within the party in a much more extensive
sense than it had been in the Jiyiito and Minshuto, After the 1956 election, vote gathering
increased as politicians 'learned that they needed a faction if they were to gain control of
the government' (Masumi 1995:190), or to participate in the decision making within the
party as concerned policy and appointments. Faction formation thus became a primary
task for politicians wanting to establish or maintain their prominence. This prompted
Fujiyama to form his own faction and run in the presidential election in 1960. He openly
admitted that his factional buildup was to realise his rise to president, and that was his
aim again in 1963 (Fujiyama 1976:234). The Miki faction's entrance in the Kishi cabinet
in 1958 was also seen as an attempt to keep up the strength of the faction because without
tangible rewards the faction would be out of the factional 'game' (Watanabe 1958: 187).
Because the factions were becoming valuable power players and funding bodies, they
could form coalitions that could later be changed. Leiserson described these manoeuvres
in his 'theory of games' and convincingly argued that the distribution of posts was used
strategically for coalition building (Leiserson 1968:779). As the leaders expanded their
groups, their leverage in negotiations with other politicians at the time of leadership
elections increased, and it became easier for leaders to make strategies, form alliances
and majorities within the party." By 1957, the meaning of the terms 'mainstream' and
'anti-mainstream' had changed, and came to refer to allied factions that had voted for or
against the president. As seen earlier, the mainstream was overrepresented in cabinet but
more and more factions came to be included as the 1960s progressed, a necessary move
to continue the coalition games (Kohno 1997:110; Cox and Rosenbluth 1995:363). Such
coalition behaviour was in striking contrast with the behaviour of the factions in the
Jiyiito, where the two wings did not negotiate. In the Jiyuto, alliances did not easily shift.
The polarised factions had aimed to win, and not share their power with groups
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contesting their power. The LDP factions, on the other hand, had the cohesiveness to be
able to negotiate with other groups and to shift their allegiance and behave as
mainstream, neutral or anti-mainstream at different times (see Leiserson 1968:779).
Membership gave the factions explicit and measurable power status. As Thayer (1969:35)
notes, 'more members mean more strength for the faction, and particularly more votes in
the party presidential election.' Although coalitions could be unstable, as Cox and
Rosenbluth (1995:358) point out, they also provided means to manage such instability
through coalition shifts, and thus created a more stable party environment than that of the
early postwar period.
While the press criticised factional appointments to party and cabinet posts (JT 8.7.57)
and urged for a principle of 'the right man in the right place', it was also acknowledged
that disregarding factions caused instability. In 1958 the Japan Times said:
Unfortunately the Liberal-Democratic party is made up of a number of thinly disguised
factions; hence the acute difficulties that attend Cabinet making. Mr. Kishi will find his
task far from easy owing to factional strife. Those groups that are not favorable to
Mr.Kishi are not strong enough, not numerous enough, to deprive him of the Prime
Ministership, but they can give him considerable trouble by making all sorts of demands
upon him, more or less under threats of defection (3.6.58).
Well into the 1960s, the view could be heard that factionalism was destabilising. Ike
(1964:408) argued that factionalism affected leadership adversely because it was only
after infighting that leadership could be chosen, weakening party leadership. However,
when the factional fighting had ceased to be so heavily centred around the presidential
elections and spread into other areas, factional manoeuvres came to be viewed in a more
positive light. The political system was getting more stable the longer the LDP stayed in
power, and the factional system of the LDP was also becoming a stabilising attribute,
keeping the party together as the party developed techniques to minimise 'the disruptive
nature of factionalism' (Stockwin 1970:371). Political power came to be measured in the
ability to provide party and government posts and political funding. Factionalism did not
have to result in a party split as long as disgruntled leaders were granted some important
positions (see JT 14.11.62).74Totten and Kawakami (1965: 113) argued that:
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As it is, only if the LOP Presidentpersistently refused to deal with a sufficient number of
factions, would they have reason to bolt the party. By providing ready backing, therefore,
for a number of prime ministerial contenders within the framework of a party assured of
access to the premiership, the. flexibility afforded by factions actually promotes the
continuity of the LOP as a single party. In other words, factions in this sense foster party
unity.
Scholars studying other political systems have also noted that factionalism may be a
means to keep a party together, especially when parties are formed as mergers of smaller
parties (Beller and Belloni 1978c:441). In fact, factionalism may thus not only keep the
party together, but even contribute to its growth (Beller and Belloni 1978c:441). As the
1960s progressed, the argument was heard more frequently that the factional system was
indeed making leadership within the LDP fairly stable (Stockwin 1989: 162). The loyalty
and hierarchy fostered within the LDP factions, through structured membership, clear
internal organisation and structured distribution of awards created internal factional
stability that kept the party together (Hoffman 1981:236). Watanabe (1962: 103) argued
that increased party democracy in the form of factions was a blessing:
....party splits and dissolutions are past history because of a change in the relations
between the factions and so coup d'etat-style take-overs do not happen anymore. Under
the 'one man' [Yoshida] leadership, dissatisfactionstruck inwards until it reached a level
of explosion. Under the current factional coexistence system, on the other hand, (... )
discontent is usually worked through in each faction and is automatically controlled
through a process of oppositionand then compromise.
Fukui argued that the 'delicate balance' maintained by 'moderating and unifying'
factions meant that the party could be held together. Factions, could articulate interests by
different sections of the party (Beller and Belloni 1978c:440), and accommodate diverse
factions such as the old Matsumura faction, discontented with the constitution and
foreign policy, and the Yoshida faction, favouring US cooperation and maintenance of
the system established under the Occupation (Fukui 1970:48). Although it was often
argued that factions weakened authority and party leadership (Beller and Belloni
1978c:440), factions could also contribute to party democracy and stability by allowing
all party members to have their voice heard, smoothing party management and holding
the party together (Baerwald 1986: 16, 34). It was therefore noted by scholars that
although the LDP factions were now active participants in presidential elections and the
nomination process for cabinet positions, 'factionalism in the Liberal Democratic Party
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has neither kept it from power nor paralyzed its actions in political crises' (Maki
1962:161; Shiratori 1988:170-1).
Between 1956-64 demands for the inclusion of the anti-mainstream increased because of
the destabilising nature of polarised conflict between the mainstream and anti-
mainstream, but it was not until the early 1960s that a clear trend towards greater
inclusion of factions in cabinets and chief organs of the party emerged. These steps
created a system of factions, which contributed to intra-party stability. Beller and Belloni
(1978c:442) suggested that in factional systems 'dysfunctional divisiveness and
functional unity may coexist.' Although anti-mainstream discontent with the distribution
of key posts continued (Cox and Rosenbluth 1995:357; Cox and Rosenbluth 1996:263),15
the notion of a 'balance of power' within cabinet replaced the mainstream-anti-
mainstream divide, reducing the instability of factionalism.
4.8. Conclusion
The LOP was not a coalition of factions at its inception in 1955, but a polarised party
internally divided into a large number of small fluid groups like the Jiyiito and Minshuto
before it. It was not until 1957, after the adoption of secret ballot elections for the party
presidency, that the factionalism started changing significantly with factions
consolidating and creating lasting membership. The factions showed some historical
continuity in the first year in terms of membership, which slowly decreased as the
factions recruited a larger number of new Dietmembers, Thefactions took on a new role
as the primary promotional units for appointments to cabinet and party.
All these changes in the political roles of factions led to a transformation in the factional
system. The development of the factional system of the LDP confirmed that factionalism
does not have to lead to party splits as Huntington had argued, but could lead to the
creation of a factional system capable of generating stability rather than divisiveness (see
Stockwin 1980). The LOP was still heavily fragmented, but the factions were
fundamentally different from the factions that had existed before in both structure and the
functions they served. The factions became politically important entities, the basis for
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appointments in both party and cabinet. All these changes transformed the nature of
factionalism because the factionalisation of the LDP became means of keeping a big and
diverse party together. I will now tum to a discussion of the underlying forces of this
change in the nature of factionalism within the LDP.
Notes
1 As seen in Chapter 2, Kishi had formed a faction within the Jiyiito before splitting in 1954 while Miki
Bukichi established himself within the Nihon Jiyiito formed in 1953. These factional groups established
themselves further within the Minshuto between 1954 and 1955 while the party was in government.
2 Watanabe (1958: 144) also mentions Matsuno Raizo as one of the eight leaders (shuno) of the JiyiitO.
3 This table may imply coherence but was will be clear in the following discussion, the factions presented
in this table varied in character in the first years.
4 Yoshida, SaW Eisaku and Hashimoto Tornisaburo refused to join the LDP because of their opposition to
Hatoyama (Watanabe 1958:144). However, the Yoshida faction, including Hayashi Joji and Masutani
Shtiji, formed the clearest opposition to Hatoyama within the party.
5 Hatoyama was the only candidate. However, 19 votes had the name of other party members, while 76
were invalid. This last group was believed to consist largely of Jiyiito people protesting Hatoyama's
selection (Goto et al. 1982:141).
6 This was seen in the various motives of the leading politicians. Many argued that Kono had plans for
Kishi to become the next president and for himself to come after Kishi (see Goto et al. 1982: 145). Mutual
distrust had, however, developed between Kono and Ishibashi in spite of their cooperation in the
Hatoyama cabinet and this helped to lead Kono to support Kishi in the presidential election (Goto et al.
1982:145).1t noticeably affected the alignments that Kono had created many enemies who then sought to
work against him, even though he was not running for the presidency.
7 When Ishibashi fell ill in January 1957 Ishida became a de facto leader of the group and took part in
maneuvers to decide who should take over from Ishibashi (Hayashi 1957b:42-3).
8 Some sources, such as Watanabe (1966:27-8), say the Ikeda and SaW factions had been formed within the
larger Yoshida faction by the first presidential election in spring 1956, although they were still very
small. The media generally referred to the Yoshida faction, although Yoshida was not a member of the
LDP, but sometimes referred to the Ikeda faction or the Ikeda-Yoshida faction, and of Ikeda as the 'real
leader' of the Yoshida faction. After the December election Ikeda seems to have clearly emerged as a
leader uniting a large portion of the ex-Yoshida forces but Sato, who-had also stayed outside the LDP
until after the formation of the Ishibashi cabinet (Goto et al. 1982: 143), also had his own following (JT
30.12.56; 14.10.56; 16.10.56).
9 Ono's con-committal answer when asked about his support was 'my state of mind is as white as the snow
on mount Fuji'. This became a fashionable phrase and was mirrored in the name chosen for the faction
later, Hakuseikai (Watanabe 1958:112).
10 The main Hatoyama followers joining Kishi were Hoshijima, Omura, Shuto Shimpachi and Kikuchi
Yoshiro (Watanabe 1958:107). Others, such as Okubo, Kita, Seko, Kate Tsunetaro and Yamamoto
Katsuichi decided to support Ishibashi in the election which made his candidacy possible (Watanabe
1958: 167) and later joined the Ishibashi faction. These members split again in the Ishibashi faction after
Ishibashi's retirement in 1957 in two groups, led by Okubo and Ishida (Watanabe 1958:168).
11 As did Nakasone Yasuhiro who was to join the Keno faction later.
12 The Sannokai had been formed before the presidential elections in 1956 by former centrist Kaishinto
forces resentful of Miki Takeo's increasing influence. Support for Kishi within the group was strong. It
was led by Narahashi Wataru, Ogawa Hanji, Kameyama Koichi, Kawazaki Suegoro, Maeda Fusanosuke
and Waseda Ryuemon (AS 29.11.56).
13 Three joined the Kishi faction and three the Miki faction. One member moved to the Upper House.
14 According to Watanabe (1958:96), Ishida Hirohide was the first to use the term 'shichika shidan,
sanrentai.' The divisions, with more than 20 members, were the Kishi, Ishibashi, Kono, Ono, Yoshida,
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Ishii and Miki-Matsumura factions, and the regiments, with around ten members each, the Kitamura,
Oasa and Ashida factions.
15 Watanabe relates the story of Kawano Yoshimitsu who became member of the Ono faction because Ono
was a matchmaker for his daughter but he had been a member of the Hirokawa faction in the Jiyiito
(Watanabe 1958:127).
16 This factor was mentioned particularly in the case of Ono, Kono and Ishii factions (Watanabe 1958:114,
137). Nakasone (1999: 131) says he joined the Kono faction because he wanted to learn from Kono,
17 This analysis uses my database with information from SCAP Miscellaneous Political Parties and Groups
1949, GS(B) 02683, SCAP Miscellaneous Political Parties 1951, GS(B) 02674-5, Asahi Shimbun 1952
(3.10.52,7.10.52), 1953 (16.3.53) and 1956 (11110156), and Watanabe 1958, and only takes into account
those with clear affiliation to faction, and not those with double affiliation.
18 One of them had though run for Bunjito in 1953 but lost.
19 The high number of unknown affiliations is due to gaps in my database for the Minshuto.
20 Four had unknown affiliation according to my database, indicating that they were either neutral or close
to Yoshida, and one was considered close to Hatoyama.
21 Murakami had been close to Ashida when he was first elected in 1946 and did not move close to Ono
until after the Showa Denko scandal (Watanabe 1958: 119).
22 Estimates of membership until the early 1960s varied as it was largely a guessing game practiced mainly
by journalists. An observer in 1957 estimated that the Kishi, Kono and Ono factions each had around 50
members, the old Kaishinto forces around 50, and the Ikeda, Sat6 and Ishibashi factions around 25 each,
in addition to a number of neutral politicians (Hayashi 1957b:45, see also Hayashi 1957a:34). Benjamin
and Ori (1981) base their analysis on figures published in 1976, which differ slightly from mine, but
show similar trends.
23 Watanabe (1958:106) describes such defections from the Kishi faction (Chiba Saburo, Omura Seiichi and
Shute Shimpachi left the faction), the Kono faction (where some members left because of their
opposition to Mori Kiyoshi and Shigemasa Seishi being made sokkin), and the Ishibashi faction (where
opposition to Ishida led to a confrontation between the Ishida group and the Okubo group). Nagayama
Tadanori left the Ono faction to join the new Kaya faction, perhaps in the belief that Ono had reached his
political peak and that new leaders had more to offer (Watanabe 1958:58; JT 1.1.60).
24 The Kaya faction appeared in 1958 preparing for the next presidential election (AS 5.1.58) but it only had
five members in 1960, two of who were also affiliated with other factions.
25 Disagreements arose within the Ishibashi faction after Ishida's plan to have Kishi succeed Ishibashi,
following the latter's resignation in January 1957 came to the surface. The faction was effectively split
with some supporting Okubo (Kato Tsunetaro, Seko Koichi, Yamamoto Katsuichi, Tsuji Masanobu and
Utsunomiya Tokuma) and others aligning with Ishida (Shimamura Ichiro, Fukunaga Isshin and Yanagiya
Seisaburo ) (Watanabe 1958:171). Ishida became prominent following his time as cabinet secretary in the
Ishibashi cabinet and labour minister in January 1957, and, with independent funding, he decided to form
a faction in 1960.
26 Amongst the first members were Ezaki Masumi, Endf Saburo and Ozawa Saeki (Fujiyama 1976:232).
27 According to the Japan Times, these two factions had between 30-50 members while my sources
indicate membership of 20-30.
28 Eight of the thirty one were new Dietmembers: seven were former members of Jiyiito who had belonged
to the Yoshida, Hirokawa and Ono factions; six had belonged to various factions in the Kaishinto; six
had been neutral Jiyiito members; and three had been independents since the early 1950s.
29 Again, figures are not totally reliable. According to Benjamin and Ori (1981), the number of LDP
members not affiliated with any faction stayed at around 11 until 1962 when it almost disappeared. The
pattern Benjamin and Ori present is, however, very similar to that put forward here, with non affiliation
almost disappearing but then growing again in the first half of the 1960s, although they time the revival a
little later.
30 According to my data, double membership was steadily going down from 1958 and was down to one
digit numbers in 1958. Benjamin and Ori argue that double membership stayed at 22 until 1960 when it
started to decrease rapidly.
31 The Keno faction did very well in the 1963 election and gained 11 members, rising from 35 to 46
members. The Sato faction lost five seats, from 52 to 47. The Ikeda faction lost four seats, from 51 to 47.
The Ono faction lost one and went down to 29. The Fujiyama faction went from 25 to 22 seats and
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Kawashima's Koyii Club went from 25 to 20 seats. The Mild faction increased its strength and went from
32 to 36 seats, the Ishii faction stayed at 14 seats and the Fukuda faction went from 20 to 21 seats (JT
23.11.63).
32 Eleven had run for or been elected for Bunjito in 1953, three had been in the Hatoyama faction but did
not leave, while one was neutral.
33 They were Ono himself, Murakami Isamu, Kanda Hiroshi and Fukuda Hajime.
34 Various lobbying groups also existed within the LDP which were cross-factional, the most prominent
being those on South Korea, Taiwan, Communist China, USSR, national defence, Latin America and
overseas economic cooperation (Fukui 1970:250; JT 31.10.62).
35 The IkedalY oshida faction, with support from a third of the Kishi faction, and half of the Ishii faction,
formed a 'Council for Deliberating the Current Political Situation' (Jikyoku kondankai) before it was
decided to send Hatoyama to Moscow. They threatened to cede from the party in the autumn of 1956 but
decided against it in early October (JT 16.10.56, 14.10.56). The group was said to have the support of
176 Dietmembers from both houses (JT 6.10.56).
36 Itwas approved in spite of 75 members of the LDP absenting themselves from the vote (Iyasu 1983: 109).
37 This was a ploy designed by Kono, but after Mild's death he became very prominent within the
Hatoyama wing and was sometimes called 'Kono the regent' (Kono shikken) (Iyasu 1983: 108).
38 Sato was considered to be in the right wing within the right wing, being anti-China and anti-USSR, while
Ikeda was in the left, with some interest in China. Kishi's stance was unclear. The left wing within the
party included men like Ishibashi Tanzan, Matsumura Kenzo and Takazaki Tatsunosuke, Kono Ichiro,
Fujiyama Aiichiro and Miki Takeo. At the extreme left of this group were Ishibashi, Matsumura, Furui
Yoshimi and Utsunomiya Tokuma (JT 31.10.62).
39 See Sato and Matsuzaki (1986:79) and Curtis (1988:87-88) on changes in factional influence on policy
making since 1970.
40 The faction held courses for young people in 1961 chosen from election districts and got 2-3000
participants (Fujiyama 1976:236).
41 The 'proportionality principle' secured a faction cabinet posts in correspondence with the strength of the
faction. The 'separation of powers principle' secured to four different factions the three highest party
posts and the presidency (Kohno 1997:95).
42 In the second Hatoyama cabinet, Kawasaki Hideji of the Kitamura faction was, for example, rewarded
for his efforts to join the Kono and Kitamura factions together. He, however, left Keno after the
presidential election in 1956 and joined the Miki-Matsumura faction. Other prominent members of the
Keno faction, such as Utsunomiya Tokuma went to the Ono faction, while Nakasone Yasuhiro came to
be central to the Kono faction (Watanabe 1958:208).
43 Of those recommended by the old JiyiitO forces, Murakami Isamu, Kuraishi Tadao, Ota Seiko and
Funada Naka, had close connections with Ono Bamboku, while Baba was close to Ogata. Yoshino and
Kobayashi were also appointed but they were members of the House of Councillors.
44 In 1958 the anti-mainstream Ishibashi faction was discontent that the Kishi faction was getting
disproportionally many posts. The faction formed a group, 'Shinwakai,' to fight these appointments and
insisted on the resignation of Kori Ytlichi, director general of the Autonomy Agency because of his
choice of two Kishi men as party officers (JT 8.8.58).
45 In the nisan'i rengii deal it was decided that the candidate coming second would be made vice prime
minister. This deal was, however, not honoured by Ishibashi (Goto et al. 1982:138, 150).
46 Watanabe (1966:30) argues that Ishida made 60 promises for sixteen cabinet chairs before the election to
secure Ishibashi's election.
47 See Chapter 5 for more detailed discussion of this agreement.
48 Ono had requested four posts, amongst them the Finance Ministry for Mizuta Mikio (JT 28.7.60; Ono
1964:94-5) but Ikeda was made Finance Minister in the end. The Ono faction did, however, get two
posts: Mizuta Mikio was made MITI minister and Kanda Hiroshi minister of Health (Ono 1964:95).
49 Both Ono and Ishii had believed they would be chosen as vice-president.
50 Ikeda had supported Ishii initially, but was instrumental in securing Ishibashi's victory through the ni-san
irengo agreement.
51 The Miki faction got cabinet posts for Matsuura Shfitaro, Uda Koichi and Ide Ichitaro.
52 The Oasa faction was given. a post which is counted here with the Kishi faction as the two factions were
more or less merged.
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53 The Ono faction was in the mainstream but declared that they were happy not to get cabinet posts as long
as Ono was made vice president (AS 17.7.57).
54 When this cabinet was formed, two jitsuryokusha had their own plans for a new mainstream composition.
Ishida of the Ishibashi faction sought to create an Ikeda, Miki, Ishida, Sato alliance and push Keno and
Ono out (Watanabe 1958:171). Miki was also interested in pushing Kono and Ono out in order to create a
mainstream composition of Ikeda, Sato and Miki (Watanabe 1958:182). Both plans failed and Ishibashi
became anti-mainstream while the Miki faction only got one post.
55 Three other members of the cabinet did not have clear factional affiliation. Fujiyama Aiichiro, foreign
minister, was not a Dietmember at the time but was considered by some to be a member of the Kishi
faction. Ichimanda Naoto, finance minister, was by some considered to be a member of the Kono faction
although other sources have him as unaffiliated. Aichi Kiichi, cabinet secretary, was said to be close to
Kishi while others considered him closer to Ikeda and Sato (Togawa 1982; AS 11.10.56).
56 This cabinet is usually called the second cabinet and the reshuffle in July 1957 called the 'first reformed
cabinet'.
57 The Ishii faction was not given a seat when the cabinet was formed but later acquired a post.
58 The Miki faction in particular was not happy with only one post (Watanabe 1958: 182).
59 Their declaration read: 'In light of the police problem. the abnormal Diet sessions and people's criticism,
the LDP should modestly reflect on its responsibility, and speedily reconsider personnel decisions, set up
a leadership by the whole party and start anew. And we propose that the Kishi cabinet hold presidential
election no later than 7 January. We had requested that a resolute step is taken, but unfortunately there
are disagreements on this important issue and so we resign' (Watanabe 1966:48).
60 Kishi had rewarded long time friends such as Takechi Yiiki in the first Hatoyama cabinet, Kawashima
Shojiro in the second, and Nanjo Tokuo in the Ishibashi cabinet and the first Kishi cabinet.
61 Kishi made several of the Oasa faction ministers: Miyazawa Taneo was transport minister in the
Ishibashi cabinet, Karasawa Toshiki was justice minister in the first Kishi reform cabinet, and Miura
Kazuo was agriculture minister in Kishi's second cabinet (Watanabe 1958: 100).
62 A group headed by Nanjo Tokuma, one of Kishi's closest supporters since the days of the Saiken
Rernmei, was against Kishi's planned cooperation with Kono, while another group, led by Kawashima
Shojiro, Akagi Munenori and Okura Saburo supported the plans (Watanabe 1958:97-9). The group
around Nanjo was also discontent because Nanjo had not been reappointed Construction Minister. They
demanded that Nanjo be made Chief Cabinet Advisor but later insisted on Fujieda Sensuke.
63 After the formation of the Ishibashi cabinet, the faction split into a bureaucratic group and a party
politician group over the distribution of cabinet posts. Initially, the faction decided to recommend Ishii
and Tanaka Isaji for cabinet posts. However, a struggle ensued between the party politicians and the
bureaucrats within the faction, which resulted in the withdrawal of Ishii himself and the entrance of
Tanaka, as representative of the party politician group, and Nadao Hirokichi, as representative of the
bureuacratic faction, in cabinet (AS 24.12.56). The struggle continued .as Nadao joined the second Kishi
cabinet in 1957 but Tanaka lost his post (Hayashi 1958:82).
64 Thayer described the principle as one where the big factions got two to three seats, small factions one or
none, and three seats were given to the Upper House. Factions in opposition to the Prime Minister in the
previous presidential election might get 1-2 seats fewer than they were 'due' (Thayer 1969: 195).
65 Not all factions were happy though. The Ono and Fujiyama groups were not happy with the number of
posts, and the Kono and Ishii factions felt left out (JT 1.1.61).
66 Sato, Fujiyama, Kono, Kawashima and Miki all accepted cabinet portfolios.
67 In addition the Fujiyama, Miki and Ishii factions got one post each and the Kawashima faction two.
68 In August 1964, the Sato faction had six members in the Executive Council, the Ono faction five, the
Ikeda, Miki, Kawashima, Kono and Ishii factions three each, and the Fukuda and Fujiyama factions one
each (Fukui 1970:91).
69 However, by 1972 the president's faction had stopped nominating for the 'big three' posts (Kohno
1997:98).
70 The press nicknamed Kishi 'ryo Kishi' (or two-faced Kishi) because he seemed to be standing in both
camps (JT 11.12.56).
71 Kaya was appointed chairman of PARC in July 1962 but his factional affiliation was unclear. Kaya was
prominent and had tried to start a faction in 1960 but was also close to the Sato faction which was
moving more into anti-mainstream circles at this time.
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72 Kohno has pointed out, however, that from the 1970s onwards the secretary-general did not generally
come from the president's faction (Kohno 1997:98).
73 This was for example clear in December 1961, when the Japan Times noted that although Sato was
interested in becoming the next prime minister, he could not do so until 'a tripartite alliance was formed
among his own faction, the Kishi group headed by his brother, former Prime Minister Kishi, and the
Ikeda faction' (22.12.61).
74 Kono Ichiro contemplated leaving the LDP and forming his own party in 1960. The plan was aborted
when it became clear that only 27 of the faction's 34 members were prepared to leave. Kono argued the
split was to 'prevent dictatorial tendencies by a single and powerful conservative party' (JT 18.8.60) and
it was also argued it was to debate new types of conservatism. However, critics argued that it was largely
Keno's fear of isolation within the Ikeda administration that led him to contemplate a split (JT 12.8.60,
15.7.60, 18.8.60).
75 Cox and Rosenbluth show that the mainstream faction promoted their own incumbents and protected
their incumbents through 1960-90 (1996:265).
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CHAPTERS:
THE NEW FACTIONS: FROM THE CENTRE TO THE PERIPHERY
5.1. Introduction
The previous chapter established that the LDP factions changed significantly in the first
years of the party, as the factions reorganised, consolidated and formed membership. I
will now turn to a discussion of what prompted these changes, i.e. the causes of the LDP
factionalism.
Scholars have long been interested in the question what causes factionalism (Beller and
Belloni 1978a; Panebianco 1988; Sartori 1976; Zariski 1960). On this question the
cultural-historical institutional approach and the rational choice approach have shared an
intense interest in the wider institutional environment. In the case of Japan a variety of
institutional factors have been considered, such as the political dominance of the LDP
from 1955 to 1993 (Benjamin and Ori 1981:80; Sartori 1976:85), and the adoption of a
secret-ballot election of the party president of the LDP in 1956 (Baerwald 1964:224;
Mitchell 1996:116; Seito to habatsu 1968:10; Watanabe 1966:21). These have been
widely seen as spurring the growth and expansion of factions in the late 1950s and early
1960s.
However, two main arguments relating to the multimember electoral system have come
to dominate scholarly discussion on the causes of factionalism in Japan that have created
an important link between the two main institutional approaches to factions. First, the
need for political funds has been recognised as a major impetus for factional formation. It
is generally acknowledged that the LDP factions serve to channel enormous amounts of
money into the party-they generate much more political funding than the party itself.
The multimember electoral system, it is argued, plays an important part in creating
greater funding needs (Cox and Thies 1998:267; Hrebenar 1986a:61; Kohno 1997:104;
195
Chapter 5: The New Factions: From the Centre to the Periphery.
Baerwald 1964). Consequent changes in funding laws have also been identified as major
obstacles to the eradication of factions (Curtis 1988; Cox and Thies 1998; Iseri 1988:188;
Iwai 1990).
Second, the electoral system has been identified as a major impetus for factional growth
and has become the most popular explanation of factionalism in Japan (Baerwald
1986:40-41; Cox and Rosenbluth 1995:355; Cox, Rosenbluth and Thies 1999:34; Iseri
1988:58; Kohno 1997:92; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993:59; Shiratori 1988:173;
Stockwin 1989:162; Thayer 1969:35; Watanabe 1958:27). It has been argued by both
Western and Japanese scholars, that the factions help politicians to maximise gains from
the multimember electoral system, and that this type of electoral system is conducive to
the growth of and maintenance of factions (Baerwald 1986; Fukui 1970; Kohno 1997;
Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993; Thayer 1969).
While this twofold institutional focus on factionalism in Japan is clearly a fruitful way to
provide an understanding of factional development, I will argue that the institutional
approach needs to be refocused to give a fuller picture of factionalism in earlier periods.
Presenting data collected on general elections between 1955 and 1964, I argue that on its
own the multimember electoral system did not cause factionalism but that factional
fighting spread out to the electoral districts from the party centre. The electoral system,
pitting members of the same party against each other, did not cause the factional
divisions. Only when factions had emerged as important political and financial groups
and had acquired membership, did factional fighting spread to the electoral districts.
Furthermore, while the multimember electoral system may have created incentives for
LDP candidates to appeal to voters through financial means, as Cox and Thies (1998:267)
argue, I argue this did not necessarily foster factionalism. The electoral system did not
affect the development of factionalism until after the factions had consolidated
significantly in the LDP as a result of increased financial capability of the factions.
The process whereby changes in the structural environment affected party organisation
was very complicated and involved two main structural and institutional changes. First,
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the presidential elections, introduced in 1956, started a process towards a consolidation of
factions. The 1956 presidential election taught the leaders that a more clearly defined
support was needed to win open presidential elections (Iyasu 1996:135; Masumi
1995: 19). Second, the organisational development of the LDP was affected by a more
general structural change, namely the development of stronger relations between
politicians and the business community which in tum was taking rapid changes because
of economic growth. The power struggles within the party changed factionalism and
political leadership significantly as they spread into the electoral districts where they
became institutionalised. A part of this development was changes in electioneering and
the establishment of personal support groups in the electoral districts, the kiienkai. The
process of factionalisation reveals incremental institutional changes in reaction to the
organisational environment, and power politics. This, much rather than the macro
political environment and efforts by politicians to maximise their gains within that
political environment, encouraged factionalism within the LDP.
5.2. Factionalism in the periphery and the electoral system
Scholars of comparative politics have focused on the electoral system as an important
factor contributing to political factionalism (Beller and Belloni 1978c:432; Sartori
1976:93; Zariski 1978:24). A variety of electoral systems have been studied and it argued
that certain electoral systems, such as highly proportional electoral systems, and systems
that use primaries, produce fission within parties and encourage factionalism (Beller and
Belloni 1978c:432; Benjamin and Ori 1981:79; Sartori 1976:98). In studies of Japan, the
multimember electoral system, in force between 1925 and 1993, apart from the election
in 1946, has been considered particularly effective in generating factional divisions. This
argument has been echoed in most institutional analyses on factionalism inJapan, and has
been particularly well studied after the rational choice approach became popular in the
1990s (Baerwald 1964; Cox, Rosenbluth and Thies 1999; Fukui 1970, 1978; Iseri 1988;
Kohno 1997; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993; Sartori 1976; Sims 1991; Stockwin 1983;
Thayer 1969; Totten and Kawakami 1965; Uchida 1969, Watanabe 1958).
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As indicated above, the multimember district system based on 3-5 member districts with
a single non-transferable vote (SNTV), is not a postwar phenomenon but was established
in 1925 and used until 1993, apart from the first postwar election in 1946, when a shift
was made to a large district system (Iseri 1988:58; Uchida 1983:111). In the postwar
period, the House of Representatives had 466 seats divided between 119 districts until
1954 when a one member district was set up in Amarni, and the seats thus went up to
467.1 There were 40 three member districts, 39 four member districts, and 38 five
member districts.
Scholars have argued that there are strong links between this type of electoral system and
party organisation. Most scholars have been reluctant to argue that the multimember
electoral system creates factionalism, and have in most cases only argued that it
maintains factionalism or explains its survival (see Baerwald 1964:226; Cox, Rosenbluth
and Thies 1999:34; Iyasu 1996:135; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993:59; Stockwin
1989:167)_2 According to this argument, a big party like the LDP which aims for a
majority, must put forward a number of candidates in each district who then must
compete with each other for nomination and support. Watanabe concluded in 1958 that
the competition was becoming more severe within the conservative camp than between
conservatives and progressives (Watanabe 1958:28). Most scholars have argued that this
situation in the electoral districts is conducive to factionalism. Candidates react to this
institutional environment by first, seeking factional backing, electorally and financially
(Fukui 1978:50; Kohno 1997:102; Stockwin 1983:221; Stockwin 1982:125; Uchida
1983:109), and second, by creating their ownjiban, or local support base, in which other
candidates could not enter, forming areas similar to a single member district system (Iseri
1988:58-9). This in tum affected the electoral behaviour of the factions, according to this
argument. Because the factions had started behaving like parties in the electoral districts,
they avoided putting forward more than one candidate in each district so as to avoid
friction within the faction (Cox and Rosenbluth 1995:356; Stockwin 1982:125; Stockwin
1983:221).
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The following sections will discuss each of these arguments in tum, using data collected
for all general elections and the factional affiliation of LDP members between 1955 and
1964. I will argue, first, that the size of the LDP is not an adequate explanation as to why
factionalism became so pronounced. Second, I argue that a system of factional
endorsements took time to develop in the electoral districts and that factional nominations
did not become a problem until the late 1950s. Third, I will argue that factionalism in the
periphery was encouraged by the development of personal support groups which made
factional divisions in electoral districts easier.
5.2.1. Factionalism, party size and organisation
It is only in the last few years, and largely as a response to the rational choice theoretical
contribution to the study of factions, that scholars have come to argue that the electoral
system may be of less significance in explaining factionalism than previously believed
(Curtis 1999; Reed 2003). Curtis (1999:143) argues that the relationship between
factionalism and the multimember electoral system is complicated and that two
conditions were needed for the multimember district to cause factionalism, namely:
When the party is unable to structure the vote among multiple candidates and when voter
support for a particular party is high enough that the party can reasonably expect to elect
more than one candidate in a district. There will be no intra-party competition in the
absence of either of these conditions.
I will return to the first condition later, but if we look at the latter condition, it is true that
between 1958 and 1963 the LDP got more than one candidate elected in most districts,
between 35 and 44 districts saw 3 LDP members elected, and 10-12 districts had 4 LDP
members elected (Fig.5-1). However, as discussed in Chapter 3, the multimember
electoral system was introduced in 1925 and the JiyUt5 and the Kaishinto fought under
this system in five elections between 1947 and 1955. Although the Jiyuto was smaller
than the LDP and its size fluctuated between elections, it was big enough to expect to
elect more than one candidate in most districts it was running in.3 In fact, as seen before,
between 1949 and 1953, 63-81 % of the districts elected more than one Jiyuto candidate
and the number of districts where two candidates were elected was particularly high.
Even so, the competition in the electoral districts did get worse after the formation of the
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LDP. In the elections of 1958, 1960 and 1963, the number of districts where three or four
members were elected increased greatly, compared to the Jiyuto in the 1940s, and the
number of districts with only one candidate of the same party dropped as well. Only in
1949, did Jiyuto have a comparable number of districts where 3 members of the party got
elected. Nevertheless, both the Jiytuo and the LDP satisfy Curtis' condition of reasonably
expecting to elect more than one candidate, even though the factionalisation of the two
parties was very different-in the Jiyiit6 it was much less severe and did not seem to
reach into electoral districts, indicating that the relationship between factions and the
multimember electoral system is complex, and that Jiyuto candidates used other methods
than factional affiliation to secure their election under the multimember electoral system.
This leads us to the first condition Curtis mentions, the issue of party organisation and the
party's ability to structure the vote amongst multiple candidates. It has often been argued
that because the LDP has no grassroot organisations it cannot support all candidates that
run in a district. For example, Kohno (1997:102; see also Thayer 1969:35) claimed that
because in the 1947 electoral system
these candidates competed for the same pool of conservative voters, it would have been
difficult for the party to develop a campaign for any particular candidate. Unable to rely
on the party per se, the candidates were better off affiliating with the existing LDP
factions for financial support and campaign expertise.
As seen in Chapter 3, the Jiyuto in particular solved this problem in a very different way
from the LDP. Candidates looked to a number of politicians in the party for financial
support and, in fact, received added support if the leader of their faction was running in
the same district. This indicates that structured factionalism was perhaps not the only
option available for the LDP in order to structure the vote among multiple candidates. It
is a fact that LDP members came to rely on factions for electoral and financial support,
but this does not necessarily mean that the electoral system was a primary causal factor.
It could be argued that the problems the LDP had in structuring the vote were due to the
fact that the LDP was created as a merger of two parties, a party born out of diffusion
(see Panebianco 1988). However, if that had been the case we should see these problems
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present from the outset. It is interesting to note that the electoral behaviour of LDP
politicians changes gradually in the first few years. If we look at the behaviour of the
factions in the electoral districts between 1958 and 1963, we see a process of factionalism
gradually spreading into the districts, but no clear factional divisions. A close look at the
behaviour of Diet candidates in electoral districts until the early 1960s shows how
factionalism only slowly came to affect electoral politics. First as seen in Figures 5-2 to
5-4, a large number of members of same factions ran against each other in districts in
general elections until 1963. Second, the number of Dietmembers changing their
factional affiliation so as not to face members of their own faction, and the emergence of
factional candidacy to the Diet, increased very slowly in this period. This strongly
indicates that the electoral system did not create the divisions but rather that factionalism
spread from the centre into the electoral districts. I will now turn to a more detailed
discussion of nomination politics in the electoral districts.
5.2.2. Factional endorsements
Scholars have observed that the LDP factions would rarely sponsor more than one
candidate in a district in order to avoid internal factional competition (Cox and
Rosenbluth 1995:356; Cox, Rosenbluth and Thies 1999:38; Stockwin 1983:125; Shiratori
1988:174). If the multimember district system causes factionalism in big parties, and
considering that many LDP candidates were already familiar with the problems caused by
many candidates of the same party running in the same district from their time in the
Jiytito, we would expect to see such factional divisions within the districts in the early
years of the LDP. I have analysed election data for the LDP between 1955 and 1964 and
what the data tells us (Figure 5-2) is that contrary to what would be expected, the first
three elections of the LDP saw quite a high rate of members of the same faction running
against each other. Furthermore, there is not a significant reduction in the number of
districts with multiple faction candidates between 1958 and 1963 (Fig.5-3 and 5-4). This
is in spite of the fact that the factions were extending their activities into the electoral
districts from around 1957, and the electoral system was starting to feature in factional
activities. The first few elections do not show a trend towards a pattern whereby the
factions would avoid having more than one of their members elected in the district.
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Factional endorsements did not become a problem in the LOP until 1957, although there
had been instances where factional conflict was said to affect results. This had happened
at times between 1954 and 1957. As noted earlier, factionalism became more visible after
the formation of the Minshuto in November 1954. The factionalisation of the party was
mirrored in the elections in February 1955, and it was noted that factional fighting in the
Minshuto was spreading into the electoral districts. The Asahi noted that the Hatoyama
faction, the Kishi faction, the old Kaishinto faction and the old Nihon Jiyuto faction were
fighting over nominations. An example of this was Wakayama I" district where a Kishi
faction candidate, a candidate from the former Nihon JiyOto and a candidate from the
former Kaishinto were running-all for the Minshuto (AS 22.1.55).
In the summer and autumn of 1956, the LOP lost the gubernatorial elections in Miyagi,
Toyama, Aomori and Gumma, which was blamed on factional conflict within the LOP.
The winning candidate in Aomori had sought party endorsement but entered as an
independent when he failed to secure endorsement because of a factional disagreement.
Factional differences also prevented the organisation of a new prefectural organisation in
the district until late in the summer of 1956, resulting in the defeat of the conservative
candidate. In Miyagi the party candidate came in third because of factional struggle. In
Toyama it was noted that the antimainstream Dietmember in the district had supported
the Socialist backed candidate when his own factional candidate failed to win party
endorsement (JT 30.10.56).
But it was not until 1957 that factional endorsements in the electoral districts were
considered a major problem with the party leadership. The conflicts until then mirrored
factional conflict at the centre of the party, but the factional divisions had not created
divisions at the electoral level.. The LOP had set up an electoral strategy committee
(senkyo taisaku iinkai) at its establishment in 1955 (Cox and Rosenbluth 1995:357), but
in 1957 the party established stricter guidelines on party nominations in order to reduce
the number of official LOP candidates and avoid tomodaore (falling down together) (Cox
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and Rosenbluth 1995:363). In September, the party leadership also called for the
dissolution of factions, in part because of problems caused by cabinet members and party
executive staff campaigning indistricts on behalf of candidates belonging to their own
faction (AS 19.9.57). However, in the 1958 general election, party leaders openly backed
candidates, giving them funding and electioneering on their behalf (AS 18.5.58).
Simultaneously, factional fighting was spreading into the election districts leading to dog-
eat-dog battles between LOP candidates in the districts (AS 19.5.58).
In spite of these developments, the first few general elections of the LOP showed a
continuation of the trend seen before where members of the same faction ran in the same
district. As seen in figure 5-2, in the HR elections in 1958 there were 28 instances where
two members of the same faction ran and were elected from the same district." The Kishi
faction got two of its members elected in nine districts and three members elected in one
district. The Ishibashi and the Ishii factions got two of their faction members elected in
two districts each. In addition, in Fukuoka third district a candidate was elected who was
affiliated with both the Ikeda and Ishii factions, but this district already had one Ishii
candidate. The Ono faction got two of its members elected in three districts, and the
Keno faction did this in two districts. The Sat5 faction got two members elected in two
districts, while in Fukui district an Ikeda/Sato affiliated candidate also got elected along
with a Sato candidate. The Ikeda faction got two of its members elected in 3 districts, and
faction members in one district. The Miki faction got two members elected in three
districts. The Kishi faction, which was the president's faction in 1958, had the highest
number of districts with multiple candidates elected, 9 districts with 2 members, and 1
district with 3 members--characteristics that Prime Minister Ikeda's faction also showed
in 1960 and 1963. It was a characteristic throughout this period that the president's
faction was eager to expand to consolidate its power and at the same time attracted
Dietmembers and candidates because of its power.
By 1960, when most of the incumbent party members had already been drawn into the
factions, it became paramount in order to maintain the power of the factions to recruit
new members and to compete with other factions for the new Dietmembers (see Thayer
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1969). Factional nominations were an effective tool to attract new faction members. This
accelerated the process whereby new candidates would seek the support of factions to get
nomination and electoral and fmancial support. Faction leadership, by the same token,
sought new candidates who had clout and a good possibility of getting elected (Iseri
1988:60). The Japan Times reported that the power struggle in the party was forcing old
politicians to retire for the factions to 'see as many new candidates as possible running in
the election from their own clique so that they can secure a position of power in the
party' (29.10.63). This process moved the factional competition into the districts, and
could only be accelerated as more candidates were recruited into factions as part of the
power struggle in the party. The electoral system had, by this time, become strongly
related to factionalism in the public's mind and the press frequently argued that it was the
pitting of candidates of the same party against each other in the districts, that caused the
factionalism (JT 10.12.60; AS 31.8.64).
As endorsements became more faction based, it was natural for politicians to seek to
avoid running against members of the same faction, as it would limit the resources
available. There were a number of examples where candidates sought to change factions
to avoid this problem. It was, for example, claimed that Sate Torajiro, who was close to
Ishibashi Tanzan in the Jiyuto and ran in Shizuoka 1st district, approached the Kono,
Ikeda and Ono factions in 1960 because Ishibashi was a Dietrnember for Shizuoka 2nd
district (Watanabe 1958: 166). However, he joined the Fujiyama faction in 1960. Factions
as the locus for electoral support became established. Tsukada Juichiro also left the Ono
faction before the 1958 general elections. Tsukada was against Ono's cooperation with
Kono and Miki Bukichi, but he also faced electoral difficulties as he was fighting a Keno
faction member, Tanaka Shoji in Niigata fourth district, which could affect his chances of
getting elected and so Tsukada went on to join the Ishii faction (Watanabe 1958:131).
Watanabe argues that many Dietmembers had similar motives for changing factional
affiliation at this time (Watanabe 1958:131). It revealed the extent to which factional
conflict had spread to the electoral districts that by around 1960 LOP members were
moving between factions in an effort to increase their chances of getting elected, a trend
not seen before.
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Although there were therefore trends towards factional nominations by 1960, there are
limited changes visible in the data. In 1960 there were again 28 instances where two
members of the same faction were elected in the same district and two districts where
three members of the same faction were elected (Figure 5-3). The Fujiyama faction got
two candidates elected in two districts; the Ishida faction in one district; the Ikeda faction
in four districts; and in two districts it got three of its candidates elected; the Kishi faction
got two candidates elected in six districts; the Ishii faction got two candidates elected in
two districts; the Kono faction got two candidates elected in three districts; the Sato
faction in five districts; the Ono faction in three; and the Miki faction in two districts.
It was ironic that in spite of the movement to dissolve factions in 1962-63 (see Chapter
6), the 1963 general elections saw the fiercest factional fighting in the electoral districts
yet. Faction leaders were concerned with increasing their power at the party centre and
thus put forward a great number of candidates, ignoring the fact in the current climate of
factional electoral and financial backing it was affecting their chances of getting elected.'
In this election 21 districts saw members of the same faction being elected in (Fig.5-4).
In the district of Miki Takeo, Tokushima 1st district, five LDP candidates were fighting
each other. In this district, as in many others, the aggressive methods used by the
mainstream Keno faction were especially noted, where he supported a new candidate
against incumbent LDP candidates (AS 9.11.63). This election spurred a great power
struggle between the Keno and Sate factions in preparation for the party presidency,
encouraging both factions to seek to expand their factions by entering as many members
in districts as possible, thereby further escalating factional conflict (AS 9.11.63; Masumi
1967:45, and further discussion in Chapter 6). The SaW faction got two members elected
in three districts, while the Kono faction did so in one district but got three members
elected in one district. The leading Ikeda faction had two members elected in seven
districts.
It took some years before factional politics led to clear factional endorsements and
factional elections. As factionalism spread to the districts, the situation seemed more to
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resemble a mad power scramble where factions tried to get their candidates elected
without much heed to real chances of winning. Factionalisationwas led by the power
struggle at the centre of the party; and not by the electoral system itself.
5.2.3. Kaenkai
Returning to Curtis' observation that factionalism will develop when the party is unable
to structure the vote among multiple candidates, it is paramount to look at electioneering
in the districts. It has been argued by many scholars that the growth in personal support
groups for LDP candidates in electoral districts, the so-called kiienkai, and the building of
personal constituencies, the jiban, in the 1950s, facilitated the factional divisions in the
electoral districts (Curtis 1988:177; Masumi 1995:5; Benjamin and Ori 1981:116). Many
have also pointed out that the establishment of a jiban and then of a kiienkai within an
electoral district helped to solve the problem of multiple candidacy in the multimember
electoral system (Reed 2003:20).
I will argue that it is more fruitful to look at the development of kiienkai in relation to the
power struggles within the party, and not in terms of the electoral system. The timing of
their development coincides with a spread in factionalism to districts and was particularly
important because they made the spreading of factional conflict to the periphery easier
(see Thayer 1969:27-8 for examples of individual LDP politicians setting up offices and
staff to serve their electoral district). Factions in the party could more easily function in
electoral politics because of the way the districts had been divided (Stockwin 1982:124).
Divisions in the districts came to mirror those in the party; candidates had factional
labels; and even in the prefectural chapters, members were divided into mainstream and
antimainstream factions (Curtis 1971:7).
The composition of local political support groups changed gradually in the early postwar
period. The traditional jiban, personal support base, was built on local bosses (meiboka)
who would deliver the vote for politicians, a system which Iyasu argues is built on the
'traditional, Japanese groupism society' (denio tekina nihonteki shiidan shugi shakai)
(Iyasu 1984:121; 1996:147). During the Occupation, the process towards a more diverse
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system of support groups was accelerated as 'votes could not longer be gathered only
with the support of the bosses' (Curtis 1971:127; Iyasu 1984:121; Babb unpublished
thesis:202). Rather than rely on 'local bosses,' politicians sought to organise locally
elected officials, medium and small businesses, manufacturers, agriculture, mountain and
fishing villages, labour and social welfare groups as well as the mass electorate into
formal groups, to more effectively gather enough votes (Benjamin and Ori 1981:116;
Curtis 1971; Iyasu 1984; Scalapino and Masumi 1962: 85, 123; Stockwin 1983:210,
224). The kiienkai had regular meetings and engaged in various activities in support of
the candidate, and for strengthening of the group itself (Stockwin 1982:122; Shiratori
1988: 183; Curtis 1971). The kiienkai were important in moving electioneering and
electoral support to candidates away from the party, institutionalising this practice in the
election districts. The formation of kiienkai encouraged the decentralisation of the LOP-
a development some observers argued was positive (see Chapter 6)-which in tum had
important consequences for factionalism, and its possibility to thrive. The kiienkai, more
than the old jiban system, created a basis for a system of exclusive political groupings
around individual LOP candidates, facilitating factional divisions in the electoral districts.
The institutionalisation of the kiienkai was helped by a favourable external environment.
The party system was becoming more stable. Party strength stabilised and the number of
Dietmembers with no previous political experience was falling. Incumbent Dietmembers
thus were able to both strengthen their jiban and build up koenkai (Iyasu 1984:120).
Furthermore, after the merger of the two major prewar conservative parties, alternation in
power ceased to be the norm and the LOP was able to retain a majority in spite of
declining vote (Stockwin 1983:213-14). These developments in the electoral districts
weakened party control; efforts to move election campaigning towards the party failed,
and by the mid-1960s it was decided
to let the party's candidates fight each other freely. The fiercer the battle, the more the
candidates would attempt to increase their votes and, in aggregate, the greater the total
number of votes the party would receive (Curtis 1971: 140).
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Attempts by the LDP to change from a parliamentary party (giin seit6) to an organised
party (soshiki seit6) by building up party membership were unsuccessful. Growth in
membership in the late 1950s was largely due to the fact that the kiienkai were recruiting
new membership. The party was not built on a conventional grass root basis, but on party
members recruited through the local kiienkai where the members identified more with the
local candidate than the national party (Benjamin and Ori 1981:35). And thus, by 1961
'when kiienkai membership surpassed 10 million, the LDP had changed from a party of
Diet members into a mass party based on factions and kiienkai' (Masumi 1995:5), with
kiienkai attracting a membership ranging between 50,000 and 150,000 members (Curtis
1971:130-1). Curtis noted that it was generally accepted that the kiienkai emerged as a
response to the new factors in the environment within which campaigning strategies
operate (Curtis 1971:127).
That the multimember electoral system did not inherently cause factional divisions, can
also be seen from the history of the Jiytito and the Kaishinto, The Jiyuto and Kaishinto
were able to survive within the same electoral framework without factional conflict
spreading to the districts. As Baerwald (1964:226), for example, noted, the electoral
system did not cause factionalism as 'it was not so great an impediment to unity in the
Yoshida era', but rather 'impedes the abolition of factions.' It is clear, as Cox,
Rosenbluth and Thies (1999:34) point out, that although the multimember electoral
system makes it difficult for candidates of the same party to rely on the party label alone
,
in their electoral campaigns, this does not necessarily lead to factional politics, but to
some type of 'atomistic politics' where candidates pursue a personal vote. This is a much
more accurate description of the effect of this type of electoral system. The LDP factions
extended from the centre to the periphery with intensification of factional conflict in the
party, aided by the establishment of the kiienkai, which became another element of the
factional struggle-a tool to maintain power in the centre of the party (Masumi 1995:5).
The electoral system only Came to play a role in encouraging and maintaining
factionalism, after the factions as financial and electoral support groups with a defined
group of supporters, had established themselves in the party. In the first few years after
the formation of the LDP, it was largely in presidential elections that factional activity
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was great but in the early 1960s general elections were increasingly characterised by
factional manoeuvres. In the 1963 election campaign, for example, all factions were
openly trying to expand, and each faction aimed to increase factional membership by 20-
30 people (AS 10.9.63). For the factional leaders, the electoral system was only an
additional factor helping them to establish their influence within the party." The electoral
system did not cause the factional divisions of the LOP, but could be said to have
facilitated factional divisions by making it possible for candidates to run as candidates of
different factions. As these divisions became manifest locally they in tum encouraged
factionalism generally in the party. What was of primary importance in allowing factional
conflict to spread to the electoral districts, was the intense power struggles at the heart of
the party, to which we now tum.
5.3. Power struggles at the centre
If factionalism spread to the electoral districts because of power struggles at the centre of
the party, what caused these power struggles and how did they manifest themselves?
Most, if not all, scholars who have researched factionalism within the Liberal Democratic
Party have argued that the introduction of a secret ballot election of the party president in
December 1956 amongst the party's Dietmembers and local representatives had a
massive influence on factionalism within the party (Baerwald 1964; Calder 1988,
Watanabe 1958; Thayer 1969:21; Masumi 1967:36). Masumi (1967:36) pointed out that
'the essence of factional fighting is in the presidential elections. From the very beginning
of the conservative merger this has been the locus of the struggle, You could say that
when presidential elections were adopted the factions developed' (see also Thayer
1969:21). The vernacular press and politicians such as Kono Ichiro and Ono Bamboku
frequently argued that it was because of the presidential elections that the factions
became fixed entities, a 'party within the party' (AS 23.8.62; 30.5.64). Matsuno Raizo, a
member of the SaW faction, confirms this in his autobiography:
It was at the time of the Hatoyama and Yoshida party conservative unification that
factions started developing clearly. At the time both parties wanted to lead the new party
and thus open presidential elections were decided upon. Elections are a logic of numbers.
The person who gathers the highest numbers becomes president. And so factions openly
followed (Matsuno 1994:203).
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The decision to choose the LDP president by secret ballot elections proved to be an
important stimulus to factional politics, as argued in Chapter 4, revealing the importance
of the institutional environmentl>f the LDP. They created a basis for factional formation
and the hardening of such groups as political manoeuvres to control the votes of the rank-
and-file was necessary to ensure victory. As seen in Chapter 4, in 1956 these manoeuvres
built on existing groupings but encouraged steps to increase the control of 'votes' with
the introduction of awards to supporting leaders and their followers. Commentators noted
that factions 'advanced' with each general election they gained new members, while
factions that failed to attract members and funding grew weak (e.g. Iyasu 1984: 117).7The
presidential elections created a new institutional environment within the party, which
shaped the power struggles taking place. However, as we will see, it was not the only
force changing the internal organisation of the LDP. The relationship between big
business and conservative politicians was changing, aiding the factional build-up.
When the LDP was first formed, the party was unable to choose a president from the
various leaders in its ranks, where the main competition was between Hatoyama Ichiro
and Ogata Taketora. It was thus decided to set up a leadership committee (sosai daiko iin
sei), consisting of Hatoyama Ichiro, Ogata Taketora, Miki Bukichi and Ono Bamboku8
until the matter could be solved. Such group leadership had been set up several times
before in the early postwar period in the Shinpoto", the Minshuto.l" and the Kaishinto!'
when these parties had been unable to decide on a leader (Quigley and Turner 1956:338;
Yanaga 1956:247).
The decision to adopt secret ballot elections for the LDP president was the result of
tactical thinking amongst the party leaders. After the committee had been set up the
various leaders of the party continued to debate the selection method for the president.
Hatoyama seemed to have secured support of many of the most prominent politicians of
the Jiyuto and Kohno thus announced that he would prefer it if the party decided on one
candidate before the election and proposed that Hatoyama be chosen leader and Ogata
vice-president (Watanabe 1966:25). However, Ogata was confident that he could win if a
secret ballot was held (Watanabe 1966:24) and would not accept this proposal unless
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Hatoyama agreed to promise to resign after the USSR-Japan treaty, but this failed
(Watanabe 1966:25). Hatoyama was eventually forced to accept the idea of a secret ballot
because of the pressure within the party. Itwas therefore decided that the party president
and vice president should be chosen at a party convention by secret ballot. If no candidate
received a majority, another round should be held to choose between the two candidates
who received the most votes (Watanabe 1966:39-40).
The decision to hold secret ballot elections was made with short term tactical goals in
mind, but was to affect the intra-party divisions greatly. Although the immediate
consequences of such an election were partly foreseen, the long term impact could not be
known (see Thelen and Steinmo 1992:21-2). Kawashima Shojiro, Kishi's chief of staff,
pointed out in November 1956 that unrestrained popular vote would be bad for the party
and argued that the result would be internal divisions caused by the opposition to the new
leadership by the losing side. More importantly, he argued that because there were no
detailed regulations about the intraparty election, ambitious candidates would definitely
resort to vote buying. 'In other words' Kawashima declared, 'we are not against the
method and principle itself, but we are afraid of its consequences' (JT 13.11.56).
It has been argued by some observers that factionalism played a major part in presidential
nominations in early postwar Japan as well, and that 'the conferences of both right-wing
parties frequently diluted their formal power by giving perfunctory approval to leaders
who had already been agreed upon in factional bargaining' (Quigley and Turner
1956:333; Yanaga 1956:247). To observers at that time, party elders were important in
breaking deadlocks between factions:
Conference election of the president of a conservative party, however, has been little
more than confirmation of a leader who has already been agreed upon following a
behind-the-scenes struggle among factional interests. Occasionally the deadlock has been
broken and superficial unity restored by the nod of a trusted party elder or political sage
(Quigley and Turner 1956:337) ..
Although there were certainly factional struggles over leadership, in particular in the
Minshuto, the nature of these struggles was very different from the struggles that
developed within the LDP. In 1948, when Ashida Hitoshi retired from his post as party
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president of the Minshuto, a struggle ensued between Tomabechi Gizo, a right hand man
of Ashida, Narahashi Wataru and Inukai Ken. There were, however, no factional
agreements made similar to those of the LDP, and the leadership was chosen on the basis
of which wing of the party was stronger at the time. The Inukai group proved stronger in
1948, and Inukai was chosen president by the end of the year, despite the opposition of
the Ashida faction (NT 29.11.48, 22.2.49).
In the Jiynto the situation was slightly different. Matsuno Raizo described the Jiyuto
election system for leadership as 'a family affair and far removed from the open elections
where numerical strength is required, making factionalism rampant' (Matsuno 1994:203).
The leadership of the Jiyuto was not contested in elections. Yoshida was chosen prime
minister in spring 1946, and a little later leader of the Jiyuto, through a deal between
himself and the leadership of the party (Watanabe 1966:22). Yoshida was not chosen
because of factional strength as he did not have a faction at the time but because of
decisions taken by the purged leadership (Reed unpublished). Similarly, when Ogata
Taketora was chosen as president of the Jiyuto in November 1954, it was not because of
his prominence as factional leader, but because of Yoshida's support (Reed unpublished).
He was the handpicked heir of Yoshida himself (Tomioka 1953:104,106; Hori 1975:87;
Yanaga 1956:163; Reed unpublished). Ogata distanced himself from Yoshida in 1954, as
he was wooed by Kishi to join the movement for a merger of the conservative parties
(Kurzman 1960:282) and he publicly declared that unification would be desirable. But, as
the discussions with the Kaishinto were divided between 'the Yoshida and Hatoyama
groups, Ogata stayed firmly within the Yoshida wing when the Jiyuto split again in
November 1954. Faction backing was thus not relevant in choice of leadership. Leaders
with big factions behind them, such as Ono and Hirokawa, were never considered for
leadership, in spite of factional strength (Reed unpublished). Furthermore, Ono and
Okubo, who led the party politician faction following Hatoyama's purge, did not take any
active part in picking Hatoyama's successor.
The open elections in the LDP signaled a new period in the history of conservative
parties, as the party convention ceased to be a mere rubber stamp and became the battling
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ground for the leadership. It also signaled a new era in that the 'chiiri)' (the elders) lost
their ability to affect key decisions of the party, and the factions took over.12 Thus
although the president was nowchosen through open and secret elections and the result
could not always be foreseen, the 'secret room deals' (misshitsu seiji) that traditionally
were made in Japanese politics did not disappear. They had continued under the
Occupation, and, contrary to the expectation of many observers, continued unabated in
spite of the new election rules. However, it was no longer the elders who controlled the
backroom deals but the faction leaders themselves who tried to negotiate a deal that
would secure the election of their man (Watanabe 1966:21).
The presidential elections called for more complicated manoeuvres between politicians
than ever before because of the secret ballot voting. The dealings between the various
politicians show a process of consolidation of factions as the leaders acquired support to
be able to do deals, securing a certain number of votes.13 Such deals in presidential
elections continued (see Hori 1975:103-4; Watanabe 1966:35-36). In 1957, Kishi was
made prime minister without an election, but with secret deals between the Miki, Ikeda
and Sato factions (Watanabe 1966:44). Coalition building was practised again in the
presidential elections of January 1959, when the anti-Kishi forces united around
Matsumura Kenzo against the 'degradation' of the LDP (JT 24.1.59). Again, in the
presidential elections of July 1960, coalition building was rife as the bureaucratic and
party politician factions came head-to-head (see JT 15.7.60). The Ono faction made a
deal with the Ishii faction similar to that made in 1956 (nisan'i rengo), as Ono believed
he was going to get Kishi's support for the presidency (Ono 1964:102-4).14 Kishi did not
honour his promise and it transpired that Kishi had made at least three deals with other
faction leaders during his cabinets, promising to pass leadership on to them in return for
their support.f The Ishii faction also failed to honour the deal and Ono was forced to
withdraw his candidacy (Watanabe 1966:31-32). When Ikeda announced his intention to
resign due to bad health in October 1964, he said he wanted the successor to be picked
'through peaceful talks at the party's official organs' (JT 28.10.64). But that was proving
difficult because of the manoeuvres of the factions that had already started. The party
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seemed split in their support of Sato and Keno but eventually the former was elected
president.
The presidential elections, first held in December 1956, affected the internal politics of
the LDP. They pitted candidates against each other, making coalition building important
to secure victory. This in turn led politicians to recruit as many candidates as possible and
to seek to maintain that support. This build-up in the party inevitably led to factional
struggles in the electoral districts as faction leaders fought for new and incumbent
Dietmembers. Thelen and Steinmo's dynamic constraint model captures well the changes
taking place in the LDP factions. The institutional changes were producing changes in the
functioning of the factions which furthered the political struggles and drove their
development forward. The development of kiienkai as personal support groups allowing
divided electoral districts, aided this development further. In this way the electoral system
was important in helping to spread factionalism in the periphery but it did not create it. At
the same time, the financial environment and the political funding arrangements were
changing so as to make continuing factional support possible. I will turn to political
finance now.
5.4. Factions and political finance
It has been claimed in a number of studies that factions serve a very powerful role in
providing financial backing for candidates to the Diet (Baerwald 1986; Fukui 1970:130;
Goto et al. 1982:140; Hrebenar 1986a; Iseri 1988 72; Shiratori 1988:174; Stockwin
1982:125; Totten and Kawakami 1965; Watanabe 1958).16Kohno states that: '[b]ecause
LDP factions, rather than the party itself, financed the campaigns of individual members
under the 1947 electoral system, factional leaders were responsible for soliciting political
funding from corporations and business associations.' (Kohno 1997:104). It has also
been widely argued that the multi-member district electoral system encourages money
politics, because it encourages the forging of close ties between factions and business
interests, and it leads to heavy campaign expenditures as LDP candidates seek to out
compete each other (Cox and Thies 1998; Hrebenar 1986a, Curtis 1988; Iwai 1990).
However, it should be clear from Chapter 3, that the relationship between politicians and
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business has not always been the same in the postwar period. Financial backing has not
always been clearly faction-based and the relationship between business and conservative
politicians has not been static. The diverse financial routes into the LDP cannot simply be
explained by the merger in 1955 of two distinct parties (see for example Sartori
1976:93).17 Although the Jiyuto, like the LDP, faced intra-party competition in the
electoral districts, political fundraising was fairly centralised. Funding routes were
relatively few, small and personal in nature. In my view, the development of factions as
fundamentally financial groups had less to do with electoral politics and more to do with
the process of institutionalisation of the LDP and with power politics within the party
centre which prevented the establishment of centralised party control.
A number of changes took place in the late 1950s that transformed the relationship
between business and conservative politicians, which in tum changed the functions and
political importance of the factions. First, the relationship between big business and the
LDP became much closer than before. Second, the factions established political
associations on the basis of their increasing political power, thereby transforming their
political roles (Watanabe 1958:13-15). Third, the relationship between big business and
factions was further strengthened through common study groups set up between factions
and individual businessmen to discuss policy, establishing the factions further as major
political actors. The LDP factions that were emerging were multifaceted financial groups
that acted as political fundraisers, distributors of funds, as well as groups that gave
leaders and faction members a formal venue to meet with' the business community and
industry. The groups became centres of considerable political importance. Panebianco
pointed out that the weaker the institutionalisation of the party, the less diversified its
financial sources (1988:59), and that a party born out of territorial diffusion, like the
LDP, showed greater dependency on the external environment (1988:50-52). These
factors hindered the institutionalisation of the party but political strategies and power
politics pushed the party further towards less centralised control and greater
factionalisation. As will become clear, the steps taken to make the factions the political
and financial groups they became, were made with immediate power related issues in
mind, and not long term goals such as the manipulation of the electoral system.
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5.4.1 Business and conservative politics
It has often been argued that the dissolution of the zaibatsu during the Occupation
affected conservative politics by creating multiple channels of funding (Iyasu 1996: 144).
Fukui (1970:44) claims that the stability that was acquired between parties and the
business community was largely due to the fact that the role of industrial associations and
their national federations was steadily growing. As seen in Chapter 3 the four main
business organisations were formed in the first few years after the end of the war and
Fukui argues that these business organisations became a substitute for the zaibatsu. But
Fukui (1970:44) asserts:
Whatevermonetary contributionswere made during this period by these business groups
to a party came almost invariably from individual firms or, more frequently, a particular
director or directors of a firm. It was not until party politics was freed from the legal and
psychological restrictions of the Occupation period that the large business organisations
began to playa decisive role as the de facto representatives of the nation's business
interests and principalproviders of political funds for the conservativeparties.
After the economic rubble in which Japan found herself after the end of the war, the
economy started growing rapidly in the mid-1950s, leading to expanding functions of
both government and business (Masumi 1967:34). The rapid growth 'intensified the
intimate political interdependence of the Japanese state and Japanese industrial society'
(Calder 1988:19). More specifically, the growth affected the relationship between the
business community and conservative politicians (Johnson 1982; Masumi 1967), as
financial contributions moved from individual entrepreneurs to various employer
associations after the Occupation (Fukui 1970:51-2). At this time, the economic
bureaucracy began sharing its powers with big business through consultations and
amakudari, the hiring of ex-bureaucrats into industries (Johnson 1982: 196). This
signalled the end of state control and the birth of "Japanese style corporatism' (Johnson
1982:197). Watanabe (1962:98; see also Iyasu 1996) describes this development thus:
After the war the zaibatsu were dismantled and tax and political funding laws were
introduced.The big political funding source that the conservativeparties had had before
the war had been dismantledand in its stead individual businesses created various routes
of funding to leaders within the conservativeparties. Those who achieved control of this
funding absorbing route became the party's jitsuryokusha [powerfulpoliticians] and 30-
40 member groups of rank-and-file Dietmembers emerged around them. There was
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overlapping between these factions in terms of funding and each jitsuryokusha had links
to tens or hundredsof businesses.
Scholars have debated whether big business was instrumental in the conservative merger
in 1955 (Kohno 1997:76; Masumi 1985:249), but it is clear that the relationship between
business and political parties had consolidated at this time, affecting the future
development of the factions. It should be noted that the system whereby financial
channels to politicians became visible and powerful took about ten years to emerge. This
is not to say that business did not influence party politics in the first decade of the
postwar period. Financial interests intervened in the struggles taking place within the
JiyUto at various times, and tried to influence politics to increase stability (Fukui
1970:50).18
As discussed in Chapter 3, the big business organisations had not been closely connected
to the conservative parties until this time in spite of some political interference, as in the
calls for unification in 1952-54. Such interventions by big business and business
organisations increased in the mid-1950s. Another significant step in this direction came
in January 1955, before the formation of the LOP, when the economic community, led by
Ishikawa Ichiro, president of the Federation of Economic Organisations, and Fujiyama
Aiichiro, president of the Chamber of Commerce, created an organisation known as the
Economic Reconstruction Council (Keizai saiken kondankai) (ERC) (Kato 1963; Uchida
1969:88; Fukui 1970:146). The Shipbuilding Scandal had partly prompted the
establishment of the council, and Uemura Kogoro, vice chair of Keidanren and leader of
the ERC, said it was necessary, in order to avoid corruption in relation to donations, to
Put them in a blender to remove their colouring, so to speak, consolidate them, and then
make contributionsfocusedon the general objectiveof implementingappropriatepolicies
for the reconstruction of the Japanese economy and the stabilization of the people's
livelihood (Masumi 1985:306).
Estimates for LOP spending varied from 20-80 million yen per month. The government
gave 20.000 yen per Diet seat (see JT 11.2.61; 14.2.61). The ERC was to be independent,
gathering contributions from companies and federations to all parties, and distributing
them to all the parties in the name of the Council, although over 90% of the funds seem
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to have gone to the conservative parties (Masumi 1985:306-7; Thayer 1969:77-8». The
council donated 100 million yen to all major parties in February 1955, and between 2500
and 3700 million yen in 1955 and 1960 (Masumi 1985:307; Thayer 1969). However, in
spite of the great success in the 1960 election, when the council gathered 800 million yen,
mainly for the LOP, the organisation was disbanded in March 1961 (JT 11.2.61). Both
sides had become disillusioned with the ERC. Business leaders had complained that in
spite of increasing financial demands by politicians, the LOP was not maintaining its
political strength. Business leaders were also complaining that the factions were not
weakening in spite of the centralisation of funding but were in fact asking for funds for
themselves (Thayer 1969:78). The Japan Times reported in December 1959 that in spite
of the 20 million yen donated monthly to the LOP, '[T[he council serves as a channel
through which only official donations are made. Privately businessmen have been asked
by the various factions of the Tory party to make other donations' (28.12.59). For their
part, politicians complained that they were like 'errand boys of the economic community'
(Thayer 1969:79). Kono Ichiro (1958: 199) was very critical of business intervention and
argued that
Of course the relations between business and politics should be close but there should be
a mutual firm understanding that each does their part. If not, then politics will deteriorate
and the business world will become corrupt. If we look at this historically, we see that
Hatoyama and other prewar politicians trusted in this distinction. Recently, however, it
has become blurred, and the nation's trust in conservative politics has fallen as a result.
Kono was infuriated by the business world's meddling in the issue of Hatoyama's
resignation as prime minister in 1956 when it proposed that Hatoyama should quickly
retire as he was in ill health and not able to do his duties (Keno 1958:192). A meeting
was held with business leaders and business organisations where Keno spoke strongly
against business interference in political matters (Kono 1958:193).
In response to these problems of the ERC, the LOP decided in December 1959 to form a
committee, Jiyn Kokumin Rengo (National Union of Liberals), within the party to gather
funds for LOP members through monthly donations (JT 28.12.59). The committee had 40
members who sought contributions from industry. A major criticism of this arrangement
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was that it was not very different from the ERC, apart from the fact that politicians rather
than business were gathering the money-from the same sources-and thus did not
reduce the danger of mismanagement (Thayer 1969:80).
After the dissolution of the ERe, the Kokumin Kyokai (The People's Association) was
formed in July 1961 as a body to 'collect operational funds of the Liberal-Democratic
Party from every stratum of the people' (JT 22.11.61). The Kokumin Kyokai had
established local offices in all prefectures by the mid-1960s (Thayer 1969:81) with the
purpose to 'remove the direct links and interest hunting between politicians and
enterprises' (Kato 1963:41). The Kokumin Kyokai was very different from the ERC in
that first, it was directly linked to the LDP; second, for the first time, funding effort
included the public as well as business; and third, it was based on monthly dues rather
than voluntary donations (Thayer 1969:80). The idea was that individual members could
pay between 100 and 10,000 yen per month, and organizations and companies up to
100,000 yen, which would go into the coffers of the party (JT 11.61). 'The whole idea is
to have grass-roots support for the party, as it were, instead of the financial backing of
only the big business' (JT 14.2.62). The Kokumin Kyokai became the most important
fundraiser for the party, coordinating donations and providing 90% of the LDP funds by
the mid-1960s (Fukui 1970:146). It was meant to curb the increasing power of the
factions and was
designed to minimize, if not entirely eliminate overnight, private contributions going to
individual leaders within the party, by channelizing the funds into the party treasury. If
this plan proves successful, it would mean one effective way of eradicating factions, for
factional leaders cannot exist without a solid financial basis' (iT 13.1.63).
Observers at this time were not oblivious to the fact that the establishment of such
funding channels, meant to make financial contributions more visible and thus less liable
to corruption, could actually strengthen and nurture the factions (Kato 1963:42).
However, creating closer relations between business and politicians was mutually
beneficial. The business community had greater opportunities to influence the political
processes, while political leaders used business connections and their funding to
strengthen their position within the party. The development of organised links between
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business and politics in the early 1960s was strongly related to the struggle between those
fighting to keep Ikeda in the Prime Minister chair for another term, and those aiming to
replace him, a struggle that divided the business community as well (Kato 1963:43).
However, it soon became clear that the Kokumin Kyokai suffered from fundamental
weaknesses.l" First, the organisation was not preventing factional contributions. Business
gave enough to the organisation to 'maintain a formal relationship' with the party, while
a large portion of the contributions went to factions and individual politicians (Thayer
1969:73; JT 6.10.62). Second, the drive to increase contributions from individual party
members did not succeed, and by 1965 it was clear that such contributions only amounted
to 10% of all contributions (Thayer 1969:80-1). Third, although funds to the Kokumin
Kyokai did cover around 70% of the daily expenditures of the party, it did not suffice to
run regional party chapters. Some observers pointed out that if all factions were abolished
the party would have to distribute at least 1 million yen to each party member, at least
twice a year, to reach the funding levels that the factions had reached by 1963 (JT
14.12.63; see also Watanabe 1958:20 for an estimate of amounts needed to be amassed
by the party). Thus some politicians argued that if factions were abolished, total funds
available would decrease, threatening the party's dominating status (Thayer 1969:54).
Views on the close relationship between business and politics were diverse. An observer
argued that the close ties developing between politicians and the business community
were an inevitable consequence of changing times saying: 'We are now in a situation
where businessmen have to have an interest in politics and act politically' (Kato
1963:41). Many businessmen argued that collaboration was necessary for economic
policy making and general political stability. Others, like Ishizaka Taizo, chairman of
Keidanren, were against the forging of such close relations (Kato 1963:41).
In spite of differing views on the close relationship between the LDP and the business
community it became clear that all moves to change funding routes after the formation of
the ERe were calculated in terms of the power struggle within the party. The formation
of the Jiyu Kokumin Rengo (National Union of Liberals) was said by some to be a tool to
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prolong the life of the Kishi cabinet (IT 28.12.59) when it was first formed, while the
dissolution of the ERe in 1961 was said to benefit Kishi and Ikeda and disadvantage
smaller factions (IT 11.2.61). In the finance committee of the LDP in 1961, factional
balance had to be achieved to stop claims that the financial arrangements were benefiting
certain factions over others (Thayer 1969:79). In 1962, when Prime Minister Ikeda
wanted to appoint Ishida as director to strengthen the Kokumin Kyokai the move was
seen as a political move by Ikeda to isolate Keno financially (IT 14.2.62). During the
dissolution debate in the LDP in 1963, it also proved difficult to get the faction leaders to
follow the recommendation made that funding be centralised, because, it was argued,
other factions would still find a way to get private funding (Masumi 1967:44). All
attempts at changes revealed the faction leaders' determination to preserve their source of
funds to be able to maintain a following (IT 13.1.63). What made that possible was the
establishment of financial associations, the seiji kessha, around the factions in 1957-59 to
which I now turn.
5.4.2 Seiji kessha
The growth of the Japanese economy and the close relationship that was developing
between conservative politicians and big business contributed greatly to a
decentralisation of power within the party, financially and politically. Research has
shown that state funding of political parties serves to strengthen party headquarters vis-a-
vis the sub-units of the party (Muller 1993:422). This fits the LDP organisational history
well. Within the LDP, the factions became involved in political fundraising to a much
greater extent than had the factions of the Jiyuto and Minshuto, raising much more from
private industries than the state provided. This led to decentralisation of the LDP-it was
no longer the party leadership, and in particular the secretary-general, who gathered and
distributed funding; the factions adopted this role. However, the factions could not
become viable financial units without political power. Sartori argues that money will start
to go to intra-party factions rather than the central party when the former have become a
'more profitable investment' (Sartori 1977:95). This was clearly seen in the LDP. As
seen when the Ishibashi cabinet was formed in December 1956, the factions were
225
Chapter 5: The New Factions: From the Centre to the Periphery
emerging as groups with considerable political clout, with more autonomy than before,
which weakened the party leadership.
This is when faction leaders started forming political associations (seiji kessha)-political
groups around influential politicians, that gathered independent political funds. It had
been observed in the presidential elections in 1956 that the faction leaders had acquired
great financial power which they were using at their own discretion. Ishibashi's pleas to
the party to dissolve the factions were seen by the press as an opportunity to halt this
development and 'prevent Kishi, Ishii, Ono and other party leaders from distributing
election funds among their supporters' (JT 24.1.57; see Fukui 1970: 138). The Japan
Times said about this:
A proposal was made in the LDP that in order to increase unity within the party the
factions must be dissolved. All groups centering around individual leaders should be
dissolved apart from the two groups coming from the LP and the DP. This proposal
though had the disadvantage that it was taken by some as a method to 'earmark the
"outsider" Kishi, who belonged to neither of the two major parties, and make him a
stranger among the other party members' (24.1.57).
These calls were ignored. Independent political funds made it possible to assemble a
faction and through it gain power within the new institutional environment of the LDP
with its presidential elections and struggle between various politicians. By forming
political associations, the factions could make larger political donations legal and avoid
taxauon/" Factions were transforming themselves from the-informal funding groups they
had been into a new type of faction with twin features. One feature was the factions as
political groups and 'friendship societies' creating a forum for fellow Dietmembers to
meet, the other feature was the factions as financial associations with the main goal of
getting political funding to and distribute it to members (JT 11.10.63).
The close links that were being forged between the jitsuryokusha and the business
community deeply affected the nature of factional organisation. Most factions formed
political associations in 1957. The Kishi faction formed the Kizankai in 1957; The Kono
faction formed the Shunjukai; the Ikeda faction formed the Kochikai; the Sato faction the
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Shuzankai: the Ishibashi faction the Tanzankai; and the Ono faction formed the
Bokuseikai in 1958 (Fukui 1970:118).21
Businessmen were likened to 'cormorant fishermen' as they were drawn to the factions
by faction leaders eager to 'enlarge their own support organisations' (Kate 1963:40).
Factions convinced businesses to give them funding by arguing that sufficient funding
was the key to winning (AS 28.10.63). The factions created financial connections through
a variety of links. Some of these connections had been created before the war and in the
early postwar period, but the links grew markedly, based largely on connections through
bureaucracy and school ties (Iyasu 1984: 131). For example, Kishi had business
connections dating back to his days in the wartime Ministry of Commerce and Industry,
but was primarily in the steel and iron business, and got lot of money from Surnitomo
(Kato 1963:40; Kurzman 1960:378; Babb 2001). The Sato faction built its funding on
connections Sato had built up in the transport, maritime, and shipbuilding business during
his time in the Transport Ministry. The Ikeda faction was in securities, automobile, and
spinning. The Keno faction was more influential amongst estate, sugar, fishing and water
companies. The Ono faction was in construction (like the Kono faction) but its support
was not as clearly tied to specific industries as that of the other factions (Watanabe
1958:128-9).22 The Ishii faction had financial connections through former Jiyuto
members in the petrol, spinning, and rubber industries. The Miki-Matsumura and
Ishibashi factions built up links with individual businessmen (Watanabe 1958:128). A
fundamental factor in the rise of the Fujiyama faction was the fact that Fujiyama himself
h d . b . t' 23a extensive usiness connec Ions.
Fundraising ability was recognised in the late 1950s as fundamental for factional buildup,
and this changed the parameters defining effective faction size (see Watanabe 1958:166).
The Fujiyama and Ishida factions could only enter the factional race in the end of the
1950s when they achieved independent financial ability (Watanabe 1958: 170). Those,
like Ashida Hitoshi, who, in spite of a long political career, did not have financial ability
to support a faction on par with the strongest factions, had to withdraw from the race
(Watanabe 1958:195). The LDP factional system did not allow small patron-client groups
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like those that were found in the Jiyiit6 and Minshuto. Factions had to have at least a
dozen members to be viable, and there was an upper limit to their size as well, which
again made them different from the old factions. In the early 1960s a faction leader was
not considered able to support more than around 40 members financially (see Watanabe
1964:2-3). The early factions, because of their very different functions, were not
perceived as having such limits to membership and many Jiyiito factions had between 70
and 100 members.
In the Jiyuto and the Minshuto, those controlling the secretary-generalship, the main
conduit for political funds, often acquired a faction. In the LOP, these conduits of funds
multiplied, and included not only the secretary-general and those in charge of finance
committees, but also new organisations like the Kokumin Kyokai and all the routes being
set up by individual faction leaders (see JT 14.2.62). The power of the secretary-general
was being rivaled by the rapidly increasing ability by other prominent politicians to
gather funding.
Observers in the late 1950s forecast that the LOP factions could not continue to
strengthen because of their size, lack of unity and limited access to funds, and that they
would vanish when the money dried up as had been the case with the Jiyuto (Watanabe
1958: 108). This proved to be a miscalculation as the factions in the LOP went on to forge
direct links with the business community. After the formation of the first Kishi cabinet,
and even more so after the formation of the second cabinet: the factions had acquired the
political power necessary to make them, rather than the party leadership, profitable
financial recipients. The news brought to Kawashima, secretary-general, by the business
community that they were being approached by individual politicians for funds
(Watanabe 1958; Iseri 1988:184), prompted Prime Minister Kishi to call for the
dissolution of factions in the autumn of 1957 (AS 7.9.57; Watanabe 1958:21). By autumn
1957, six factions had reported as political associations (AS 7.9.57)_24Observers debated
whether Kishi's attempts to restore the power of the party leader were effective or not
(Watanabe 1958; Iseri 1988:73)_25Prime Minister Kishi acknowledged in September
1957 that it might prove difficult to dissolve factions as they had started to report as
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political associations and were also serving as a meeting point for 'likeminded people'
(AS 19.9.57). Although factions had served as financial tools for a long time, the
formalisation of the factionsus financial recipients changed radically the image of
factions. Kishi said about this change in early September 1957: 'the factions have become
quite different from the time of the presidential elections' (AS 2.9.57). A few days later at
a press conference, he made clear his worries and explained that dissolution was
necessary to stop the development whereby politicians created new groups that they then
reported as political associations and sought to gather funding through them. This, he
warned, had made the factions 'a party within the party' (AS 7.9.57).
Many scholars have argued that it was under the Kishi administration that the factions
started to consolidate. Masumi (1995:2; see also Goto et al. 1982:148) argued that:
The basic organizational structure of the LDP was established while Kishi Nobusuke was
party president and prime minister in 1957-60. Its most important element was the
habatsu, or faction, a unit central to the distribution of party and govermental posts.
This was largely due to the fact that the factions became seiji kessha in this period. In
spite of Kishi's attempts to curb the growing political and financial influence of the
factions, they continued to grow and their relations to big business expanded. While
contributions in the Jiyuto and the Minshuto had been very personal in character, the
connections in the LDP became formalised. Although many businesses gave to a number
of factions and would attend the meetings of many factions (Thayer 1969:74), their
connections to individual factions became very close, in particular with the establishment
of common study groups, to which I tum now.
5.4.3. Forging links between factions and business
After the factions had established seiji kessha, and forged close links with big business,
another step towards even closer relations between factions and business came in the
early 1960s as factions formed 'study groups with leading businessmen. These changes
revealed clearly the increasing role of money in politics. To many commentators, the
early 1960s were in fact 'the peak of informal business influence' (Babb 2001:26; Kato
1963).
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At the end of 1962, SaW Eisaku formed a group called Choeikai based on the close
relations SaW had built with Anzai Hiroshi, vice chairman of Tokyo Gas. It included
many influential businessmen such as the chairmen of Yawata Iron Manufacture and
Nikkyo Securities and the president of Fuji Bank. The Kono faction established a similar
organisation in April 1962, called the Tokyo Shunjiikai as a 'venue for businessmen and
political leaders to discuss matters' (Kato 1963:40).26 Around 200 businessmen were
connected to the club, amongst them the chairmen of Showa Denko and Komatsu. At the
same time, Miki Takeo formed the ChUo Seisaku Kenkyusho (Central Policy Research
Club) which included many well known businesses and business organisations such as
Nihon Boeikai and the Japan Committee for Economic Development (Keizai Doyukai),
Prime Minister Ikeda's Kochikai arranged meetings for discussion between the faction
members and business, and also arranged smaller meetings between the leaders of his
faction and business groups, in the so-called Suehirokai (Thayer 1969:66). Ikeda was
particularly well connected in the business world and worked closely with the so-called
'four samurai', Kobayashi Ataru (former banker and influential member of the business
community), Nagano Shigeo (vice president of Japan Chamber of Commerce and before
that, Nippon Steel), Sakurada Takeshi (Executive director of Nikkeiren), and Mizuno
Shigeo (KaW 1963:41; Thayer 1969:166; Calder 1988:96). These groups were not
exclusive and some businessmen would attend meetings with more than one faction or
move from one to another?7
Fukui argued that there were indications that the Kokumin Kyokai would curb factional
ability to raise funds (1970: 158, 169). However, it became clear that the close
relationship between the LDP and big business, which had started to consolidate in the
late 1950s, continued to be concentrated within the confines of the factions and that
attempts to establish centralised fundraising bodies could not curb that development.
5.4.4. The financial relations between leaders and followers
The close relationship between faction leaders and business leaders greatly facilitated a
stable financial relationship between faction leaders and faction members. It became clear
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in December 1956 that factional leaders used money from business to ensure the support
of Dietmembers in presidential elections. Their appeal to Dietmembers was 'look for a
big tree when you seek shelter' and a faction executive was quoted as saying: 'in our
faction we are making a big reliable tree with money' (AS 28.10.63). Scholars have
argued that the electoral system played a central role in transferring financial power from
the party headquarters to the factions (Cox and Thies 1998; Hrebenar 1986a, Curtis 1988;
Iwai 1990). Developments in the late 1950s, however, indicate that power relations
within the party were much more instrumental than concerns about factional competition
in electoral districts in driving this development.
As Kawashima had feared, the 1956 presidential election saw a mad scramble for votes
as the three candidates sought to buy the support of regional representatives and
Dietmembers (see fT 17.12.58). Local representatives attending the party conference
were provided with housing, money, women and banquets after arriving at Tokyo airports
and railway stations (Watanabe 1966:31; J'I' 11.12.56). It was estimated that the three
candidates used up to 300 million yen,28but in 1960 Ikeda alone was reported as having
spent 700 million yen to ensure his election, while Ono blamed his defeat on the lack of
money (Watanabe 1966:64).
Dietmembers needed considerable funding to, first, tend to the perceived needs of the
electorate, including bon kure gifts (gifts given at the Bon festival and at year end), gifts
for weddings and funerals and for purchases of equipment (Watanabe 1958:6). Money
was needed to give to local politicians in the prefecture, city and towns and to influential
men (yiiryokushas in villages, as well as to voters who came to Tokyo for sightseeing
(Watanabe 1958:6). Second, Dietmembers needed to pay for the ever more expensive
election campaigns. A common 'quote' was 'nita, ichiraku' (with two you are in, with
one you are out), according to the Japan Times, where 'two' meant 20 million yen and
'one' meant 10 million yen. In the summer of 1956 it was claimed that election costs had
gone up and that the slogan was now 'santo, niraku' (with three you are in, with two you
are out) (fT 30.6.56). However, some estimated that the party was only giving a third to
one tenth of the real cost of an election to a Dietmember (Thayer 1969:29; J'I' 10.12.60).29
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The rest had to be gathered through other means, such as friends and relatives, business
firms, personal funds and factions (Thayer 1969:29-30). After the formation of the LOP,
the factions became a major provider of these funds.
The cost of elections had always been a source of concern for Dietmembers, In the first
years of the postwar period, the cost of elections was lower, but the main difference from
the LOP was to be found in the structure of political funding. The LOP factions
developed threefold functions as a funding aid, both for elections and for daily expenses:
a faction leader would give funding to members; he would put members into contact with
business leaders; and in some factions, well connected members would help other
members with funding (Thayer 1969:30). Political expenditure and the ability to provide
these funds rose steadily, and especially under the Kishi administration (Tominomori
1994: 146). According to Watanabe, factions were distributing around 1-2 million yen to
each member and around 500,000 yen for o-chiigen (mid-summmer presents) in 1958.
The abilities of the factions varied with size and financial connections (Watanabe
1958:169-70; Fujiyama 1976:245). In the 1958 elections, each faction leader as well as a
number of individual politicians supported a number of candidates and sought to give
them nearly as much as the party headquarters' contribution (AS 18.5.58).30 The system
was still very loose and nearly 200 candidates were receiving funding from more than
one faction according to the Asahi Shimbun (AS 18.5.58).
By the February 1960 general election, the amount of funding had doubled or even
tripled as candidates got 2-3 million yen from the faction in addition to the 1 million yen
from the party. Faction leaders gave in addition 100,000 yen monthly in summer ochiigen
and in 'mochidai' (general expenses) (lyasu 1984:125; Fujiyama 1976:245). In the 1960s,
a seniority rule developed in some factions and those elected many times would get more
funds than junior Dietmembers. Other factions would distribute a basic sum with the
possibility of a supplement later (Thayer 1969:30). This change was made possible
because of the cultivation of relations between influential politicians and business.
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Many scholars argued that the multimember electoral system made elections in Japan
very expensive, forcing LOP candidates to use money to distinguish between themselves
and other LOP candidates in the districts, and that this was 'the main reason why almost
all candidates in the LOP belong to a particular faction' (Shiratori 1988:174; Cox and
Thies 1998:268; Fukui 1978:50; Baerwald 1986:40-1). It became clear in the presidential
elections in December 1956 that the factions' financial capability had grown
considerably, and before the general elections in May 1958, it was clear that all the LOP
factions were supporting their 'own' candidates (AS 18.5.58). However, my data suggests
that this support came about as a result of power struggles at the party centre and not
because of the electoral system as such. As seen in the development of membership of
factions, party members moved between factions and were affiliated with more than one
faction in many cases in the early years of the party, similar to the Jiyiito and Minshuto,
As a result, the financial support was not exclusive; and there is much to suggest that
party members did not seek 'shelter under a big tree' but looked to a number of
politicians. The reason for the factionalisation was that the options available to party
members in relation to financial support were changing, irrespective of the electoral
system. The weak leadership structure of the party allowed party leaders to build up their
own financial power and thus allowed them to keep continuous pressure on the
leadership. This created incentives for candidates to look to one faction only for support
in return for their allegiance.
There can be no doubt that the wider structural economi~ environment affected party
development in Japan in the early postwar period. For example, the dissolution of the
zaibatsu during the Occupation and the reorganisation of the business community in
Japan helped to create factionalism, reshuffling political funding routes and eventually
leading to a diversified system which allowed politicians to acquire political power
(Watanabe 1958:15; Baerwald 1964:225). However, it is important to note that the
relationship between this structural environment and political organisation is not one-
sided. Politicians were also active in creating this system. The political environment
within the party changed to such an extent that financial power became the main criteria
for political leadership, not only of the party, but also of the factions. This led a number
233
Chapter 5: The New Factions: From the Centre to the Periphery
of prominent politicians to lose their status within the LDP because of their inability to
acquire the financial power needed for leadership (see Watanabe 1958:196, 158). Before
the presidential elections in thesummer of 1960 Ikeda is said to have boasted that he was
the second best fundraiser after Kishi, and that 'Ishii has practically no ability in this
respect. Therefore, Ikeda argues that Ishii is not qualified to become the party's next
president' (JT 1.6.60).
5.5. Conclusion
It has been argued in this chapter that the institutional approach to factionalism in Japan
is flawed because of the excessive importance attributed to broad structural factors like
the multimember electoral system. A comparison of factionalism in the first decade of the
postwar period with factionalism in the first years of the LDP shows that the electoral
system did not cause factionalisation. The fight in electoral districts was a reflection of
power struggles at the centre of the party. As seen in Chapter 3, factional fighting had not
dominated electoral politics in the Jiylito and Minshuto, In the early years of the LDP,
factional fighting started to spread to electoral districts, but it took time before it affected
electoral politics to the extent that nominations reflected the factional divisions of the
party clearly. In the period under study here, it was very common for factions to get more
than one of their candidates elected in a district. This indicates that, although factional
politics in the LDP had become entrenched within the multimember electoral system, the
electoral system did not create the factional divisions. Rather, after factional conflict had
consolidated at the centre, not only dominating presidential elections, but also cabinet
formations and party appointments, factional conflict spread to the electoral districts. The
multimember electoral system made factional divisions locally possible, especially with
the emergence of the kiienkai, and thus allowed the expansion of factional divisions.
Similarly, the electoral system did not create the factions as financial groups. Again, the
formation of seiji kessha was due to power conflicts at the centre, which encouraged
politicians to forge independent links with business, thereby contributing to the
decentralisation of the party. The economic development of the latter half of the 1950s
led to an expansion in the functions of both politics and business. As Masumi (1967:34)
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noted, this led to problems in LDP organisation and leadership power, and 'at the core of
the problem was fierce factional fight centering on the presidential election.' The ability
of the LDP executive to control the party decreased greatly as individual politicians
forged relations with big business, and in the process strengthened their position within
the party to challenge the party leadership.
The electoral system came to be an integral part of this factional system, but, as I have
argued, it did not form a decisive role in forming the factions. Rather, factional struggles
at the centre of the party based on leadership fights and competition over rank-and-file
support, spread out to the electoral districts, where candidates were being recruited into
factions before being elected, and they in turn sought factional, rather than party, support.
The organisational environment affected factional development, as seen in the changes in
funding, electioneering and leadership selection within the LDP. The following chapter
will focus further on the creation of this new factional structure, the debate about the
positive and negative effects of factionalism, and how public discourse reveals the
emergence of 'traditional' factionalism.
Notes
I See Stockwin 1983 for an excellent discussion on the electoral system for both houses of the Diet.
2 All the same, the underlying assumption has been common that the multimember electoral system
actually created factional politics. Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1993:63), for example, argued that because
the Jiyiito and the Shinpoto chose a multimember electoral system in 1947, it 'left them with the problem
of intra-party factions.' But Ramseyer and Rosenbluth do not provide supporting evidence for their
claim.
3 In the 1949 general elections the Jiyiit6 did though get 264 seats which comes close to the seats obtained
by the LDP until 1963, which fluctuated between 283 and 296.
4 My data builds on Reed (1992) and only shows candidates elected from the same districts, not those
running but losing. I left out the 1955 election because of lack of faction data at the time of the cabinet
formation.
5 This could be seen in many other districts, the Asahi Shimbun mentions Hokkaido s" district, Aomori 2nd
district, Gumma 2nd, Niigata 3rd, Ishikawa 2nd, Aiichi 1st, Nara, Okayama l" and 2nd districts, Fukuoka
4th, Kumamoto 2nd, and Kagoshima 1st district (AS 9.11.63).
6 Ishii boasted for example after the election in 1958 that all the candidates that he had supported had been
elected and that his faction had gained four members through his strong support (AS 25.5.58).
7 Iyasu noted that the Ono, Fujiyama, Matsumura, Ishii and Ikeda factions all 'advanced' by running in the
presidential election of 1960 (Iyasu 1984:117; see also Watanabe 1966:59). The Ishibashi faction on the
other hand did not grow into a solid group (kyokona shudan) like the other factions and thus 'failed'
(lyasu 1984: 117).
8 When Ogata died Matsuno Raizo took his place on the committee (Watanabe 1966:24).
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9 The Shinpoto later appointed Machida as president but when he was purged the seat was left empty.
Shidehara was made president on 3 May 1946.
10 The Minshuto, established on 31 March 1947, started with the group leadership of five people, but
Ashida and Shidehara later vied for the post. Ashida was elected. When he fell from grace over the
Showa Denko scandal, Inukai Ken was made president in a secret election. The opposition between the
renritsuha and the yatoha ended with the latter winning, choosing Tomabechi Gizo party president and
then uniting in February 1952 with the Kokukyoto to form a political club that later became Kaishinto
(Watanabe 1966:23-4;Royama 1954:156-7).
11 Quigley and Turner notes that 'a selection committee of twenty party lieutenants was authorized to weigh
the respective claims of the various factions and to decide upon a suitable leader for the presidency'
(Quigley and Turner 1956:338). The Kaishinto later brought Shigemitsu in from the diplomatic service
and made him president.
12 Prior to the first presidential election in December 1956 the choro attempted to reach an agreement on a
nomination before the convention. Those attending were Masutani Shiiji, Ono Bamboku, Hayashi Joji,
Sunada Shigemasa, Kono Ichiro, Oasa Tadao, Mizuta Mikio, Kate Ryogoro, Kitamura Tokutaro,
Hoshijima Jiro, Matsumura Kenzo, Uehara Etsujiro, and Matsuno Tsuruhei (Watanabe 1966:40).
However, their efforts were fruitless.
13 The Ishii and Ishibashi factions and their followers made a so-called nisan'i rengii [second and third
place coalition] agreement before the presidential elections in 1956 ensuring that the candidate landing in
the third place would support the candidate in the second place after the first round, if necessary. The
qualified votes at the convention were 299 LDP members in the HR, 126 members in the HC and 92
representatives from the districts, a total of 517. Six were absent and did not vote. The result after the
first round was Kishi 223 votes, Ishibashi 151 and Ishii 137 votes. After the second round Ishibashi came
first with 7 votes over Kishi, 251 against 258 (Iyasu 1984: 110). One vote was invalid. 28 votes therefore
went from the Ishii-Ishibashi camp to Kishi in the second round (Watanabe 1966:38).
14 On January 16 1959, just before the fourth presidential election in the LDP, a secret meeting was held in
a hotel in Hibiya. It was a Pledge to Cooperate, detailing transfers of power, signed by SaW, Kono, Ono,
and Kishi. The pledge was that the administration should go to Ono, then Kono, and then to SaW
(Watanabe 1966:46).
15 Kishi is said to have made such promises to Ikeda in 1959, Ishii in 1960 and Fujiyama in June 1960 (JT
28.7.60; Watanabe 1966:32).
16 Many politicians also acknowledged the use of money to manipulate politicians in the early days of the
LDP. Miyazawa Kiichi said in an interview in 1998: 'We've made clear progress in the sense that the
factions simply don't have the money anymore. It's a sad state of affairs in a way, but also very desirable
in that the curious type of faction that once distinguished the LDP has ceased to exist. The younger
politicians can't be controlled by money anymore' (Shinohara 1998:24). Others refuted this view.
Kuraishi Tadao said: It is said that factional leaders give money to .those Dietrnembers that belong to
their factions in the traditional money giving seasons, but this amount is tiny and only etiquette. When
we look closely at the matter it emerges that it is the feeling of Dietmembers that it is not money but
appointments that attract them (Masumi 1967:38). Tamura Hajime, a member of the Ono faction, also
said he did not enter the Ono faction for funding reasons, as he was the son of a wealthy man (Tamura
1994:27).
17 Sartori (1976:93) argues that although the LDP resulted from successive fusions 'the allocation of
resources has not been "fused" and points out that the discontinuity between prewar and postwar parties
in Italy is much greater in comparison.
18 For example, late in 1952, Nagano Mamoru, a financial leader, acted as a mediator between the Yoshida
and Hatoyama forces, calling for peace within the party. It was argued that business donations to the
party were made on the condition that the party would remain intact and stable (NT 27.10.52). There
were also attempts to affect party policy, as seen in the debates on the anti-monopoly law in 1949 and
1953 when Keidanren set up a committee on the issue and worked closely with the government, and on
the issue of defence production in the mid-1950s (Fukui 1970:51).
19As seen in the following chapter, the Kokumin Kyokai featured strongly in the movement to abolish
factions in 1963. Following the Miki report in October 1963, Ikeda pledged 'greater effort' to decrease
the importance of money in politics. The report recommended that all financial support be channeled
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through the Kokumin Kyokai; that a rigid ceiling be set on contributions to individuals; and that a
watchdog committee be set up to 'curb and penalize any deviation from the rules' (JT 19.10.63).
20 The tax law stipulated that business firms keep records of political contributions and that individuals
must declare the receipt of such a gift in their income tax retums. If the money was, however, given to a
'political organisation' it had nothing to do with the politician's income tax. The Japan Times thus
argued that this caused the establishment of 'political organisations' to channel the political donations
(25.7.63).
21 The Ono faction did not form a seiji kessha until after most other factions had done so. This was believed
to be because of Ono's clout as fundraiser, and the financial independence of many of his faction
members, who did not have to rely as much on Ono as many other faction members did (Watanabe
1958:113-115).
22 Ono considered this his strength in the 1960 presidential elections. He says in his memoirs: 'I had no
links with business. I had no money. But on the other hand if I had no links I had no strings with business
either. There would be no restrictions on me in politics, I would be able engage in politics for the benefit
ofthe people and would in turn get their support' (Ono 1964:106).
23 He had connections with a variety of industries and was said to be close to Mizuno Shigeo, president of
Fuji Steel Manufacturers, Adachi Tadashi, president of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and of Radio
Tokyo, Iwase Eiichiro, president of Mitsukoshi department store, and Shoji Takeo president of Asahi
Denka Kogyo (Kurzman 1960:378).
24 Ishibashi was the first to report his Tanzankai as a political association, followed by Kishi's Kizankai.
Others were Sunada's group, Keno's Shunjukai, Sate's Shtizankai and Ikeda's Kochikai (AS 7.9.57;
Watanabe 1958:22).
25 Watanabe (1958:21-22) argued that if Kishi's plans had succeeded, this would have strengthened the
party leadership and weakened party democracy. In his view, Kishi's attempts to dissolve factions were
similar to the methods used in Tokugawa Japan to weaken the daimyii (1958:22). This was an argument
he also made during the calls for abolition of factions in 1963 (see Chapter 6).
26 Keno is also reported to have two other groups for liaison between business and his faction. The
Azabudai Club was a general meeting of all faction members with the economic community while the
Sankin Society was for monthly meetings of the faction's leaders and a smaller number of businessmen.
Itwas headed by Nagata Masaichi from Daiei Motion Pictures, Hagiwara Kichitaro of Hokkaido Mining
and Shipping, and Kawai Yoshinari of Komatsu Manufacturing Co. (Thayer 1969:67)
27 The Ekonomisuto noted that Anzai Hiroshi of Tokyo Gas was a member of Sate's Choeikai, while his
younger brother, Anzai Masao of Showa Denko, was a member of the rival Kono faction's Tokyo
Shunjukai (1963:40).
28 There are no confirmed numbers available. Some sources estimated that Kishi used 300 million yen,
Ishibashi 150 million, and Ishii 80 million yen while other sources estimate that the expenditures were
100 million yen, 60 million yen and 40 million yen respectively (see Iyasu 1984:110; Watanabe
1966:30).
29 Fujiyama (1976) gave an account of his sources in his memoirs, but he also had much personal wealth to
build his faction on in the early years although it dried up in the mid-1960s.
30 The individual politicians supporting candidates included Fujiyama Aiichiro, Ichimanda Hisato, Kaya
Okinori and Ishida Hirohide, but they were all eager to establish their own factions (AS 18.5.58).
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CHAPTER6:
TRADITION, MODERNISATION AND ATTEMPTS TO ABOLISH
FACTIONS
6.1. Introduction
As factionalism became entrenched in the LDP and started to affect politics more, calls
for the abolition of factions increased. As discussed earlier, the factionalism of the early
postwar period was seen to be highly destabilising for the political system and there were
periodic calls in the media, from both political analysts and politicians, for a stop to
factional infighting. It was not, however, until the late 1950s that calls for 'dissolution' of
factions (habatsu kaisan) were made. The first calls for dissolution of factions were made
after the formation of the first Ishibashi cabinet in December 1956. In the autumn of 1957
factions were officially dissolved but were revived unofficially shortly afterwards. The
second and much more influential movement for dissolution started in 1960 and reached
its peak in late 1963. Factionalism however survived. Some detailed historical analyses
have been done on the movement for dissolution of factions (Masumi 1967; Watanabe
1966; Iseri 1988; Uchida 1983). The movement has often been dismissed as a cynical
political strategy. It was used, it was argued, in inter-factional battles to gain the upper
hand in the battle for leadership of the party (Masumi 1995; Watanabe 1962; Fukui 1970;
Iseri 1988) and perhaps to pacify the public, increasingly critical of the factional
maneuvers in the LDP. Masumi argues, for example, that 'probably no one, not even
those who were calling for the elimination of the factions, really believed that they could
be dissolved' (Masumi 1995:3). Scholars have come to the conclusion that the efforts to
dissolve the factions yielded no results and that the whole movement did not affect the
development of factionalism.
This chapter will discuss the most significant movement for dissolution of factionalism-
that occurring between 1962 and 1964. Although all the attempts to uproot factionalism
failed, I will argue that the movement for factional dissolution in 1962-64 had a much
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greater influence on the development of factionalism than is usually acknowledged.
Taking my cue from Dryzek (1997), I seek to identify different discourses on
factionalism in the early 1960s and different ways of understanding factions and their
political effects. The debate that ensued within and outside the LOP on the positive and
negative effects of factionalism, I argue, was strongly linked to the social movement on
democracy and modernisation which was very active in the early 1960s, spurred by both
internal and foreign efforts to realise 'true' democratisation in Japan. I argue that two
main discourses can be identified during the early 1960s which portrayed factionalism as
traditional. I argue that the development from informal tendencies and patron client
groups into highly institutionalised groups was not a natural or predictable part of the
modernisation of Japan and that the view of the LOP factions as 'traditional' was akin to
an 'invented tradition.' The debate on traditions and modernisation in Japan helped to
reinforce a factional discourse which saw the LOP factions as 'traditional' and Japanese,
emphasising continuity in Japan's development as 'indigenous norms' reasserted
themselves (see Stockwin 1983:209), while at the same time working against too much
Westernisation. In this sense, both main discourses on factions in the early 1960s served
to give factions history and tradition to fall back upon, making them a more accepted
aspect of Japanese political life.
6.2. Democratising Japan: uprooting the traditional
Within the LOP, the early 1960s were dominated by a debate on the future of the party,
and the need for it to modernise. To many observers, the top was not a modern party, it
lacked a modern structure and focus on policy. Factionalism was considered a cause, as
well as a symptom of this problem (see e.g. Masumi 1967; AS 2.6.58; JT 9.6.59).
Although the concept of modernisation only emerged in Japanese studies in the early
1960s (Kersten 2000), it was closely related to the ongoing debate on Japan's
democratisation that had commenced following Japan's defeat in the Second World War.
The view that Japan and Japanese politics were not modem, but governed by traditional
thought and values, had been prevalent in Western analyses of Japan since before the end
of the war. The idea was promoted in the United States during the Pacific War that they
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were fighting an enemy nurtured by traditional and undemocratic values. The US State
Department noted in a report written shortly before the end of the war, that 'Despite the
drastic economic changes of the past 30 years, the social structure retains many features
of Tokugawa feudal days' (OSS/State Reports, Japan Social Relations in Japan 1945).
Not only that, US authorities promoted an image of their enemy as inherently inferior,
primitive, childish and suffering from mental and emotional deficiency (Dower 1986:9,
270). The Japanese were often depicted as subhuman and propaganda pictures showed
them as animals: monkeys, dogs, sheep or vermin (Dower 1986:37).
Through the 'national character' studies that were popular before and during the war in
the US, the Japanese people and their war behaviour was explained through culture and
personality.' Militarism arose out of Japan's history, culture and collective psychology,
the story went (Dower 1986:29). The Japanese were fanatically loyal and conformist,
filial and devoid of individualistic attributes. They were also considered devoid of logic
and rationality. The analogue with sheep pointed out the perceived 'herd mentality' of the
Japanese (Dower 1986:84).
After the war, the SCAP Government Section, many of its staff having been involved
with Roosevelt's New Deal, became very enthusiastic for the 'uprooting of the injustices
and traditional attitudes which, it was plausibly argued, had nurtured Japanese
ultranationalism' (Sims 2000:241; Dower 1986:23; Baerwald 1977:9; Ward 1968a:482).
To achieve this objective, Japan needed to shed its feudal character and to be thoroughly
democratised. SCAP said about the wartime leaders of Japan:
It was these very persons, born and bred as feudalistic overlords, who held the lives and
destiny of the majority of Japan's people in virtual slavery, and who, working in closest
affiliation with its military, geared the country with both the tools and the will to wage
aggressive war (SCAP Review of Government and Politics, Feb. 1951, 02558-60).
In the first two decades after the end of the war, Western analyses of the Japanese were
dominated by the view that Japan was essentially premodern and feudalistic. Those
involved with Japan's recovery argued that 'there was something fundamentally
unhealthy and undemocratic about Japan's whole process of modernisation since 1868'
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and thus needed to be 'cured' (Sims 2000:240). This made 'rooting out feudalism in a
hurry' a major task for the Occupation authorities (Wildes 1954:67; Dower 1986:306;
Baerwald 1977; Hall 1965; Ishida 1968). Japanese intellectuals took a similar stance,
arguing that the war had been caused by the lack of autonomy by society from the state
(Kersten 2000:1; Maruyama 1963:258). After the end of the war, Dower has argued, the
deep racism of the war years subsided somewhat but in its place 'benign racism'
appeared. This racism was discernible in reports written by SCAP, and also in literature
on Japan in the 1950s as well as the English speaking media, such as the Nippon Times.
Japan was immature in terms of culture, personality and institutions (see Dower
1986:124). The Japanese were like children to be educated and 'guided toward maturity'
(Dower 1986:303, 122). This view was not only expressed by US experts but also by UK
specialists, who referred to the 'present immaturity' of Japanese development (Dower
1986:134).
Said's (1978) groundbreaking work on Orientalism showed how the West had
constructed images of the Orient as totally different from and opposed to the West, while
at the same time reducing the Orient 'to a timeless essence that pervades, shapes and
defines the significance of the people and events that constitute it' (Carrier 1995:2). The
American government and foreign scholars revealed interesting images of the Orient and
of the West itself in the views they expressed about Japan during and after the war.
During the war foreign governments and scholars had viewed Japan as 'us' against
'them,' creating an Orient that was different and often inferior to the West. Other scholars
have since come forward and pointed to the existence of an 'Occident'-implicit
assumptions made about the West itself that contrasted with the non-West. Scholars and
observers, not to mention SCAP, used opposed essentialisations to create an image of the
West as well as of Japan which were in contrast (see Carrier 1995). From the images
conjured of the Japanese, the West was rational, individualistic, modern, mature. Both
images were, of course, imagined (Carrier 1995:28; Spencer 1995:237).
The dichotomy between the traditional and the modern in Japanese politics was marked
throughout the early postwar period. Democratisation meant reform of the Japanese and
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their institutions to make them 'conform more or less with Western democratic norms'
(Stockwin 1982:44; Ward 1968a:486). Factionalism featured in this debate on Japanese
institutions and Japanese ways of thinking and was considered a feudal heritage.
Although the Occupation authorities used the word 'faction' with little consistency, to
refer to both parties and intra-party groups, the general view was that Japan was
factionalised; that this was a premodern characteristic; and thus bad. The US State
Department had noted in the last stage of the war that a variety of cliques (batsu) existed
at different levels of Japanese society, zaibatsu (financial cliques), gunbatsu (military
cliques), monbatsu (lineage or pedigree) and kanbatsu (bureaucracy), which the public
distrusted. US leaders were encouraged to play upon this distrust of faction to attack
Japan (OSS/State Reports, Part I, R&A Report 117, 1945). The SCAP said about the
prewar political parties 'Thoroughly unrepresentative and unresponsive to the popular
will, boss-dominated and venal, these old political factions had never inspired the respect
or trust of the Japanese people' (SCAP Political Orientation of Japan 1949:338). As
early as 1942 the US State Department reported that
throughout the Far East, family connections and traditional relationships of other sorts
still have a very strong hold on the people. Throughout this area, therefore, it is necessary
to pay attention to personal groupings which are frequently more significant than formal
political organizations (OSS/State Reports, 1942 Survey of Japan).
The idea of 'democratising' a society on all levels linked up with the view that Japan was
less developed than Western societies. Images of wartime kokutai ideology, fanatic
loyalty to the emperor, and other images of cultural uniqueness and backwardness fed
into this discourse.2 There was a close relationship between SCAP and many of the most
prominent Western scholars writing about Japan at this time as some of the scholars
worked for SCAP or the US authorities, creating a convergence between scholarly and
SCAP views.3
The emphasis on the faction as a traditional entity-a feudal heritage, resting on personal
relations between bosses and followers--continued in the postwar period. Social groups,
such as factions, were 'still dominated by traditional social norms of cohesiveness and
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cooperation and still distinguished for their hierarchical structure' (Burks 1964:69). An
article in the Nippon Times in 1946 described the Jiyiito and the Shinpoto thus:
Mainly backed up, as they are, both by parasitic big landowners and by financial
zaibatsu, these parties possess something of a factional nature in that their members are
bound together in a relationship of the kind such as we see existent between bosses and
their followers, though they bear the high-sounding apellations [sic] of "Liberals" and
"Progressives." In view of the fact that there still largely prevails in the agrarian districts,
a relationship of master and servant farmers and that there is accordingly still room for
the illegal practice of the purchase of peasant votes through the influence of landowning
bosses, these parties will probably be able to collect a large number of agrarian votes,
especially as they will be supplied with enormous election funds by the financial zaibatsu
(17.2.46).
Historians argued that the prewar political party system, with its factions and machine
politics, still influenced postwar politics greatly in spite of attempts to democratise it. Ike
(1958:277-8) argued that
for all its modernity, the culture still pays its homage to the past, and tradition and custom
make their influence felt in a myriad of ways. The weight of the past seems particularly
heavy in that facet of the culture which has to do with social behavior.
Political parties were dominated by the traditional dualistic social organisation, which
encouraged factionalism. Quigley and Turner (1956:330) argued that:
In Western society the visible structure of political parties is modified by an intricate
network of personal relations and informal organization. The oligarchical and dualistic
tendencies of most party organization are, of course, intensified in the Japanese cultural
setting. This is to be expected in a culture where dualism' characterizes so much of the
social behavior and where hierarchical control has not been tempered by broad
experience with democratic institutions. But effective political power often is wielded
behind the scenes by experienced and dominant leaders whose prestige commands
greater allegiance than do party regulations and formal structures. The persistence of
long-established cultural traditions is illustrated by the tendency of the parties in postwar
Japan to follow the organizational patterns established by their prewar ancestors.
Underlying all these analyses was an assumption that factions were a 'symptom' of an
underdeveloped political system-a sign of backwardness. Factions, and in fact the
whole Japanese political system, was said to be based on personal relations, making
Japan less modem and less institutionalised than the West (Ike 1958:277; Yanaga 1956;
Quigley and Turner 1956; Vinacke 1956:441). Political parties were yet to develop into
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this more modern form in Japan, it was argued, because of the strong influence of 'feudal
traditions' which fuelled factionalism (Ike 1958:76). Sakano (1948:75) claimed that the
Fudai (party politican) forces within the Jiytito in the late 1940s had 'few modern
political characteristics' and that 'their unity is fairly tight and flavoured with half
feudalistic friendships' while the newcomers to the political scene were considered more
'modern.'
Patronage groups were viewed with much greater negativity than any other groups in the
political parties. This was because the patronage faction was strongly related to 'old
fashioned' politics in both Japanese and Western literature. Ono Bamboku, one of the
most prominent politicians of the early postwar period, was considered by many to be
such an 'old fashioned' political boss. Sakano (1948:99), in his early analysis of
factionalism in the Jiyuto written in 1948, says Ono was an 'old fashioned' tactician who
only thought about 'the party or the faction, and not about policy but political strategy.'
Sakano continues: 'rather than promoting policies and fighting fair and square, there is
with Ono scheming and constant coming together and parting of politicians' (1948:101).
This type of politician was considered to be the basis of conservative politics and was
characterised in feudal terminology and oyabun-kobun relations in the discourse of the
time (see Sakano 1948:99).
Bossism was considered 'imbedded in Japan's political mores' and often seen as
emanating from the underground world, yakuza relations and oyabun-kobun relations
(Dull 1957). These characteristics of Japanese politics were claimed to have survived
through the Occupation reforms and the development of the new postwar political
system. Maki (1962: 158) comments that
Japanese and foreign observers alike have been concerned by the continued presence in
Japanese political activity of such things as bloc voting in villages, dictated by a local
political boss or by influential families; the existence of bossism, both in local politics
and on the level of the national parties; the failure of women to exercise the suffrage
independently; corruption, especially vote buying; and the tendency of the Japanese voter
to cast his ballot on the basis of personality rather than of issues.
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To many observers, both Western and Japanese, prewar undemocratic political practices
thus continued on both local and national level, especially in conservative politics.
In spite of this scholarly attention paid to the factional characteristics of Japan, it can
hardly be said that a public discourse on political factions existed. Surprisingly, in the 10
years from the end of the war till the formation of the LDP the term faction, or 'habatsu',
is rarely mentioned in newspapers. A computer aided search for the word in the Asahi
Shimbun, a major daily newspaper with leftist leanings, reveals that of the 108 entries for
this word in the period 1945-1959, only 14, or 13%, appear before the merger of the
JiyiitO and Kaishinto in November 1955. The rest, 87%, are in the period 1956-59.4 The
bulk of the articles between 1945 and 1955 are concentrated in 1952 and 1953, when
there were major disruptions in the party over personnel decisions. From this fact alone it
seems that during 1945-55, 'factions' were not considered to have much political
relevance.
Not only is the word 'faction' used sparingly in the Asahi Shimbun until 1955, but it is
only used in relation to discussion about internal fighting and internal competition in the
party. Most of the articles between 1951 and 1953 on factions have to do with
disagreements over appointments, and the factional rivalries are situated within that
frame. The strength or weakness of factions is discussed in relation to their struggles with
other factions, such as the predominance of the Yoshida fa~tion in the leadership struggle
with Hatoyama within the Jiyiito, or the Ono faction's strength and its attempts to destroy
the Hirokawa faction. The word 'faction' is thus not used in general terms to refer to
party politics. We are never told that the Yoshidafaction is considering this or that action
for the party-in those instances there are only references to PM Yoshida and 'the party
leadership.' The image is given that factions have very limited importance for national
politics, and that either factions argue all the time, or (or maybe also) factions exist only
because of personal feuds over power.
Moreover, in the newspapers at this time, there is no explicit discourse on factionalism-
there is no discourse on what a faction is, how it functions, what reason there is for a
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membership of a faction, or how widespread they are. The very limited discourse on
factions until 1955 gives prominence to the polarisation within the parties and pays little
attention to other large factions. Although the word 'habatsu' is used to include groups
with leaders and followers, it refers much more frequently to the wider network of
support that the two poles within the parties were able to amass in their wrangle over the
leadership of the party. From this discourse, we understand that there is an entity within
the party called a faction because we hear the names of factions occasionally and even
names of a few faction members, but the discourse does not explain what this entity is. It
was not until the early 1960s that a distinctive discourse on factions came to the surface
in relation to the emergence of the societal debate about modernity, taking many of its
themes from the early postwar debates on the traditional characteristics of Japanese
society. I will now briefly discuss the scholarly debate on modernisation that ensued in
Japan in the early 1960s.
6.3. The Modernisation theory: the traditional and the modern
Ever since the end of the war '[p]ostwar Japanese society, especially in the period
between 1945 and 1960, was obsessed with the democratic idea' (Kersten 2000: 1).
However, modernisation theory only started appearing in Western scholarly publications
in the late 1950s and early 1960s (Randall and Theobald 1985:1). This theory,
characterised by the 'evolutionary optimism' that societies would develop from the
traditional towards the modem, was widely applied to Japanese society. The theory was
embraced by many in Japan and by the early 1960s the intelligentsia in Japan was hotly
debating whether Japan was modernising and had in fact achieved democratisation. The
feeling had grown strong at that time amongst Japanese intellectuals that democracy was
in crisis and that autonomy, personal and social, had not been achieved (Kersten 2000: 1-
4). A variety of paradigms were involved in the debate on modernisation: 'tradition
versus modernity, East versus West, internally-generated versus externally-generated
change, a modern versus feudal' (Kersten 2000: 109). The central issue was how to
reconcile Western ideas of modernisation with traditional, indigenous culture. Should
Japan strive to modernise through 'Westernisation', or could Japanese traditions be
integrated with ideas of democracy and modernity? Through this debate, 'modernisation'
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and 'democratisation' came to be seen as interchangeable processes in Japan (Kersten
2000:109).
A number of US and Japanese scholars organised five annual seminars, Conference on
Modem Japan, in the first half of the 1960s to discuss aspects of Japan's modernisation,
successes and problems. These seminars reflected the development within modernisation
scholarship in the West in the 1960s - the emergence of 'modernisation revision' which
showed growing interest in the survival of traditions (Randall and Theobald 1985:34).
For most scholars, the 'traditional' and 'modem' elements of Japanese society were seen
as representing opposing poles. However, some scholars were proposing that tradition
and modernity were not opposite poles but could co-exist as seen in the history of post-
Restoration Japan to confine Japan's modernisation (Burks 1968:568; Hall 1965:37;
Ward 1969:78, 80). According to this view, Japanese society was a peculiar fusion of the
traditional and the modern and it was unclear to what extent Japan could thus modernise
(see Ward 1968a:3; Hall 1965:16; Burks 1968:541; Richardson and Flanagan 1984:159).
Scholars also debated whether traditional culture could in fact bring about modernisation.
Scholars identified a number of traits that showed the perseverance and continuity in
traditional attitudes, in particular the lack of autonomy amongst political actors, the
preference for group rather than individual decision making, and the view of politics as a
'personalized process', where personal relations are deemed more important than issue
oriented loyalties (Ward 1969:68-70).
It characterised this debate, that traditional culture was usually viewed as a static
phenomenon, something transferred in its entirety from feudal times into present Japan.
Nakane criticised this view and said that through such an approach 'any phenomena
which seem peculiar to Japan, not having been found in western society, can be labeled
as "feudal" or "pre-modem" elements, and are to be regarded as contradictory or
obstructive to modernization' (Nakane 1970:ix).
It was in the middle of this debate about traditions and modernisation that the movement
emerged within the LDP for a modern and faction-free party. The scholars involved in
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the debate on modernisation were in many cases focusing on the late Tokugawa and
Meiji periods, seeking to identify changes towards modem society and democracy.
Others focused more on problems facing modernisation and democracy in the postwar
period. But in both perspectives the scholarship focused on identifying moves away from
feudal traditions towards more modem and democratic characteristics. The debate in the
LOP about the factions and their 'traditional' features took on a similar form as the
advocates of change argued that Japan needed to move away from factionalism towards
modernisation.
6.4. The movement for dissolution of factions
Against this growing dialogue on democracy and modernity, and questions about the role
of traditions in modernisation, the movement for the modernisation of the LOP, and in
particular the dissolution of factions, emerged. While the discourse on factions
throughout the first ten years of the postwar period had been very limited, as seen before,
there had been intermittent calls for a stop to factional fighting and the solving of
factional disputes (habatsu kaishos. After 1957, there were increasing calls for
'disbanding' (kaisan) of factions, reflecting the more extensive organisation of the LOP.
Two major movements for dissolution of factionalism emerged in the period under study
in this thesis, one in 1956 and the other in 1960. I will discuss each in turn.
6.4.1. The first movement for dissolution
The first call for dissolution of factions came from Prime Minister Ishibashi Tanzan after
he formed his cabinet in December 1956 (JT 15.12.56; Masumi 1995:20; Iseri 1988:184).
However, the factions did not respond to this call and factional activity continued. The
first real movement for the dissolution of factions commenced in September 1957, when
Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, Kawashima Shojiro, secretary general, and Ono
Bamboku, vice president, made an appeal for the dissolution of factions (habatsu no
kaishii). This included the political associations (seiji kessha) that leading politicians in
the LOP had recently established (Masumi 1967:37; Iyasu 1984: 111).5
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In September 1957 the party executive, Kishi, Sunada Shigemasa and Ono started
dissolving their factions. The Ono faction's Hakuseikai was dissolved; Kono disbanded
the Shunjukai; and the Yoshida faction dissolved the Heigokai (Masumi 1995:212; Iseri
1988:184; Okano 1963:35-36; AS 20.9.57). Miki's Sannokai was also disbanded, while
Sunada Shigemasa's Senkenkai, Keno's Shunjukai and Kishi's Kizankai withdrew their
applications for official registration as political associations to the Autonomy Agency
(Fukui 1970:138; AS 27.9.57). However, a number of political associations such as the
Ikeda faction's Kochikai, Sate's Shuzankai, Ishibashi's Tanzankai and Ishii's Suiyo
kurabu refused to comply (Fukui 1970: 138; AS 27.9.57). Calls for dissolution became
embroiled in power issues and were unavoidably seen as directed against any antagonists
of the party leadership with the result that many factions refused to comply (Iyasu
1984:112).
The publicly declared motive for the dissolution of factions at this time was that they
were highly destabilising and affected the efficiency of the LDP as a political party. Kishi
was eager to halt the development, described in Chapter 5, whereby the factions were
gaining financial and political influence by establishing their own private funding
channels to big business (Iyasu 1984:111-112). He wanted to increase the power of the
leadership and thus weaken his adversaries (Iseri 1988 185).
It proved difficult to reverse the factional development (A~ 7.9.57). The factions resisted
these efforts by Kishi to gain firmer control over the party and factional activities were
again apparent six months later. Before the general elections in May 1958, Kishi
appealed to party members to accept financial help from the party only, and not from
factions, but it was clear that all factions, including the Kishi faction itself, were
supporting candidates on a factional basis (AS 18.5.58). Factionalism thus continued
unabated.
6.4.2. The second attempt at dissolution
The second attempt to abolish factions started in 1960 but reached its climax in 1963.
This movement differed fundamentally from the first one in that the primary motive was
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no longer only to achieve greater stability and centralisation of power, but to modernise
the LOP and shed it of its 'traditional' cloak. Politicians and observers alike started
analysing the deeper sources of factionalism in Japanese politics and the issue brought to
the surface a debate about party democracy, Japan as a democratic nation, modernisation
and tradition.
The origins of this second movement can be traced to the autumn of 1960 when an
organisation, Seisaku Doshikai, was formed by 69 former and present LOP Dietmembers,
'to eliminate factional strife'. As seen in Chapter 4, the factions had by this time become
structured units, easily identifiable as groups with clear membership, playing a central
role within the party. The JT commented that
Conflicts between different factions in the Liberal-Democratic Party have not only
weakened the party and the Government in the past but also have led to severe criticism
by the general public. Althoughwe are inclined to doubt the desirability of political clubs
in general, this new body, to be known as the SeisakuDoshikai, has definite objectives in
view. It will launch a campaign for the coming general election in support of Prime
Minister Ikeda, and after the election, it proposes to call on the various factions within the
party to join it for the purpose of strengtheningparty unity (25.10.60).
The aim to modernise the LOP became party policy at the party convention in January
1961, when an organisation research committee (tiisoshiki chosakaiy was set up to
achieve 'reorganisation reform for a modern party' (Masumi 1967:37; Iseri 1988:185).
This committee, chaired by Masutani Hideji, researched a variety of reform issues but did
not focus on factions specifically." Although in this attempt to modernise the LOP, the
factions were not directly discussed, they later became central to the movement and were
to become a prime example of the lack of modernisation (see e.g. Thayer 1969:53).
Factions were first directly researched in a second organisation research committee set up
in July 1961, headed by Kuraishi Tadao. At the end of November, this committee
published its report in which it suggested that first, the party president should distance
himself from any faction and take the initiative by dissolving his own faction; second,
that he should trust all party members and adhere to the principle of 'right person in right
place' (tekizai tekisho);7 third, that the party should be more centralised, fourth, a
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personnel agency should be set up within the party, headed by the vice president or the
secretary general, to handle appointments; fifth, the election system should be reformed
so that members of the same party would not have to fight each other (Masumi 1967:37).
The work of this committee was important for the debate on factionalism in that it linked
for the first time factions and modernisation, and it further identified a number of factors
contributing to or causing factionalism. First, it argued that the party was too
decentralised and that the president did not have enough power to act independently,
being too involved in the inner struggle to be unbiased. Kuraishi said that:
the political power of the person elected party president is limited and he builds
management of the party on balance of the influence of each faction leader, and so
appointments are not in accordance with the president's will but according to each faction
leader's nomination (Masumi 1967:38).
He argued that it was primarily the distribution of posts that lured rank-and-file members
into the factions, and thus, if party leadership was strengthened and the party
management made more centralised, the factions would disappear (Masumi 1967:38).8
The phrase 'strengthening of leadership' tshidoryoku kyoka) became fashionable
(Masumi 1967:36).
Second, the committee argued that the medium sized electoral system was to blame for
factionalism. This was a new emphasis which had not featured much in the discussion on
factionalism before but was to remain the focus point until the electoral reform in 1994
(see Curtis 1999:chapter 4).9
The move for dissolution of factions received another boost on 30 January 1962, when 24
people representing the eight factions established the Toro Sasshin Konwakai (Party
Moral Reform Meeting), with Kuraishi Tadao and Fukuda Takeo at the forefront. The
group said in a prospectus that the LDP 'had betrayed the people with endless factional
fighting over the government' (Masumi 1967:38). At their inaugural meeting in May, 65
members of both houses of the Diet attended and called for:
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1. party unification, modernisation and the destruction of the factional system
(habatsu taisei) with the establishment of strong leadership with democracy as its
basis.
2. Rejection of favouritism and factional restrictions in presidential elections and in
its stead a free vote based on individuals.
3. Reform of the electoral system that makes party members fight each other and
makes factional rivalry fierce. An election system based on political parties
should be established (Masumi 1967:38).
Shortly before the presidential election 14 July 1962, before it was known that no one
would challenge Ikeda as party president, the Party Reform Council met to 'urge
influential party leaders to forego factional strife and to cast votes independently in the
July 14 presidential election' (JT 3.7.62). This call was, however, ignored as the factions
had by this time taken on such a variety of roles for their members that it was not realistic
to expect faction members to ignore faction discipline completely.
In August 1962, the TOfu Sasshin Konwakai group decided at a meeting attended by 78
people, incumbents and former Dietmembers of both houses, to develop an 'active party
modernisation drive' (Masumi 1967:39; JT 10.8.62). In order to achieve their aim, the
Council reconfirmed its basic objectives to structurally modernise the party and to
dissolve the factions. They also decided to change their name to Tofu Sasshin Renmei
(Moral Reform League). A call was made to start a promotion for a small election
constituency system 'as a step to dissolve the Tory factions.' Twelve members were
elected to act as representatives and monthly meetings were planned (JT 10.8.62).
However, it was argued from early on that the TofU Sasshin Renmei was in fact a
factional plot to replace Ikeda-a claim that seemed confirmed when the group became
inactive after his successful reelection in 1962. It was common knowledge that most of
the Konwakai group were members of the Kishi/Fukuda faction (Masumi 1967:39) who
sought to overthrow Ikeda.1OUnsurprisingly, therefore, the Tofu Sasshin Renmei was
dismissed by Ikeda as a 'sectarian group' and he argued that an official party organ
should take on these matters (JT 8.6.63). As the group established itself as an anti-
leadership force, it caused divisions within the party, and in April the Ikeda, Ono and
Kono factions banned their members from joining the group. Within the Kishi faction,
252
Chapter 6: Tradition, Modernisation and Attempts to Abolish Factions
the Kawashima group which was close to 6no and Keno, was critical of the club. The
Fujiyama faction shared with the Konwakai a critical attitude to Ikeda but was reluctant
to align with them because ofthe strong support to SaW in the group (Masumi 1967:39).
Watanabe Tsuneo dismissed the Konwakai as a group acting to grasp power themselves
in the name of factional dissolution and modernisation. In a journal article Watanabe
(1962:101) said:
The motives for the group's leaders' actions is to remove the current leaders and give
power to the rising leaders. It could be said that this is the revolt of the upper level of the
regiment against the divisional commander group ... The established leaders of the LDP
are eight: Ikeda, Kishi, Sato, Ono, Kono, Fujiyama, Miki and Ishii. Even if they rotated
power it would take at least 10 years. They want to destroy the system of co-existence of
the general officer leveljitsuryokusha in the party and hasten the arrival oftheir period of
power.
Although the Konwakai did become embroiled in the factional fight it said it was fighting
against, it was a notable movement because of the emphasis it put on the reform of the
electoral system and the introduction of a single member system. Its leader, Fukuda, said:
I wanted modernisation of the LDP built on the basic principle of electoral reform but it
does not seem to appeal to the public and they don't react to the discussion about the
election system. So factional dissolution rather than electoral reform has become the
central issue but I still think we must change the election system (Masumi 1967:39).
Moreover, although the TOfu Sasshin Renmei was viewed unfavourably by the party
mainstream, it did influence the party executive. This coincided with another
development. The point was frequently made by the media that the LDP could only
afford the 'luxury' of factionalism if they were sure they could hold on to their majority
and the reigns of government. Simultaneously the point was made that it was quite
possible that the JSP might catch up with them (JT 6.10.62, 14.11.62, 20.12.62). The fear
of the left was strengthened further when an article by Ishida Hirohide called 'A Vision
of the Conservative Party' was published in Chilo Karon (January 1963), where he
argued that the LDP would lose power in the near future if votes for the party kept
decreasing. The Japan Times commented on the dwindling conservative vote, and said:
This trend in tum is due to the changing social and economic structure of the electorate,
brought about by the modernization of Japanese society. The increasing proportion of the
non-agrarian population, for instance, seems to compel the conservative party which has
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relied heavily on the farming population for support, to readjust its policies and programs
and perhaps even practices.
It is, therefore, somewhat ironical that the conservative party that has steered the nation
on its course toward modernizationduring the last decade or more is now being forced to
modernize itself (13.1.63).
This fear of losing power, combined with the need to respond to the suggestions put
forward by the TOfu Sasshin in order to weaken the attacks on Ikeda and his
administration, prompted the establishment of a third committee-the Party Organisation
Research Council (soshiki chosakai), created in autumn 1962 (Masumi 1967:40; JT
20.12.62). The Research Council had five subcommittees, one of which dealt with the
electoral system, one with party organisation, one with funding, and one with party unity
(Masumi 1995). Factions were discussed by the last sub-committee, which was chaired
by Nadao Hirokichi (Iseri 1988: 185). It seemed that those involved believed that the
greatest contributing factor to factionalism was the presidential elections (see Masumi
1967:40; JT 8.6.63).
The committee was to work till October 1963, but an interim report was submitted to
Ikeda as a guideline to coincide with the cabinet reshuffle in July 1963 (Baerwald
1964:226; Iseri 1988: 185-6). The report argued that it was paramount for the LDP to
increase unity and party leadership (lseri 1988 186). In the report, Miki declared that
'First of all, outmoded factionalism must be crushed' (JT 9.7.63)/ I because factions
weakened leadership and solidarity and discipline (Masumi 1995:76). The report further
said: 'We cannot be blind to the fact that factional 'struggle weakens the (party)
president's power of control and disturbs party solidarity and discipline. The present
factional situation must be eliminated at all cost' (JT 5.7.63). The report recommended
that new party structures be established to take care of appointments; that a limit be set on
the number of candidates running for party presidency; and that all political contributions
be made to the party (Baerwald 1964:226).
The Party Unity subcommittee of Miki's Organisation Research Council put forward its
final report on party modernisation in October 1963 calling for the disbanding of factions
in accordance with the wishes of the public (lseri 1988: 186; JT 27.10.63, 29.10.63). The
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report recommended the principle of 'right person in right place' to guide the Prime
Minister in his appointments, rather than the principle of factional balance. It was
suggested that an open election of the president should be replaced with advance
consultation by a specially appointed committee composed of those who had held the
post of president or Speaker of the House together with other party members who had
served the party for a long time. This resembled the choro status held by senior party
members in the early postwar parties. It was also deemed necessary to extend the
president's terms to three years. A personnel department would also merit-rate party
members (Masumi 1967:43; JT 8.6.63).
The findings of the Organisation Research Council's finance subcommittee were that
party funds should be centralised to eliminate factionalism. The electoral system
subcommittee blamed the electoral system for the factionalisation of the party and
recommended that the electoral system be reformed so as to minimize factional rivalry
(Masumi 1967:43; JT 8.6.63).12
Following the report, Ikeda called upon the factional leaders-the 'shidancho '-to reach
a consensus on the Miki report. After much debate, the party approved 'in principle' the
Miki committee report but failed to reach agreement on the timing for elimination of
factions. It was well known that most factions were against the dissolution (Masumi
1995:77). Although the Sato, Miki and Ishii factions expr~ssed readiness to disband, the
Kono, Ono and Kawashima groups had not shown much willingness. Ono argued that it
was unrealistic to disband altogether, while Kono claimed that if factions were disbanded,
'sokkin seiji ' [comrade politics] would take over (Kuraishi 1987:434). Keno was quoted
in the media as saying that the factions 'serve as a "check and balance" mechanism and
that without factions, the Liberal-Democratic Party would come under the dictatorship of
the party president' (JT 25.10.63; Masumi 1995:78; Iseri 1988: 187). Similar arguments
were put forward by various politicians in both houses of the Diet (Thayer 1969:55).
Although Ikeda asked Kono to 'refrain from publicly defending factionalism', there are
indications that Ikeda himself never believed that it would be possible to realise any of
the suggestions made by the Miki committee although he publicly continued to support
255
Chapter 6: Tradition, Modernisation and Attempts to Abolish Factions
dissolution (Masumi 1995:77; 1967:45; Iseri 1988: 187). He was quoted as saying that
'factions are not bad. What's bad is factional struggle' (JT 25.7.63) and that 'it is quite
natural for human being to have likes and dislikes and for the likeminded to flock
together' (JT 6.10.62).
Observers were not optimistic that the report would or could be taken seriously. The
Yomiuri Shimbun commented:
It is problematic whether the party as a whole has approved and is supporting the
committee's recommendation for disbanding its factions. Only the Ikeda and Miki groups
have shown any inclination to comply. Lukewarm and perfunctory as the reform plan is it
appears likely to be ineffective. This is considered evidence that the ruling party lacks
ability to reform (Yomiuri Shimbun in JT 29.10.63).
It was also widely acknowledged that the financial aspect of the factions created a major
obstacle to their removal. Maeo Shigesaburo had suggested that the grant to individual
candidates be raised from the current 1-2 million yen, as it seemed that a more realistic
estimate of the financial needs of candidates in elections was between 10 and 30 million
yen. The JT commented: '[F]actional followers have counted upon their leaders for the
bulk of funds for their political activities, as well as for election expenditures. This fact
alone stands in the way of an antifactionalist movement' (27.10.63). This was
undoubtedly a major obstacle. The factions paid lip service to their dissolution but none
were keen to lose their financial independence and the power that came with it (Iseri
1988:73-4 ).
The movement to abolish factionalism was thus fraught with difficulties. Ikeda was the
main spokesman for 'modernisation' but at the same time was desperately in need of
factional support to keep him in power. Faction leaders feared that dissolution would only
mean that other factions got ahead. Keno complained that if all factions were dissolved at
a stroke, the Ikeda faction would get an unfair advantage by being in power (JT 10.12.63;
19.10.63). Sate, on the other hand, feared the aggressiveness with which the Keno faction
had been expanding. Ikeda had wanted the report to boost the support for the party in the
Lower House elections scheduled for November, but instead it caused much resistance
within the party.
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The short time available before the elections made it even more difficult for the factions
to respond. However, in order to show the public that the party was reacting to the Miki
report, Ikeda decided to dissolve his faction's Dietmember group, the Iseikai, in late
October, and many other factions followed (Masumi 1967:45).13To show its support for
dissolution of factions, the business community decided to donate a billion yen to the
Kokumin kyokai, i.e. to the party itself (Masumi 1967:45). However, it was debated
whether all units of the factions needed to be disbanded or not. The J'I' reported that there
was a 'body of opinion' within the party which believed that even if the political
associations were disbanded, the factions as friendship societies should not necessarily be
disbanded (11.10.63). In spite of Miki Takeo's insistence, the seiji kessha were not
dissolved simultaneously.
In spite of the apparent agreement within the party to abolish factions, the HR elections in
November 1963 were 'exceptionally factional' with factions collecting one billion yen14
and running unendorsed candidates against endorsed candidates of other factions
(Masumi 1967:45).15 Sate's fears about the Keno faction were confirmed. Keno was
openly working to expand his faction before the election by amassing new candidates and
collected election campaign funds earlier than other factions. The Japan Times' analysis
was that 'Kono, a realist, believes that the shortcut to the party presidency lies in building
up the largest faction. He is aiming at organizing a faction, larger than the one under SaW,
his major rival' (iT 25.10.63). Keno openly argued for the good use of factions (habatsu
yuy6ron) on his electioneering tours (Masumi 1967:45). This strategy paid off, and the
Kono faction gained 12 new members while the SaW faction lost eight members (Masumi
1967:45).
After the HR election in November 1963 Ikeda commented that 'things have improved.
The general election was not as characterized by factional strife as reported in some
newspapers'. He said the problem should be tackled 'from a long-range point of view'
and that he would adopt the Miki recommendations step by step (iT 23.11.63). The
media, however, saw this election as marked by more factional struggles than any
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previous election and pointed out that factional dissolution seemed more remote than ever
(IT 22.12.63).
The Tofu Sasshin Konwakai, infuriated by the Kono faction's conduct in the election,
formed the Jinshin Isshin To Kindaika Suishin Honbu (Headquarters to Promote the
Transformation of People's Minds and Party Modernisation) in December in cooperation
with the Sate faction. The group continued to rock the Ikeda administration and set about
to prevent Ikeda's third reelection as prime minister (Kuraishi 1987:435). A total of 117
members from both houses of the Diet attended the group's meeting on December 3, and
they attacked Kono fiercely (AS 4.12.63; Masumi 1967:46). Their resolution was that
Kono is the only one to disregard the factional dissolution and argues that factions are
good. He is using the construction ministry post for profit and what is more, he aims to
strengthen his faction. We are now creating a new cabinet and should exclude Kono from
it. We lead the thought of the people to new channels tjinshin 0 isshin shi) and believe
this is one step to respond to the wishes of the people. We have therefore organised in
this group and ask for Ikeda's resolute decision (Masumi 1967:46).
The group was increasingly critical of the Prime Minister and in the general elections in
November 1963, 20 candidates were elected with Tofu Sasshin endorsement. It had thus,
in effect, become the Fukuda faction (1970: 113). It did, though, reorganise yet again, in
July 1964, as To kindaika giin renmei-a joint anti-Ikeda front with the participation of
Fukuda, SaW, Fujiyama, Ishii, Ono and Miki faction members (Fukui 1970: 114).
Shortly after SaW had joined the TOfu Sasshin in the Ninshin Isshin group he dissolved
the Sato faction's Mokuyokai but decided to create a new 'friendship group' (shinboku
dantai) called Takeike kurabu (Masumi 1967:46). Under increasing pressure, Keno
finally dissolved his funding collection group, the Daiichi Kokusei Kenkyiikai. SaW
responded by dissolving his financial group too, the Shiizankai (Masumi 1967:46). The
Miki faction then followed, disbanding its financial group the Shin seiki keizai
kenkyusho and the Ikeda faction's Kochikai was dissolved too. Despite this, there were
signs that the factions were still retaining their function as 'private supporting
organisations' (IT 10.12.63). Ikeda acknowledged the possibility of this happening. At a
press meeting on 9 December, he said he was convinced factionalism could be
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eliminated, 'but warned that other groups of a social nature, which would be difficult to
prevent, may come into being after the factions are disbanded.' He went on to say that he
thought factions linked with .money and position 'and which exert pressure on others'
should be disbanded (JT 10.12.63).
The mood in the media following the factional dissolutions in November and December
1963 was generally skeptical and negative. Citing the failure of the first movement under
Kishi to disband factions, this second movement seemed doomed as a failure too.
Political activities during and after the electoral campaign supported this view. Ironically,
throughout this dissolution process, all factions seem to have been involved in
recruitment of new members. Indeed, the planned dissolution of the TOfu Sasshin Renmei
was expected to fuel the battle between the factions for those members (JT 10.12.63).
All major factions had been dissolved by early 1964 and by the end of the year discussion
on factions had decreased greatly in the press. However, Asahi Shimbun reported that
factional maneuvers were taking place informally (Masumi 1967:46). The JT commented
that 'a very sensible effort for "party modernization" is now off the agenda for some time
to come, at least' (JT 13.6.64). The cries for party modernisation had subsided but the
presidential election of July 1964 was factional as before and the factions were openly
revived again later that year (Masumi 1995:79; AS 30.5.64).
6.5. The premodern factions and modernisation
In the domain of social discourses, there are frequently struggles between discourse types
where attempts are made to make one discourse the dominant one in the social domain
(Fairclough 1989:90; Dryzek 1997: 12, 20). The guiding light of the movement for
dissolution of factions in the early 1960s was modernisation. However, in this debate, I
argue, there were two main discourses which contended for dominance." On the one
hand were those in favour of factional dissolution, who argued first, that party
organisation needed to be modernised so as not to rest on factions, but on grass root
membership with centralised control; and second, that political interaction within the
party needed to be modernised so that policy issues could prevail over personal
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allegiance. These are all criticisms that had been voiced over factionalism in many
political systems (Beller and Belloni 1978c:440). Factionalism was considered
dysfunctional, weakening authority and legitimacy of party leadership and preventing
advancement based on merit. On the other hand, an opposing discourse emerged which
argued that factionalism actually had positive attributes. Those who argued in favour of
factionalism within the LDP successfully used the issue of party democracy to challenge
the 'abolitionists'. Such arguments have also been made in comparative studies and it has
been argued that factionalism can allow representation of varied interests, especially in
big parties, and limit conflict (Beller and Belloni 1978c:441).
Although these discourses were opposed to each other, they had in common the
underlying and largely undisputed assumption that the LDP factionalism was traditional
and had its roots in Japan's history and culture. I will now look at these two contending
discourses in turn.
6.5.1. Factionalism as hindrance to democracy
Although the concept of modernisation was never well defined within the party, what the
party focused on in the drive for party modernisation was a European model of what is
modern, an idea which had been deemed desirable ever since the Taisho era. It seemed to
include both institutional modernisation which scholars at the Hakone conferences had
emphasised (Kersten 2000: 110-11 ), and the social ~odernisation of people. The
participants at the Hakone conference had defined modernisation as the widespread
participation of members of society in political affairs, and a 'secular, and increasingly
scientific, orientation of the individual to his environment' (Hall 1965: 19), as well as
social modernisation resulting in 'a lessening tendency for individuals to identify their
interests with and feel loyalty towards small face-to-face groups' (Hall 1965:21).
The LDP's concern with the first of these issues, that of institutional modernisation, was
seen in arguments made to the effect that the LDP should change into a mass party with a
grass roots base and centralised organs-a policy oriented party rather than a candidate
oriented one (Curtis 1999: 163). In the movement to abolish the factions in the early
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1960s, it was argued that at the heart of the problem was the fact that the powers of the
president had been diminished to the point where he could not control the party (see Iseri
1988: 186; Stockwin 1970:367; Masumi 1967), a point which had been made ever since
the Hatoyama cabinets (JT 15.12.56) and was clearly emphasised in both the TofU
Sasshin Renmei, and in Miki's party organisation committee. It became accepted wisdom
that the weak leadership of the leaders of the LDP, whereby' in practice ... there is a form
of collective factional leadership amongst six officials' (Burks 1964:80), caused
factionalism within the party, and that by contrast the strong leadership of Yoshida had
prevented factionalism to flourish within the Jiyuto. Factionalism was related to
corruption, bargaining and behind-the-scenes politics-the antithesis of strong and
transparent leadership (see Stockwin 1982: 125).
Moreover, to those in favour of factional dissolution, factional conflict was undemocratic
because it was not fought in the public arena, but in the 'backrooms of politics'. In a
newspaper article called 'The test of democracy', Kuroda Kazuo argued that factionalism
was a serious threat to democratic rule and warned that
We must not forget that the end of prewar democracy in Japan was spelled by the
degeneration of democracy into c1iquism. Though the prewar Constitution also assured
the democratic rights of the people, actual politics became an arena for rival cliques
striving for supremacy. And it just so happened that a military clique led by Gen. Hideki
Tojo came to dominate Japan. The fate of Japan's postwar democracy will be determined
by the outcome of the effort to overcome illogical emotionalism and corrupt factionalism'
(JT 8.3.58).
Prime Minister Kishi based his call for the abolition of factions in 1958 on the same
argument. 'Factional activity within the Conservative Party is threatening to derail
democratic politics,' he said, 'and we must use all our strength to remove this evil' (AS
2.6.58). His call for abolition of factions was an obvious attempt to centralise control of
the party and prevent the development of devolved power to factions (Watanabe
1958:21).
The second aspect of the modernisation debate within the LDP, concerned autonomy in
social relations linked to policy issues. Factionalism was seen as the antithesis of the idea
of personal autonomy that Maruyama Masao and others of the Japanese intelligentsia
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argued for. To many scholars, individualism was needed for modernisation (Bellah
1965:411). Therefore it was considered important to uproot traditional Japanese morality
built on loyalty (cho), filial piety (ko) and personal obligation (giri) (Bellah 1965:408).
To observers in the early 1960s, the LOP epitomized old traditional moral values and
traditional Japanese attitudes towards politics. The LOP was described as a 'party based
not on distinct policies but on personal allegiance to certain leaders, and held together
more by the pursuit of political power than by common ideals or ideologies. And the role
of a party leader and Prime Minister ... was to keep the factions sufficiently in check to be
able to govern' (JT 9.6.59; see also 19.1.59). A party based on the pursuit of power rather
than policy was politically immature. Politicians driven by political loyalty to leaders
rather than political ideals lacked autonomy.!" Factional dissolution was essential to
remove the dominance of traditional personal, hierarchical relationships and to allow
impersonal relationships based on policy issues to flourish.
Although this discourse on centralised power, transparency, rationality and concern with
policy was very strong, a contending discourse used aspects of the idea of modernisation
to argue that factionalism was a positive feature of modern politics.
6.5.2. Factionalism as a protector of democracy
While the movement for dissolution of factions received much support in the political
world and-it seemed-amongst the public, a number of observers and politicians argued
that factionalism could have positive effects as well. Central to this discourse was party
democracy. To some the open (i.e. factional) elections of the party president were an
important element of party democracy (Goto et al. 1982: 141-2). It was argued that
factionalism contributed to intraparty democracy by allowing greater participation of the
rank-and-file in decision making. The intraparty situation of the LOP was compared to
that of the prewar Seiyiikai which was considered highly undemocratic because of the
power of the party leadership and the requirement that the rest of the party follow it
blindly (Iwasaki 1921 :81), and to the early postwar Jiyuto under Yoshida's leadership,
but the Jiyuto leadership had frequently been criticised for undemocratic practices while
under Yoshida's control. The Nippon Times wrote late in 1952:
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To a great extent the trouble among the Liberals has stemmed from the fact that the party
leaders seldom took the rank-and-file members into their confidence. This could be
remedied by permitting the 'individual members to enjoy a louder voice in party affairs.
And if the opinion of the majority of the party members could be obtained on key issues,
it could prevent factions such as the Hatoyama group from applying the squeeze and even
threatening to play ball with the Opposition parties (17.12.52).
Those against the dissolution movement within the LDP argued that centralisation had
allowed Yoshida to cultivate his 'autocratic rule' and to take vital political decisions,
such as the dissolution of the Diet in 1952 and 1953 as well as important personnel
decisions, without consulting the party executive, relying instead on close associates
(Watanabe 1962:97; Thayer 1969:55; Stockwin 1970:367, 1982:125). The establishment
of the Mindoha in 1952 was a reaction to this autocratic rule. Factional struggles had
been repressed during this time, but because of that party politics had been highly
undemocratic, it was argued. In the LDP the factions allowed politicians to solve their
differences rather than split the party (Watanabe 1962:99). Factionalism, it was argued,
made political inclusion possible and prevented the monopoly of the party by the
president's sokkin and thus contributed to the party democracy that the Mindoha had
fought for within the Jiy11t6(Masumi 1967:41; Stockwin 1970:367). Watanabe wrote a
harshly worded journal article arguing that to dissolve factions and go back to increased
presidential power, akin to that of Yoshida in the Jiy11t6,would be going against all
democratic and modernising principles (Watanabe 1962). These were precisely the
arguments used by Kono Ichiro and Ono Bamboku, the most vocal oppositionists to the
dissolution of factions amongst politicians. Ono is quoted as saying that
Many Dietmembers have argued lately that factions are an obstacle to modernisation and
are bad. But looking at the political situation, can we deny that factions have assisted in
realising modernisation? ..The bureaucratic elements of the party have argued for
centralised leadership and argue that we should create a powerful one-man Prime
Minister and a system of subordination of a few hundreds of rank-and-file who will have
no power to speak (hatsugenken). We should not accept this argument for factional
abolition. We cannot ignore the fact that the factions have increased the influence
(hatsugenryoku) of the rank-and-file. I would accept it if the argument for modernisation
and dissolution led to real democratisation and modernisation, and not to a camouflaged
strong government. I will not be duped by this flowery prose of modernisation (Masumi
1967:41).
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According to this line of argument, factions were therefore important in giving rank-and-
file Dietmembers influence (hatsugenken) (AS 23.11.63; Watanabe 1966:40-41). As seen
before, during the Hakone conferences, liberal Japanese scholars had been adamant that
the modernisation process had to be identified with democratic political culture (Kersten
2000: 111; Hall 1965:27-9).18 However, even if factionalism was not considered part of
modem political culture, it could be justified if it promoted party democracy and thereby
in fact aided the emergence of, and protected, a democratic political culture.
This discourse, although much less powerful than that of the dissolutionists, used the
issue of party democracy to challenge the view that factional abolition was necessary.
They used the same issues, democracy and modernisation, to argue for their cause.
6.6. Factions as traditional entities
In the debate about factional dissolution, party modernisation and intra-party democracy,
multiple discourses emerged about the relationship between democracy and
modernisation, and the role of tradition in modernisation. This debate highlighted the way
the factions were increasingly seen as traditional entities, described with reference to
history. The two main discourses on factions in the early 1960s used similar rhetorical
devices, arguing that the LOP factions were traditional groups.
As seen earlier, those criticising factionalism and calling for its abolition stressed the
need to move away from tradition toward modernity. The Japan Times asked in 1957:
'From where does this factionalism come? Are there some factors which are inherent in
the Japanese? These are questions which must be asked and probed with all sincerity by
our political leaders if factionalism is to be eliminated from our political scene' (20.3.57;
see also 22.12.63). These were questions asked by many observers and scholars and the
answer resembled that given in the early postwar period when the 'pre-modem' features
of Japanese society were blamed for the relative backwardness of Japanese politics.
While in the early postwar period such theories were mainly used to describe the Imperial
system, Japanese society in general and the characteristics of the Japanese (see Nakane
1970: Ishida 1985; Fukui 1978), they now became a set theoretical framework for the
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institutional development of political phenomena like factions. The LDP factions existed
and acquired their organisational features because of Japanese culture and 'feudal'
traditions which were obstructive to modernisation (see Nakane 1970; Ward 1969; Ishida
1968; Yun 1994:552; Ike 1958).19The LDP factions were based on loyalty of followers
to leaders and vice versa, the argument went-a cultural trait traced back to the
Tokugawa era. Ishida argued that 'non-functional in-group solidarity' was a cultural and
historical trait common to all social organisation in Japan (Ishida 1968:334). The LDP
factions rested on a traditional understanding of loyalty, a cultural pattern which seemed
to have survived into contemporary Japan (see Richardson and Flanagan 1984:132; Ward
1969:72-3).
Maruyama contrasted modernity to feudalism (1963:258). Similarly, within the LDP the
factions were measured against this definition of feudalism and seen as a reminder of
Japan's feudal past. As seen earlier, personalism was considered a problem in Japan,
preventing the development of personal autonomy (Kersten 2000:213; Maruyama
1963:258; Ward 1969). But this also featured as an explanation as to why factionalism
existed in political parties and interest groups as factionalism was considered the basic
unit of organisation for personalistic politics (Ward 1969:71). Ward (1969:71) argued
that traditions still persevered which made people join someone rather than something, to
select a protector and leader rather than a cause. The bond thus established is apt to be
close, durable, and usually dependable, requiring loyalty an? trust.
While those advocating the dissolution of factions had stressed that the LDP needed to
move away from the 'traditional' way of doing politics, it was often argued that
factionalism was 'natural' because it was traditional. This view was compatible with the
growing view that traditional factionalism could survive in and actually aid
modernisation (Randall and Theobald 1985:50-1; Burks 1968; Hall 1965). In his
autobiography, Ono Bamboku ·(1964:180) argued that factionalism was inevitable in
large groups:
The newspapers like to use the word 'faction' (habatsu). To me as an LDP politician
listening to the news, there seem to be various factions. They say that there are only
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factions in our conservative party that fight and distort politics. Recently when the
Socialist Party's Kawakami and Asanuma fought over the chairmanship, someone said
with surprise 'there are factions in the JSP too' as if it was some new revelation. It is
inevitable that when three people meet there are likes and dislikes and therefore factions
appear. That is only human nature and inevitable whatever the social group. Because we
cannot escape factionalism in human groups we should concentrate on how we can best
deal with factions for good group life. I acknowledge the existence of factions but it is
useless to call for the dissolution of factions.
Keno also argued in his election campaign in 1963, just after the party had resolved to
disband all factions, that factions had existed for a long time and that to his knowledge
his senpai (elders, mentors) had not used them in a bad way (Masumi 1967:46; see also
AS 14.12.63). Many scholars and observers started also to focus on the positive functions
of factions in the 1960s: Totten and Kawakami's article in 1965 'The Functions of
Factionalism in Japanese Politics' epitomizes this new focus.
These views should not be dismissed as mere excuses for continuing factionalism. They
resonated with the debate on modernisation and traditions taking place in Japanese
society at the time, and with the Japan Theory (Nihonjinron) explanations that were
becoming popular at this time. Scholars were moving away from the self-critical view of
Japanese society that could be detected in the early postwar period, when factions were
portrayed as in direct opposition to 'modernity' and when traditions had been 'relegated
to a negative, shamed past' (Kersten 2000:113; Sakano 1948; Bellah 1965). The late
1950s and early I960s saw a move away from these views and towards an increased self-
confidence, where Japanese traditions and history became a new source of pride, playing
a role in modernisation (Davis 1992:255; Kersten 2000: 117; Hall 1965:37; JT 31.11.62).
Out of this new self-confidence the Japan Theory emerged, viewing negative images of
Japanese uniqueness as positive cultural assets (Davis 1992:255; Kersten 2000:50).
Factionalism could therefore be viewed as a step forward from autocratic politics of the
early postwar period, a sign of greater democratisation, a traditional Japanese feature
which should not, and could not, be eradicated.
From these changing views on modernisation the argument was sometimes made that
factions could be separated into modern and premodern components. The 'modern
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component,' the political associations (seiji kessha) that served the functional purpose to
gather funding and control party members, was considered compatible with democracy,
while the 'old fashioned' component, i.e. the friendships and patronage, needed to be
eradicated. The JT wrote:
various problems still remain to be settled as to the way the 436 Liberal-Democratic
members of the Diet should be controlled after the factions are disbanded. The way
political funds and important Cabinet and party posts are distributed poses difficult
questions. Shigesaburo Maeo, secretary general of the party, who has been spearheading
the move to disband factions, said it would be sufficient if old-fashioned factions were
dissolved (14.12.63).
And patronage factions were considered less modern than factions caused by policy
differences. This view formed the basis of the argument that LOP factions needed to be
transformed into policy groups (Sumitomo 1959:124). Scalapino and Masumi (1962:101)
argued that
Perhaps the quotient of modernity in Socialist factionalism is higher than that in Liberal
Democratic Factionalism - that is, factors such as ideology, policies, and political tactics
may playa larger role in producing socialist divisions, and factors of personal allegiance
or provincialism a smaller role.
Although people debated whether factions could be part of modernisation or not, the
basic assumption that factions had their roots in tradition was hardly debated. But it was
questionable to what extent the LOP factions could be said to be traditional, considering
that the Jiyuto and Minshuto factions were so different. I will now discuss the creation of
the myth of traditional factions in more detail.
6.7. Inventing 'traditional' factions
It is an interesting paradox that although the LOP factions were showing new structural
characteristics and had taken on new roles not served by conservative factions before,
they were described as traditional and typical Japanese entities. This was evident in the
Japanese press and in contemporary writings. As seen before, until the formation of the
LOP, a discourse on factions can hardly be said to have existed in the public domain in
Japan. But by the end of the 1950s, a powerful discourse on factions was emerging which
was heavily imbued with tradition and culture. The word •habatsu' started to appear with
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more frequency in the Asahi Shimbun in the late 1950s and discussion on factions
increased from year to year till 1960.20 I would like to argue that the language of tradition
in relation to factionalism is best understood against the background of the growing pride
in Japanese traditions and culture, and the emergence of Nihonjinron explanations in the
1960s.
The LDP factions, it was commonly argued in the press and by commentators, were an
example of the tenacity of tradition over modernisation. It was argued that the LOP
factions were a feudal heritage, based on personal relationships and a strong sense of
obligation, loyalty, and compromise, rather than institutionalised relationships (Ward
1969:71; Lane 1992:372). Many scholars argued that these cultural values, or 'code of
behaviour,' were important for an understanding of Japanese factions (Hoffman
1981:249; Stockwin 1970:365). Observers noted that the loyalty seen within the LDP
factions was a prime example of the perseverance of Confucian values and the way that
old cultural values had survived the democratisation of Japanese society (Curtis 1988,
Ward 1969). Although Thayer (1969:41) acknowledged that the LDP factions were new
in a sense, he argued that Japan was 'ensnarled in the old, pre-modern factions ... '
because factionalism was essentially pre-modern and that such a 'feudal' heritage still
had its hold on pol~tics. The LDP, he argued, 'concentrates on burnishing a modern
image. But the Dietman feels a little uncomfortable in its glare; he talks new but thinks
old, and continues to look to his faction for both comfort arydsupport' (Thayer 1969:41).
All these characteristics were in many ways a continuation of the discourse on Japanese
society as it was during and first after the war (Brines 1948:303; OSS/State Department
Reports 1942 Survey of Japan). As seen before, early postwar analysts focused on
traditionalism in Japanese society in general. Burks referred to the Tokugawa value
pattern as one which emphasised 'group loyalty, group coherence, and inherent duties
(more than rights)' (Burks 1968:546), and this value pattern was said to have persevered
into the postwar era. Yanaga argued that at the basis of bossism in postwar Japan lay the
'Confucian precepts of loyalty to one's parents, superiors, masters, teachers, employers,
and benefactors' (Yanaga 1956: 110-11). As discussion on factionalism specifically was
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very limited in the early postwar period, however, it is difficult to ascertain to what extent
factions were considered traditional, although the assumption seems implicit in the early
discourse that factionalism, as other aspects of Japanese society, was traditional.
However, if we compare more closely the way the press and contemporary observers
depicted factionalism in the first ten years of the postwar period to the way the LOP
factions were presented, important differences emerge. This was particularly noticeable
in discussion about the importance loyalty, and consensus and avoidance of conflict,
played in conservative politics.
Loyalty has been considered one of the traditional features of LOP factionalism that has
its roots in Japanese traditions and feudal heritage. The LOP factions were characterised
by clear relationships between leaders and followers, where loyalty was enforced and
cultivated as a clear collective incentive to bind the faction together and create stability.
The discourse at the time took its cues from Japanese tradition and culture, creating
strong connections with feudal Japan. Thayer (1969:41) noted the use of traditional
language in commentary on factions which was not limited to observers, but was used by
politicians themselves. As seen in Chapter 4, the relationship between faction leaders and
their members in the LOP was described, by both observers and politicians, as a
relationship between patrons and clients, oyabun and kobun. There are references to the
seemingly feudal-like loyalty (chusei) of followers to leaders, and of hierarchy and
mutual loyalty, evoking images of familial relations between leaders and followers (see
Watanabe 1958). Politicians spoke about 'duty and humanity' (giri ninja) and
commentators used metaphors from Tokugawa Japan to describe the bonds of loyalty
between faction leaders and members (Watanabe 1962:91; Iyasu 1996: 158). It was noted
by both journalists and politicians that factional activity, leaders amassing followers
around them (torimaki), and the formation of factional groups (habatsu doshii, were all
well known practices historically, and that traditional patron-client considerations played
a part in luring Dietmembers into factions. To Thayer, traditional language gave Japanese
politicians some psychological 'fulfillment'. He argued: '[T]his vocabulary is particularly
apt in describing the factions. The old concepts of loyalty, hierarchy, and duty hold sway
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in them. And the Dietman (or any other Japanese) feels very comfortable when he steps
into this world' (Thayer 1969:41).21
If we look at the way factions were presented in the first decade of the postwar era,
however, loyalty seemed to have been understood very differently. As seen in Chapters 2
and 3 the early factions had vague membership which shifted easily and frequently and
both conservative parties suffered from major splits. While scholars in this period often
argued that loyalty was primary in personal relations in Japan, observing the political
events of the time they also argued that opportunism was rampant. Brines (1948:303)
argued that:
... the Japanese have many inbred weaknesses, which their extreme insularity has
exaggerated. The rigidity of their social code attests to that. They are people, for instance,
who exalt loyalty above all other attributes, because instinctively they are opportunists.
While loyalty was considered the backbone of Japanese society and politics,
commentators also pointed out that it was very difficult to enforce discipline in political
parties and preserve party unity. Frequent shifts in party allegiance were seen as
emanating from loyalty to leaders being much stronger than loyalties to parties in early
postwar Japan (Wildes 1954: 104; Political Reorientation 1949:340; Ward 1968b:482;
Totten and Kawakami 1965:111). For one thing, political ambition often strained party
loyalty=-e.g. some argued that Japanese politicians were infected with a 'ministerial
disease' arising 'from the inordinate desire, an obsession, of every Diet member to
become a cabinet minister' (Yanaga 1956:255; Watanabe 1962:99). But this 'obsession'
did not create a rigid factional system but rather led Dietmembers into 'shifting and
transferring their loyalties whenever they are offered an opportunity for advancement'
(Yanaga 1956:256).
Although the discourse on traditions is extensive in the early postwar period, there is a
marked absence of direct discussion on loyalty within factions in the early postwar
factions. The terms oyabun and kobun, terms frequently used to describe factional
relations within the LOP, were not used much in discussion about the Jiyuto and
Minshuto.22 As seen in Chapters 2 and 3, loyalty to factions seemed inferior to political
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expediency in the Jiyuto and Minshuto: factional membership was ill defined; and
politicians moved between groups. Because factional membership was ill defined, there
were few direct ways of enforcing loyalty. Politicians evaluated their own political
strength and on that basis took decisions on whether to defect or stay when factional
conflict intensified. Thus, for example, a large number of Hatoyama faction members
decided not to leave the party in 1953 and 1954, because, in Wildes' words: 'while loyal
in their thoughts to Hatoyama [they] foresaw his defeat looming' (Wildes 1954: 147)_23
Loyalty could not be enforced in the absence of well defined membership to groups.
Loyalty within the LOP, on the other hand, seems best understood in terms of
organisational theory. Within the LOP faction membership had acquired a very different
meaning, and thus loyalty, carefully counterbalanced with selective incentives, was
needed to achieve organisational continuity (see Panebianco 1988: 10). A feeling of
belonging was cultivated because it was necessary for the groups to maintain themselves
as active players within the LDP. Faction leaders made it clear that Dietmembers were
required to show loyalty to these new groups (Thayer 1969: 15). A system of 'factional
exchange' emerged (Cox, Rosenbluth and Thies 1999:37) where faction leaders got
support in exchange for help with funding, endorsements and posts. Loyalty could be
induced through this mutually beneficial relationship. Faction leaders could withdraw
support to faction members to enforce discipline (see Masumi 1995:63). There were also
rumours that faction leaders kept a check on faction m~mbers with so-called 'loyalty
blacklists' ichuseishin no enmachoi to enforce loyalty for favours given (AS 6.1.56).
Faction leaders had difficulties making sure their factions voted the right way and there
were discussions within the party about making votes of Dietmembers in presidential
elections public in order to enforce factional discipline (Ono 1964: 109). Factionalism
changed significantly in the first few years of the LOP's existence, as Watanabe
(1958:145) noted:
the era of the small oyabun who had two to three people under his command was over
(shuhei shika nai shO oyabun) and in its place rose a new generation that successfully
created the big powerful factions we see today. The factions that they own (karera no
shoyu suru habatsu) are a product of their political labour won with hardship and great
financial investment.
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In the late 1950s observers referred to Dietmembers approaching faction (ha ni
chikazukui, which did not indicate much bonding; others affiliated with factions (ha ni
zoku suru, ha ni gatchiri to musubitsuku), indicating a bit more involvement. Others
approached factions with more closeness (ha ni sekkin) or were engrossed in a faction (ha
ni fukairi) (Watanabe 1958: 150). These factions had organisational characteristics not
seen before in conservative factions. All the same, they were considered 'traditional',
emanating from Japanese culture.
Turning to the emphasis on consensus and the avoidance of conflict, we see similar
differences between the early postwar and the LOP factions. The LDP factions had, by
the late 1950s, become central to decision making on cabinet and party appointments. To
some, this was another ancient cultural trend, in the importance given to consensus in
political decision making and the view that conflict ought to be avoided (Ward 1969:62;
Hoffman 1981:241). However, as seen earlier, the Jiynto and Minshuto factions had not
been consulted on appointments or policy decision making, and were in many ways based
on conflict within the polarised atmosphere of the parties, where factions did not seek
compromise. Factional conflict was uncompromising and splits frequent. This
understanding could still be seen in the early years of the LOP. The Japan Times
commented in 1957:
Another important factor is the tendency of the Japanese to avoid a compromise. A
classic example of this is Japan's walkout from the old League of Nations. Thus if one
group within a party cannot have its way, it will pick up its marbles and form a new
group. If one should look into history he will find another example in the struggle for
power between the Heike and the Genji clans, when the winner tried to wipe out the loser
(20.3.57).
However, as factionalism entrenched itself within the LOP and came to stabilise the
party, the factions came to be increasingly seen as traditional forces based on the ancient
principles of compromise and' unity.24 Factional and inter-factional unity was to be
understood in relation to the 'traditional self-enclosed village' and the 'large ie family
structure' (Hoffman 1981:241) where manoeuvring was done 'implicitly and tactfully'
and conflict avoided or at least postponed (Hoffman 1981:241).
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Yet another problem with the idea of the LOP factions as traditional was the total
disregard by observers and scholars of outside influence on the development of LOP
factionalism. The relationship between Washington and conservative politics in the 1960s
was very different from that of the early postwar days when the SCAP was critical of the
conservative parties, their traditional thinking and backward politics. It became clear in
1951, as seen in Chapter 2, that it was actually the conservatives, the political forces the
US had mistrusted most, who were supportive of US foreign policy, embracing the
security and peace treaties (see Igarashi 1985:355). The US had supported progressive
political forces in order to democratise Japan but after the end of the Occupation the
political ties between conservatives and the US strengthened.
The LOP factions were not born wholly out of an indigenous political culture of
personalism, hierarchy and feudalism. The reverse course in the late 1940s diverted US
attention from Japan's democratisation to Japan's economic and military buildup as an
ally to the USA and not a neutral country. US intervention in Japanese politics after the
reverse course in 1948, with political payoffs by US authorities to the LOP between 1955
and 1972, the M-Fund being handed over to individuals within the LOP in the late 1950s,
helped create internal divisions within the party abetting factional infighting (see Johnson
2000:83-5)_25 In 1958 Eisenhower authorised the CIA to provide funds to Prime Minister
Kishi and selected members of the LOP (Schlei 2000:94)" affecting political competition
within the party. Kishi had in fact been supported by a number of influential but private
Americans between 1947 and 1952 who sought to push Kishi to the front line of politics
with it in view to change Occupation policy. Once Kishi had been made Prime Minister
in 1957, the CIA began in earnest to influence LOP politics with the aim to strengthen
Kishi's hold on power, channeling money to 'Kishi's circle within the LOP' (Schlei
2000:99). Although Western scholars approached the study of Japan's modernisation as
outsiders, studying the foreign Orient, the US had a great influence on Japan's social and
political development-its modernisation-(Johnson 2000:82) an influence which is
often ignored.
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The LDP factions were engulfed in a discourse that saw them as an institution handed
down from the past although many of those practices considered traditional had not been
a part of early postwar factionalism. This discourse did not emerge suddenly and
decontextualised-it was based on previous discourses about Japan as premodern, and as
a society based on feudal relations. However, as Dirks et al. point out, the notion of
cultural durability often proves to be a misperception when a historical perspective is
adopted (1994:3; see also Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983). Vlastos (1998:3) argues that
Tradition is not the sum of actual practices that have perdu red into the present; rather,
tradition is a modern trope, a prescriptive representation of socially desirable (or
sometimes undesirable) institutions and ideas thought to have been handed down from
generation to generation.
Although many of the supposedly traditional characteristics of the LDP factions were not
directly inherited from their predecessors, the discourse of tradition-although more like
an invented tradition-was very powerful in creating a notion of continuity and a
constant influence of ancient cultural values on political life. The LDP factions, it was
argued, were derived from a factional history spanning from Tokugawa times to the
present. Through the incessant comparisons of the modern and the traditional, the
dichotomy of the West and Japan, one could see Orientalist attitudes reducing Japan to a
set of cultural and behavioural trends as opposed to the West. But at the same time these
comparisons may have helped in constructing a Japanese self-image built on comparisons
and the dichotomy with the West which allowed the recognition of indigenous traditions
that were not Western (Carrier 1997:7). This self-image was consequently used to
support the claim that Japan was a unique society, and that its traditions were in fact 'one
of the secrets behind the country's industrial success' (Davis 1992:255).
But the idea of LDP factions as reflective of '''time-honoured'' beliefs and practices'
(Vlastos 1998:7) had both positive and negative connotations as seen in the movement
for the dissolution of factions; Indeed, LDP factions as 'feudal remnants' had a very
negative connotation-journalistic discussion on factions between 1955 and 1964 was
very critical. The discussion about factionalism, modernisation and tradition that
surrounded the drive to abolish factionalism in the LDP, gave an image of failure to
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accomplish the victory of modernisation over traditions dating back to feudal times
(Stockwin 1983:210). Despite this negativity, however, in relation to the rising
confidence that the Japanese were acquiring after the Occupation, 'time-honoured
practices' were also of positive value, not least in conservative politics. The most
effective cleavage in Japan was caused by different value systems, and not economic or
status differences. The LDP, as a conservative party, had 'vast psychological resources of
traditional values' which it has rested its political strategies on, and which have often
been dominant over anti-traditional value systems found in higher education and the
labour movement (Watanuki 1967:457-8). Watanuki argues that promoting and
preserving traditional society, such as hierarchical interpersonal relationships, has had
deep political consequences in Japan, solidifying conservative support in society
(1967:459). By the same token it could be argued that promoting the image of tradition in
factional politics served to establish factionalism as a part of LDP politics.
Practicing Occidentalism while pointing out the dichotomy between the traditional and
the Japanese, and the modem and the Western, helped to construct a Japanese self image
in opposition to the West (see Carrier 1995:7). So, although factions were often
represented as a socially undesirable institution, they were also a specifically Japanese
entity, a tradition that has persevered into the present (see Vlastos 1998:43). This
discourse made factions not only 'traditional' but also 'normal' in the Japanese setting.
With the language of tradition, the transition whereby the LDP became a party divided
into distinctive factions became more natural and less visible. The construction of a
'traditional' image and the use of traditional vocabulary in the factional politics of the
LDP, whether within negative or positive discourses on factions, thus contributed to the
strengthening of the LDP factionalism rather than to its weakening.
6.8. Conclusion
I have argued here that the evolution of factional politics within the LDP cannot be
understood without comprehending the debate on tradition and culture between scholars,
politicians and observers that took place in the 1960s, and the contending discourses on
factionalism, and how they affected factional development. The movements for
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dissolution of factions signaled a much more pronounced presence of factions; the
factions had established themselves to the extent that there was something to be
dissolved, very unlike the early postwar factions. The movement to dissolve factions in
the early 1960s was closely related to the debates taking place in some quarters of
Japanese society on whether democracy in Japan was failing (Kersten 2000). The
modernisation of the LOP became a part of the overall modernisation of Japanese society,
and the factions were perceived as the greatest obstacle to a true modernisation of the
party. The factions were closely related to the feudal past of Japan, the opposite to
democracy and modernity. This was done explicitly with references to Tokugawa Japan
and implicitly with the 'language of tradition' .
What was overlooked in the drive for modernisation and the dissolution of factions, was
that the LOP factions were in fact a modern creation, very different from the factions that
had existed within the conservative parties until then. The LOP factions were closely knit
entities, they deliberately used traditional terms to refer to the relations between leaders
and followers, and they sought to invoke loyalty amongst the Dietmembers. All this gave
the LOP factions stronger 'traditional' characteristics than were visible within the
Minshuto and Jiyuto factions, and that made them the opposite of the 'modernity' that
Japan sought to achieve. The traditional norms that the LOP factions rested on did not
have real historical continuity in conservative politics. But they were concepts with
traditional connotations, terms much used to refer to feudal Japan and premodern Japan
and were invoked from the late 1950s in much of the discourse on LOP factions.
At the same time, the traditional characteristics gave the factions certain legitimacy to
work against too much 'modernity' in the sense of too much Westernisation. Terms such
as 'loyalty', 'groupism', and 'leaders-followers' were a reminder of the Japanese
heritage. Politicians, journalists and observers often pointed out in the early 1960s that
factionalism had been a feature of Japanese society for a long time. Factions were a
socially undesirable institution but they were also seen as a specifically Japanese entity.
Factions thus become not only 'traditional' but also 'normal' in the Japanese setting,
making it seem more difficult or less desirable to uproot them. With the inroad of the
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language of tradition, the transition whereby the LDP became a party divided into
distinctive factions became more natural and less visible. This gave the LDP factions
legitimacy, a tradition to fall back on, that allowed them to survive within the party to
serve the institutional needs that had been created in the past decade.
Notes
I A number of studies were done that varied greatly in their approach to Japan. As Dower (1986: 118-122)
shows, many were done by people who had no first hand experience of Japan but were hostile to Japan,
such as Gorer, while others were made by researchers, though with little more first-hand knowledge of
the country, more sympathetic to Japan and Japanese culture, such as Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead.
However, the view was widespread that the Japanese people were homogenous in terms of cultural
influence: lacking in individuality and culturally primitive.
2 The kokutai was a 'unique national polity as a family nation with the emperor as its father ... Japanese
culture was praised as spiritual, harmonious, and based on justice and collective welfare' (Shillony
1991:142).
3 Harry Wildes and Kenneth E. Colton who both wrote extensively about Japan worked for SCAP, while
Yanaga Chitoshi worked for the US government during the war.
4 Between 1960 and 1969 there were 213 entries for 'habatsu', twice as many as in the 15 year period
before it.
5 Many factions had already reported as 'political associations' (seiji kessha) and continued to work as such
(Iyasu 1984: 111).
6 The main reforms of this committee were the establishment of a financial committee (zaimuiinkai) and the
kokumin kyokai (discussed in Chapter 5) (Masumi 1967:37).
7 There had been calls for the reversal of factional appointments at least since 1960 (AS 12.4.60; Masumi
1967:36). Scholars and observers generally agreed that factionalism worked against promotions based on
ability (see Stockwin 1970:366).
8 The view seemed quite widespread that the conservative party had suffered from weak leadership ever
since the formation of the first LDP cabinet headed by Hatoyama (AS 13.7.56; Watanabe 1958:
Watanabe 1964)
9 Curtis argues that the view that the electoral system caused candidate-centered rather than party-centered
campaigns, encouraged factionalism and corruption, discouraged policy debates and stood in the way of
a competitive party system, was accepted without qualifications (Curtis 1999: 150).
10 Of the 18 members in 1964, eleven had been in the Kishi faction (some with double affiliation with other
factions) in 1961. Two came from Ikeda and Sam factions and three from the Ichimanda faction.
According to Masumi, there were also many Sato faction members in the group in the early years of the
movement (Masumi 1967:39).
II It was telling that an Asahi poll in June 1963 showed that 59% of those asked 'can we eradicate factions'
said 'no' and only 9% 'yes'. (Masumi 1967:47fn), despite the fact that the public and local LDP leaders
seemed overwhelmingly to wish for factional reform (Masumi I967:47fn; Okano 1963:38).
12 The committee seemed to be considering both proportional systems as well as single member systems
(JT 17.8.63).
13 Sam's Mokuyokai decided to dissolve on October 22, followed by the Miki faction's Seisaku Doshikai
and the Ishii faction's Suiyo kurabu. The TOfu Sasshin decided to dissolve on the zs". The Ono, Kono
and Fujiyama factions however refused to dissolve (Masumi 1967:45; JT 10.12.63).
14 It was said that each faction managed to raise one billion yen, the same amount the party as a whole had
been given (Masumi 1967:45).
15 Of the Ikeda faction's 60 candidates, four had no endorsement; of Ono's 49 candidates seven had none;
of the Miki faction's 58 candidates, six had no endorsement. In total twelve unendorsed candidates were
elected (Masumi 1967 from Yomiuri 7.11.63).
16 My discussion here on discourses has been influenced by Dryzek's (1997) study of environmental
discourses and the way different discourses construct different stories.
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17 Burks (1968:554) discusses leader-follower relationships as a prime example of the undemocratic
characteristics of the Tokugawa bureaucracy.
18 Amongst the participants, Kawashima argued that democracy was a 'motive power' for changes and
modernisation while Schwartz argued that modernisation could be achieved under a variety of regimes:
including fascism, militarism and communism, and he pointed out that signs of modernisation could be
seen late in the Tokugawa era under oligarchic rule (Burks 1968: 19).
19 There is a wealth of examples of these arguments, see JT 17.10.62 and 6.10.62 when it was stated that
the LDP was under the 'feudalistic control' of the factions).
20 I counted how many times the word 'habatsu' and names of individual factions appeared in headlines.
'Habatsu' are mentioned 3 times in 1955 but in 1956 it jumps to 20 times, 21 times in 1957,27 times in
1958, 25 times in 1959 and 20 times in 1960. Throughout the I960s, the frequency fluctuates much more
with 'habatsu' only mentioned 4 times in 1961, 17 times in 1962,41 times in 1963, 15 times in 1964,24
times in 1965,26 times in 1966, 17 times in 1967,39 times in 1968 and 9 times in 1969.1t is interesting
to note that the great jump in frequency in 1963 happens at a time when there were major efforts to
abolish factions but in that year general elections were held which were extremely factional in nature (see
Masumi 1995).
21 Johnson (1982:81) noted a similarly widespread use of traditional language within the bureaucracy, in
which feudal terminology was used to describe internal independence and sectionalism, which led to
great rivalry between ministries.
22 Newspapers referred to the 'close associates' (sokkin) of Yoshida and 'close associate politics' (sokkin
seiji) rather than factional politics based on oyabun-kobun relations.
23 Of these, Ono Bamboku, Matsuno Tsuruhei and Ando Masazumi were best known.
24 Johnson (1982:239, 313) made a similar observation about the bureaucracy. He noted that the principle
of 'consensus' did not appear within the bureaucracy until the 1950s, and argues that is was based on
changes in historical circumstances and political consciousness rather than Japanese values.
25 The M-Fund was named after the chief of the Economic and Scientific Section of SCAP, General
William Frederic Marquat. It was formed after the end of the Occupation, comprising of several funds
which had been used by SCAP during the Occupation to influence political and foreign policy operations
like the formation of the SDF as well as for economic rebuilding (Schlei 2000:89; Johnson 2000:85). It
was initially administered by the US but after the Security Treaty of 1952 it was jointly controlled until
the late I950s when it was handed to the Japanese (Johnson 2000).
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CHAPTER 7:
CONCLUSION
Three main aims for this research were set out in the Introduction. First, to fill in gaps in
the history of factionalism in Japan by analysing the character of the factionalism within
the early postwar conservative parties, the Jiynto (Liberal Party) and the Minshuto
(Democratic Party), over a 19 year period, between 1945 and 1964. Second, to seek to
clarify how and why factionalism has changed in this period. Third, to look at discursive
practices in relation to factionalism and how discourse contributes to the maintenance of
factionalism.
The LDP factions have been very important and powerful political institutions within the
party for many decades, and although not part of the formal organisation of the party,
have 'provided the primary political community for Japan's political elite' (Curtis
1988:80-81). Because of the political importance of the factions to the research material
on the LDP is to be found in abundance. Scholars have sought to explain why the LDP
factions exist, how they are maintained, and what role they play in the party's power
structure and policy making. However, detailed analyses on early postwar factionalism
are surprisingly few. My research is intended to show postwar Japanese factionalism in
an extended historical light with a detailed comparative analysis of factionalism within
the conservative parties in Japan in the early postwar period and that of the LDP. It is my
hope that with a historical perspective, made possible with the presentation of more
extensive data on factionalism within the Jiyfito and Minshuto than has heretofore been
published in Western publications, we can more fully understand the nature of
factionalism in Japan.
I have argued that in this period Japanese factionalism changed more than is usually
acknowledged. Most studies have assumed strong historical continuity between LDP
factionalism and early postwar and prewar factionalism, and have tended to look at the
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unfolding of conservative factionalism as a progressive and natural development. To
some scholars this continuity is due to the political culture of Japan, emanating from
traditional feudal values and Confucianism. To others, the multimember electoral system,
first introduced in 1925 was paramount in creating political factionalism. I have sought to
demonstrate here that this notion of continuity is problematic on many levels. A basic
observation discussed here is that the early Jiyuto and Minshuto factions did not fit the
definitional template that scholars have built from the extensive research already done on
the LOP factions. From the example of the LOP factions scholars have tended to view
conservative factions in Japan as organised groups, based on clear patron-client relations,
fostering close relations between leaders and followers based on loyalty. These groups
have been considered to be of great political significance, the de facto political actors
within the parties, funnelling money to members and supporting them in electoral
campaigns (see Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993:60-63; Scalapino and Masumi 1962:89).
The main features of early postwar conservative factionalism were established in
Chapters 2 and 3, showing important differences in the structure and functions of the
intra-party factions from the factions of the LOP.
From those differences it was argued that rather than focus on continuity in factionalism
in Japan, we should focus on change and seek to identify the forces that instigate and
shape factional changes. Chapter 2 showed that early postwar factions had different
organisational qualities from the LOP factions. The factions had characteristics of
tendencies and clientelist groups but, although their structure varied significantly, they all
had in common a much looser structure, a much lower level of organisation and a much
vaguer idea of membership than any of the LOP factions. It is also highly significant that
early factionalism was also considered highly destabilising for the political system. This
was clearly seen in the vernacular press and in analyses by observers at the time.
Factionalism was dangerous to the party system as it destroyed party unity and led to
splits.
As mentioned earlier, most of the existing research on LOP factions indicates that the
wider institutional environment has played an important part in creating factionalism in
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Japan and certainly in maintaining it. This refers in particular to the multimember
electoral system. The factions, it is argued, serve an 'election-enhancing' function by
dividing the vote under the multimember electoral system where members of a large
party are forced to compete with each other in electoral districts (Ramseyer and
Rosenbluth 1993:60; Cox and Thies 1998:267; Cox, Rosenbluth and Thies 1999:33). The
idea that the creation and maintenance of conservative factionalism in Japan is best
understood in terms of the multimember electoral system has existed for a long time, but
has become particularly influential in the last ten years or so with the multiplication of
rational-choice approaches to Japan. My approach is in essence institutional, and draws
on a lengthy list of studies already done on factionalism. However, my approach is more
of a micro approach than most approaches to Japanese factions, looking at incremental
changes in the organisational parameters of the party which affected the power politics
within the party. My research aims to show that the importance given to the multimember
electoral system is problematic when studied in a historical light.
In the first part of the thesis it was seen that although the Jiyiito and the Minshuto
competed under the same multimember electoral system as the LOP, factionalism within
these parties was significantly different from that of the factionalism which developed
later within the LOP. In spite of the great emphasis being put on the part the
multimember electoral system plays in producing and/or maintaining factionalism in
Japan, few studies have researched prewar and early postw?I' factionalism and the way it
affected electoral politics. This thesis has tried to provide a first step towards a greater
understanding of the relationship between these two factors. My study of the electoral
districts between 1947 and 1964 shows that the relationship may not be as
straightforward as is usually assumed. Chapter 3 expanded on the different characteristics
of the early postwar factions within the multimember electoral system from those
believed to characterise the LOP factions. Two important differences emerge. First, the
early conservative factions were not effective ladders for advancement within party or
government. Being a member of a faction was not an effective way to be promoted unless
the faction was that of the party leader. Within the polarised atmosphere of the parties,
both parties tended to exclude dissident elements from important posts. After the
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formation of the LOP, on the other hand, dissident elements were increasingly being
included in the party hierarchy. Within the LOP, being a member of a faction became an
essential prerequisite for being"promoted within party or government. Second, within the
JiyOto and Minshuto, factional conflict did not habitually reach out to the electoral
districts. In Chapter 3 it was seen that the Jiynto was large enough to face the same
electoral problems the LOP later had: it had to put forward multiple candidates in districts
who then had to fight each other as well as candidates of other parties. All the same,
Jiynto candidates did not fight their campaigns on the basis of factional affiliation and did
not receive exclusive financial aid from one faction, like LOP candidates came to do.
Quite the contrary, there were a number of examples where Jiyuto members fighting in
the same district belonged to the same faction, and sought to assist each other on that
basis. In Chapter 5 it was also seen that although LOP factionalism came to manifest
itself in the electoral districts, it was not so from the outset. My data indicates that
factional conflict spread from the party centre into electoral districts but took a number of
years to establish itself. In the party's early years, factional conflict continued to be
concentrated in the party centre. However, because of changes in the inner organisational
dynamics of the party, the factions were driven by the perceived need to expand and
consolidate to get the upper hand in the power struggles at the party centre, which led
them to spread their activities into electoral districts. However, as factionalism was
spreading to the electoral districts, the factions were not used to minimise the negative
effects of the multimember electoral system on the party. In the party's early years the
factions would often put multiple candidates forward in the electoral districts, which
increased intra-factional struggles. This indicates that it was not electoral politics that was
the driving force behind electoral factionalism but power politics at the centre.
My critique of the existing approaches is that they have focused too much on macro
institutional factors like the multimember electoral system, and not paid enough attention
to the incremental changes that took place within the LOP in reaction to immediate power
concerns. I argued that Panebianco's organisational theory of the 'genetic models' of
parties is helpful as a first step in establishing how party organisation relates to the
environment in which the LOP emerged (Panebianco 1988:50). The JiyOtOand Minshuto
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were created through penetration into the electoral districts while the LOP emerged out of
diffusion, being formed out of the two existing conservative parties and their local
organisations. This preconditioned their inner organisation, the cohesion of the elite and
the institutionalisation possible. However, I also argued that this model is not sufficient to
explain the history of these parties because it pays so little attention to later time
organisational changes which could alter this 'genetic model'. The organisational
environment of the LOP changed dramatically in the party's first years as a result of
power struggles and these were to affect the nature of factionalism. Rothstein argued that
'at certain moments in history ... .institutions are created with the object of giving the
agent (or the interests the agent wants to further) an advantage in the future game of
power' (Thelen and Steinmo 1992:21). Most of the structural changes that affected the
organisational environment of the LOP factions in the early years, such as the adoption of
presidential elections and the establishment of seiji kessha, were made with such power
gains in mind. The presidential elections were adopted in a power struggle between the
old Jiyuto forces and their opponents. Chapter 4 traces these rapid changes in
factionalism after the formation of the LOP. After the first presidential elections,
factional membership started consolidating, and factions became increasingly important
in distributing posts in party and cabinet. At the same time policy became less important
in separating factional groups. The cumulative effects of this system could not be known
at the time. As seen in Chapter 5, political associations (seiji kessha) then appeared a few
months later as a result of links that were being forged bet~een business and politicians
and as a way to manipulate the electoral laws. Individual politicians acquired the ability
to gather their own funding to increase their independence and ability to fight other
groups within the party for power. These changes were fundamental to the factional
system as it developed. The changing institutional environment led LOP politicians to use
this new financial power to encourage rank-and-file politicians to stay with them in return
for LOP support and nomination, support in Diet, money, posts and influence (Iyasu
1984: 126). They thus used the financial power they had acquired to form a permanent
following. The cumulative result of these changes in the institutional framework was the
establishment of a factional system based on the power of jitsuryokusha, replacing the
polarised party environment of the immediate postwar years. These micro organisational
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and institutional factors affected the institutional setup incrementally, creating a new kind
of factionalism.
Looking at the way factionalism was presented and understood in both Japanese and
Western publications between 1945 and 1964 we also see discontinuity. In the early
postwar period, political factionalism was considered destabilising for political parties
and the political system. In the press and in contemporary analyses, factions were seen as
constantly changing groups with very limited recognisable membership. Their instability
for the political system was caused by the fact that these groups changed rapidly; they
could inflate and deflate very quickly in response to specific circumstances. There was no
visible role for them in politics. My analysis shows that although these factions had a
very limited political role to play, their influence on political processes was considerable
in terms of a polarised conflict between the two main factions within the parties, the
presidential group and those contesting its leadership. These groups fought bitterly over
control of the party and showed readiness to split from the party if they failed. As seen in
Chapter 4, there is a distinct change visible after the formation of the LDP in the way
factionalism is perceived and understood. As the factions acquired membership and
visible political roles they came to be seen as less of a destabilising force. The discourse
on instability started giving way to another way of thinking about LDP factions. They
became part of the 'system': they were visible, with membership and clear political
functions. Although factionalism was heavily criticised these groups came to be viewed
as political entities which could also contribute to political stability and keep the party
together.
Attempts to abolish the LDP factions between 1962 and 1963 show further changes in the
way factions were perceived, which related to the wider societal debate on modernisation
and traditions. Although these attempts to eradicate factionalism failed and factionalism
continued unabated, they paved. the way for the emergence of new discourses about
factionalism. Politicians and observers debated factionalism and its effect on politics.
Factionalism became closely connected to concurrent debates about modernisation,
Japanese traditions and culture, democracy and Westernisation. At the same time
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factionalism came to be increasingly related to traditions. This was not only due to a
'cultural' approach to factionalism in political science. Scholars and observers had
explained Japanese politics and society in terms of culture and behaviour ever since the
war but factionalism and traditional society were not clearly connected until after the
formation of the LOP. Chapter 6 delved further into how factionalism evolved in the
1960s in relation to the debate on modernisation and tradition in Japan. I argued that
although attempts to abolish factions within the LOP failed the debate that ensued raised
wider questions about the place of tradition in political development in Japan. Politicians
and many commentators relied on the language of tradition to enhance understanding of
factionalism, which was used to both argue for the eradication of factions and to justify
their continuing existence within the LOP.
Scholars have come to the conclusion that the efforts to dissolve the factions yielded no
results and that the whole movement did not affect the development of factionalism. But
looking at the dissolution movement we unveil important issues connected to tradition
and modernisation which shaped the debate on factionalism. The factions were
legitimised and maintained by ascribing to them features seen as 'traditional'. I argue that
these features were, however, recent inventions when it comes to factionalism in Japan.
The factions were engulfed in a discourse describing them as familiar and normal, and
many of their functions were decreed 'traditional' but had not been served by factions in
the past. Some of the functions the LOP factions serv~d were being connected to
'traditional values', and the tight membership structure and the loyalty enforced, never
seen in conservative factions before, was considered Confucian or feudal. The debate on
traditions and modernisation in Japan in the early 1960s concealed the discontinuity in
factionalism and the changes in the structure and functions of conservative factions. It
helped to reinforce a factional discourse which saw the LOP factions as 'conventional',
emphasising continuity in Japan's development as 'indigenous norms' reasserted
themselves (see Stockwin 1983:209). Ironically, both the critics and proponents of
factionalism may thus have contributed to the continuance of factionalism through their
extensive use of cultural referencing in this atmosphere of Nihonjinron.
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Factionalism is a particularly important subject of study in Japan in light of the fact that
since the late 1950s it has been a central part of LDP politics and an integrated part of
Japanese politics in general. Had factionalism not developed the way it did within the
LDP, the political landscape of Japan might be very different. It is likely that the party
would not have been able to hold the reins of power for 38 years had intra-party
factionalism not been institutionalised. Understanding factionalism, its underlying causes
and effects, is thus paramount to our understanding of Japanese politics. After the period
under study in this thesis, LDP factionalism continued to develop along the lines already
set out in the early 1960s. The factions introduced measures to avoid overendorsement of
LDP candidates in elections, to give non-mainstream factional members access to party
resources to avoid schism and splits, and to equalise the allocation of cabinet posts (Cox
and Rosenbluth 1995:363). The 1970s saw some changes in factional politics as the
party's fortune seemed to be turning and the economic situation got worse following the
oil shock. Some of the biggest factions, and the Tanaka faction in particular (successor of
the SaW faction), started aggressively to expand to bolster its position within the party
and to forge links with opposition party members, thereby indicating its willingness to
split from the party if the need arose (Cox and Rosenbluth 1995:364). The 1980s saw a
stronger LDP in electoral terms. Fundraising had decentralised following the new
fundraising laws in 1976 (Curtis 1988:163), leaving faction leaders with less fundraising
responsibilities for their members (Cox and Rosenbluth 1995:365). However, the LDP
was implicated in a number of bribery scandals which invol~ed top LDP politicians. This,
combined with continuing power struggles within the LDP led the party to split in 1993
and lose its electoral majority in the Lower House. The LDP's 38 year continuous reign
thereby ended. Following complicated political manoeuvres large scale political reform
was undertaken in Japan with a change in the electoral system in 1994 to a system of
proportional representation and single member electoral districts introduced (see Reed
1999: 177).1
Scholars have debated whether the LDP factions will disappear, now that the
multimember electoral system, which had been widely blamed for factionalism, has been
abolished. It is still unclear what the overall trend is. There are some indications that the
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new electoral system has started to change the factional exchange between leaders and
follower, with leaders playing less of a role in nominations and followers less willing to
follow their faction (Cox, Rosenbluth and Thies 1999:33). However, as Cox, Rosenbluth
and Thies (1999:56) themselves point out, these changes coincided with the LOP's loss
of power and it is therefore difficult to determine to what extent the electoral system has
produced changes. As seen earlier, my research indicates that the relationship between
factionalism and the multimember electoral system is not as simple as scholars have
indicated. Although the LOP factions took up extensive electoral functions, these were
not the reason for their establishment. The LOP factions may therefore not disappear or
become the 'fluid groupings' that Cox, Rosenbluth and Thies (1999:56) envisage, simply
because of a change in the electoral system. The factions as historical institutions adapt to
changing organisational environments, as seen in the LOP's first years. They may thus
yet again take on a different structure and a new meaning to react to a new institutional
environment. My research indicates that we cannot gain full understanding of
factionalism in Japan without looking at political factions in a historical light,
continuously putting into question ideas of continuity, and paying closer attention to
incremental changes that may change the course of development.
Notes
1 The 130 old multimember districts have been made into 300 new single-member districts while 180 seats
are allocated by proportional representation in 11 districts.
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